Ecologic Immunology of Avian Influenza (H5N1) in Migratory Birds

[Coleman]

Re: Ecologic Immunology of Avian Influenza (H5N1) in Migratory Birds

The tunnel sight finds no end ...

Bird flu: Main danger of livestock transports
VIENNA. New studies confirm cube assumptions since emerging the virus trunk H5N1: Of game birds, cubes do not separate danger for cube bird flu from poultry transportation go out. With the Ornitolenkongress Vienna also the topic bird flu in one treats.

During the spreading of the poultry plague or bird flu game birds play only a subordinated role. Which is already assumed since emerging also the virus trunk H5N1 dangerous for humans into the 1990er years, works by newer studies. With 6. Congress of the European Ornithologen of 24. until 29 August in Vienna is discussed the topic bird flu intensively, reported congress supervisor Hans Winkler of institute for Konrad Lorenz for comparative behavior research (KLIVV). The threat of many migratory birds forms a further emphasis by the climatic change.

Bird courses would leave trace of devastation

The fact that the bird flu plays a role under birds living in the wild hardly shows among other things the spreading data of the recent cases. If game birds would play a crucial role, then the regular bird courses would have to leave as it were a trace of devastation in the landscape. For instance in Africa would have itself in the autumn - if many kinds of bird from the breeding areas for instance in Europe arrive - which accumulate cases up of poultry plague. This is however not to be observed.

Are actionism lock up utilizable poultry

?The main danger during the spreading of the bird flu poultry transportation? form, thus for Winkler. To that extent it seems also strangely a little, if utilizable poultry is locked up with bird flu danger, in order to protect it against the game birds. For Winkler that is free little actionism, after the slogan: ?One must do something?. Bird flu still for a long time everything to the topic is not generally clarified game birds and, about whether and how the virus is spread, without the animals get sick or which viruses occur with game birds. Also with the bird flu virus there are more or less aggressive forms.

Climatic change for game birds more threateningly

For game birds substantially more threateningly than the bird flu virus the climatic change excludes itself anyhow. Already in the 1970er and 1980er years came it by extremely dry years in the African Sahel zone to inventory break-downs with many Langstreckenziehern, which winter in this area. ?There also protection efforts in the breeding areas in Europe do not use anything, if the animals die then in the winter in Africa?, so Winkler. After the situation of the Sahel zone improved around the year 2000 a little, a further aggravation of the situation is to be feared by the climatic change.

?Meteoroligists assume above all it becomes drier particularly in the western Africa?, so Winkler. Internationally there are efforts therefore in view of the recent developments that with protection programs breeding areas and winter areas with are always included.

Austria developing country in things bird customer and bird protection

Austria applies concerning bird customer and bird protection in as much as developing country as there are no nationally operated bird control rooms contrary to many neighbour states. In Austria data are usually honorary raised and converted to bird courses or inventory numbers. As it were as center applies the bird protection organization BirdLife, which is organized as association.

http://www.nachrichten.at/regional/oesterreich/583561?PHPSESSID=addb85eff213cc863b1563fda6ee75ea

[sharon sanders]

Re: Ecologic Immunology of Avian Influenza (H5N1) in Migratory Birds

Thank you, everyone, for the discussion.

I am asking everyone to remain civil and refrain from name calling and/or insults by reference.


S.

[HenryN]

Re: Ecologic Immunology of Avian Influenza (H5N1) in Migratory Birds

Yes, they don't say it, but others do (for example Gauthier-Clerc et al.). The precise pattern of spread places an evidentiary burden on people claiming that migrants are the vectors (especially if this precise pattern does not match any known migratory pattern). A match of the broad pattern is not good enough.
And of course it is possible that it is x% migrants and 100-x% trade. I think it would be constructive to return from time to time to the issues raised by the Weber-Stilianakis-paper (ands as niman has admitted of not having read it I will completely ignore his comments). It is still largely unknown how heavy exercise and infections interact in migrants. Current knowledge makes it worthwhile to consider the hypothesis that heavy exercise and infection with HPAI don't go together very well...
I just think that there so many doubts that the role of migrants should still be treated as an open question.

The problems with most of these "papers" really stems from the fact that the authors have no background in infectious disease. Most have some affiliation with bird watchers or wetlands groups and they view H5N1 from the point of view of the bird.

However, H5N1 is not linked to an individual bird, individual species, or individual pathway. In fact the nature reserves offer an opportunity for the H5N1 to hitch a ride on multiple species and move from one flyway to another.

That is why these conversations are such a waste of time. Those with these religious convictions create straw men, such as the demand that an individual species or flyway explain all of the data. It is not reality based.

The facts on the Qinghai strain are quite simple. It was first identified in May, 2005 at Qinghai Lake. At that time it was possible to argue that the strain would burn itself out at Qinghai Lake. Sequence data said otherwise, but those who couldn't read a sequence could use the dead birds don't fly argument.

However, by the summer of 2005, that argument was not viable. Prior to Qinghai Lake, the Asian version of H5N1 had never been reported in wild birds or poultry west of China. Russia, Kazakhstan, and Mongolia all reported H5N1 for the first time ever in the summer of 2005, and all involved the Qinghai strain. H5N1 was isolated and sequenced, including H5N1 from a healthy crested grebe, and the story was over.

The presence of Qinghai H5N1 in Siberia predicted movement into Europe, the Middle East, and Africa because of overlapping flyways. Those predictions were confirmed in 2005 with Qinghai H5N1 isolations in all three regions. Many more countries (over 50 in total) reported H5N1 in early 2006 and again ALL were the Qinghai strain, which was found primarily in wild birds, especially in Europe, but was also in a small number of poultry outbreaks in Europe, as well as human cases in Turkey, Iraq, Azerbaijan, Egypt, and Djibouti. Although the sequences signaled independent introductions of various sub-clades, ALL were Qinghai.

Moreover, the evidence against smuggling or trade was also OVERWHELMING. Although poor biosecurity will lead to local spread, the spread into these new areas was almost exclusively via wild birds. The only credible example of H5N1 movement over long distances via poor biosecurity was the H5N1 in Hungary and the UK this year. Although wild birds could have been involved in the spread, the linkage of both location to the same company and the close similarity (99.96%) between isolates from the two sites suggests the H5N1 may have been trucked from Hungary to the UK by a turkey distibutor. However, the 99.96% match identified what kind of of matches would be expected in farm to farm or farm to wild bird transmissions, and such matches was not evident in the multiple introductions.

The country with the largest number of positive wild birds in 2006 and again in 2007 was Germany. In 2006 there were three distinct introductions. One was in northern Germany, where there were ZERO reported outbreaks on farms. The northern Germany sequences matched southern Denmark, where there were also no reported outbreaks on farms. A second subclade was in southern Germany where there were no reported outbreaks in poultry. These sequences matched Switzerland isolates, where there were no reported outbreaks on farms. A third subclade was in southern German and matched sequences that had a wider distribution (Italy, the Czech Republic, and Ukraine).

Although the outbreaks were regionally distinguishable by sequence, the H5N1 was not limited to a given species. The same sequences in northern Germany that were in MANY wild bird species were also found in a cat and a stone martin. Similarly, sequences from Austria that matched a healthy teal in Egypt in 2005 were found in a goose and cat in Austria.

Thus, H5N1 moves from flyway to flyway and from species to species and attempts to pin H5N1 down to a given species or flyways are at best uniformed.

These facts are quite public and fully supported by public sequences and peer reviewed journal articles, bird watcher fairy tales not withstanding.

The sequence analysis also discredits reports of trade and smuggling. In 2004 H5N1 was smuggled into Belgium. The H5N1 was clade 1 out of Thailand. The number of clade 1 infections reported in poultry or wild birds in Europe is ZERO. The number in the Middle East is ZERO. The number in Africa is ZERO. The number anywhere other than southeast Asia is ZERO. The same is true for H5N1 found in quarantined exotic birds from Taiwan. The H5N1 was the Fujian strain (clade 2.3). The birds died in quarantine in the UK in early 2006. The number of Fujian isolates from farms or wild birds in Europe is ZERO. The number in the Middle East is ZERO. The number in Africa is ZERO. In fact the number outside of eastern China and southeast Asia is ZERO.

ALL of the reported infections in wild birds (dozens of species), domestic poultry, people, and various mammals such as cats, stone martins, dogs, foxes have been Qinghai (clade 2.2).

The DATA could not be clearer.

[Laidback Al]

Re: Ecologic Immunology of Avian Influenza (H5N1) in Migratory Birds

Tompe, I am not sure I understand the nuances of the discussion in this thread, so if I misrepresent your position please let me know. I imply from your posts that, while bird migration might explain a small fraction or percentage of the current distribution of H5N1, you believe that almost all or a substantial portion of the geographic distribution of H5N1 can be attributed to trade and human transportation of infected species.

That is, you have basically proposed a hypothesis that it is not wild bird migration but trade and transportation of infect birds that explains the current worldwide distribution of H5N1. Any good hypothesis should have predictive power, it should not merely be based on post hoc correlation of transportation links and nodes with confirmed H5N1 samples. Given your trade and transportation hypothesis, will you provide a prediction where the next outbreaks of H5N1 will occur and perhaps speculate on which species might be identified with these next outbreaks?

[tompe]

Re: Ecologic Immunology of Avian Influenza (H5N1) in Migratory Birds

Sorry, no substantial reply from me right now, but the following quote by niman I do not consider to be civil:

bird watcher fairy tales not withstanding

This is simply a wholesale dismissal and no argument.

[AlaskaDenise]

Re: Ecologic Immunology of Avian Influenza (H5N1) in Migratory Birds

Which bird species migrates between July and December from Novosibirsk to the Caspian Sea

Oenanthe oenanthe is one that may fill the bill. Those breeding in the NW tip of North America & NE arctic coast of Siberia end up on the Senegal & Ivory Coast shores in December. The Oenanthe oenanthe would be in the same valley as the first 2005 outbreak in Turkey at just the right time.

.

[gsgs]

Re: Ecologic Immunology of Avian Influenza (H5N1) in Migratory Birds

no Oenanthe = Wheatear virus in my database.
That would be an unusual species for H5N1-transmission.

They would have tested it, if someone agreed with you...

[AlaskaDenise]

Re: Ecologic Immunology of Avian Influenza (H5N1) in Migratory Birds

be an unusual species for H5N1-transmission.

Why?

It's just one example.

Actually the earliest large deaths were at the Azir Reservoir (Naxcivan). They buried the birds and the test report was "lost." They were reported as migratory ducks, but the specific species weren't identified.

.

[gsgs]

Re: Ecologic Immunology of Avian Influenza (H5N1) in Migratory Birds

apparantly no influenza virus was ever isolated from a Wheatear.
That makes it unusual.

[HenryN]

Re: Ecologic Immunology of Avian Influenza (H5N1) in Migratory Birds

Sorry, no substantial reply from me right now, but the following quote by niman I do not consider to be civil:



This is simply a wholesale dismissal and no argument.

Scientists rarely base an entire argument on negative data. Bird watchers and conservation groups do, which generates fairy tales that are repeated again and again.

As noted, such comments in 2005 had some rationale (especially if the sequence data was ignored).

In 2007, the comments are fairy tales at best.

[HenryN]

Re: Ecologic Immunology of Avian Influenza (H5N1) in Migratory Birds

apparantly no influenza virus was ever isolated from a Wheatear.
That makes it unusual.

Please.

You are once again confusing transport of H5N1 with detection of H5N1, which has been shown time and time again to not be warranted.

The heathy teal in the Nile Delta in 2005 is a good example. NAMRU-3 got a weak positive on a PCR test. They tried to isolate the virus and failed. They then passed the sample multiple times over a column to extract the RNA. They were able to generate HA and NA sequences. The sequences were clearly Qinghai H5N1 amd were virtually identical to the Qinghai H5N1 subsequently isolated in Austria from a cat (also asymptomatic) in 2006.

The best candidate for the transport of H5N1 are asymtomatic birds. The teal was asymptomatic. The testing of live asymtomatic birds in western Europe is abysmal. In 2005, when the teal was flying around the Nile Delta, western Europe reported ZERO cases of H5N1. All of Africa also reported ZERO cases (the Egyptian positive was not reported until the fall of 2006 because of difficulties in growing the virus or obtaining a sequence), but the sample was collected in December, 2005).

Most of the detection in Europe has been in resident birds. In 2006, the most common species were mute swans, which are resident.

Thus, citing negative data to rule out a species has no scientific basis, especially when the tests being run are largely CONFIRMATORY tests, which work well on farms where there are typically MANY captive dead and dying birds, but the use of such tests to detect Qinghai H5N1 in live healthy birds remains well into the abysmal level.

[HenryN]

Re: Ecologic Immunology of Avian Influenza (H5N1) in Migratory Birds

apparantly no influenza virus was ever isolated from a Wheatear.
That makes it unusual.

The number of clade 2.2 (Qinghai) sequences from teal at Genbank equals ONE, the isolate from the Nile Delta in December, 2005.

[sharon sanders]

Re: Ecologic Immunology of Avian Influenza (H5N1) in Migratory Birds

Scientific debates are not for sensitive persons. We encourage vigorous debate but do not allow direct/indirect insults.

"Fairy tale bird watcher" is ok. I am one.

We have many scientists who participate. If you venture in, put on your Winter coat.

[Anne]

Re: Ecologic Immunology of Avian Influenza (H5N1) in Migratory Birds

the absence of proof is not the proof of the absence.

but Dr Niman, dont we have some proof of commercial " spreading" ? ( with quinxhai and nigeria for example )

[HenryN]

Re: Ecologic Immunology of Avian Influenza (H5N1) in Migratory Birds

the absence of proof is not the proof of the absence.

but Dr Niman, dont we have some proof of commercial " spreading" ? ( with quinxhai and nigeria for example )

No, that is another fairy tale.

Here is a brief history of the number of tales put out by bird watchers and wetlands/wildlife conservation groups. The Qinghai trail tale really begins in Mongolia at Erhel Lake in August, 2005.

http://www.recombinomics.com/News/08060501/H5N1_Mongolia.html

The lake is quite remote and not linked to poultry, so initially the conservation groups "helping out" in Mongolia started with denials.

http://www.recombinomics.com/News/08180505/H5_Mongolia_Confirmed.html

First they acknowledged that wild birds were dead, but couldn't be due to H5N1 because not enough birds were dead. When the birds were H5 positive, they said it couldn't be H5N1 because not enough birds were dead. When H5N1 was confirmed, it was not a problem because the swabs on healthy birds were negative, so H5N1 couldn't spread (more dead birds don't fly). When dead wild birds began appearing in almost every province in Mongolia and the Mongolian government called in WHO and researchers in Russia for help, the conservation groupss switch to Europe, saying that H5N1 didn't make it to Europe because dead birds don't fly. When H5N1 appeared in Europe, the switched to Nigeria, saying all of the outbreaks spread from one large commercial farm due to trade. They added that if wild birds were involved, H5N1 would be in Egypt. When H5N1 was in Egypt, they switched to denying H5N1 was in wild birds because they tested over 10,000 wild birds in Africa and found ZERO positive for H5N1. When sequences from Nigeria showed that the outbreaks were due to MULTIPLE independent introductions, they focused on all of the (false) negatives in Africa and Europe.

They STILL maintain that the wild birds are "victims" and are being infected by H5N1 from commercial farms, exotic imports, or smuggled birds (with NO evidence other than the link between Hungary and UK).

It is ALL a fairly tale repeated again and again.