Avian flu H5N1 discussion - news/case lists links - 2022+

[sharon sanders]

hat tip Hogvet51


snip


In summary we are at the point where the case load is slowing and released information is slowing even more as federal and state animal and public health staffs are reduced by cuts and less proactive U.S. public health policies come to the forefront. I don’t think our risk for cross species infections or for another human pandemic from H5N1 (or any other agent) has lessened whatsoever; however, our odds for early detection and a timely effective response continue to deteriorate daily.

I talked to an unnamed former VS colleague at the North Carolina meeting, still with a job, but quite pessimistic that VS or the animal health regulatory infrastructure in general has even minimal staff in place to handle a large resurgence in HPAI outbreaks next fall, let alone a major zoonotic pandemic or foreign animal disease response.

I hope industry is ready to step up to fend for itself in the event of a major animal health challenge, including one that involves a One Health threat. The capacity for a sustained federal or state effort will not be there initially. Plan accordingly to protect your interests.

For those of us who still believe, it may be a good time keep up our seasonal influenza vaccines for limited cross protection and to stockpile some N-95’s for those we love!

https://hogvet51.substack.com/p/h5n1-out-of-the-headlines-catching

[Pathfinder]

ISSN: 1080-6059

Disclaimer: Early release articles are not considered as final versions. Any changes will be reflected in the online version in the month the article is officially released.

Volume 31, Number 6—
June 2025

Research Letter

Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Isolated from Dairy Farm Worker, Michigan

Nicole Brock, Joanna A. Pulit-Penaloza, Jessica A. Belser, Claudia Pappas, Xiangjie Sun, Troy J. Kieran, Hui Zeng, Juan A. De La Cruz, Yasuko Hatta, Han Di, C. Todd Davis, Terrence M. Tumpey, and Taronna R. Maines
Author affiliation: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA

Suggested citation for this article

Abstract

Influenza A(H5N1) viruses have been detected in US dairy cow herds since 2024. We assessed the pathogenesis, transmission, and airborne release of A/Michigan/90/2024, an H5N1 isolate from a dairy farm worker in Michigan, in the ferret model. Results show this virus caused airborne transmission with moderate pathogenicity, including limited extrapulmonary spread, without lethality.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b viruses have displayed unprecedented global spread among wild birds leading to numerous spillover infections in mammalian species. Of note, outbreaks in dairy cattle and gallinaceous birds have resulted in human infections in the United States during 2024–2025 (1). Increased frequency of H5N1 viruses crossing species barriers has caused concern that the avian influenza viruses are adapting to mammals. A critical component of influenza pandemic preparedness is early identification of emerging novel influenza viruses that cause disease and transmit efficiently in humans. A clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 virus, A/Michigan/90/2024 (MI90), genotype B3.13, was isolated from a conjunctival swab specimen collected from a human patient in Michigan with conjunctivitis after exposure to infected cattle (2,3). In this article, we report the pathogenesis, transmission, and airborne exhalation of MI90 virus in ferrets, the standard animal model for influenza virus risk assessments (4).

We inoculated 18 ferrets with MI90 virus as previously described (5,6). We euthanized 3 ferrets on 3 and 5 days postinoculation (dpi) to assess virus spread in tissues. We used 6 ferrets to assess transmission in a cohoused, direct contact setting as a direct contact transmission model and through the air in the absence of direct or indirect contact as a respiratory droplet transmission model. We paired each ferret with a naive contact, as previously described (4). We observed clinical manifestations daily and collected nasal wash (NW), conjunctival, and rectal swab samples every 2 days postinoculation or postcontact. We confirmed transmission by testing for seroconversion to homologous virus in the contact animals.

Although all MI90-infected ferrets survived the 21-day study, we noted moderate disease. In inoculated ferrets, the mean maximum weight loss was 9.8%, fever (1.8°C above baseline) and lethargy were transient, and nasal and ocular discharge and sneezing were evident on days 4–9 dpi (Table). We detected virus 3 dpi primarily in respiratory tract tissues; titers were highest in ethmoid turbinate samples (7.4 log₁₀ PFU/mL) and at low levels in brain and gastrointestinal tissues. We observed similar results in tissues collected 5 dpi.

Figure. Transmission and measurement of airborne avian influenza A(H5N1) virus isolated from dairy farm worker, Michigan. A, B) For DCT and RDT testing, ferrets (n = 12) were intranasally inoculated with...

During the direct contact transmission experiment, inoculated ferrets shed virus in NW that peaked at 4.7–5.4 log₁₀ PFU/mL at 1–5 dpi (Figure, panel A). Four of 6 cohoused contact animals had virus in NW (peak 2.5–4.9 log₁₀ PFU/mL) at 5–7 days postcontact, whereas all 6 contact animals had viral RNA detected (3.6–7.7 log₁₀ copies/mL) in NW (7) and seroconverted to MI90 virus, indicating that transmission was 100% (6/6 animals). In the respiratory droplet transmission experiment, NW collected from inoculated animals peaked 2.6–4.8 log₁₀ PFU/mL at 1–3 dpi, whereas 3/6 contact ferrets had detectable virus in NW by day 7 postcontact (peak 2.6–4.8 log₁₀ PFU/mL; days 9–11 postcontact) (Figure, panel B) as well as viral RNA (6.7–8.2 log₁₀ copies/mL), and seroconverted, confirming transmission through the air in 50% of ferrets (3/6). We also detected infectious virus in conjunctival and rectal samples from inoculated animals, but only from 2 contact animals (Table).

To further evaluate the level of virus exhaled by MI90-inoculated ferrets and the potential for airborne transmission, we collected aerosol samples 1 time each day at 1–5 dpi for 1 hour from the 3 ferrets that were euthanized at 5 dpi. Air samples were analyzed for infectious virus and viral RNA by using the BC251 cyclone-based sampler (kindly provided by Dr. William Lindsley, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health) and the SPOT water condensation sampler (Aerosol Devices, https://aerosoldevices.comExternal Link), as described previously (8) (Figure, panel D). The highest mean titer of virus was detected at 2 dpi in NW collected from all 3 inoculated ferrets (6.5 log₁₀ PFU/mL) (Figure, panel C). Airborne virus was highest at 3 dpi as measured in both samplers, up to 133 and 41 PFU/hour, supporting transmission observed in both contact models within 3–5 days after exposure.

Overall, MI90 virus displayed reduced virulence in ferrets compared to another H5N1 virus isolated from a dairy farm worker in Texas (8,9); the Texas virus possesses a genetic marker in the polymerase basic 2 protein (E627K), known for enhanced replication and pathogenesis in mammals. At this position, MI90 encodes 627E, like most other viruses isolated from cattle, and contains polymerase basic 2 M631L, which is associated with mammal adaptation (3,9). In addition, polymerase acidic 142N/E has been linked to increased virulence in mice (10); the Texas virus has an E and MI90 virus has a K at this position. Both viruses have identical hemagglutinin sequences associated with receptor binding and the multi-basic cleavage site. Despite differences in virulence, both viruses transmitted in the ferret model with similar proficiency and levels of airborne virus.

Because avian H5N1 viruses cross the species barrier and adapt to dairy cattle, each associated human infection presents further opportunity for mammal adaption. This potential poses an ongoing threat to public health and requires continual surveillance and risk assessment of emerging viruses to improve our ability to predict and prepare for the next influenza pandemic.

Dr. Brock is a microbiologist in the Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Her research interests include the pathogenicity, transmissibility, and host response associated with emerging strains of influenza virus.

...

https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/31/6/25-0386_article

[sharon sanders]

FluTrackers.com
@FluTrackers
·
48s




Blog - CDC: A/California/147/2024 & A/Washington/239/2024 "..viruses scored in the 'moderate risk' category for potential emergence & public health impact,....These results validate the proactive, coordinated U.S. government response.", by
@Fla_Medic
https://flutrackers.com/forum/forum/internet-communication/avian-flu-diary/1012651-cdc-adds-2-new-h5n1-viruses-to-their-irat-list… #H5N1

[Commonground]

Avian Influenza in Cats Is Not Getting the Attention it Deserves, UMD Researchers Warn

20-Year Review Underscores Need for Better Surveillance to Protect Cats, Humans
By Fid Thompson May 09, 2025

More surveillance of domestic cats is “urgently needed” amid a steep recent increase in feline H5N1 avian influenza infections, according to University of Maryland public health researchers who conducted a sweeping literature review on the illness in cats.

The study, which spanned data on bird flu in cats from 2004-24, was published Wednesday in Open Forum Infectious Diseases. Though the disease is not passed human-to-human right now, public health authorities say the emerging threat of a human pandemic is intensified by increased contact between infected animals and humans, which increases the likelihood of a mutation that would allow such transmission.

“The virus has evolved, and the way that it jumps between species—from birds to cats, and now between cows and cats, cats and humans—is very concerning. As summer approaches, we are anticipating cases on farms and in the wild to rise again,” said the study’s lead and senior author Dr. Kristen Coleman, assistant professor in UMD School of Public Health’s Department of Global, Environmental and Occupational Health and affiliate professor in UMD’s Department of Veterinary Medicine.

“Bird flu is very deadly to cats, and we urgently need to figure out how widespread the virus is in cat populations to better assess spillover risk to humans,” she said. “We want to help protect both people and pets.”

continued: https://today.umd.edu/avian-influenz...searchers-warn

[Commonground]

Spring 2025

A magazine for friends of the Warren Alpert Medical School of Brown University: How can health systems prepare for the potential spread of avian flu?



Ask the Expert: Leonard Mermel

Ever since the highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 first emerged in 1996, it’s “haunted” infectious diseases expert Leonard Mermel, DO, ScM, he says. As it spread from birds to mammals, including humans—and killed about half of the people who contracted it—he couldn’t help but think of the 1918 flu. “Humanity may well be on the brink of the next great pandemic and we are scantily clad to protect ourselves from a virus that will surely thin the herd,” he wrote in The Lancet in 2005. Two decades later, Mermel, a professor of medicine (and a drummer), is still beating the same drum. “I’m either Chicken Little or Paul Revere,” he says. “I hope the former, but if the latter, I want to get the word out.”

The current outbreak, which began in 2021, is infecting more and more mammals. It’s killed big cats in zoos, elephant seals in South America, farmed mink, pet cats, and many others. It’s infecting cows and spreading to farm workers. So, it’s undergone genetic changes that have allowed it to adapt to live in a mammal. We’ve had a few human cases where the CDC did a deep investigation and didn’t find the source—no exposure to farm animals, didn’t have backyard birds, didn’t drink raw milk. Well, where did they get it? We don’t know. Based on a dramatic reduction in funding and personnel in public health at the federal and state level, there may be reduced case finding and underreporting, making it more difficult to determine if this virus is spreading in communities around the US.

For bird flu to fully adapt and then spread person to person, there has to be a genetic change where it preferentially binds to human airway cell receptors. There was a Science article published Dec. 5, 2024, that was somewhat frightening, demonstrating that a single mutation could lead to that. Other changes are needed; it has to survive in and exit the infected human cells. I’m not a virologist, but if that happened, I believe we would certainly have a human pandemic.

As the medical director of the Department of Epidemiology and Infection Control for Brown University Health, I’m very fortunate that our administration is willing to listen to my concerns. We have been meeting weekly as a health care system, addressing various issues regarding pandemic preparedness. Hospitals need to think about, what are their stockpiles of personal protective equipment, stockpiles of antiviral agents? What would be their staffing plans? How would they accommodate an increased volume of patients seeking care as we experienced with COVID?

You don’t want to get the public riled up—I’m sensitive to that. But they need to know what’s really going on and we need to find that equipoise. It’s hard in human nature to plan for the worst-case scenarios. But they’re possible, and that’s the problem with our just-in-time mentality, particularly in the US. I think we’re on the precipice. But have we learned the lessons of COVID?

https://medicine.at.brown.edu/how-can-health-systems-prepare-for-the-potential-spread-of-avian-flu/

[Pathfinder]

Why we should seriously consider vaccinating wild birds to control bird flu

By Lynn C. Klotz | May 14, 2025
...
It’s infected nearly 500 species of wild birds and mammals ranging from foxes to zoo tigers. It’s time to consider another means of stopping its spread: vaccinating wild birds and, perhaps, other wildlife. By doing so, we will rescue large numbers of animals from a painful death, slow the transmission of infections, and reduce the probability of a pandemic in humans. These outcomes provide reason enough to vaccinate wildlife.
...
How to vaccinate wild birds. Birds like snow geese, which congregate in large numbers, are ideal targets for mass vaccination. They breed during the summers in the arctic and fly south to the United States and as far as Mexico in the winter. Snow geese have turned up infected at several sites in the United States, some of the more than 400 species of wild bird to be affected by H5N1.

The World Organization for Animal Health, an intergovernmental organization, suggested in 2023 that it won’t be easy to vaccinate wild birds: “[W]ide-scale bird flu vaccination of free-ranging wild bird populations is typically considered impractical with currently available vaccination strategies,” a committee report reads. That agency and the Food and Agriculture Organization, a UN agency, called vaccinating wild birds an “urgent research priority.”

The Cornell Wildlife Health Lab points to some of the challenges facing any mass wildlife vaccination campaign: “Before a wildlife vaccine can be used in populations of wild animals, a great deal of research must be done to determine the safest and most effective vaccine, the most palatable bait formulation, and the best cost-effective distribution method [but] oral vaccination of wildlife holds great promise in limiting the public health, agricultural industry, and conservation consequences of diseases that circulate within wildlife.”

This effort will be worth it to protect wild birds, domestic poultry, and other species. Indeed, researchers have already vaccinated at least one wild bird species, the endangered California condor.
...

https://thebulletin.org/2025/05/why-we-should-seriously-consider-vaccinating-wild-birds-to-control-bird-flu/

----------------------------------
See also:
US - The race to protect endangered condors against deadly bird flu

https://flutrackers.com/forum/forum/united-states/h5n1-tracking-af/980075-us-the-race-to-protect-endangered-condors-against-deadly-bird-flu

[Pathfinder]

Russia -

Translation Google

May 21, 2025, 00:01

Contagious with fur: Bird flu in cats threatens the world with a new pandemic

How likely is it that another strain dangerous to humans will emerge?

Denis Gritsenko

Highlight the main points Off

The bird flu virus from cats, which are now suffering from this infection en masse, is highly likely to spread to humans and cause a dangerous epidemic comparable to smallpox , Alexander Ginzburg, director of the Gamaleya National Research Center for Epidemiology and Microbiology, told Izvestia.

According to the specialist, in case of such a development, a prototype vaccine should be created in the country, the production of which could be quickly established if necessary . According to other scientists, animals can indeed serve as a convenient reservoir for the formation of new H5N1 strains that are dangerous to humans, but overcoming the interspecies barrier is a difficult task for the pathogen . It will probably be easier for the virus to approach humans through birds and pigs than through cats. Read more about the new threat in the Izvestia article.

The virus is more dangerous than smallpox

The probability of the bird flu virus spreading from cats, which are now being infected en masse in the US and Europe, to humans is very high , Alexander Ginzburg, director of the Gamaleya National Research Center for Epidemiology and Microbiology, told Izvestia. Given the infectiousness and severe clinical manifestations of this pathogen, the epidemic it causes could be comparable to outbreaks of smallpox , the scientist said. Therefore, Russia needs to create a prototype vaccine against H5N1.

— We need a prototype of this vaccine . It must pass the first and second stages of clinical trials against the strain that is very likely to be transmitted not only between animals, but also from person to person. The fatality rate there is 50-70%, and with airborne transmission, smallpox will seem like a toy compared to what can happen as a result of one or two mutations , — said Alexander Gintsburg.

A ready prototype of the vaccine should be available in case such a strain spreads in our country or other countries, so that within three to four weeks it would be possible to develop a drug for the whole of Russia and introduce it into civil circulation . However, such work is not currently being conducted at the Gamaleya Center and there is no single state program that would unite the capabilities of developers and manufacturers of a promising vaccine , he added.

Epidemiologists have noted the active spread of the bird flu virus among cats in Europe and the United States this spring . According to the European Food Safety Authority, more animals were exposed to the virus in the first three months of 2025 than in the previous nine months . Cats usually become ill by eating infected poultry or eggs. Infections have been reported in poultry farms in Belgium, causing paralysis, ataxia, and other severe symptoms. The animals had to be euthanized . Similar cases have been identified in Iceland and Norway. A similar situation is developing in the United States.

The danger of the spread of the H5N1 virus among cats for humans is that animals serve as an excellent reservoir for the emergence of new strains of the pathogen that will be capable of being transmitted to humans , noted Mikhail Bolkov, a researcher at the Institute for the Study of Aging of the Russian Gerontological Research and Clinical Center of the Russian National Research Medical University named after N.I. Pirogov of the Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation.

— The flu virus moves between animals and humans cyclically. When in animals, it can change its antigenicity because they are sick with different strains than humans, and if different variants end up in one cell, a new genome can be assembled from different components. Flu viruses have a segmented genome, he told Izvestia.

Cats have become an indicator of the spread of the virus among mammals. It is impossible to stop this process, and all that remains is to observe and prepare for possible problems , the specialist emphasized.

Epidemic among mammals

Researchers in the UK call the extent of bird flu’s spread around the world a mammalian panzootic that could contribute to human infection . They cite confirmed cases of mammal-to-mammal transmission on European fur farms, among marine animals in South America, and in dairy cattle in the US. They say that by early April this year, 70 human cases of bird flu had been reported in the US. Of these, 41 were linked to dairy herds, 24 to poultry farming, and two to interactions with other animals. The sources of three other infections remain unknown .

Experts estimate that H5N1 currently has a much lower potential for transmission than previous human flu subtypes that have caused pandemics or seasonal outbreaks . And the virus is still poorly transmitted from person to person, although agricultural workers who frequently come into contact with animals remain at risk.

It will be difficult for the H5N1 virus to overcome the interspecies barrier, although it has a high potential for mutations . If it is able to infect humans, it will most likely happen not through cats, but through birds or pigs , Elena Malinnikova, head of the virology department at the Russian Medical Academy of Postgraduate Education of the Russian Ministry of Health, told Izvestia.

— In terms of overcoming the interspecies barrier, bird flu from birds and pigs is closer to humans than from cats. But such a transfer of infection is very difficult. At the same time, flu viruses have a very high potential, because their RNA is not folded into a spiral, but has eight separate fragments. And they are characterized by reassortment — “mixing” of different variants inside the cell. They can really be transmitted from one species to another . In 2009, a triple reassortant appeared — pandemic H5N1, which infected birds, pigs, and humans. But there is no pathogen that could pass to people from cats yet, and specialists are not currently considering this possibility , — the expert said.

If the bird flu virus manages to overcome the interspecies barrier and infect humans, it will be able to actively spread among people, but it is unlikely to have a catastrophically high mortality rate or symptoms comparable to smallpox , added Stanislav Otstavnov, head of the laboratory for the analysis of population health indicators and digitalization of healthcare at MIPT.

https://iz.ru/1889349/denis-gritcenko/zarazitelnyj-s-mekhom-ptichij-gripp-u-koshek-ugrozhaet-epidemiej-huzhe-chernoj-ospy

[sharon sanders]

Here is this expert's credentials: https://microbiol.crie.ru/jour/pages/view/Gintsburg

[Commonground]

H5N1 in U.S. Dairy Cattle: An Unprecedented Event in the History of Virology

5 June 2025

by Fabrício Souza Campos

Fabrício Souza Campos is a virologist and professor at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), Brazil. He coordinates the Graduate Program in Agricultural and Environmental Microbiology and leads research on virus surveillance in wildlife and domestic animals, with a focus on zoonotic threats and One Health. He has worked on projects ranging from Antarctica to the Amazon, combining field ecology, molecular diagnostics, and genomic analysis.


Influenza A viruses are classified based on the antigenic properties of two surface glycoproteins: hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA). There are 18 known HA subtypes and 11 NA subtypes, and their combinations give rise to multiple influenza A subtypes, such as H1N1 and H5N1. Among these, H5N1 is a highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus, historically associated with severe disease and high mortality in birds, as well as occasional zoonotic transmission to humans.

Initially known for devastating poultry outbreaks, H5N1 gained global attention in 1997 when it caused human infections in Hong Kong. Between 2003 and 2006, it expanded across Asia, Europe, and Africa, affecting both domestic and wild bird populations. The evolution of H5N1 has been characterized by the emergence of distinct genetic clades, classified according to the hemagglutinin (HA) gene phylogeny. In response, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) established a standardized nomenclature system, initially defining ten major clades (0–9). Among them, clade 2.3.4 subsequently diversified into subclade 2.3.4.4, noted for its enhanced adaptability and ability to spread globally.

-snip-


The incident highlights a broader challenge: the interplay between epidemiology and policy. In the U.S., the Department of Agriculture (USDA) provides financial compensation to producers for poultry losses in the event of HPAI outbreaks. While this ensures rapid compliance with depopulation protocols, it may unintentionally reduce incentives for rigorous biosecurity implementation. This phenomenon, often described as “moral hazard,” reflects a systemic weakness wherein reimbursement can displace responsibility. In such cases, even the most advanced infrastructure cannot compensate for gaps in institutional coordination and risk accountability.

In contrast, Brazil—operating with more limited economic resources and without a national compensation program—managed to contain a 2025 outbreak of H5N1 in commercial poultry in Montenegro, Rio Grande do Sul. The response was led by the Brazilian Department of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply (MAPA), the State Center for Health Surveillance (CEVS/RS), and the National Laboratory for Agricultural Defense of Brazil (LANAGRO). These agencies swiftly coordinated field surveillance, culling, sanitary barriers, and tracing protocols. In the absence of financial indemnification, Brazilian producers may have been more vigilant, knowing that failure to act could result in irrecoverable economic losses. To date, the virus remains restricted to avian species in Brazil.

The contrast between the U.S. and Brazilian responses reveals an important insight: effective outbreak control depends not only on scientific capability or funding, but also on well-aligned incentives, clear governance, and cultural attitudes toward biosecurity. It raises a thought-provoking question: can the United States learn something from Brazil’s approach?

https://virology.ws/2025/06/05/h5n1-in-u-s-dairy-cattle-an-unprecedented-event-in-the-history-of-virology/

[Commonground]

BirdCast Forecasts and Alerts are back online
May 28, 2025

Update: 28 May, 10am ET. The technical issues with the migration forecasts and alerts have now been resolved. Thank you for your patience as we worked through various fixes.

Additionally, we would like to highlight, since some have noticed, that Canada is still not included in our BirdCast coverage despite the appearance of recent graphics. Though we have been exploring partnerships for several years to collaborate with our Canadian colleagues, any current graphics showing coverage in Canada are related only to the technical issues rather than to new data or a new product.

Please note, when viewing migration forecasts, you may need to force a refresh of your browser to see graphics appear in their most up to date form.

Google Chrome
Windows users: hold down Ctrl and then press F5 on your keyboard
Mac users: hold down Cmd and Shift and then press R on your keyboard

Firefox
For Windows users: hold down Ctrl and then press F5 on your keyboard
Mac users: hold down ? Cmd and ? Shift and then press R on your keyboard

Safari
Go to Safari > Empty Cache, or hit Opt + Cmd + E
To refresh, click the refresh button on the address bar or press Cmd + R

https://birdcast.info/news/birdcast-forecasts-and-alerts-temporarily-unavailable/

Live bird migration maps
See real-time analysis maps of intensities of actual nocturnal bird migration, as detected by the US weather surveillance radar network between local sunset to sunrise. Cornell Lab of Ornithology currently produces these maps

June 4, 2025

https://birdcast.info/migration-tools/live-migration-maps/

[Pathfinder]

Bald eagle infected with bird flu successfully rehabbed, released back into wild

By Jordan BowenPublished June 9, 2025 6:02 am EDT

The Brief
-The Raptor Center of Tampa Bay is one of the first organizations to successfully rehab a bird infected with bird flu.
-The male juvenile bald eagle spent 59 days in rehab before being released.
-His sister, who was infected with bird flu, died just two hours after being rescued.
...
Because of the female's symptoms, they were preparing to euthanize her, but she died before they could. Both tested positive for highly pathogenic avian influenza. However, the male was asymptomatic, so Murrah reached out to U.S. Fish and Wildlife for guidance.

"They had advised us that they would euthanize a bird because of the difficulty of dealing with isolation," Murrah said.

But Murrah says she and her team saw an opportunity to try and save this bird because, although he tested positive for bird flu, he wasn't showing any symptoms that would cause him pain.

"For us, we had an asymptomatic bird, very bright-eyed, very active in the cage, good body weight. And like I said, had I not tested him, you wouldn't have thought he had anything wrong with him," Murrah said.

After a 33-day quarantine, Murrah says he tested negative, but just to be sure, they tested him again after a week and a half, and he was still negative. He spent the next 21 days in a 100-foot-high flight cage until he reached proper body weight to be released back into the wild.
...

https://www.fox13news.com/news/bald-eagle-infected-bird-flu-successfully-rehabbed-released-back-wild

[Pathfinder]

With AI, Researchers Find Increasing Immune Evasion in H5N1

June 20, 2025
...
Los Angeles, Calif.—The H5N1 avian influenza virus has infected birds and mammals around the world. As of June 2025, 70 people have been infected, and 1 person has died in the United States. A new analysis suggests that the virus is evolving clever strategies. Using artificial intelligence tools, researchers at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte (UNCC) analyzed thousands of viral proteins and found that their bonds to protective antibodies have weakened over time.

Newer versions of the virus have improved their ability to evade the natural defenses of the human immune system. “The virus has certainly mutated away from what we saw a decade ago,” said UNCC computational biologist Colby T. Ford, Ph.D., who led the study. “They don't even look the same.”

These adaptations increase the pandemic potential of the virus, he said, and candidate vaccines developed 10 years ago may not be efficacious against the contemporary strains of the virus. “This has the potential to be bad.”
...

https://asm.org/press-releases/2025/june/with-ai,-researchers-find-increasing-immune-evasio

[Commonground]

California Uses Multipronged Approach Against Avian Flu

JULY 3, 2025
By Marcus A. Banks

California has responded to the ongoing avian influenza (H5N1) outbreak by monitoring human and animal activities, testing wastewater and raw milk, and even testing for the virus in cats, said its public health laboratory director Anthony Tran, DrPH, MPH, D(ABMM). Speaking at the ASM Microbe 2025 meeting, in Los Angeles, Dr. Tran said this was the first time that a One Health approach to infectious disease management has been incorporated into a statewide emergency response.


There have been 70 confirmed U.S. human cases of H5N1 since April 2024, Dr. Tran explained.

“We’ve taken the lion’s share of that here in California,” Dr. Tran pointed out, with 38 confirmed and one probable case. Most U.S. cases are mild, he noted, but there have been four hospitalizations and one death.

Dr. Tran said California is the state with the largest agricultural industry in the United States, with confirmed cases of H5N1 in more than 766 cattle herds. California public health officials quarantined those herds to prevent infected milk from entering the food supply. As of the ASM Microbe meeting, Dr. Tran said more than 80% of the herds were removed from quarantine once H5N1 was no longer detected in milk from cows in the herd.

“This actually meshed a lot with data we had seen from other states, with the—pun intended—herd immunity of the cattle being infected and then leveling off in terms of immunity from H5N1,” Dr. Tran remarked.

He also noted that 37 human avian influenza cases (36 confirmed cases and one probable case) in California were in farmworkers, suggesting some cattle-to-human transmission as farmworkers handled infected milk. The hemagglutinin protein on H5N1 binds to receptors that allow for interspecies transmission, Dr. Tran said (Cell2025;188[4]:919-929.e9).

As H5N1 cases in cattle stabilized, evidence of the virus also began to decline in wastewater.

“This [wastewater surveillance] is not only an early warning system, we feel, but it coincided at this time with what was actually happening in the cattle,” Dr. Tran said.

Wastewater surveillance capacity was relatively straightforward to increase, Dr. Tran noted, by making this a focus at the state’s own laboratories and partnering with private industry. Testing for H5N1 in raw milk was harder, he acknowledged, as there are no established protocols for public health laboratories doing this. Raw milk is allowed to be produced and sold within California state lines, Dr. Tran said, causing some of his colleagues to proactively test for H5N1 in raw milk supplies. The FDA does not allow sale of raw milk across state lines because it could be contaminated, Dr. Tran noted.

Given the lack of standard protocols for testing for H5 in milk at public health laboratories, the first protocol was for influenza A virus in general, and the state now has an H5-specific subtyping assay. This work led to several raw milk recalls in California in November and December 2024.

“We have also started to find H5N1 in cats,” noted Dr. Tran, as further evidence of the state’s One Health approach to surveillance. Cats are also susceptible to H5N1 from raw milk or food.

If a cat with an encephalitic neurologic illness potentially indicating flu dies and tests negatively for rabies, public health officials then test for H5N1. Thus far, this has yielded 21 cases of confirmed H5N1 infection in domestic cats. Detection of H5N1 infection in cats is considered a potential harbinger of a larger influenza problem.

Dr. Tran said California plans to continue intensive H5N1 surveillance.

https://www.idse.net/Influenza/Article/07-25/California-Uses-Multipronged-Approach-Against-Avian-Flu/77617?utm_source=social&utm_campaign=072025_California-Uses-Multipronged-Approach-Against-Avian-Flu&utm_medium=Twitter

[sharon sanders]

We have documented 24 H5N1 cats in California. The difference of 3 is nothing. Close enough because the actual number is probably much higher by dozens or hundreds. Imho, based on the late reporting of how saturated California was with H5N1 at the end of 2024.

hat tip Pathfinder:

California Contra Costa 12/30/2024 04/04/2025 EA H5 Domestic cat
California Contra Costa 01/16/2025 04/02/2025 EA H5N1 Domestic cat
California Contra Costa 01/16/2025 04/02/2025 EA H5N1 Domestic cat
California Shasta 12/11/2024 03/14/2025 EA H5N1 Domestic cat
California Imperial 01/22/2025 02/20/2025 EA H5N1 Domestic cat
California San Mateo 01/29/2025 02/05/2025 EA H5 Domestic cat
California Contra Costa 01/15/2025 01/24/2025 EA H5 Domestic cat
California Los Angeles 01/08/2025 01/15/2025 EA H5N1 Domestic cat
California Los Angeles 01/08/2025 01/15/2025 EA H5N1 Domestic cat
California Los Angeles 12/14/2024 01/03/2025 EA/AM H5N1 Domestic cat
California Los Angeles 12/14/2024 01/03/2025 EA/AM H5N1 Domestic cat
California Los Angeles 12/10/2024 01/03/2025 EA/AM H5N1 Domestic cat
California Los Angeles 12/11/2024 01/03/2025 EA/AM H5N1 Domestic cat
California Los Angeles 12/10/2024 01/03/2025 EA/AM H5N1 Domestic cat
California Santa Barbara 12/17/2024 01/02/2025 EA/AM H5N1 Domestic cat
California Santa Barbara 12/12/2024 01/02/2025 EA/AM H5N1 Domestic cat
California Los Angeles 12/26/2024 12/31/2024 EA H5N1 Domestic cat
California Los Angeles 12/26/2024 12/31/2024 EA H5N1 Domestic cat
California Los Angeles 12/06/2024 12/27/2024 EA/AM H5N1 Domestic cat
California Los Angeles 12/10/2024 12/23/2024 EA H5N1 Domestic cat
California Fresno 12/09/2024 12/17/2024 EA H5N1 Domestic cat
California San Bernardino 12/04/2024 12/10/2024 EA H5N1 Domestic cat
California Tulare 11/22/2024 12/03/2024 EA H5N1 Domestic cat

California Contra Costa 12/11/2024 06/16/2024 EA H5N1 Domestic cat

https://flutrackers.com/forum/forum/united-states/h5n1-tracking-af/996286-us-h5n1-avian-flu-in-domestic-cats-list/page3

https://www.aphis.usda.gov/livestock-poultry-disease/avian/avian-influenza/hpai-detections/mammals

[Commonground]

The H5N1 Wake-Up Call: Why Cornell’s Latest Numbers Should Change Everything You Think You Know About Dairy Biosecurity

Sunday, July 13th, 2025
Cornell just proved H5N1 costs $950 per infected cow—while most producers still think it’s just a bird problem.


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Look, I’ve been digging through Cornell’s latest H5N1 study, and honestly? Most producers are sleepwalking into a financial disaster. The real kicker isn’t that H5N1 costs $950 per infected cow—it’s that 76% of infected animals show zero symptoms while silently wrecking your operation. California just proved this with their 6.8% production drop in December 2024, forcing Governor Newsom to declare a state emergency after 645 dairies got hit. The math is brutal: a 500-cow operation looking at potential losses of $475,000 if this thing spreads through your herd. What’s happening globally right now is a shift from reactive crisis management to proactive biosecurity—and the producers getting ahead of this are positioning themselves for serious competitive advantages. You need to start treating your milking parlor like a controlled environment this week, not when H5N1 shows up at your neighbor’s place.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

• Milking parlor biosecurity cuts transmission by 90% – Start with between-milking disinfection protocols using accelerated hydrogen peroxide systems, focus on stainless steel surfaces where the virus survives 72 hours, and you’ll prevent the $950 per cow losses that are crushing unprepared operations in 2025’s volatile market.
• Silent carriers are destroying operations invisibly – Implement daily bulk tank RT-PCR testing to catch infections 24-48 hours before clinical symptoms appear, because Cornell’s data shows most infected cows never show visible signs while shedding virus for three weeks straight.
• Pennsylvania’s proactive approach beats California’s reactive crisis – Invest in mandatory surveillance systems now (60-90 days before fall migration peaks) to maintain virus-free status and capture market premiums that are running $1.20+ per hundredweight above affected regions.
• Technology ROI justifies investment for 1,000+ cow operations – Real-time milk RNA monitoring systems detect infections immediately, enabling rapid isolation protocols that prevent bulk tank contamination and the catastrophic herd-wide spread that’s devastating California’s Central Valley.
• Fall migration window demands immediate action – July through September is your critical preparation period before seasonal wild bird movement increases transmission risk, so get your enhanced biosecurity protocols operational before the virus finds your operation instead of you finding it first.

You know what’s been keeping me up at night since I got my hands on Cornell’s latest economic impact study? The numbers are… well, let’s just say if you’re not taking H5N1 seriously yet, you’re about to.

I’ve spent the last few weeks digging through the real data—not the rumors floating around at co-op meetings or the half-baked speculation in farm forums—but the actual peer-reviewed research and verified government reports. What I found is both more alarming and more manageable than most of the chatter suggests.

Here’s the thing, though: we need to stop treating H5N1 like it’s some distant threat that only affects “those other farms.” It’s here, it’s spreading faster than anyone predicted, and if you’re not prepared… well, let’s just say the math isn’t pretty.

The Cornell Numbers That Should Terrify Every Producer

Dr. Daryl Nydam’s team at Cornell just dropped their comprehensive economic analysis, and the headline figure is absolutely brutal: $950 per clinically affected cow in direct economic losses. Not the $504 figure that’s been floating around some industry circles—$950. Per cow.

According to recent work from Cornell’s veterinary college, that’s based on tracking a 3,900-cow operation in Ohio through 67 days of what can only be described as H5N1 hell. But here’s what really gets me… that’s just the tip of the iceberg.

The infected cows lost approximately 900kg of milk over 60 days following the outbreak. But—and this is the kicker that’s got me genuinely concerned—significant production drops persisted well beyond clinical recovery. Some producers I’ve been talking to in the Central Valley are calling them “zombie cows.” Animals that technically survive but never get back to their genetic potential.

Think about that for a second. You’re not just dealing with acute losses during the outbreak—you’re looking at long-term impacts on herd productivity that extend far beyond what most insurance programs cover. This development is fascinating from a scientific perspective, but terrifying from a business standpoint.

Continued: https://www.thebullvine.com/news/the...y-biosecurity/

[Commonground]

Excerpt from Post #166 above:


Implementation Timeline That Actually Makes Sense

Here’s where I want to get practical for a minute. Based on what I’m seeing work across different regions, there’s a logical 90-day implementation timeline that makes sense:

Days 1-30: Critical Foundation Get your milking parlor biosecurity protocols in place. This means between-milking disinfection, dedicated equipment that never leaves the parlor, and basic PPE compliance. Don’t overthink it—just start with the basics that work.

Days 31-60: Surveillance Systems Implement bulk tank testing protocols. Whether that’s daily RT-PCR testing or weekly surveillance depends on your risk level and budget, but you need some form of early detection system in place before fall migration.

Days 61-90: Advanced Protocols This is where you add the sophisticated stuff—automated monitoring systems, milk acidification protocols, and advanced worker protection measures. But only after you’ve got the basics down.

What strikes me about this timeline is that it’s achievable for most operations without breaking the bank. The key is not trying to do everything at once.

https://www.thebullvine.com/news/the...y-biosecurity/