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Nature. Policy: Adaptations of avian flu virus are a cause for concern
[Source: Nature, full text: (LINK). Extract.]
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Policy: Adaptations of avian flu virus are a cause for concern
Kenneth I. Berns,<SUP> </SUP>Arturo Casadevall,<SUP> </SUP>Murray L. Cohen,<SUP> </SUP>Susan A. Ehrlich,<SUP> </SUP>Lynn W. Enquist,<SUP> </SUP>J. Patrick Fitch,<SUP> </SUP>David R. Franz,<SUP> </SUP>Claire M. Fraser-Liggett,<SUP> </SUP>Christine M. Grant,<SUP> </SUP>Michael J. Imperiale,<SUP> </SUP>Joseph Kanabrocki,<SUP> </SUP>Paul S. Keim,<SUP> </SUP>Stanley M. Lemon,<SUP> </SUP>Stuart B. Levy,<SUP> </SUP>John R. Lumpkin,<SUP> </SUP>Jeffery F. Miller,<SUP> </SUP>Randall Murch,<SUP> </SUP>Mark E. Nance,<SUP> </SUP>Michael T. Osterholm,<SUP> </SUP>David A. Relman,<SUP> </SUP>James A. Roth & Anne K. Vidaver
Journal name: Nature - Volume: 482, Pages: 153?154
Date published: (09 February 2012)
DOI: doi:10.1038/482153a
Published online 31 January 2012
Members of the US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity explain its recommendations on the communication of experimental work on H5N1 influenza.
We are in the midst of a revolutionary period in the life sciences. Technological capabilities have dramatically expanded, we have a much improved understanding of the complex biology of selected microorganisms, and we have a much improved ability to manipulate microbial genomes. With this has come unprecedented potential for better control of infectious diseases and significant societal benefit. However, there is also a growing risk that the same science will be deliberately misused and that the consequences could be catastrophic. Efforts to describe or define life-sciences research of particular concern have focused on the possibility that knowledge or products derived from such research, or new technologies, could be directly misapplied with a sufficiently broad scope to affect national or global security. Research that might greatly enhance the harm caused by microbial pathogens has been of special concern. Until now, these efforts have suffered from a lack of specificity and a paucity of concrete examples of 'dual use research of concern'. Dual use is defined as research that could be used for good or bad purposes. We are now confronted by a potent, real-world example.
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-Journal name: Nature - Volume: 482, Pages: 153?154
Date published: (09 February 2012)
DOI: doi:10.1038/482153a
Published online 31 January 2012
Members of the US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity explain its recommendations on the communication of experimental work on H5N1 influenza.
We are in the midst of a revolutionary period in the life sciences. Technological capabilities have dramatically expanded, we have a much improved understanding of the complex biology of selected microorganisms, and we have a much improved ability to manipulate microbial genomes. With this has come unprecedented potential for better control of infectious diseases and significant societal benefit. However, there is also a growing risk that the same science will be deliberately misused and that the consequences could be catastrophic. Efforts to describe or define life-sciences research of particular concern have focused on the possibility that knowledge or products derived from such research, or new technologies, could be directly misapplied with a sufficiently broad scope to affect national or global security. Research that might greatly enhance the harm caused by microbial pathogens has been of special concern. Until now, these efforts have suffered from a lack of specificity and a paucity of concrete examples of 'dual use research of concern'. Dual use is defined as research that could be used for good or bad purposes. We are now confronted by a potent, real-world example.
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