Announcement

Collapse
No announcement yet.

[fluWho] WHO: Concerns over Chair's text on sharing of flu viruses and benefits

Collapse
X
 
  • Filter
  • Time
  • Show
Clear All
new posts

  • [fluWho] WHO: Concerns over Chair's text on sharing of flu viruses and benefits

    TWN Info Service on Intellectual Property Issues
    15 August 2008
    Third World Network
    www.twnside.org.sg

    WHO: Concerns over Chair's text on sharing of flu viruses and benefits

    Published in SUNS #6539 dated 15 August 2008

    Geneva, 14 Aug (Sangeeta Shashikant) --

    The issue of the balance between the sharing of the influenza virus and the sharing of the benefits from the use of the virus (especially vaccines and other medical products to counter the deadly avian flu) is being handled by a process in the World Health Organisation, in which developed and developing countries are negotiating the terms of a decision that covers rights and obligations in the sharing of virus, the research and commercial use of the virus, and the access to the vaccines and other products.

    A step in the process has been the issuing at the end of June of a draft
    text on virus sharing and benefit sharing by the Chair of the
    Intergovernmental Meeting (IGM) on Pandemic Influenza Preparedness
    . The

    Chair is Jane Halton, Secretary of the Department of Health and Ageing, Australia.

    The text is giving rise to concerns among officials of some developing countries as well as independent experts, who feel that the Chair's text does not adequately reflect, even as alternative options, many of the ideas and suggestions put forward by developing countries.

    In particular, Indonesia, the African Group and Thailand had submitted comprehensive proposals as inputs to the drafting of the text.

    The IGM on Pandemic Influenza Preparedness was set up by the 2007 World Health Assembly through Resolution 60.28, to undertake reform of the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN) and in particular to formulate Standard terms and conditions for virus sharing and benefit sharing as well as to review the terms of reference of the WHO Collaborating Centres dealing with influenza.

    A Working Group of the Intergovernmental Meeting held on April 3-4, 2008 in Geneva, agreed that the various proposals contained in the consolidated text of EB 122/5 would contribute towards preparation of a Chair's text, which is to be the basis for discussion at the next WHO meeting on virus and benefit sharing on 9-15 November 2008.

    The Chair's draft takes the form of a "streamlined" text, as if there is
    agreement on almost all aspects of the document, although to date very
    little discussion has actually taken place on the proposals.

    In some areas, it summarises proposals put forward to the extent it misrepresents the original proposal.

    It also excludes several issues that could hurt the sensitivities of major industrialized countries such as the US and EU, whose businesses are major beneficiaries of the present virus sharing system.

    This is most obvious in the way the Chair's text treats intellectual property (IP) issues.

    The paper excludes any provision that the recipients of viruses should not have IP claims over the products derived from viruses donated.

    Such a provision is supported by Indonesia, the Africa Group and by Thailand, but heavily contested by industrialized countries.

    According to sources, during the Working Group meeting, in reply to a query by a Member state, it was confirmed that if there is dissatisfaction with the Chair's text, member states at the forthcoming November meeting could rely on the consolidated text of EB 122/5, which contains all the proposals of member states.

    According to some diplomats, although it is not expressly mentioned in the
    outcome document of the Working Group, the understanding is that the Chair would prepare a text that would merge similar proposals and present as options proposals which diverge.

    However, the present Chair's text disregards many of the proposals put
    forward, and where it puts forward options, it does so selectively.

    The Chair also presents what she believes to be "compromise text" in areas that have not been the subject of an in-depth discussion nor any agreement on the compromise.

    Halton explains her actions in an email to delegations. She says that "some have expressed a preference to retain all of the original language and alternative concepts as proposed in submissions to the IGM in November 2007, while others have expressed a preference for a streamlined text with a minimal number of areas of disagreement".

    She adds that an attempt has been made to balance the various comments, with two key guiding principles:

    (1) where a compromise position seems feasible, this has been put forward as streamlined text (adding that this approach has chiefly been used with regard to virus sharing, which has had more lengthy discussion);

    (2) where positions cannot be reconciled, or where issues have not been debated, an attempt has been made to retain all of the competing
    concepts and ideas, though not in full detail or in the original terminology
    (this approach has chiefly been used in benefit sharing, which has not yet
    been discussed in the working group).

    She asked countries to comment on:

    (I) concepts or issues which are included in EB122/5 and which do not appear in the draft Chair's text;

    (ii) concepts or issues which have been paraphrased in the draft Chair's text but which do not adequately capture the proposals as they appear in EB122/5;

    (iii) textual suggestions to improve the technical correctness of the draft Chair's text; and

    (iv) Member States' views on issues in the draft Chair's text, particularly where they have not been debated to date and also where
    there may be room for compromise.

    Some developing countries have privately indicated that the Chair's text in
    its present form is unacceptable.

    Further, unlike the relatively open debate of the WHO's Intergovernmental
    Working Group on IP, Innovation and Health (whose negotiating document and comments on the document by countries as well as by NGOs were made available on a public website), secrecy shrouds the Chair's text and the comments on the Chair's text, all of which are not publicly available.

    According to an email message sent by Halton and received by some
    delegations, "contributions received from Member States will be considered
    by the Chair in preparing a final version of the text" and "that on 28 July,
    all contributions will also be posted in the original language of submission, on a password-protected website", adding further that "information on accessing the website will be sent to Bureau Members before that time".

    A WHO official informed SUNS that "a password-protected web community" has been set up for Member States to access contributions received from Member States on the Draft Chair's text, and this has been communicated to the Bureau Members (which should in turn inform other countries that they represent).

    Some delegates contacted by SUNS were however unaware of this website, while others who were aware of this could not use the password.

    Concerns on the Chair's text, some of which are mentioned in some developing country submissions, include the following:

    (1) The Chair's text presents a mostly streamlined text on virus and benefit sharing, on the assumption that much of the content has already been agreed to by member states, although the actual situation is to the contrary.

    (2) The text does not adequately reflect even as alternative options, many of the proposals put forward by developing countries, i. e. Indonesia, the African Group and Thailand. For example, termination clauses proposed in the Africa Group and in Thai papers have been left out of the Chair's text.

    Another example is that Indonesia, Thailand and the Africa Group have stated that there should be no IP claim by WHO-designated laboratories and other entities that receive biological materials, over the substances, processes and products derived from the use of the biological material. However, no mention of this is made in the Chair's text.

    (3) The Chair's text also drops crucial details from original proposals and sometimes even narrows proposals put forward to the extent it misrepresents the original proposals. For example, para 6.11 of the Chair's text states that "Vaccine manufacturers shall set aside x% of each production cycle of vaccines for H5N1 and other influenza viruses of human pandemic potential for the provision to the WHO stockpile free of charge," while para 6.12 of the Chair's text states "Vaccine manufacturers shall also set aside x% of each production cycle of pandemic vaccine for provision through the WHO on the basis of public health need".

    These paragraphs seem to be taken from the Africa Group proposal, but it
    inadequately captures what the African paper states. While the Chair's text only speaks of providing vaccines to the WHO, the Africa paper also
    advocates prioritizing the needs of developing and least developed countries and that X% should be reserved for developing countries and provided at an affordable price. It also proposes a method of calculating the affordable price. (Para 6 (b) (I) & (ii) of the Africa Group paper A/PIP/IGM/7).

    Another example is para 6.16 of the Chair's text, which narrows the scope of the proposal in the Africa Group paper to vaccine manufacturers providing royalty free licence to any influenza vaccine manufacturer based in the member states from where the relevant clinical specimen was collected from.

    The African proposal was broader; it required third parties to grant on
    request, a non-exclusive, royalty free license to any domestic influenza
    vaccine manufacturer from developing and least developed countries and in particular to the country providing the specimen.

    Para 6.16 also does not make any reference to the proposal in the Africa
    Group paper, which talks about access to and transfer of technology and
    know-how in vaccine development as well as capacity building for domestic influenza manufacturers from developing and least developed countries. (The proposals are in the African paper, para 6 (a) (I) (ii) of Section H).

    (4) A positive element in the Chair's text is that it refers to "Standard Material Transfer Agreement" (SMTA), thus accepting the concept in principle. However, there is concern that the SMTA in the Chair's text shows no characteristics of being legally binding on the recipient of the specimens and viruses provided through the WHO virus and benefit sharing system.

    According to a developing country's submission in response to the text, the Chair's text is not clear on who are the signatories to the SMTA; the format of the SMTA; how the SMTA will be executed; or the dispute settlement mechanism if a party to the agreement fails to comply with the terms and conditions in the SMTA.

    The Chair's text thus appears to pay "lip-service" to the concept of "SMTA". The Africa Group has presented a paper which allows implementation of the SMTA through "Implementing Letters", which are signed by the provider and the recipient as relevant, but these also do not feature in the Chair's text.

    (5) The Chair's text places benefit-sharing obligations of the recipients and dispute settlement in a section separate from the terms of the SMTA with the result that the recipients of biological materials need not commit to benefit sharing through an agreement. In addition, if there is non-compliance with the terms of the SMTA, there is no mechanism for the provider of materials to take action against the recipient (e. g. the manufacturer). The dispute resolution provided in the Chair's text is only between Members.

    The resulting effect is that countries that fail to comply with sharing the
    viruses (Chair's text states that Members agree to routinely provide
    clinical specimens) may be brought to the Health Assembly but no action may be brought against the recipients that do not fulfill their benefit shari ng obligations or do not comply with the terms of the SMTA. For an effective virus and benefit sharing mechanism, benefit-sharing obligations have to be a part of the SMTA. The papers of Indonesia, Thailand and Africa Group require recipients of the virus to be bound to sharing of benefits through a written agreement. The Africa paper further proposes a dispute settlement mechanism between the provider of biological materials and the recipient.

    (6) The section on benefit sharing in the Chair's text presents tasks and routine obligations of WHO as the primary benefit to be obtained by
    developing countries in "benefit sharing" arising from the use of the
    viruses. This detracts attention from the real issue at hand, i. e. what are
    the benefit sharing obligations of recipients of biological materials such
    as the vaccine manufacturers, etc.

    (7) Para 5.1.1 (a) and (b) of the Chair's text are about entities that would be allowed to receive the "clinical specimens or viruses". Basically, it requires countries to share viruses with a WHO Collaborating Centre for Influenza or a H5 Reference Laboratory (H5RL) of their choice.

    But through these laboratories, the materials can be shared with:

    (I) laboratories in the WHO Network, which according to the definition, is
    comprised of National Influenza Centres; WHO Collaborating Centres On
    Influenza; H5 Reference Laboratories (H5RL), and essential regulatory
    laboratories;

    (ii) vaccine manufacturers;

    (iii) diagnostic manufacturers;

    (iv) pharmaceutical manufacturers; and

    (v) public health researchers.

    In effect, the Chair's text allows free flow of "clinical specimens and
    viruses" once the materials are given to the WHO Collaborating Centre/H5RL.

    There are at least two issues that arise. First is the wide authority given
    to the WHO designated centres (although the mandate for H5RLs is only to diagnose H5 infection) to decide to whom to give the biological materials to, bypassing the WHO Secretariat.

    Second is the fact that the Chair's text not only requires the transfer of
    the vaccine virus (i. e. the modified virus used for vaccine development)
    but also the clinical specimens (e. g. throat swabs), and the isolated
    viruses to third parties (i. e. entities other than the WHO designated
    centres).

    This is in total disregard of proposals put forward in particular by the
    Africa Group, which wants to limit the number of parties that receive the
    clinical specimens and the vaccine viruses and limiting the type of
    materials transferred to third parties to vaccine virus.

    (8) The lack of clarity as to whether the definition of "biological
    materials"
    extends to parts of the biological material such as genes,
    sequences etc, since it is not explicitly mentioned. According to Edward
    Hammond, an expert on virus and benefit sharing: "With current technology, vaccine companies and other biotechnology enterprises do not necessarily need to receive specimens, viruses, or other biological materials from WHO collaborating centres in order to obtain viruses (and viral genes) that are submitted to the WHO system. The copying of viruses and their parts from sequence data only takes a few days at present, and will get easier and faster in the near future."

    Therefore, he adds, it is imperative that the same benefit sharing
    mechanisms should apply to the sequence data itself and to the biological
    material generated (i. e. synthesized) from that data through the application of computational and laboratory techniques.

    (9) The Chair's text repeatedly uses the phrase "global public health
    security" although the concept of "security"
    in WHO documents has been objected to by several developing countries even in the context of virus and benefit sharing.

    (10) The text proposes that the review of the Terms of Reference of the WHO-designated centres be done by the Advisory Committee and not by the IGM. However, the concern here is that there will likely be little coherence between the Standard Material Transfer Agreement and the Terms of Reference, if the review of the latter is left to the Advisory Committee.

    (11) The overall effect of paragraphs 5.2.1 and 5.3.2 is that laboratories that share clinical specimens will have to register those specimens in the traceability mechanism as pandemic influenza preparedness biological materials (PIP biological materials). Those who receive the PIP biological materials will have to register receipt of the materials and comply with any other data requirements of the traceability and associated reporting mechanisms.

    However, the proposed traceability mechanism in the Chair's text should also track movement of the vaccine virus; parts of the virus (e. g. genetic and other components, genes, sequences and polynucleotides as well as the polypeptides they encode); report on the "use" of the materials by
    laboratories that may be part of the WHO network (e. g whether the lab did isolation, developed vaccines virus, developed diagnostic kit etc.) and by the vaccine, diagnostic, and pharmaceutical manufacturers and public health researchers; track the benefits shared by recipients of biological materials with the WHO system and member states; and documents executed (e. g. MTAs signed) in the process of virus and benefit sharing.

    Some submissions by countries also suggest that consideration should be
    given to the recently concluded "Global strategy and plan of action on
    public health, innovation and intellectual property" (WHA Resolution WHA
    61.21).

    The Strategy mentions concepts such as "appropriate licensing policies,
    including but not limited to open licensing", "patent pools", open-source
    approaches and it would be interesting to see how these concepts may be
    applied in the context of virus and benefit sharing particularly in
    resolving tensions surrounding IP. +

    For all list information and functions, see: http://lists.sunshine-project.org/lists/info/flu
    --
    ------

  • #2
    Re: [fluWho] WHO: Concerns over Chair's text on sharing of flu viruses and benefits

    November should be fun.

    Here we go again, the states that are happy with the status quo are not going to want to accept anything that smacks of a binding commitment and the states that did not have a seat at the big table when the existing arrangements were formulated are - rightly - going to cry foul when nothing much changes. It was exactly this kind of fudge - nice words and ideals but no teeth to give them force - that created the IHR(2005) and so the mess these negotiations are now trying to clean up.

    The final wording will look as if it is more equitable but it will be up to the US and EU type nations to regulate their own labs and big pharma - which of course they will be unable/unwilling to do as they exert so much control over their governments agendas. I wonder what the conference that tries to sort out the mess left by this treaty will be called?

    All these painful changes take place at an excruciatingly slow pace but at some point the major powers of the 20th century will have to realise that if they dont make use of their moment in the sun to put in place a system that passes the 'veil of ignorance' test then they will be on the receiving end as the 21st century powers exact their revenge.

    Comment


    • #3
      Re: [fluWho] WHO: Concerns over Chair's text on sharing of flu viruses and benefits

      [From a blog post to appear in a few hours at
      http://immunocompetent.com.

      There are links to supporting material that will be there. - EH]

      Gene Squatters Claim the Next Pandemic
      --------------------------------------
      If you think oil speculators are an ethically-challenged crowd, consider pandemic squatters.

      There are many examples. For one of the most offensive, we turn to Finland.

      Finns are usually an inoffensive crowd, but it seems that a few of their number are hoping for the big one to come.

      A big pandemic, that is. And they're putting their money on H5N2. Helsinki-based Remedal, a tiny company with no apparent independent R&D capacity, has filed for patent on bascially all injected or intranasal human vaccines containing an H5 and an N2 antigen (i.e. against H5N1 recombined with 'normal' human H3N2).

      For good measure, Remedal further specifically claims such a vaccine using three HA genes that are WHO GISN materials: A/Hong Kong/213/2003, A/Vietnam/1194/2004, and A/Vietnam/1203/2004.

      So, Remedal hopes, if an H5N2 recombinant goes pandemic (or seriously threatens to), it will own rights to the vaccine - and make a fortune.

      Some might vainly hope that we can have confidence that the patent authorities weed out this kind of application, but that would be an unfounded hope, because lousy patent applications issue all the time.

      It's clear that the company has no ability to develop and market a flu vaccine. It's only announced compound is a "dietary supplement" that it says aids alcohol metabolism, reducing hangovers and liver damage.

      Even there it is looking for somebody to buy and commercialize the compound. Remedal of Helsinki is not about to provide the world with pandemic flu vaccine, although it is ready to claim a royalty on every shot if its gamble on H5N2 pans out. (And probably file a patent infringement lawsuit against anyone selling an H5N2 vaccine.)

      Worse than Roche and Tamiflu.

      At least Roche makes something. (No comment here on the perverse incentives to crime that issuing such patents might generate.)

      Part of what's going with this kind of patent squatting is an intellectual property system in dire need of reform, which goes well- beyond the H5N1 issue. But WHO's blind eye cast on pandemic influenza vaccine patents is a big problem too. When pressed to acknowledge intellectual property issues at all, WHO usually apologizes for whatever is the status quo. Its stockpile effort to date is a good example. WHO should be out there drawing a public health line around claims on pandemic vaccines and, in particular, patent claims on WHO GISN materials.

      If that were the canse, then the GISN's crisis wouldn't be nearly as severe, and attempts at unethical pandemic squatting would be reduced.

      -
      -------

      Comment


      • #4
        Re: [fluWho] WHO: Concerns over Chair's text on sharing of flu viruses and benefits

        While I agree with the general premise that the some of the aberrant IP laws emanating from the US, and the attempts to foist them on the rest of the world through the horse trading in the Doha round, are to be resisted at all costs I am not sure the WHO is the right body to fight this battle. US patent law has boldly gone where it has no right be and anyone wishing to oppose its spread beyond US shores can rely on my support.

        Comment


        • #5
          Re: [fluWho] WHO: Concerns over Chair's text on sharing of flu viruses and benefits

          We may wish to open a discussion thread on this issue, as it is an important one to resolve.

          The blog post above raises an important point, but does not acknowledge the counter side of the argument. I have done my best to sum up my knowledge of this debate in general terms below - and hope that the explanation is clear and makes sense to readers.

          The Finnish example is a prime example of unacceptable ethics and a bad attempt at profiteering in the event of a disease outbreak, and should be easy to outlaw and ban. However, it is a more extreme example of a wider issue.

          In the present global health system, the catch is that for 'natural' infective entities to be entirely removed from patent and intellectual property, is to (in effect) remove research funding. The world relies on the fact that companies compete and seek to grow in value to keep shareholders happy - therefore they invest their development capitol into R&D in health areas that have unmet need, and whose outputs can be protected. New and emerging infective disease threats are one of these. Because of the 'short life' of vaccines (new licenses are needed annually as the infective agents mutate and change), the area of vaccine development and manufacture has not been appealing (profitable with lowish risk) to many companies. The threat of a severe pandemic has spurred research however, and this is why for the first time in over 50 years, we have a host of potential new vaccine technologies that will replace the antiquated egg based production we presently have.

          What is an essential truth here is:- any treatment that is developed against a new health threat must return its investment R&D and a profit. For wider drug development:- a patent lifetime for a drug or vaccine is @20 years, and R&D lead time to get to a licensed product may be anything up to 10 years (or in some cases longer, but most aim for shortening the time to market and @6years is most normal), there is little time to recoup an investment. There is only then 10 years to get back the development costs and put the company into profit. Development costs to license may be as much as $100million for a drug, and many will fail before ever reaching market.

          For vaccines however, where there is a requirement for a new HN type, (and as we have already seen), pre-pandemic medicinal licenses have taken some 3 years to achieve a licence authorisation (at shortest). Each time a strain is varied, a licence variation must be applied for, with more trials and more expense. Production lifetime is short and so supply will be finite. Manufacturing will need to be in advance of confirmed demand in most cases.

          SO - why does this matter? Pharma companies have to borrow money or justify to investors huge potential R&D spend, and they need to ensure that patents are sufficiently tight to protect the investment that is made. This applies whether it is a New Chemical Entity (NCE) or a vaccine or a gene therapy.

          In practice, a demand to move all biological entities out of the remit of present patent law means that there is no security to any R&D investment that utilizes a natrual biological feature:- examples might be the patenting of genes for gene therapy, and also vaccines that depend on gene sequences and viral samples.

          This is the conundrum - take away the commercial element of vaccine production, and there is no R&D investment, investment security and marginal commercial incentive ... manufacture is also complex and expensive, and health and safety and medicinal licensing requirements are expensive and onerous. This is why so many vaccine manufacturing companies went under, were taken over and subsumed etc in the 1970's and 80's, reducing the world to a handful of specialist vaccine manufacturers.

          If the world wants vaccines and therapies based on the new technologies of gene therapy - to mention just a couple of examples - then in a Capitalist Global Society it has to understand and accept the realities of commercial entities such as pharmaceutical companies, and find a mechanism that meets these fundamental laws of corporate operations and profit, and live with some aspects of poor ethics. If the money isn't in the treatment then Boards of Directors cannot authorise the operational costs and development risks.

          If the world does not want this sort of ethically questionable operation in the field of health (especially in the field of global health), the only solution I see is that the people of the world must pay for it directly through their governments. (I dont think our global society is ready for this yet...) Give a global health body such as the WHO the full patent rights on all biological entities, through which all R&D is funded and directed. R&D costs are funded by every nation by a donation that represents a fixed proportion of its GDP. Then allow WHO to license out the rights to that entity for development to whomever applies (pharma companies) so that pharma, in effect becomes development subcontractors and manufacturing companies with respect to health products based on genetic data and infective pathogens. Companies can licence the rights to entites that are fully developed and licenced. Novel uses of such therapies could perhaps be patented ... BUT a royalty gets paid by each pharma manufacturer for each unit of product sold to the central fund, to help finance operations. The more of a product sold, the greater the returns to the central fund. Every nation would also have access to the technology required for vaccine manufacture etc, as this would be developed by the central body and any company/ nation would have access to the data and expertise. It would however have to invest in manufacturing plant, and it would then be up to it as to what it wished to charge or not for resultant vaccines etc.

          2 extremes, but I cannot see any points anywhere in the middle. Perhaps others can, but these are the realities of the 21st century - so whilst we consider the issues that are being raised here, we need to remember these inescapable facts. There is not going to be an easy solution, and it may take the calamity of a global pandemic to get things moving forwards towards a more altruistic ideal.

          Comment


          • #6
            Re: [fluWho] WHO: Concerns over Chair's text on sharing of flu viruses and benefits

            Luckily, Louis Pasteur was born in XIX century.... (1822)

            Comment


            • #7
              Re: [fluWho] WHO: Concerns over Chair's text on sharing of flu viruses and benefits

              Vibrant62, excellent discussion regarding the economic issues surrounding vaccine research, development, and production. The option you present about WHO being given all the patent rights is about the only viable option to protect the world from a future, high CFR pandemic.

              Private sector corporations respond to business opportunities as you describe. They are reactive not proactive. There will be a capital infusion and a ramp up in production and distribution by Pharma companies only when there is certainty of a profit to be made. That certainty will occur only after the pandemic has started and the sick and dying start piling up. Of course, by then it will be too late to provide an equitable distribution among all the countries of world. Only those corporations or governments with vast monetary resources will be able to buy into the limited stocks of vaccines.

              Comment


              • #8
                Re: [fluWho] WHO: Concerns over Chair's text on sharing of flu viruses and benefits

                [Edward Hammond Commentary]

                Nevermind that a large proportion of the speakers are actually from US
                institutions; but for a mere 1,000 euros, folks heading for Portugal
                can take in many of the "stars" of influenza research at the "European
                Scientists Fighting Influenza" conference in September.

                The price of admission comes complete with symposia sponsored by GSK, Solvay, Baxter, MedImmune (AstraZeneca), "European Vaccine Manufacturers", and Roche.

                To see the program, visit: http://www.eswiconference.org/Programme-Full-14-15.asp

                If that doesn't exhaust your bank account, you can tmove on to the "Influenza Vaccines for the World" in April 2009.

                "Influenza Vaccines for the World" has a rock star science advisory panel suitable for its lifestyles of the rich and famous location: Cannes, France.

                Corporate sponsorships are a Who's Who of the vaccine industry.

                I guess that vaccines are, just maybe, a we bit more more profitable
                than industry claims.

                This latter conference features presentations on social and political aspects of influenza vaccines.

                These will likely be carefully vetted so as not to leave any of the industry execs in attendance with heartburn or the WHO representatives blushing.

                For more information, visit: http://www.meetingsmanagement.com/ivw_2009/index.htm

                Together, at the beach, and ensconced in luxury, we can beat
                this influenza pandemic
                EH

                For all list information and functions, see: http://lists.sunshine-project.org/lists/info/flu
                -
                -------

                Comment


                • #9
                  Re: [fluWho] WHO: Concerns over Chair's text on sharing of flu viruses and benefits

                  Originally posted by Laidback Al View Post
                  Vibrant62, excellent discussion regarding the economic issues surrounding vaccine research, development, and production. The option you present about WHO being given all the patent rights is about the only viable option to protect the world from a future, high CFR pandemic.

                  Private sector corporations respond to business opportunities as you describe. They are reactive not proactive. There will be a capital infusion and a ramp up in production and distribution by Pharma companies only when there is certainty of a profit to be made. That certainty will occur only after the pandemic has started and the sick and dying start piling up. Of course, by then it will be too late to provide an equitable distribution among all the countries of world. Only those corporations or governments with vast monetary resources will be able to buy into the limited stocks of vaccines.

                  I didn't read all the long posts in this thread, but this one caught my eye.

                  > WHO being given all the patent rights is about the only viable
                  > option to protect the world from a future, high CFR pandemic.

                  ahh, it's not so easy. And not the only way.
                  (E.g. killing all people would work too)

                  Well, what's "high" ? No one can estimate with any certainety
                  how high high is ;-)

                  > There will be a capital infusion and a ramp up in production
                  > and distribution by Pharma companies only when there is
                  > certainty of a profit to be made

                  no. Not certainety of profit is required. Just good chance.
                  The higher the possible profit, the higher its likelyhood the
                  more investment is justified.
                  I'm interested in expert panflu damage estimates
                  my current links: http://bit.ly/hFI7H ILI-charts: http://bit.ly/CcRgT

                  Comment


                  • #10
                    Re: [fluWho] WHO: Concerns over Chair's text on sharing of flu viruses and benefits

                    I have long argued the need to adopt a system similar to that outlined by Vibrant62 above.
                    The fact that we need development of new vaccines, and this needs to be paid for, does not mean we should be allowing any country, corporation or individual copyright on any thing for which nature herself is the rightful patent holder.

                    It may be useful to split the vaccine problem in two - seasonal & pandemic. Seasonal vaccine has been supporting itself - commercially - so far and while the major players have been in no great hurry to pay for certification of a new (not egg based) manufacturing process cell based production is here. Pandemic vaccine needs much the same end product but the timings are a little different. Seasonal flu vaccines manufacturing capacity survives on regular alternating orders from the north and south hemisphere. These orders are placed 6 months in advance and are predictable in size and timing. If you want to supply the pandemic trade you will need capacity to produce a billion odd doses at a few weeks notice and you may only get an order every 30 or 40 years. This is understandably not the kind of business plan that is going to draw investors. If you build a plant to meet this surge the chances are it will be obsolete before it is needed, also egg based production is a non starter as it can not deliver given the short time between pandemic onset and peak infection period.
                    Either we just accept these things happen and accept the odd culling of mankind or we devise a plan to cope with these periodic attacks on humanity. If we conclude that a massive investment to mitigate the effects of a severe flu pandemic are worth paying for - not a no brainer as there are plenty of other problems that could benefit from this level of global commitment - then I would argue that this is a national security issue and should be treated - and funded - as such. While advocating a major effort in pandemic planning what I am implicitly planning for is not any old flu pandemic (1957 / 1968) but a 1918+ pandemic, the distinction is important. In a 1918+ pandemic you can not devise a xenophobic plan, protecting you citizens alone does not solve the problem as the collateral damage to the worlds economy would leave them healthy but wishing this recession was mild like the 1930's. Enlightened self interest means the richer nations need to pay for and implement a plan that covers most of the worlds people regardless of the fact they can not pay themselves - this is the price we pay for being relatively comfortably off and wanting to stay that way.

                    Comment


                    • #11
                      Re: [fluWho] WHO: Concerns over Chair's text on sharing of flu viruses and benefits

                      Interesting development that will further put the cat amongst the pigeons. FW

                      US government lays patent claim on bird flu virus
                      20 August 2008

                      TITLE: WHO-linked centre lays patent claim on bird flu virus
                      AUTHOR: Edward Hammond
                      PUBLICATION: SUNS (Third World Network)
                      DATE: 15 August 2008



                      WHO-LINKED CENTRE LAYS PATENT CLAIM ON BIRD FLU VIRUS

                      Published in SUNS #6539 dated 15 August 2008

                      Bogota, 14 Aug (Edward Hammond*) -- In a development that is likely to raise more pressing questions about reform of the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN), an international patent application has surfaced in which the US Centres for Disease Control (CDC) and US National Institutes of Health claim ownership of Indonesian influenza genes.

                      A recent patent search has revealed that the CDC, which is a WHO collaborating centre, is applying for a patent for a new vaccine against influenza, particularly for bird flu (H5N1). The vaccine incorporates genes from a H5N1 strain isolated from an Indonesian human victim of bird flu in 2005.

                      The strain that contains the genes was transferred to the WHO GISN by Indonesia for characterization for public health purposes, but may wind up as the property of the US government.

                      Under US law, the US government agencies would offer licenses to the technology to pharmaceutical companies. The patent application indicates that the US government intends to pursue the claim in most countries of the world, including Indonesia itself, as well as neighboring countries.

                      The application was first lodged in the United States on 16 February 2006, and then filed with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) on 16 February 2007. It was first published as application WO2007/100584 on 7 September 2007 on a WIPO internet database, but is only now coming into public light.

                      The patent application claims a new vaccine against influenza, particularly for Bird Flu (H5N1). The vaccines incorporate one to four genes from a H5N1 strain isolated from an Indonesian human victim in 2005 (denominated A/Indonesia/5/05).

                      The patent application also claims similar vaccines that incorporate genes of flu strains from Thailand (A/Thailand/1(KAN-1)/04) and A/Ck/Thailand/1/04), Hong Kong (A/Hong Kong/156/97) and South Korea (A/Ck/Korea/ES/03).

                      The vaccine is of a new type called a DNA vaccine. These stimulate the immune system like others vaccines, except instead of using a traditional approach, such as injecting a dead virus, they consist of lengths of genetically engineered DNA called plasmids. This type of vaccine is under development in a number of biotech labs.

                      Influenza has eight genes in total, so the US government's DNA vaccines will incorporate up to 50% of the flu strain's genome. In order for the H5N1 genes to work in the DNA vaccine, they are "codon optimized", meaning that small genetic changes are made to the natural H5N1 genes. These changes are mostly designed to enhance the key natural genetic properties of the flu strain.

                      The patent application raises specific questions about the US CDC, which is a WHO Collaborating Centre for influenza virus studies. The WHO Collaborating Centres receive influenza viruses from donor countries for public health characterization purposes, and not for the purposes of making proprietary claims.

                      Continued http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/health.info/2008/twnhealth info20080804.htm

                      Comment


                      • #12
                        Re: [fluWho] WHO: Concerns over Chair's text on sharing of flu viruses and benefits

                        > The application was first lodged in the United States on 16 February 2006,
                        > and then filed with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) on 16 February 2007.
                        > It was first published as application WO2007/100584 on 7 September 2007 on a WIPO
                        > internet database, but is only now coming into public light.

                        Supari may have known it earlier and it may have contributed to the differences.
                        But why did everyone keep it secret ?
                        Maybe WIPO has a secret database just as WHO and everyone had to promise
                        to keep things secret.
                        I'm interested in expert panflu damage estimates
                        my current links: http://bit.ly/hFI7H ILI-charts: http://bit.ly/CcRgT

                        Comment


                        • #13
                          Re: [fluWho] WHO: Concerns over Chair's text on sharing of flu viruses and benefits

                          JJackson, if a pandemic starts, I think they could just scale up
                          vaccine production. Maybe some relaxations on biosecurity are needed
                          or such, but with cell-based technology, we had been told that
                          it could be scaled up quickly.
                          Just purchase or rent more bioreactors, hire some more workers,
                          where's the problem ?
                          It may be a bit more expensive, though.
                          I'm interested in expert panflu damage estimates
                          my current links: http://bit.ly/hFI7H ILI-charts: http://bit.ly/CcRgT

                          Comment


                          • #14
                            Re: [fluWho] WHO: Concerns over Chair's text on sharing of flu viruses and benefits

                            Originally posted by gsgs View Post
                            JJackson, if a pandemic starts, I think they could just scale up
                            vaccine production. Maybe some relaxations on biosecurity are needed
                            or such, but with cell-based technology, we had been told that
                            it could be scaled up quickly.
                            Just purchase or rent more bioreactors, hire some more workers,
                            where's the problem ?
                            It may be a bit more expensive, though.
                            Many things might be possible but if a pandemic starts today none of these are in place. There is no agreement in principle even on who is going to do what, what regulatory short cuts are going to be acceptable, who is going to be in charge of production, who is going to have access to any vaccine produced, which process and what plants, on whose territory, would TRIPS Article 31 cover the patent and IP issues. That is a very abbreviated list of questions to which we should already have the answers and questions we should not be grappling with while the pandemic rages around us. We are five years on and are still defining the questions, is this really good enough given the potential consequences of being this unprepared? We should accept an imperfect plan that lays out exactly what happens from declaration of stage 6 now and haggle over how we make it better with what ever time we get.

                            P.S. Edward Hammond is the keeper of the sunshine projects flulist which includes a number of good reports on WHA & GISN deliberations.

                            Comment


                            • #15
                              Re: [fluWho] WHO: Concerns over Chair's text on sharing of flu viruses and benefits

                              FluTrackers.com does not accept any donations or support from pharmaceutical entities. We are neither "pro" nor "con" this industry. We hope to objectively illuminate the many different issues regarding pandemic influenza and other infectious diseases.

                              Thank you to everyone participating on this thread.

                              Comment

                              Working...
                              X