Re: Osterholm warns about pandemic
here some info about the aftermath of the 1976 non-pandemic
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from
Richard E. Neustadt, Ernest R.May , thinking in time , the uses
of history for decision makers (1988)
page 152
First: if someone says: "a fair chance" as before the Bay of Pigs
(or a "strong possibility" as with swine flu), or more generally,
"The Guatemalans won't let us keep our camps here," ask,
"If you were a betting man or woman, what odds would you put on that ?"
If others are present ask the same at each, and of yourself too.
Then probe the _differences_:Why ? This is tantamount to seeking
and then arguing assumptions underlying different numbers
placed on a subjective probability assessment.
We know no better way to force clarification of meanings while
exposing hidden differences.
Judging by our students, millions of Americans are either
unfamiliar with numerical notations of probability or are
uncomfortable at the idea of stating a subjective judgement
in such terms.The doctors of the swine flu case,for instance,
recoiled from it, at least outside their own ranks.
On odds of a pandemic they refused to give Ford any number
beyond " 1 to 99 percent". [12] But we have yet to find
a fellow citizen unused of placing bets and giving odds
on races or at games. So play it as a game and ask for odds
on each presumption.If the doctors or their fellow experts
hesitate we offer the suggestion of one accademic collegue
with extensive government experience: Ask instead, "When
I brief the press, with you by my side as an expert, and
I tell them the odds are X, will I be right ? No ?
Then how about Y ?" And so forth.
Once differing odds have been quoted, the question "why ?"
can follow any number of tracks.Argument may pit common sense
against common sense or analogy against analogy.
What is important is that the expert's basis for linking
"if" with "then" gets exposed in the hearing of other
experts before the lay official has to say yes or no.
A variant on giving odds is placing bets in the sense
of a challenge:"How much of your own money would you
wager that the presumed thing actually happens ?"
Hidden differences are flagged by different sums.
[12] : Richard E. Neustadt, Harvey V. Fineberg , The Epidemic That Never Was (1983)
http://www.sciforum.hu/index.php?image=speakers&content=sp_fineberg
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R._E._Neustadt
http://ksgfaculty.harvard.edu/Ernest_May
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Estimating The Odds Of A 1976 Pandemic
1.) CDC formed two panels of experts to estimate the probability of a pandemic
in 1976 result :
---- 10%-25%
---- 40%
2) the members of the Advisory Committee (March 10,1976) later said they had assigned
privately nonpublic probabilities for a 1976 pandemic of
---- 2%-20%
3) departmental and White House aides assigned to that event probabilities of
---- 20%-50%
("the higher the level, the fewer the doubts")
sources:
1)
http://www.ourcivilisation.com/aids/chap3.htm
2) Alexander,May page 55
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"Alexander-Questions"
from Richard E. Neustadt, Ernest R.May , thinking in time , the uses of history for decision makers (1988)
page 152 ,153
Our second test is "Alexander's question". One of us coined this term for it in another book,
and we might as well stick with the label [13].
The Alexander named is not Aristotele's pupil, the great conqueror, but merely the man who asked
the question in March 1976 at the Advisory Committee meeting that preceeded the decisions
to immunize the country against swine flu. Dr. Russell Alexander [a], a public health professor
at the University of Washington, wished to know what fresh data from anywhere, including
the Southern Hemisphere, could cause his collegues to revise or to reverse their judgement
that the country should get ready to be immunized _en masse_ starting next summer.
Mild outbreaks only ? None ? Time-frames ? Locations ? He asked but never got an answer.
In the circumstances it was the right question, we believe;pursuing it it would
have flushed out a set of deeper questions, which also did not get asked: questions
about tradeoffs between side effects and flu, questions about programming and scheduling
review, questions distinguishing severety from spread, questions about stockpiling, and more.
In retrospect they all deserved a thorough airing.This they did not get. Still the right
initial question _was_ asked.We draw our term from that.
Adapting but slightly we put the emphasis on presumptions rather than conclusions, and urge
the comparable questions:What new _Knowns_ would bring you to change items _Presumed_ ?
When ? And why ? Passed around the circle, those should sharpen differences, spur debate,
and force out inferences, whether of courses or of values. The counterpart question did
not do that for Alexander.That is because the director of the CDC
chairing the meeting where
Alexander asked it chose not to pursue it. We recommend hot pursuit.
[13] : Richard E. Neustadt, Harvey V. Fineberg , The Epidemic That Never Was (1983)
[a] : http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/261096_russobit28.html
: http://66.249.93.104/search?q=cache:F5psvPsKguIJ:www.americaabroadmedia.org/docs/Sencer%2520transcript.pdf