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RTL INVESTIGATION - Brazilian chicken infected with bird flu on our plates?
An audit report by the European Commission, revealed by RTL, highlights failures in the management of the risk of avian flu in Brazil, the world's leading poultry exporter. The inspectors stress that the Brazilian authorities are prioritising the protection of local businesses to the detriment of health controls.
Virginie Garin
published on 11/20/2024 at 07:40 - updated on 11/20/2024 at 07:40
It was an unappetizing discovery made in the spring of 2024 by inspectors from the European Commission's Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety. They went to Brazil to conduct an audit from April 15 to May 3 to see how the country's authorities were managing the risk of avian flu in the poultry sector.
These checks concerned farms exporting products to Europe. Written last October, the report resulting from this audit concludes that the system of surveillance of livestock farms set up in Brazil "provides sufficient guarantees (...) so that products likely to be exported to the EU are, except as regards the surveillance of highly pathogenic avian influenza".
The report speaks of "particularly worrying" facts which could lead to the appearance of undetected sources of contamination.
No protocol for slaughtering poultry
So cases can be reported, but are not systematically brought to the attention of the country's health authorities. The report highlights "the weakness of the criteria governing declarations of suspected cases."
And even worse, if a case were discovered, the protocols of the companies audited by Europe "did not contain any modus operandi for the slaughter of poultry". Which means that the chickens could still be marketed and therefore eaten.
Major failures
The inspectors denounce significant failures in the Brazilian control system. While recalling that this is less a matter of public health (there are no health risks in consuming this meat once cooked) than a matter of unfair competition for our farmers.
Because in Europe, when a case is reported, the entire herd must be eliminated. This also has an impact on the export trade relations of the countries concerned: for example, China, the world's largest importer, "imposes a total embargo on all imports from a country when a case is reported, which has immense economic consequences for the exporting country."
Europe imports more than 300,000 tonnes of poultry each year
This report concluded that the "weaknesses of Brazilian controls allow the world's leading producer and exporter not to endanger its market shares compared to other producers on the planet".
Have Brazilian poultry companies ever hidden cases to avoid being penalized for exports? Have we in Europe imported and therefore consumed meat from infected poultry? In any case, the control system set up in this country does not allow this to be denied.
In Brazil, only cases in wild birds have been reported since the virus appeared in this country in May 2023. But no farm has officially been affected.
Brazil is now the world's largest exporter of poultry. Europe imports more than 300,000 tons each year and the agreement that could be signed with Mercosur provides for an additional 180,000 tons.
https://www.rtl.fr/actu/enquete-rtl...-grippe-aviaire-dans-nos-assiettes-7900442342
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Brazil 2024-8002
Country Brazil
Audit number 2024-8002
Title evaluate the animal health controls in place, in particular on avian influenza in relation to export of poultry, eggs and their products to the European
Union Audit period 04-05 2024
Published date 09-11-2024
Report
EN (812 kb)
FR (288 kb)
DE (312 kb)
Annex
Competent authority action plan (353 kb)
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https://ec.europa.eu/food/audits-analysis/rep_details_en.cfm?rep_inspection_ref=2024-8002
From the PDF link above:
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Executive summary
This report describes the outcome of the hybrid audit of Brazil, carried out from 16 April to 3 May
2024 as part of Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety work programme.
The objective of this hybrid audit was to evaluate the systems developed and implemented by
Brazilian competent authorities to certify that animal health requirements related to avian influenza
are met for consignments of relevant poultry commodities exported to the European Union.
The audit concludes that the system provides sufficient assurances that commodities which might be
exported to the EU comply with the most of relevant import requirements, except for the surveillance
for HPAI that might not be sufficient for the earliest detection of the disease.
1. The veterinary services can deliver appropriate animal health controls in relevant areas, such
as the registration of commercial poultry establishments, bird movements, traceability, and
import controls. Coupled with mandatory biosecurity measures applied on commercial
establishments, these activities effectively contribute to reducing the likelihood of highly
pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) entering the country through imported commodities and
provide a good basis for disease control in case the disease reaches commercial farms.
2. The knowledge on non-commercial (backyard) poultry establishments varies between states.
The low registration of these farms in some states complicates the organisation of active
surveillance, controls, and enhanced surveillance in zones around outbreaks, and they might
result in undetected reservoirs of infection. The authorities are making efforts to improve their
registration, in particular in HPAI high-risk areas.
3. The official controls on commercial poultry farms give guarantees on the correct and effective
application of preventive measures to reduce the risk of HPAI in those establishments and
verify the capability of operators to contribute to the early detection of the disease.
4. The less sensitive (mortality) and incomplete production criteria set for declaring suspicion of
HPAI, combined with the low sampling of suspected cases not fully adapted to the
epidemiological risk, weakens the authority capability to detect disease at earliest occasion.
This creates a potential risk of delayed detection, response and containment of HPAI
outbreaks. Although official information campaigns are increasing stakeholders’ disease
awareness, the situation does not yet provide assurances equivalent to the EU standards and
weaken the early warning system for HPAI.
5. The surveillance of HPAI in wild birds does not include all priority locations and key sites,
including two of the three main bird migratory routes. Therefore, the authorities have
incomplete information for assessing the risks for virus spread following findings of HPAI in
wild birds. To address this, the authorities are revising their surveillance plan.
6. The design and implementation of active surveillance for HPAI follows international standards
and complements other components of surveillance for the disease. Although its
implementation does not contribute to early detection of HPAI, provided the early warning
system for the disease is adequately improved, active surveillance can reinforce the credibility
of the country’s free disease status.
7. Authorities effectively applied measures to control outbreaks in backyard establishments
according to the adapted contingency plan. Despite not being equivalent to the zones
mandated by EU law, the surveillance and restriction zones established around noncommercial
farms with outbreaks were deemed appropriate for preventing the spread of the
disease, considering the non-commercial nature of the farms and additional measures
implemented.
8. The authorities have designated a laboratory network for avian influenza diagnoses. Despite
the official monitoring of the network, some laboratories performing screening tests for avian
influenza do not have proof of satisfactory participation in a recent proficiency test to
demonstrate the reliability of their results.
9. The only laboratory involved in investigating suspect cases of the disease provides timely and
reliable results. However, concerns arise regarding Brazil's extensive poultry production.
Given the scale and potential severity of a large HPAI epidemic, the current testing capacity
may be insufficient, and it is unclear whether authorities would be able to get timely result
delivery to implement subsequent controls. The authority is considering expanding testing
capacity by involving other laboratories for disease confirmation.
10. The authorities have not tested their contingency plan for HPAI. The limited practical
arrangements in place – especially concerning farm depopulation - raises doubts about their
readiness to effectively manage larger epidemics.
11. The verification procedures in place (audits, inspections, supervision of implementation)
contribute to ensure compliance with the rules, improve effectiveness of the official controls
and activities and facilitate continuous improvement.
12. The certification system is clear and robust, contributing to the overall strength of the system.
The report contains recommendations to the competent authority to address the shortcomings
identified.
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