US - Dairy cows test positive for H5N1 avian flu in Texas, Kansas, Idaho, Michigan, New Mexico, Ohio, North Carolina, South Dakota, Colorado, Iowa, Mi

[Pathfinder]

How bird flu virus fragments get into milk sold in stores, and what the spread of H5N1 in cows means for the dairy industry and milk drinkers


Published: April 25, 2024 3:04pm EDT

Authors
Noelia Silva del Rio
Associate Specialist in Cooperative Extension, Production Medicine and Food Safety, University of California, Davis

Richard V. Pereira
Associate Professor of Veterinary Medicine and Associate Agronomist, University of California, Davis

Robert B. Moeller
Professor of Veterinary Medicine, University of California, Davis

Terry W. Lehenbauer
Professor of Veterinary Medicine, University of California, Davis

Todd Cornish
Professor of Veterinary Medicine, University of California, Davis​

The discovery of viral fragments of avian flu virus in milk sold in U.S. stores suggests that the H5N1 virus may be more widespread in U.S. dairy cattle than previously realized.

The Food and Drug Administration was quick to stress on April 24, 2024, that it believes the commercial milk supply is safe. However, highly pathogenic avian influenza virus can make cows sick, and the flu virus’s presence in herds in several states and now new federal restrictions on the movement of dairy cows between states are putting economic pressure on farmers.

Five experts in infectious diseases in cattle from the University of California, Davis – Noelia Silva del Rio, Terry Lehenbauer, Richard Pereira, Robert Moeller and Todd Cornish – explain what the test results mean, how bird flu can spread to cattle and the impact on the industry.

What are viral fragments of avian flu, and can they pose risks to people?

It’s crucial to understand that the presence of viral fragments of H5N1 doesn’t indicate the presence of intact virus particles that could cause disease.

The commercial milk supply maintains safety through two critical measures:

• First, milk sourced from sick animals is promptly diverted or disposed of, ensuring it does not enter the food chain.
• Second, all milk at grocery stores is heat treated to reduce pathogen load to safe levels, mainly by pasteurization. Pasteurization has been shown to effectively inactivate H5N1 in eggs, and that process occurs at a lower temperature than is used for milk.

The viral fragments were detected using quantitative polymerase chain reaction testing, which is known for its exceptional sensitivity in detecting even trace amounts of viral genetic material. These fragments are only evidence that the virus was present in the milk. They aren’t evidence that the virus is biologically active.

To evaluate whether the presence of the viral fragments corresponds to a virus with the capacity to replicate and cause disease, a different testing approach is necessary. Tests such as embryonated egg viability studies allow scientists to assess the virus’s ability to replicate by injecting a sample into an embryonated chicken egg. That type of testing is underway.

On April 24, 2024, the FDA said it had found no reason to change its assessment that the U.S. milk supply is safe. The agency does strongly advise against consuming raw milk and products derived from it because of its inherent risks of contamination with harmful pathogens, including avian flu viruses.

How does an avian flu virus get into cow’s milk?

Currently, cows confirmed to have H5N1 have different symptoms than the typical flu-like symptoms observed in birds.

Abnormal milk and mastitis, an inflammatory response to infection, are common. While there is speculation that other bodily secretions, such as saliva, respiratory fluids, urine or feces, may also harbor the virus, that has yet to be confirmed.

How waterfowl or other birds transmitted H5N1 to cattle is still under investigation. In 2015, an outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza in commercial poultry farms reached its peak in April and May, the same time birds migrated north. Birds can shed the virus through their oral, nasal, urine and fecal secretions. So the virus could potentially be transmitted through direct contact, ingesting contaminated feed or water, or inhaling the virus.

Infected dairy cows can shed the virus in milk, and they likely can transmit it to other cows, but that still needs to be proven.

Contagious pathogens that cause mastitis can be transmitted through milking equipment or contaminated milker’s gloves. Ongoing research will help determine whether this is also a potential transmission route for H5N1, and if so, what makes the virus thrive on mammary tissue.

If H5N1 is found to be widespread in milk, what risks can that pose for the dairy industry?

For the dairy industry, infection of cattle with H5N1 avian influenza virus creates challenges at two levels.

The overriding concern is always for the safety and healthfulness of milk and dairy products.

Existing state and federal regulations and industry practices require sick cows or cows with abnormal milk to be segregated so that their milk does not enter the food supply. Proper pasteurization should kill the virus so that it cannot cause infection.

The American Association of Bovine Practitioners has also developed biosecurity guidelines for H5N1, focusing on key practices. These include minimizing wild birds’ contact with cattle and their environment, managing the movement of cattle between farms, isolating affected animals, avoiding feeding unpasteurized (raw) colostrum or milk to calves and other mammals, and ensuring the use of protective personal equipment for animal caretakers.

The other major concern is for the health of the dairy herd and the people who take care of the dairy cattle. A farm worker who handled dairy cows contracted H5N1 in Texas in March 2024, but such cases are rare.

No vaccines or specific therapies are available for avian influenza infections in dairy cattle. But following good sanitation and biosecurity practices for both people and cows will help to reduce risk of exposure and spread of the avian influenza virus among dairy cattle.

For cows that get the virus, providing supportive care, including fluids and fever reducers as needed, can help them get through the illness, which can also cause loss of appetite and affect their milk production.

Dairy farms facing an outbreak will have economic losses from caring for sick animals and the temporary reduction in milk sales. Approximately 5% to 20% of the animals in the affected herds have become ill, according to early estimates. Affected animals typically recover within 10 to 20 days.

At least 21 states have restricted importing dairy cattle to prevent the virus’s spread, and the federal government announced it will require that lactating dairy cattle be tested before they can be moved between states starting April 29, 2024. While the overall impact on U.S. milk production is projected to be minor on an annual basis, it could lead to short-lived supply disruptions.

How worried should people be about avian flu?

The federal government’s monitoring and food safety measures, along with pasteurization, provide important safeguards to protect the public from potential exposure to avian influenza virus through the food chain.

Drinking raw milk, however, does represent a risk for exposure to multiple diseases, including H5N1. This is why the FDA and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention strongly recommend drinking only pasteurized milk and dairy products.
​
https://theconversation.com/how-bir...r-the-dairy-industry-and-milk-drinkers-228689

 

[Pathfinder]

​Colombia becomes first country to restrict US beef due to bird flu in dairy cows

By P.j. Huffstutter and Tom Polansek

April 25, 20241:41 PM CST Updated 24 min ago

CHICAGO, April 25 (Reuters) - Colombia has restricted the import of beef and beef products coming from U.S. states where dairy cows have tested positive for avian influenza as of April 15, according the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

It is the first country to officially limit trade in beef due to bird flu in cows, in a sign of a broadening economic impact of the virus that has restricted poultry trade globally. Colombia imports a small amount of beef from the U.S. annually, according to government data and market analysts.

...
https://www.reuters.com/markets/com...Reuters),the U.S. Department of Agriculture.​

 

[Michael Coston]

An HPAI Cattle Roundup - April 25th

A growing, but incomplete, picture of affected States




#18,025

It's been a busy day, with a media report by Tyne Morgan writing in the Bovine Veterinarian a report that quotes Andrew Bowman at Ohio State University - who has tested 150 samples of pasteurized milk purchased at the retail level - as finding 38% (n=58) were PCR positive for H5N1 RNA.

PCR positive does not indicate whether the virus remains infectious (aka `viable'), so samples have been forwarded to St. Jude Children's Research Hospital, where attempts are being made to culture the virus.​

The milk was reportedly purchased from 6 states, but the manufacturing codes on the positive samples came from as many as 10 states. Since the USDA has only confirmed 8 states with H5N1 in dairy cows, this suggests the problem is more widespread than has been reported.

The decision announced yesterday that (starting next week) lactating cows must be tested prior to interstate transport should provide more data, but testing remains limited and voluntary for the vast majority of cattle herds.​

Another report by Rhonda Brooks, also in the Bovine Veterinarian called A Message to the Ag Industry about H5N1 warns that agricultural interests must take this threat very seriously, and quotes Texas veterinarian Dr. Barb Petersen as reporting seeing `sick humans' along with `sick cows' at multiple dairy farms.

While only one mild case has been reported, in yesterday's HHS meeting (as reported by Helen Branswell for STAT), CDC Deputy Director Nirav Shah acknowledged there have been obstacles to testing farm workers.

“We’ve had a diversity of levels of engagement with farms,” Shah said. “These situations are challenging. There may be owners that are reluctant to work with public health to say nothing of individual workers who may be reluctant to sit down with somebody who identifies themself as being from the government in some way.”​

At the same meeting, Mike Watson from APHIS confirmed that the USDA had `met some resistance' from some farmers with infected cows, and it is unknown whether orders to discard infected milk are being strictly enforced.

A week ago the CDC issued recommendations for protective gear to be worn when tending to potentially infected cattle, although it isn't clear how much they are being utilized, particularly when testing for the virus is limited.




Meanwhile, the topic of testing cattle outside of the United States appear to be a third-rail that few officials are willing to touch. Sky News is reporting the UK has no plans to test local herds with a DEFRA official saying levels of avian flu are so low in birds right now that `it does not consider cattle to be at risk.'

That optimistically assumes that no spillover occurred over the winter, when infected birds were more abundant. Our spillover to cattle in the appears to have occurred in late 2023, but wasn't detected until cattle were tested in March of this year.​

I've found very little from Mexico, which both exports and imports cattle from the United States. While I suspect (read: hope) some testing is being conducted, no one seems to be talking about it.

As we discussed a few days ago, the consumption of raw (unpasteurized) milk is far more common in Mexico than in the U.S., and surveillance for potential human infections is arguably less robust than here in the states.​

While there is no way to know how big of a deal this HPAI outbreak in cattle will become, this crisis has demonstrated - once again - how unprepared the world is to deal with an inconvenient, and highly unpredictable, zoonotic threat.

I get it.​

We're all traumatized and weary from the last pandemic, and by all rights we should have a few years before we must deal with another. But viruses don't read calendars, and all indications are that the time-between-pandemics has grown shorter.

Which means we need to get better at surveillance and testing, and far more aggressive in responding to threats. The H5N1 virus has been honing its skills for years, if we hope to be able to cope, we need to do the same.​

As always, the volunteer newshounds on FluTrackers are all over this story, and you'll find expert reporting from Lisa Schnirring at CIDRAP and Helen Branswell at STAT News.

https://afludiary.blogspot.com/2024/04/an-hpai-cattle-roundup-april-25th.html
​

 

[Mary Wilson]

Above article:
Properly Prepared Beef Remains Safe; Meat Institute Calls For Guidance to Protect Workers at Beef Facilities

... Dairy cows make-up 6.8 percent of total beef production in the U.S.
All other cattle should be tested, Bulls, calfs, Angus, Hereford, Charolais, etc.
All calfs drink cows milk from birth...
More testing is required

 

[Lance]

CIDRAP- 1 in 5 US retail milk samples test positive for H5N1 avian flu fragments

https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/avian-in...amples-test-positive-h5n1-avian-flu-fragments

1 in 5 US retail milk samples test positive for H5N1 avian flu fragments


Lisa Schnirring


Today at 4:42 p.m.

Avian Influenza (Bird Flu)

​

A senior official from the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) said today that its nationwide survey of retail milk has found remnants of H5N1 avian flu viruses in one in five samples, with the highest concentrations in regions where outbreaks in dairy cattle have been reported.

Donald Prater, DVM, acting director of the FDA Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN), shared the new findings with state health officials who took part in a scientific symposium on H5N1 hosted by the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO). The results come in the wake of earlier findings this week from more limited FDA sampling, along with similar findings from a smaller set of samples tested by a lab that's part of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases Centers of Excellence for Influenza Research and Response (CEIRR) Network.

At today's ASTHO briefing, state health officials heard the latest investigation and research updates from federal health officials and had the opportunity to ask their own questions, everything from virus shedding in cow manure to pandemic preparedness.

FDA's long list of research questions


Prater reiterated that the FDA hasn't changed its assessment that the nation's milk supply remains safe. So far, early work on milk samples that were positive for H5N1 fragments haven't found any viable (potentially infectious) virus.

He said, however, that the FDA still has a long list of data gaps to fill, including identifying the risk of infection to humans via oral consumption and validating that existing pasteurization methods can inactivate H5N1.

Other data gaps include how long the virus survives in raw milk and the infectious dose of viruses. Though a major concern is retail milk, Prater also said the FDA needs to see if contamination is occurring in other products, such as cheese made from raw milk.

USDA continues to probe farm transmission patterns


Rosemary Sifford, DVM, deputy administrator for veterinary services and chief veterinarian with the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) said the agency has now shared 260 genetic sequences with public databases, up from 239 earlier this week. Of those, only 1 had a mutation linked to mammalian adaptation.

She also said the B3.13 genome circulating in cattle was first seen in poultry in the middle of March in a Texas flock at a time when the virus was cropping up in some of the state's dairy farms. Sifford said investigators continue to look at how the virus is moving on farms and how it transmits among cattle.

Scientists are looking for the virus in other species, including feral pigs, and regular influenza surveillance is monitoring the situation in commercial pigs. Sifford said efforts are under way to gauge how long infected cows shed the virus and if shedding patterns are any different in asymptomatic animals.

When asked about on-farm transmission, she said scientists haven't observed significant shedding in cow feces. Meanwhile, sampling from the USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) found the highest concentrations in milk and mammary tissue.

CDC notes cat infections, weighs risks


Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) officials shared more details from their epidemiologic investigations, including virus findings in other animals on affected dairy farms. Sonja Olsen, PhD, associate director for preparedness and response with the CDC's Influenza Division, said there were 6 H5N1 positive tests in cats from three states: 3 in Texas, 2 in New Mexico, and 1 in Ohio.

Also, there were 5 H5N1 detections in wild birds on the farms.

She said CDC a key question is the infection risk from exposure to milk and whether certain conditions, such as aerosolization, pose a higher risk.

Vivien Duggan, PhD, who heads the CDC's Influenza Division, said the interagency Flu Risk Management group, which formed 15 years ago, is meeting now to discuss prepandemic vaccines and diagnostics.

On the research front, the CDC is looking for any changes in the virus that would hamper the ability to use countermeasures, such as antiviral drugs and vaccines.

A key tool that the CDC uses to evaluate and prioritize resources is the Influenza Risk Assessment Tool (IRAT), in which its experts grade the virus using 10 data criteria. Duggan said the CDC is still gathering some data and that it will take some time to evaluate the virus and come up with a risk score. In its last assessment in July 2023, the agency scored the H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b virus from a Spanish mink farm outbreak as slightly higher for some elements than a 2022 virus from the same clade from wild birds.

Latest on vaccines, other countermeasures


So far, research results have been promising for antiviral susceptibility. And for the two candidate vaccine viruses against the H5N1 2.3.4.4b clade, experiments using ferret antisera show good cross-reaction against the outbreak strain, she said.

When state officials asked what would trigger ramped up H5N1 vaccine production, Duggan said officials are watching for certain cues, such as change in mammalian transmission, better adaptation to human-to-human spread, and clusters of cases. "There's no formula, but we're all on the watch."

Health officials also heard from government countermeasure experts, who said they don't foresee any issues with the antiviral supply chain.

State health officials had several questions about where things stand with a candidate vaccine. David Boucher, PhD, director of infectious disease preparedness and response at the Department of Health and Human Services Administration for Strategic Preparedness, said there is a limited quantity of prefilled syringes and vials that are used for clinical trials, for example. He added that health officials are already looking at regulatory pathways to use the vaccine more widely, if needed.

He said the first wave of production, if needed, could provide several hundreds of thousands of vaccine doses, and the second tranche could amount to 10 million doses. "Any pivot from that would require additional resources," Boucher said. "If we need to pull any of those levers, we're willing to do so."

Partnering with established seasonal flu vaccine producers has the benefit of a licensed platform in place that can be easily adapted to include an H5N1 vaccine virus, but he acknowledged that a downside would be a potential disruption in seasonal flu vaccine production. "There are a lot of variables that go into making that decision."

Two safety and immunogenicity studies are already under way on candidate H5N1 vaccines, Boucher told the group.
​

 

[sharon sanders]

bump this

 

[Pathfinder]

Updates on Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI)

• Content current as of:
  
  04/25/2024
• Regulated Product(s)
  • Food & Beverages

​

​...

​Ongoing Work to Ensure Continued Effectiveness of Federal-State Milk Safety System - April 2024 Update

What's New


April 25, 2024

Today, the FDA received some initial results from its nationally representative commercial milk sampling study. The agency continues to analyze this information; however, the initial results show about 1 in 5 of the retail samples tested are quantitative polymerase chain reaction (qPCR)-positive for HPAI viral fragments, with a greater proportion of positive results coming from milk in areas with infected herds. As previously noted and outlined in our summary below, qPCR-positive results do not necessarily represent actual virus that may be a risk to consumers. Additional testing is required to determine whether intact pathogen is still present and if it remains infectious, which would help inform a determination of whether there is any risk of illness associated with consuming the product. The FDA is further assessing any positive findings through egg inoculation tests, a gold-standard for determining if infectious virus is present. Early work by NIH-funded investigators indicates an absence of infectious virus in their studies of retail milk. To date, the retail milk studies have shown no results that would change our assessment that the commercial milk supply is safe. Epidemiological signals from our CDC partners continue to show no uptick of human cases of flu and no cases of H5N1, specifically, beyond the one known case related to direct contact with infected cattle. These important efforts are ongoing, and we are committed to sharing results from both the qPCR and egg inoculation tests as soon as possible.
​...

https://www.fda.gov/food/alerts-adv...pdates-highly-pathogenic-avian-influenza-hpai

 

[Michael Coston]

CDC Updated Technical Report On HPAI H5N1 Viruses






#18,027


The CDC has updated their Technical Report on HPAI H5N1 - last published in December - with details on recent H5N1 cases in Cambodia (n=5), Vietnam (n=1)and the United States (n=1), and the spread of HPAI H5N1 in American cattle.

While the CDC still believes the overall risk to human health from HPAI H5N1 remains low for the general public: `. . . additional sporadic zoonotic infections are anticipated among people with exposures to infected sick or dead poultry, wild birds, or other infected animals.'​

Due to its length, I've only included the summary and the Conclusions/Risk Assessment from a much longer report. Follow the link to read it in its entirety.

Technical Report: Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Viruses
Español | Other LanguagesPrint

Updated April 26, 2024

This report provides an update to the December 29, 2023, report to include seven new human cases (5 in Cambodia, 1 in the United States and 1 in Vietnam) and recent activity in wild birds, poultry and other animals, including the multi-state veterinary outbreak in U.S. dairy cattle, and updated information on monitoring for H5N1 virus infections in the United States. Even given these updates, CDC believes the overall risk to human health associated with the ongoing outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses has not changed and remains low to the U.S. general public at this time.

Executive summary

A small number of sporadic human cases of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) have been identified worldwide since 2022, amidst a panzootic of these viruses in wild birds and poultry. Nearly all human cases reported globally since 2022 were associated with poultry exposures, and no cases of human-to-human transmission of HPAI A(H5N1) virus have been identified. One human case of HPAI A(H5N1) virus infection in a farm worker reported in April 2024 in the United States and was attributed to exposure to presumptively infected dairy cattle. One previous human case was reported in the United States in 2022. In a few cases, the source of exposure to HPAI A(H5N1) virus has been unknown.​

To date, HPAI A(H5N1) viruses currently circulating most commonly in birds and poultry, with spillover to mammals and humans do not have the ability to easily bind to receptors that predominate in the human upper respiratory tract. This is a major reason why the current risk to the public from HPAI A(H5N1) viruses remains low.​

However, because of the potential for influenza viruses to rapidly evolve and the wide global prevalence of HPAI A(H5N1) viruses in wild birds and poultry outbreaks and following the identification and spread among dairy cattle in the United States, additional sporadic human infections are anticipated. Continued comprehensive surveillance of these viruses in wild birds, poultry, mammals, and people worldwide, and frequent reassessments are critical to determine the public health risk, along with ongoing preparedness efforts.​

Key Points

• CDC is actively working on the domestic situation with clade 2.3.4.4b HPAI A(H5N1) viruses in wild birds, with outbreaks in poultry and backyard flocks, and infections of other animals, including dairy cattle. These activities include conducting surveillance among people with relevant exposures and preparing for the possibility that contemporary HPAI A(H5N1) viruses gain the ability for increased transmissibility to and among people.
• CDC, along with state and local public health partners, continues to monitor people in the United States who have been exposed to infected birds, poultry, or other animals for 10 days after exposure. To date, more than 8,800 people in 52 jurisdictions have been monitored since 2022, and only two human cases have been identified.
• H5 candidate vaccine viruses (CVV) produced by CDC are expected to provide good protection against current clade 2.3.4.4b HPAI A(H5N1) viruses detected in birds and mammals, including dairy cattle. These H5 CVVs are available and have been shared with vaccine manufacturers.
• Because influenza viruses are constantly changing, CDC performs ongoing analyses of HPAI A(H5N1) viruses to identify genetic changes that might allow for spread more easily to and between people, more serious illness in people, reduce susceptibility to antivirals, affect the sensitivity of diagnostic assays, or reduce neutralization of the virus by vaccine induced antibodies. To date, few genetic changes of public health concern have been identified in HPAI A(H5N1) viruses circulating in wild birds and poultry worldwide and detected in dairy cattle in the United States.
• Currently, HPAI A(H5N1) viruses circulating in birds and U.S. dairy cattle are believed to pose a low risk to the general public in the United States; however, people who have job-related or recreational exposures to infected birds or infected mammals are at higher risk of infection and should take appropriate precautions outlined in CDC guidance.
• Comprehensive surveillance and readiness efforts are ongoing, and CDC continually takes preparedness measures to be ready in case the risk to people from HPAI A(H5N1) virus or from other novel influenza A viruses changes.

(SNIP)​

Limitations of the Report​

This report is subject to the following limitations. First, the number of reported human infections with HPAI A(H5N1) viruses is small. Conclusions regarding virus characterization analyses, transmissibility from animals to people, transmissibility among people, and clinical spectrum of illness in people should be interpreted in light of this small number. Second, detailed exposure information was not available for all exposed persons or for those being monitored for illness after exposure to HPAI A(H5N1) virus-infected wild birds, poultry, backyard flocks, and other animals, including dairy cattle in the United States. As of the date of this report, understanding of HPAI A(H5N1) virus infections of cattle is very limited. Thus, we are not able to assess the impact of exposure variables such as duration of exposure, nature of exposure (e.g., direct vs. indirect contact), and use of personal protective equipment on infection risk among persons with confirmed HPAI A(H5N1) virus infection or those being monitored after exposures to any animals confirmed or suspected with HPAI A(H5N1) virus infection.
Conclusions

• To date, CDC analyses of clade 2.3.4.4b HPAI A(H5N1) viruses detected in wild birds, poultry, and sporadically in mammals, including in dairy cattle, since late 2021 indicate that these viruses all have a high degree of genetic identity with each other and no significant mammalian adaptive substitutions, insertions, or deletions have been identified, particularly in the HA gene, which is important for zoonotic and subsequent human-to-human transmission.
• Considering the high prevalence of HPAI A(H5N1) viruses detected in wild birds and poultry worldwide, spillover into mammals (including carnivores that may feed on infected animals) and additional sporadic zoonotic infections are anticipated among people with exposures to infected sick or dead poultry, wild birds, or other infected animals.
• HA clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5N1) viruses currently circulating in wild birds and poultry worldwide lack the ability to preferentially bind to the types of sialic acid receptors that are predominant in the upper respiratory tract of humans and therefore do not currently have the ability to easily infect or transmit among people.
• Despite extensive worldwide spread of influenza A(H5N1) viruses in wild birds and poultry in recent years, only a small number of sporadic human infections with 2.3.4.4b or clade 2.3.2.1c H5N1 viruses have been reported since 2022; nearly all cases had recent exposure to poultry and no cases of human-to-human influenza A(H5N1) virus transmission have been identified.

While CDC’s assessment is that the overall threat of HA clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5N1) viruses to public health is currently low, the widespread geographic prevalence of infected birds and poultry raises the potential for exposures and infections of humans and other mammals that could result in viral evolution or reassortment events which might change the current risk assessment. Vigilance and ongoing surveillance of HPAI A(H5N1) viruses circulating in wild birds, poultry, and in sporadic infections of mammals and people worldwide is critical to monitor the public health risk and to detect genetic changes (particularly in the HA gene) that would change CDC’s risk assessment.​

(Continue . . .)



https://afludiary.blogspot.com/2024/04/cdc-updated-technical-report-on-hpai.html
​

 

[Treyfish]

APHIS Bolsters Animal Disease Traceability in the United States

Print
Press Release

Contact:
APHISpress@usda.gov



Requires electronic ID for Certain Cattle and Bison Moving Interstate

WASHINGTON, April 26, 2024 – Today, by amending and strengthening its animal disease traceability regulations for certain cattle and bison, the United States Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) is putting in place the technology, tools, and processes to help quickly pinpoint and respond to costly foreign animal diseases.

“Rapid traceability in a disease outbreak will not only limit how long farms are quarantined, keep more animals from getting sick, and help ranchers and farmers get back to selling their products more quickly – but will help keep our markets open,” said Dr. Michael Watson, APHIS Administrator.

One of the most significant benefits of the rule for farmers and ranchers will be the enhanced ability of the United States to limit impacts of animal disease outbreaks to certain regions, which is the key to maintaining our foreign markets. By being able to readily prove disease-free status in non-affected regions of the United States, we will be able to request foreign trading partners recognize disease-free regions or zones instead of cutting off trade for the entire country. Traceability of animals is necessary to establish these disease-free zones and facilitate reestablishment of foreign and domestic market access with minimum delay in the wake of an animal disease event.

This rule is the culmination of goals established by USDA to increase traceability, one of the best protections against disease outbreaks, and enhances a rule finalized in 2013 for the official identification of livestock and documentation for certain interstate movements of livestock.

USDA is committed to implementing a modern animal disease traceability system that tracks animals from birth to slaughter using affordable technology that allows for quick tracing of sick and exposed animals to stop disease spread. USDA will continue to provide tags to producers free of charge to jumpstart efforts to enable the fastest possible response to a foreign animal disease. For information on how to obtain these free tags, please see APHIS’ Animal Disease Traceability webpage.

The final rule applies to all sexually intact cattle and bison 18 months of age or older, all dairy cattle, cattle and bison of any age used for rodeo or recreation events, and cattle or bison of any age used for shows or exhibitions.

The rule requires official eartags to be visually and electronically readable for official use for interstate movement of certain cattle and bison, and revises and clarifies certain record requirements related to cattle.

A copy of this rule may be viewed today, and the rule will be published in the Federal Register in the coming weeks. This rule will be effective 180 days after publication in the Federal Register.

To learn more about animal disease traceability and how APHIS responds to animal disease outbreaks, visit www.aphis.usda.gov.

#

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/news/age...ers-animal-disease-traceability-united-states
​:tiphat:

 

[Pathfinder]

4/26/24-Testing Guidance for Labs for Influenza A in Livestock

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/sites/default/files/hpai-livestock-testing-recommendations.pdf

4/26/24-APHIS Requirements and Recommendations for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) H5N1 Virus in Livestock For State Animal Health Officials, Accredited Veterinarians and Producers

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/sites/default/files/aphis-requirements-recommendations-hpai-livestock.pdf


​

 

[Pathfinder]

Joint FAO/WHO/WOAH preliminary assessment of recent influenza A(H5N1) viruses


As of 23 April 2024

26 April 2024
| Emergency Situational Updates

Download (317.9 kB)

Overview


During 2020, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b viruses arose from previously circulating influenza A(H5Nx) viruses and spread predominantly via migratory birds to many parts of Africa, Asia and Europe. The epizootic has led to unprecedented numbers of deaths in wild birds and caused outbreaks in domestic poultry. In late 2021, these viruses crossed to North America and subsequently South America in October 2022. Additionally, globally, there have been increased detections of A(H5N1) viruses in non-avian species including wild and domestic (including companion and farmed) terrestrial and marine mammals and, more recently in goats and dairy cattle in the United States of America. The majority, with some regional exceptions, of the HPAI A(H5N1) viruses characterized genetically since 2020 belong to the 2.3.4.4b clade. Since the beginning of 2021, 28 detections of A(H5N1) in humans have been reported to WHO, including a case who had exposure to dairy cattle presumed to be infected with A(H5N1) virus. Of these human cases, where the haemagglutinin (HA) H5 clade is known, 13 have been caused by clade 2.3.4.4b viruses. This joint FAO/WHO/WOAH risk assessment focuses on A(H5N1) viruses characterized since 2021 and assesses the public health risk as well as the risk of the virus spread among animals.

​
https://www.who.int/publications/m/...ssessment-of-recent-influenza-a(h5n1)-viruses

 

[Pathfinder]

Excerpt:
...
Assessment of current risk to humans posed by influenza A(H5N1) viruses

1. What is the global public health risk of additional human cases of infection with avian influenza
A(H5N1) viruses?

Despite the high number of A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b outbreaks and detections in animals, and
human exposures to the virus at the human-animal-environment interface, relatively few human
infections have been reported to date.

Of the 28 human cases of A(H5N1) detections reported since the beginning of 2021, all were
sporadic infections in people exposed to A(H5N1) viruses through direct or indirect contact with
infected birds, infected mammals or contaminated environments, such as live poultry markets or
other premises with infected animals. Among these cases, there has been no reported humanto-human
transmission.

While the viruses continue to be detected in animals and related environments, including milk,
further sporadic human cases among exposed individuals are expected. Active case finding
around reported human cases has been ongoing, and should continue, to determine if there is
any human-to-human transmission.

Individuals with activities that involve exposure to infected animals and/or contaminated
environments are at higher risk and should take necessary precautions to prevent infection.18
At the present time, based on available information, WHO assesses the overall public health risk
posed by A(H5N1) to be low, and for those with exposure to infected birds or animals or
contaminated environments, the risk of infection is considered low-to-moderate. This risk
requires close monitoring and WHO and partners will continue to regularly assess and publish
public health risk assessments for avian influenza

2. What is the likelihood of cattle-to-human transmission of influenza A(H5N1) viruses?

Human cases have followed exposure to avian influenza-infected mammals for other influenza A
subtypes, including A(H7N2)19 and A(H7N7)20, but only in a few instances. To date, there has been
one reported case of infection with an influenza A(H5N1) virus in the USA in a person who worked at
a dairy farm where cattle were presumed to be infected with A(H5N1) viruses. This case presented
with conjunctivitis as the only symptom and has since recovered.

Infected lactating cattle have been reported to have high viral loads in their milk and thus could be a
source of exposure to persons in close contact with them.21 The potential role of consumption and
handling of milk and milk products in transmission, and the role of pasteurization in mitigating the
potential risk, is currently being investigated.

As long as people are in contact with infected cattle without appropriate personal protective
equipment, there is a risk for human infections. The risk can be mitigated by measures to reduce
exposure to the virus, such as the use of recommended personal protective equipment, appropriate
personal hygiene and other risk-based biosecurity measures.

3. What is the likelihood of human-to-human transmission of avian influenza A(H5N1) viruses?

There has been no reported human-to-human transmission of A(H5N1) viruses since 2007, although
there may be gaps in investigations. Prior to 2007, small clusters of A(H5) virus infections in humans
were reported, including some involving health care workers, where limited human-to-human
transmission could not be excluded; however, sustained human-to-human transmission was not
reported.22

The A(H5N1) viruses detected in mammals, including in human cases, largely retain genomic and
biological characteristics of avian influenza viruses and remain well-adapted to spread among birds.
Except for in-host obtained amino acid mutations in polymerase proteins, there is still limited
evidence for adaptation to mammals and humans even when transmission in mammals has been
suspected.23 No changes in receptor binding tropism have been observed that would increase
binding to receptors in the human upper respiratory tract which would increase transmission to and
among people. Therefore, human-to-human transmission of the currently circulating A(H5N1)
viruses is considered unlikely without further genetic changes in the virus.

WHO, together with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the
World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH), continues to monitor these viruses and will re-assess
the risk associated with the currently spreading A(H5N1) viruses as more information becomes
available.

Further antigenic characterization of A(H5N1) viruses, including in relation to the existing CVVs, and
development of specific reagents are being prioritized at the WHO Collaborating Centres and
Essential Regulatory Laboratories of GISRS in collaboration with animal health and veterinary sector
colleagues.
...

 

[Treyfish]

HelenBranswell
Colorado joins the list of states with confirmed #H5N1 #birdflu outbreaks in dairy cows. Now 9 confirmed states, 34 confirmed outbreaks. Bizarrely, there have only been 2 new outbreaks added to the list this week. Must be little testing underway.​

 

[Treyfish]

:tiphat:3 more cats in New Mexico and 1 in Ohio.. looking for a better link

Four more cats have tested positive for H5N1 bird flu in connection with a growing outbreak in dairy cows in the United States, according to state and federal officials, raising the number of cases in cats in the current outbreak to seven.

Sonja Olsen, the Associate Director of Preparedness and Response at CDC’s Influenza Division, reported three new cases in cats on Thursday and a fourth case was reported on Friday.

“The reports we heard were of cats having neurologic symptoms, rapid decline, and death,” Olsen told BNO News.

Three of the new cases were found at two dairy farms in Curry County, New Mexico and all of them died, according to the state’s Agriculture Department. The fourth case was found at a dairy farm in Wood County, Ohio...:tiphat:
https://bnonews.com/index.php/2024/04/4-more-cats-test-positive-for-h5n1-bird-flu-in-the-u-s/

 

[Michael Coston]

USDA: Colorado 9th State To Report HPAI H5 In Cattle - New Guidance Documents

#18,029


This afternoon the USDA's (HPAI) Detections in Livestock website added Colorado to the list of states (n=9) reporting confirmed HPAI in cattle, raising the total number of confirmed outbreaks to 34.

Despite multiple reports of labs finding a significant percentage of contaminated milk products on store shelves, this is only the 2nd herd confirmation over the past 7 days.​

Testing - excerpt prior to interstate transport - remains voluntary, and reports on Wednesday's CDC/HHS/USDA teleconference indicated that the USDA has seen some resistance to testing by members of the dairy industry.

Today the USDA released two new updated guidance documents:

• 4/26/24-APHIS Requirements and Recommendations for Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) H5N1 Virus in Livestock For State Animal Health Officials, Accredited Veterinarians and Producers

• [*=1]4/26/24-Testing Guidance for Labs for Influenza A in Livestock

In addition to testing cattle, the second document recommends:

Testing Wildlife

Sampling dead and dying birds as well as mammals particularly around affected premises is encouraged. Contact the local wildlife agency or call USDA Wildlife Services at 1-866-4USDA-WS (or 1-866-487-3297). They can assist with identification and sampling. Birds are sampled by collecting oropharyngeal and cloacal swabs.​

• Recommended samples from mammals include brain (preferred if clinically affected) or oral, nasal, or rectal swabs. After sampling, swabs should be placed in MTM or BHI.
• Wild bird mortality events in and around affected premises should be reported to the State Wildlife Agency or APHIS Wildlife Services at 1-866-4USDA-WS.
• Wildlife samples should be designated as “other” with “wildlife” specified on laboratory submission forms.
• Apparently healthy wildlife should not be euthanized solely for sampling. Nuisance wildlife removed with the appropriate State and Federal permits can be sampled with appropriate coordination with your local WS office or State Wildlife Agency.

Testng Sick or Dead Cats or Other Companion Animals near Affected Premises

Cats are particularly suspectable to H5N1 2.3.4.4b viruses; cats with neurologic disease and dead cats on affected dairies are widely reported.

• Brain swabs from affected cats (or whole carcasses) can be submited to NAHLN laboratories.
• Other domestic animals associated with affected farms showing illness should be tested. Contact your NALHN laboratory for consultation.

​https://afludiary.blogspot.com/2024/04/usda-colorado-9th-state-to-report-hpai.html

 

[Treyfish]

Grassley urges better data reporting on avian influenza in dairy cows


by Mark Magnuson | Apr 26, 2024
United States Senator Chuck Grassley (R-IA) responded on Thursday to a Washington Post story critical of bird flu testing in dairy cows and the sharing of results. Grassley says that the logistics of mandating more testing in millions of cows would be difficult.

However, Grassley says he agrees that testing results should be shared more quickly between USDA, FDA, the Centers for Disease Control and then with the public....:tiphat:

https://iowaagribusinessradionetwor...a-reporting-on-avian-influenza-in-dairy-cows/

 

[Treyfish]

Colorado Reports Its First Outbreak Of H5N1 Bird Flu

By Moon

04/26/2024​

Colorado reports its first outbreak of H5N1 bird flu at a dairy farm, raising the US total to 34:tiphat:

https://cedarnews.net/task/breaking...reports-its-first-outbreak-of-h5n1-bird-flu/​

 

[Treyfish]

APHIS outlines order requiring H5N1 tests for dairy cows

04/26/24 4:55 PM By Steve Davies

Dairy and poultry producers need to "redouble biosecurity efforts" and "be vigilant" about monitoring their herds and flocks for avian influenza, according to guidance released Friday by USDA for addressing the presence of HN51 virus in dairy cows.
​:tiphat:https://www.agri-pulse.com/articles...der-requiring-h5n1-tests-for-dairy-cows​​​​​​

 

[Treyfish]

Canadian officials considering "pre-pandemic" vaccines as bird flu spreads through U.S. livestock


U.S. health officials have reported recent outbreaks of H5N1 avian influenza in at least 33 dairy herds, as well as in poultry and wild birds.


Elizabeth Payne
Published Apr 26, 2024 •​
As H5N1 bird flu spreads rapidly through livestock and other animals across the U.S., Canadian officials are exploring stockpiling “pre-pandemic” H5N1 vaccines as a precaution.

The highly pathogenic avian influenza (H5N1) has not been detected in any Canadian livestock and the risk of transmission for the general public is considered low, but the recent rapid spread of the virus through livestock and elsewhere in the U.S. has public health officials around the world on high alert.
​
Health experts are urging people not to drink raw, unpasteurized, milk and to make sure meat is thoroughly cooked, but they say the real potential risk from bird flu is not from food, but from the possibility that changes to the virus enable it to jump from animals to humans. That could create a potential influenza pandemic because human immunity to the virus is expected to be minimal.



Unlike the United States, Canada does not have a stockpile of H5N1 vaccines on hand, according to the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC). But it does have agreements in place for quick access to pandemic influenza vaccines if needed, said Nicholas Janveau, spokesperson for PHAC.



“PHAC maintains agreements to secure timely access to pandemic influenza vaccines for the entire Canadian population should an influenza pandemic occur,” he said.



Those agreements should protect against the risk of vaccine embargoes, border closures and transportation and shipment delays – “as recently witnessed during the COVID-19 pandemic,” he said....
:tiphat:
https://ottawacitizen.com/news/loca...es-as-bird-flu-spreads-through-u-s-livestock​

 

[Treyfish]

US senators push for bird-flu response as FDA reports milk findings

Apr 27, 2024 02:27 AM IST​
By Julie Steenhuysen, Tom Polansek

​​​​​​
-Some U.S. lawmakers urged the Biden administration on Friday to further contain the spread of bird flu in dairy cows as tests of milk suggested the outbreak is more widespread than previously thought.
The push from Congress members for a stronger response adds pressure on federal agriculture and health authorities still seeking to confirm how the H5N1 virus is spreading and its potential risks to people, one month after the first detection in a Texas dairy herd.
...
​​​​​​"Containing this before it spreads among humans is critical. Given lessons learned from COVID, this federal response is insufficient," Republican U.S. Senator Mitt Romney said in a post on X. ....

​​​​​​Some lawmakers, including Romney, have made a bipartisan push to reauthorize legislation known as the Pandemic and All Hazards Preparedness Act that lapsed last year and is aimed at bolstering the nation's response to pandemics and other public health threats......

The difference between the genetic sequences of the worker's virus and the 239 other samples provided indicate that "this was a very longstanding, widespread epidemic," ..
I think the sequences out there probably aren't representative of everything that's circulating," said Dr. Richard Webby,

..Osterholm said the developments suggest the U.S. should be doing much more sampling, in both dairy and beef cattle, as well as pigs, which are a frequent mixing vessel for flu viruses that can be transmitted to people....

​​​​​​Democratic U.S. Senator Tammy Baldwin of Wisconsin, a significant dairy state with no reported cases, has urged the USDA to "quickly deploy additional resources in states that have the opportunity to prevent the disease from entering herds."...

The White House has said that it is monitoring the avian flu situation, launching an "immediate response team" to ensure the safety of the nation’s food supply, monitor trends to mitigate risk and prevent the virus' spread.
​....:tiphat:
​​​​​​https://www.hindustantimes.com/heal...da-reports-milk-findings-101714165046251.html