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DRC - 17th Ebola outbreak : Approx. 336 suspected cases & 87 deaths reported, 4 deaths confirmed. More results pending, Ituri province - May 2026 - WHO declares a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC)
CGTN Africa @cgtnafrica #DRCongo’s health minister warned on Saturday that the country’s #Ebola outbreak has a “very high lethality rate” and has no available vaccine or specific treatment. Africa CDC's latest update noted that the country had recorded 336 suspected cases and at least 88 deaths.
Democratic Republic of Congo: MSF prepares a large-scale intervention in response to the Ebola epidemic in Ituri province
Press release
Following the official declaration of an Ebola virus disease outbreak by the Ministry of Health of the Democratic Republic of Congo on May 15, Doctors Without Borders (MSF) is preparing to rapidly intensify its medical intervention in the Ituri province, in the northeast of the country.
On May 9 and 10, MSF received alerts of a growing number of deaths from suspected viral hemorrhagic fever in the Mongwalu health zone, an area northwest of Bunia, the capital of Ituri province. A team traveled to the area to assess the situation, in collaboration with the Ministry of Health. It was reported that 55 people had died since the beginning of April. MSF subsequently received information indicating that cases had been identified in the Bunia and Rwampara health zones.
According to Congolese authorities, 246 people suspected of carrying the virus and more than 80 deaths have been reported in the province's three health zones. This outbreak is caused by the Bundibugyo strain of the Ebola virus, which is less common than the Zaire strain, and for which there is currently no approved vaccine or treatment.
On May 15, health authorities in neighboring Uganda also confirmed a case of Ebola Bundibugyo in the country. The patient was a 59-year-old Congolese man who died on May 14. MSF informed the Ugandan Ministry of Health that it was ready to provide support.
“ The number of cases and deaths we are seeing in such a short time, coupled with the spread of the outbreak to several health zones and now beyond the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo, is extremely worrying ,” says Trish Newport, MSF’s emergency program manager. “ In Ituri, many people already struggle to access healthcare and live in constant insecurity; therefore, it is essential to act quickly to prevent the outbreak from worsening further. ”
MSF has currently deployed teams to the affected areas in Ituri to assess medical needs in collaboration with Congolese health authorities. At the MSF clinic in Salama, Bunia, three suspected cases have been placed in isolation.
Currently, MSF is mobilizing additional teams, including medical and logistical staff experienced in managing viral hemorrhagic fever outbreaks, as well as essential equipment to deploy a large-scale emergency response as quickly as possible. MSF will also ensure that strict infection prevention and control measures are in place in its existing projects to protect its staff and patients and guarantee their access to healthcare.
The estimated case fatality rate of the Bundibugyo strain is between 25 and 40%. This is the third detected outbreak involving the Bundibugyo strain, following those in Uganda in 2007-2008 and in the DRC in 2012.
Ebola is a contagious viral hemorrhagic fever transmitted to humans through direct contact with the blood, secretions, organs, or other fluids of infected animals. Human-to-human transmission occurs through close contact with the bodily fluids of infected individuals. MSF has responded to multiple Ebola outbreaks in the DRC in recent years. This is the seventeenth outbreak in the country since the first case was discovered in 1976.
Suite à la déclaration officielle d'une épidémie de maladie à virus Ebola par le ministère de la Santé de la République démocratique du Congo le 15 mai, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) se prépare à intensifier rapidement son intervention médicale dans la province de l'Ituri, au nord-est du pays.
WHO Epidemic of Ebola Disease caused by Bundibugyo virus in the DRC & Uganda determined a PHEIC
Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 12 - Determination of a public health emergency of international concern, including a pandemic emergency of the International Health Regulations (2005)
(IHR), the Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO), after having consulted the States Parties where the event is known to be currently occurring, is hereby determining that the Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda constitutes a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC), but does not meet the criteria of pandemic emergency, as defined in the IHR.
The Director-General of WHO expresses his gratitude to the leadership of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda for their commitment to take necessary and vigorous actions to bring the event under control, as well as for their frankness in assessing the risk posed by this event to other States Parties, hence allowing the global community to take necessary preparedness actions.
In his determination the Director-General of WHO has considered, inter alia, information provided by the States Parties – the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda – scientific principles as well as the available scientific evidence and other relevant information; and assessed the risk to human health, the risk of international spread of disease and of the risk of interference with international traffic.
The Director-General of WHO considers that the event meets the criteria of the definition of PHEIC, contained in Article 1 - Definitions of the IHR, for the following reasons: 1. The event is extraordinary for the following reasons: As of 16 May 2026, eight laboratory-confirmed cases, 246 suspected cases and 80 suspected deaths have been reported in Ituri Province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo across at least three health zones, including Bunia, Rwampara and Mongbwalu. In addition, two laboratory confirmed cases (including one death) with no apparent link to each other have been reported in Kampala, Uganda, within 24 hours of each other, on 15 and 16 May 2026, among two individuals travelling from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. On 16 May, a laboratory confirmed case has also been reported in Kinshasa, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, among someone returning from Ituri.
Unusual clusters of community deaths with symptoms compatible with Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) have been reported across several health zones in Ituri, and suspected cases have been reported across Ituri and North Kivu. In addition, at least four deaths among healthcare workers in a clinical context suggestive of viral haemorrhagic fever have been reported from the affected area raising concerns regarding healthcare-associated transmission, gaps in infection prevention and control measures, and the potential for amplification within health facilities.
There are significant uncertainties to the true number of infected persons and geographic spread associated with this event at the present time. In addition, there is limited understanding of the epidemiological links with known or suspected cases. However, the high positivity rate of the initial samples collected (with eight positives among 13 samples collected in various areas), the confirmation of cases in both Kampala and Kinshasa, the increasing trends in syndromic reporting of suspected cases and clusters of deaths across the province of Ituri all point towards a potentially much larger outbreak than what is currently being detected and reported, with significant local and regional risk of spread.
Moreover, the ongoing insecurity, humanitarian crisis, high population mobility, the urban or semi-urban nature of the current hotspot and the large network of informal healthcare facilities further compound the risk of spread, as was witnessed during the large Ebola virus disease epidemic in North Kivu and Ituri provinces in 2018-19.
However, unlike for Ebola-zaire strains, there are currently no approved Bundibugyo virus-specific therapeutics or vaccines. As such, this event is considered extraordinary.
2. The event constitutes a public health risk to other States Parties through the international spread of disease. International spread has already been documented, with two confirmed cases reported in Kampala, Uganda on 15 and 16 May following travel from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Both confirmed cases were admitted to intensive care units in Kampala. Neighboring countries sharing land borders with the Democratic Republic of the Congo are considered at high risk for further spread due to population mobility, trade and travel linkages, and ongoing epidemiological uncertainty.
3. The event requires international coordination and cooperation to understand the extent of the outbreak, to coordinate surveillance, prevention and response efforts, to scale up and strengthen operations and ensure ability to implement control measures.The Director-General of WHO, under the provisions of the IHR, will be convening an Emergency Committee, as soon as possible to advise, inter alia, on the proposed temporary recommendation for States Parties to respond to the event. The WHO advice is enumerated below and will be subject to further refinement as appropriate after having considered the advice from the Emergency Committee and issuing of Temporary Recommendations.
WHO advice For States Parties where the event is occurring (the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda) Coordination and high-level engagement Activate their national disaster/emergency management mechanisms and establish an emergency operation centre, under the authority of the Head of State and relevant government authority, to coordinate response activities across partners and sectors to ensure efficient and effective implementation and monitoring of comprehensive Bundibugyo virus disease control measures.
These measures must include enhanced surveillance including contact tracing, infection prevention and control (IPC), risk communication and community engagement, laboratory diagnostic testing, and case management.
Coordination and response mechanisms should be established at national level, as well as at subnational level in affected areas and at-risk areas. Should national capacities be overwhelmed, collaboration with partners should be enhanced to strengthen operations and ensure the ability to implement control measures in all affected and neighbouring areas.
Risk communication and community engagement Ensure that there is a large-scale and sustained effort to fully engage the community – through local, religious and traditional leaders and healers – so communities play a central role in case identification, contact tracing and risk education; the population should be made fully aware of the benefits of early treatment.
Strengthen community awareness, engagement, and participation in particular to identify and address cultural norms and beliefs that serve as barriers to their full participation in the response, and integrate the response within the wider response required to address the needs of the population, particularly in contexts of the protracted humanitarian crisis in Eastern DRC.
Surveillance and laboratory Strengthening surveillance and laboratory capacity across affected provinces and neighbouring provinces, through the establishment of (1) dedicated surveillance and response cells within affected health zones and across key at-risk neighbouring health zones,
(2) enhanced community surveillance, particularly focused on community deaths, and
(3) decentralized laboratory capacity for testing of Bundibugyo virus. Infection prevention and control in health facilities and in the context of care Strengthen measures to prevent nosocomial infections, including systematic mapping of health facilities, triage, targeted IPC interventions and sustained monitoring and sustained supervision.
Ensure healthcare workers receive adequate training on IPC, including the proper use of PPE, and that health facilities have appropriate equipment to ensure the safety and protection of their staff, their timely payment of salaries and, as appropriate, hazard pay Patients’ referral pathway and access to safe and optimized intensive care
Ensure that suspected cases can be safely transferred to specialized clinical units for their isolation and management in a human and patient-centred approach.
Establish specialized treatment centers or units, located close to outbreak epicenter(s), with staff trained and equipped to implement optimized intensive supportive care.
Research and development of medical countermeasuresImplement clinical trials to advance the development and use of candidate therapeutics and vaccine, supported by partners.
Border health, travels and mass-gathering eventsUndertake cross-border screening and screening at main internal roads to ensure that no suspected case is missed and enhance the quality of screening through improved sharing of information with surveillance teams.
There should be no international travel of Bundibugyo virus disease contacts or cases, unless the travel is part of an appropriate medical evacuation.
To minimize the risk of international spread of Bundibugyo virus disease:
confirmed cases should immediately be isolated and treated in a Bundibugyo virus disease Treatment Centre with no national or international travel until two Bundibugyo virus-specific diagnostic tests conducted at least 48 hours apart are negative;
contacts (which do not include properly protected health workers and laboratory staff who have had no unprotected exposure) should be monitored daily, with restricted national travel and no international travel until 21 days after exposure;
probable and suspect cases should immediately be isolated and their travel should be restricted in accordance with their classification as either a confirmed case or contact.
Implement exit screening of all persons at international airports, seaports and major land crossings, for unexplained febrile illness consistent with potential Bundibugyo virus disease.
The exit screening should consist of, at a minimum, a questionnaire, a temperature measurement and, if there is a fever, an assessment of the risk that the fever is caused by Bundibugyo virus disease. Any person with an illness consistent with Bundibugyo virus disease should not be allowed to travel unless the travel is part of an appropriate medical evacuation.
Consider postponing mass gatherings until BVD transmission is interrupted. Safe and dignified burials Ensure funerals and burials are conducted by well-trained personnel, with provision made for the presence of the family and cultural practices, and in accordance with national health regulations, to reduce the risk of Bundibugyo virus infection.
The cross-border movement of the human remains of deceased suspect, probable or confirmed Bundibugyo virus disease cases should be prohibited unless authorized in accordance with recognized international biosafety provisions. Operations, supplies and logistics Strong supply pipeline needs to be established to ensure that sufficient medical and laboratory commodities and other critical items, especially personal protective equipment (PPE), are available to those who appropriately need them.
For States Parties with land borders adjoining States Parties with documented Bundibugyo virus disease Unaffected States Parties with land borders adjoining States Parties with documented Bundibugyo virus disease transmission should urgently enhance their preparedness and readiness capacity, including active surveillance across health facilities with active zero reporting, enhancement of community surveillance for clusters of unexplained deaths;
establish access to a qualified diagnostic laboratory;
ensure that health workers are aware of and trained in appropriate IPC procedures; and establish rapid response teams with the capacity to investigate and manage BVD cases and their contacts.
Dedicated coordination mechanisms should be in place at national and subnational level in all Unaffected States Parties with land borders adjoining States Parties with documented cases of Bundibugyo virus disease.
States should be prepared to detect, investigate, and manage Bundibugyo virus disease cases; this should include assured access to a qualified diagnostic laboratory for Bundibugyo virus disease, isolation and case management capacity and activation of rapid response teams.
Any State Parties newly detecting a suspected or confirmed Bundibugyo virus disease case or contact, or clusters of unexplained deaths should treat this as a health emergency, take immediate steps in the first 24 hours to investigate and stop a potential outbreak by instituting case isolation, case management, establishing a definitive diagnosis, and undertaking contact tracing and monitoring as required.
If Bundibugyo virus disease is confirmed to be occurring in the State Party, the full recommendations for State Parties with Bundibugyo virus disease transmission should be implemented, on either a national or subnational level, depending on the epidemiologic and risk context.
State Parties should immediately report the confirmation of Bundibugyo virus disease to WHO. Risk communications and community engagement, especially at points of entry, should be increased. At-risk countries should put in place approvals for investigational therapeutics as an immediate priority for preparedness.
For all Other States Parties No country should close its borders or place any restrictions on travel and trade. Such measures are usually implemented out of fear and have no basis in science.
They push the movement of people and goods to informal border crossings that are not monitored, thus increasing the chances of the spread of disease. Most critically, these restrictions can also compromise local economies and negatively affect response operations from a security and logistics perspective.
National authorities should work with airlines and other transport and tourism industries to ensure that they do not exceed WHO’s advice on international traffic.
States Parties should provide travelers to Bundibugyo virus disease affected and at-risk areas with relevant information on risks, measures to minimize those risks, and advice for managing a potential exposure.
The general public should be provided with accurate and relevant information on the Bundibugyo virus disease outbreak and measures to reduce the risk of exposure. State Parties should be prepared to facilitate the evacuation and repatriation of nationals (e.g. health workers) who have been exposed to Bundibugyo virus disease.
Entry screening at airports or other ports of entry outside the affected region are not considered needed for passengers returning from areas at risk.
See also: Epidemic of Ebola Disease caused by Bundibugyo virus in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda determined a public health emergency of international concern
Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 12 - Determination of a public health emergency of international concern, including a pandemic emergency of the International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR), the Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO), after having consulted the States Parties where the event is known to be currently occurring, is hereby determining that the Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda constitutes a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC), but does not meet the criteria of pandemic emergency, as defined in the IHR. The Director-General of WHO expresses his gratitude to the leadership of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda for their commitment to take necessary and vigorous actions to bring the event under control, as well as for their frankness in assessing the risk posed by this event to other States Parties, hence allowing the global community to take necessary preparedness actions.In his determination the Director-General of WHO has considered, inter alia, information provided by the States Parties – the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda – scientific principles as well as the available scientific evidence and other relevant information; and assessed the risk to human health, the risk of international spread of disease and of the risk of interference with international traffic.The Director-General of WHO considers that the event meets the criteria of the definition of PHEIC, contained in Article 1 - Definitions of the IHR, for the following reasons:1. The event is extraordinary for the following reasons:As of 16 May 2026, eight laboratory-confirmed cases, 246 suspected cases and 80 suspected deaths have been reported in Ituri Province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo across at least three health zones, including Bunia, Rwampara and Mongbwalu. In addition, two laboratory confirmed cases (including one death) with no apparent link to each other have been reported in Kampala, Uganda, within 24 hours of each other, on 15 and 16 May 2026, among two individuals travelling from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. A further case reported on 16 May, an individual returning from Ituri to Kinshasa, has tested negative for Bundibugyo virus on confirmatory testing by INRB, and is therefore not considered a confirmed case.Unusual clusters of community deaths with symptoms compatible with Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) have been reported across several health zones in Ituri, and suspected cases have been reported across Ituri and North Kivu. In addition, at least four deaths among healthcare workers in a clinical context suggestive of viral haemorrhagic fever have been reported from the affected area raising concerns regarding healthcare-associated transmission, gaps in infection prevention and control measures, and the potential for amplification within health facilities.There are significant uncertainties to the true number of infected persons and geographic spread associated with this event at the present time. In addition, there is limited understanding of the epidemiological links with known or suspected cases.However, the high positivity rate of the initial samples collected (with eight positives among 13 samples collected in various areas), the confirmation of cases in both Kampala and Kinshasa, the increasing trends in syndromic reporting of suspected cases and clusters of deaths across the province of Ituri all point towards a potentially much larger outbreak than what is currently being detected and reported, with significant local and regional risk of spread. Moreover, the ongoing insecurity, humanitarian crisis, high population mobility, the urban or semi-urban nature of the current hotspot and the large network of informal healthcare facilities further compound the risk of spread, as was witnessed during the large Ebola virus disease epidemic in North Kivu and Ituri provinces in 2018-19. However, unlike for Ebola-zaire strains, there are currently no approved Bundibugyo virus-specific therapeutics or vaccines. As such, this event is considered extraordinary.2. The event constitutes a public health risk to other States Parties through the international spread of disease. International spread has already been documented, with two confirmed cases reported in Kampala, Uganda on 15 and 16 May following travel from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Both confirmed cases were admitted to intensive care units in Kampala. Neighboring countries sharing land borders with the Democratic Republic of the Congo are considered at high risk for further spread due to population mobility, trade and travel linkages, and ongoing epidemiological uncertainty.3. The event requires international coordination and cooperation to understand the extent of the outbreak, to coordinate surveillance, prevention and response efforts, to scale up and strengthen operations and ensure ability to implement control measures. The Director-General of WHO, under the provisions of the IHR, will be convening an Emergency Committee, as soon as possible to advise, inter alia, on the proposed temporary recommendation for States Parties to respond to the event.The WHO advice is enumerated below and will be subject to further refinement as appropriate after having considered the advice from the Emergency Committee and issuing of Temporary Recommendations.* The statement was updated to provide the status of a case reported on 16 May in Kinshasa.WHO adviceFor States Parties where the event is occurring (the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda) Coordination and high-level engagement Activate their national disaster/emergency management mechanisms and establish an emergency operation centre, under the authority of the Head of State and relevant government authority, to coordinate response activities across partners and sectors to ensure efficient and effective implementation and monitoring of comprehensive Bundibugyo virus disease control measures. These measures must include enhanced surveillance including contact tracing, infection prevention and control (IPC), risk communication and community engagement, laboratory diagnostic testing, and case management. Coordination and response mechanisms should be established at national level, as well as at subnational level in affected areas and at-risk areas.Should national capacities be overwhelmed, collaboration with partners should be enhanced to strengthen operations and ensure the ability to implement control measures in all affected and neighbouring areas. Risk communication and community engagement
Ensure that there is a large-scale and sustained effort to fully engage the community – through local, religious and traditional leaders and healers – so communities play a central role in case identification, contact tracing and risk education; the population should be made fully aware of the benefits of early treatment.Strengthen community awareness, engagement, and participation in particular to identify and address cultural norms and beliefs that serve as barriers to their full participation in the response, and integrate the response within the wider response required to address the needs of the population, particularly in contexts of the protracted humanitarian crisis in Eastern DRC.Surveillance and laboratory Strengthening surveillance and laboratory capacity across affected provinces and neighbouring provinces, through the establishment of (1) dedicated surveillance and response cells within affected health zones and across key at-risk neighbouring health zones, (2) enhanced community surveillance, particularly focused on community deaths, and (3) decentralized laboratory capacity for testing of Bundibugyo virus. Infection prevention and control in health facilities and in the context of careStrengthen measures to prevent nosocomial infections, including systematic mapping of health facilities, triage, targeted IPC interventions and sustained monitoring and sustained supervision.Ensure healthcare workers receive adequate training on IPC, including the proper use of PPE, and that health facilities have appropriate equipment to ensure the safety and protection of their staff, their timely payment of salaries and, as appropriate, hazard payPatients’ referral pathway and access to safe and optimized intensive care Ensure that suspected cases can be safely transferred to specialized clinical units for their isolation and management in a human and patient-centred approach.Establish specialized treatment centers or units, located close to outbreak epicenter(s), with staff trained and equipped to implement optimized intensive supportive care. Research and development of medical countermeasuresImplement clinical trials to advance the development and use of candidate therapeutics and vaccine, supported by partners. Border health, travels and mass-gathering eventsUndertake cross-border screening and screening at main internal roads to ensure that no suspected case is missed and enhance the quality of screening through improved sharing of information with surveillance teams.There should be no international travel of Bundibugyo virus disease contacts or cases, unless the travel is part of an appropriate medical evacuation. To minimize the risk of international spread of Bundibugyo virus disease:confirmed cases should immediately be isolated and treated in a Bundibugyo virus disease Treatment Centre with no national or international travel until two Bundibugyo virus-specific diagnostic tests conducted at least 48 hours apart are negative;contacts (which do not include properly protected health workers and laboratory staff who have had no unprotected exposure) should be monitored daily, with restricted national travel and no international travel until 21 days after exposure; probable and suspect cases should immediately be isolated and their travel should be restricted in accordance with their classification as either a confirmed case or contact.Implement exit screening of all persons at international airports, seaports and major land crossings, for unexplained febrile illness consistent with potential Bundibugyo virus disease. The exit screening should consist of, at a minimum, a questionnaire, a temperature measurement and, if there is a fever, an assessment of the risk that the fever is caused by Bundibugyo virus disease. Any person with an illness consistent with Bundibugyo virus disease should not be allowed to travel unless the travel is part of an appropriate medical evacuation.Consider postponing mass gatherings until BVD transmission is interrupted.Safe and dignified burials
Ensure funerals and burials are conducted by well-trained personnel, with provision made for the presence of the family and cultural practices, and in accordance with national health regulations, to reduce the risk of Bundibugyo virus infection. The cross-border movement of the human remains of deceased suspect, probable or confirmed Bundibugyo virus disease cases should be prohibited unless authorized in accordance with recognized international biosafety provisions.
Operations, supplies and logistics
Strong supply pipeline needs to be established to ensure that sufficient medical and laboratory commodities and other critical items, especially personal protective equipment (PPE), are available to those who appropriately need them.For States Parties with land borders adjoining States Parties with documented Bundibugyo virus diseaseUnaffected States Parties with land borders adjoining States Parties with documented Bundibugyo virus disease transmission should urgently enhance their preparedness and readiness capacity, including active surveillance across health facilities with active zero reporting, enhancement of community surveillance for clusters of unexplained deaths; establish access to a qualified diagnostic laboratory; ensure that health workers are aware of and trained in appropriate IPC procedures; and establish rapid response teams with the capacity to investigate and manage BVD cases and their contacts.Dedicated coordination mechanisms should be in place at national and subnational level in all Unaffected States Parties with land borders adjoining States Parties with documented cases of Bundibugyo virus disease. States should be prepared to detect, investigate, and manage Bundibugyo virus disease cases; this should include assured access to a qualified diagnostic laboratory for Bundibugyo virus disease, isolation and case management capacity and activation of rapid response teams.Any State Parties newly detecting a suspected or confirmed Bundibugyo virus disease case or contact, or clusters of unexplained deaths should treat this as a health emergency, take immediate steps in the first 24 hours to investigate and stop a potential outbreak by instituting case isolation, case management, establishing a definitive diagnosis, and undertaking contact tracing and monitoring as required.If Bundibugyo virus disease is confirmed to be occurring in the State Party, the full recommendations for State Parties with Bundibugyo virus disease transmission should be implemented, on either a national or subnational level, depending on the epidemiologic and risk context. State Parties should immediately report the confirmation of Bundibugyo virus disease to WHO.Risk communications and community engagement, especially at points of entry, should be increased.At-risk countries should put in place approvals for investigational therapeutics as an immediate priority for preparedness.For all Other States PartiesNo country should close its borders or place any restrictions on travel and trade. Such measures are usually implemented out of fear and have no basis in science. They push the movement of people and goods to informal border crossings that are not monitored, thus increasing the chances of the spread of disease. Most critically, these restrictions can also compromise local economies and negatively affect response operations from a security and logistics perspective.National authorities should work with airlines and other transport and tourism industries to ensure that they do not exceed WHO’s advice on international traffic.States Parties should provide travelers to Bundibugyo virus disease affected and at-risk areas with relevant information on risks, measures to minimize those risks, and advice for managing a potential exposure.The general public should be provided with accurate and relevant information on the Bundibugyo virus disease outbreak and measures to reduce the risk of exposure.State Parties should be prepared to facilitate the evacuation and repatriation of nationals (e.g. health workers) who have been exposed to Bundibugyo virus disease.Entry screening at airports or other ports of entry outside the affected region are not considered needed for passengers returning from areas at risk.
Rwanda Closes Rubavu Borders Over Ebola Outbreak in DR Congo
May 17, 2026 Authorities in Rubavu District have confirmed the closure of border crossings linking Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo through Rubavu following the resurgence of the Ebola virus in eastern DR Congo.
Rubavu District Mayor, Mulindwa Prosper, told UMUSEKE that the measure came into effect on the morning of Sunday, May 17, 2026, as part of efforts to halt cross-border movement and prevent the deadly virus from spreading into Rwanda.
He explained that Rwandan citizens currently in DR Congo are still being allowed to return home under strict health screening procedures.
“Every Rwandan has the right to return to their country, just as Congolese citizens have the right to return to theirs. At the borders, health authorities are conducting the necessary screening measures,” he said.
According to the mayor, all travelers crossing the border are undergoing Ebola screening, while hygiene measures and public…
Authorities in Rubavu District have confirmed the closure of border crossings linking Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo through Rubavu following the resurgence…
WHO convenes partners to strengthen Ebola response in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
17 May 2026 Brazzaville/Kinshasa — As part of efforts to support the ongoing response to the Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the World Health Organization convened governments, partners and technical agencies to align response priorities and reinforce preparedness across affected and neighbouring countries.
The outbreak has affected several health zones in Ituri Province, including Mongbwalu, Rwampara and Bunia, where health authorities are responding to confirmed cases, suspected deaths and infections among healthcare workers. The evolving situation, combined with insecurity and population mobility linked to mining and trade activities, continues to complicate response efforts and increase the risk of wider transmission.
WHO is reinforcing support to national and provincial authorities through deployment of technical expertise and emergency supplies to strengthen surveillance, case investigation, infection prevention and control, laboratory capacity, clinical care and community engagement activities.
Additional specialists in epidemiology, logistics, laboratory diagnostics, clinical care and community engagement are being mobilized to support frontline teams and help strengthen outbreak control measures in affected areas.
“Clear coordination mechanisms at provincial level will be critical to help partners rapidly align and mobilize support where it is most needed,” said Dr Mir Rahimzai, FHI 360.
Participants highlighted the importance of strong community engagement and coordinated operational approaches to strengthen public trust and support response efforts in affected communities.
The meeting brought together more than 220 participants from WHO, Ministries of Health, Africa CDC, UN agencies, humanitarian organizations, research institutions and partners following the official declaration of the outbreak by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 15 May.
Partners are expanding response activities on the ground. Médecins Sans Frontières is supporting patient isolation and infection prevention and control activities in Mongbwalu and Bunia, while additional teams and supplies are being mobilized for deployment to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda.
The World Food Programme confirmed readiness to support airlift operations between Kinshasa and Bunia to facilitate rapid delivery of emergency supplies and equipment to affected areas.
The International Organization for Migration is supporting preparedness and surveillance activities at points of entry and along key cross-border corridors linking the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda and South Sudan.
“Cross-border population movement remains a key factor in this outbreak. IOM teams are already supporting preparedness and surveillance efforts on the ground in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda,” said Dr Jerry Geoffrey Mtike, IOM.
Countries across the region are also strengthening readiness measures to reduce the risk of further spread. Zambia highlighted vulnerabilities linked to mining and trade corridors and identified diagnostic capacity, sample transport systems and cross-border surveillance among key preparedness priorities.
Dr Francis Kasolo, WHO Representative, Ethiopia, underscored the importance of strengthening preparedness beyond land borders, including air travel routes, and called for pre-positioning of essential supplies in high-risk countries.
WHO is also scaling up regional readiness activities, including deployment of supplies, laboratory coordination and development of a multi-country Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan with partners. Priority countries are being supported to strengthen emergency coordination, border surveillance, healthcare worker training and contingency planning to enhance readiness and reduce the risk of further spread.
For Additional Information or to Request Interviews, Please contact:
Chinyere Nwonye
Brazzaville/Kinshasa — As part of efforts to support the ongoing response to the Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the World Health Organization convened governments, partners and technical agencies to align response priorities and reinforce preparedness across affected and neighbouring countries.
Ebola confirmed in east DR Congo city held by Rwanda-backed militia
A laboratory has confirmed an Ebola case in the major eastern Democratic Republic of Congo city of Goma.
59 minutes ago
A laboratory has confirmed an Ebola case in the major eastern Democratic Republic of Congo city of Goma, under the control of the Rwanda-backed M23 militia, health authorities told AFP on Sunday.
A positive case in Goma has been confirmed by tests carried out by the laboratory. It involves the wife of a man who died of Ebola in Bunia, who travelled to Goma after her husband’s death whilst already infected,” Professor Jean-Jacques Muyembe, director of the Congolese National Institute for Biomedical Research (INRB), told AFP.
People from the #Ebola outbreak areas of the #Ituri province who could be infected have been identified in the province of #Kivu North. As was to be feared, the virus is moving #RDC
CongoActual
@CongoActual
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1h
Se han identificado en la provincia de #Kivu Norte personas procedentes de las zonas del brote de Ébola de la provincia
TreyfishN
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13 m #Ebola outbreak Bundibugyo: #Canary Islands receives maritime arrivals from the African continent every day and this makes it even more important to strengthen health controls, epidemiological surveillance and early detection protocols.
CVCANARIAS
@cvcanarias
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15m
Translated from Spanish
Ebola Bundibugyo Outbreak: #Canarias receives daily maritime arrivals from the African continent, and this makes it even more important to strengthen health
The Congolese Ministry of Public Health has denied, through the National Institute of Public Health (INSP), any presence of confirmed Ebola cases in Kinshasa. This denial comes as the WHO stated on Saturday, May 16, in its international public health emergency declaration, that a confirmed case had been detected in the Congolese capital in a person returning from Ituri. This contradiction between national health authorities and the UN organization is sowing confusion about the true state of the virus's spread, at a time when the transparency of information is a central issue in the epidemic response.
Georges Kisando Sokomeka @GeorgesKisando
Translated from French #Ebola: The Military Governor of North Kivu, Évariste Somo Kakule, formally prohibits the transport of deceased bodies without authorization signed by the competent health authority. This measure is part of efforts to prevent the spread of the virus, with authorities reminding that handling contaminated remains can facilitate transmission. Families are urged to collaborate with teams responsible for dignified and secure burials in cases of suspected deaths. Any suspected case or death must be reported to the toll-free number: 082 080 0001. Eka News
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CGTN Africa
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Authorities in Rubavu District have confirmed the closure of border crossings linking Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo through Rubavu following the resurgence of the Ebola virus in eastern DR Congo.
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