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I think the response and subsequent infection of a health care worker is disappointing. Considering the amount of resources provided to the health care industry, it is disappointing that a large well funded hospital in the US does is not even prepared to deal with a single infectious disease patient without infecting health care workers (and not even caused by an accident such as a needle poke).
Proper PPE hazmat gear should not be that expensive if purchased in quantity. CDC or a similar group could negotiate reasonable costs for a large purchase so that every hospital has at least a few sets. Decontamination gear (disinfectant sprayers, basically the same as insecticide sprayers and showers) should not be over expensive either. The same with tents to house the potentially infectious patients.
If US vendors can't be reasonable about costs then (though I am loathe to suggest it) perhaps we need to purchase some of this gear from china (with adequate QA measures). I have had some experience with hazmat gear (though not for biological protection). A lot of it is outrageously expensive. But, the actual manufacturing cost is not very high so it should be possible to negotiate reasonable prices for large quantities. For example, a PAPR full face respirator designed for chemical protection has a list price of $1000, but the manufacturing cost is probably less than $50 in quantity. (I have a couple of them equipped with hepa particulate filters that I use for working with fiberglass insulation).
You can lead a healthcare infrastructure to guidelines but you cannot make it train. And training is time consuming and expensive if using PPE.*
.....If US vendors can't be reasonable about costs then (though I am loathe to suggest it) perhaps we need to purchase some of this gear from china (with adequate QA measures). I have had some experience with hazmat gear (though not for biological protection). A lot of it is outrageously expensive. But, the actual manufacturing cost is not very high so it should be possible to negotiate reasonable prices for large quantities. For example, a PAPR full face respirator designed for chemical protection has a list price of $1000, but the manufacturing cost is probably less than $50 in quantity. (I have a couple of them equipped with hepa particulate filters that I use for working with fiberglass insulation).
There is no cheap way to give first world care to Ebola patients. If the case numbers start to add up, our health care system is in for a huge shock. I'm not sure how well it will function. Patient 1 and 2 are getting much better treatment than we will be administering by the time we get to patient 100,000.
Pandemic flu is a bit different critter than Ebola from a health system perspective. Much of that activity occurs out in the community, in nursing homes, schools, etc. and especially in education about vaccination and the vaccinations themselves. The training in isolation and avoiding nosocomial transmission would be applicable, but that doesn't seem to have been a problem in the Texas situation once they realized the patient was infectious. The PPE precautions, however, are much less rigorous than with Ebola. So I don't think that money was wasted, as there's no evidence of spread to other patients. In that way, the funding for pandemic flu preparation may very well have paid off.The CDC has published endless materials since 2001. As I said elsewhere, eight billion dollars was given to hospitals since 2006 specifically to prepare for pandemic flu. Where did this money and training go?
What should the CDC be doing instead? Wresting patients away from public health systems?