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Science. Evolution, Safety, and Highly Pathogenic Influenza Viruses
[Source: Science, full text: (LINK). Abstract, edited.]
<CITE><ABBR>Science</ABBR> 22 June 2012: Vol. 336 no. 6088 pp. 1529-1531 - DOI: 10.1126/science.1223204 </CITE>
<CITE></CITE>
<CITE></CITE>Policy Forum
Evolution, Safety, and Highly Pathogenic Influenza Viruses
Marc Lipsitch<SUP>1</SUP>,<SUP>2</SUP>,*, Joshua B. Plotkin<SUP>3</SUP>, Lone Simonsen<SUP>4</SUP>, Barry Bloom<SUP>2</SUP>
<SUP></SUP>
Author Affiliations: <SUP>1</SUP>Center for Communicable Disease Dynamics and Department of Epidemiology, Harvard School of Public Health, Boston, MA 02115, USA. <SUP>2</SUP>Department of Immunology and Infectious Diseases, Harvard School of Public Health, Boston, MA 02115, USA. <SUP>3</SUP>Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA. <SUP>4</SUP>Department of Global Health, George Washington University School of Public Health and Health Services, Washington, DC 20037, USA.
*To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: mlipsitc@hsph.harvard.edu
Abstract
Experience with influenza has shown that predictions of virus phenotype or fitness from nucleotide sequence are imperfect and that predicting the timing and course of evolution is extremely difficult. Such uncertainty means that the risk of experiments with mammalian-transmissible, possibly highly virulent influenza viruses remains high even if some aspects of their laboratory biology are reassuring; it also implies limitations on the ability of laboratory observations to guide interpretation of surveillance of strains in the field. Thus, we propose that future experiments with virulent pathogens whose accidental or deliberate release could lead to extensive spread in human populations should be limited by explicit risk-benefit considerations.
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<CITE><ABBR>Science</ABBR> 22 June 2012: Vol. 336 no. 6088 pp. 1529-1531 - DOI: 10.1126/science.1223204 </CITE>
<CITE></CITE>
<CITE></CITE>Policy Forum
Evolution, Safety, and Highly Pathogenic Influenza Viruses
Marc Lipsitch<SUP>1</SUP>,<SUP>2</SUP>,*, Joshua B. Plotkin<SUP>3</SUP>, Lone Simonsen<SUP>4</SUP>, Barry Bloom<SUP>2</SUP>
<SUP></SUP>
Author Affiliations: <SUP>1</SUP>Center for Communicable Disease Dynamics and Department of Epidemiology, Harvard School of Public Health, Boston, MA 02115, USA. <SUP>2</SUP>Department of Immunology and Infectious Diseases, Harvard School of Public Health, Boston, MA 02115, USA. <SUP>3</SUP>Department of Biology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA. <SUP>4</SUP>Department of Global Health, George Washington University School of Public Health and Health Services, Washington, DC 20037, USA.
*To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: mlipsitc@hsph.harvard.edu
Abstract
Experience with influenza has shown that predictions of virus phenotype or fitness from nucleotide sequence are imperfect and that predicting the timing and course of evolution is extremely difficult. Such uncertainty means that the risk of experiments with mammalian-transmissible, possibly highly virulent influenza viruses remains high even if some aspects of their laboratory biology are reassuring; it also implies limitations on the ability of laboratory observations to guide interpretation of surveillance of strains in the field. Thus, we propose that future experiments with virulent pathogens whose accidental or deliberate release could lead to extensive spread in human populations should be limited by explicit risk-benefit considerations.
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