Tweet
Translation Google
Notice ANSES
Referral No 2015-SA-0241
Maisons-Alfort, December 14, 2015
REVIEWS
National food safety Food Agency,
environmental and labor
risks relating to avian influenza
...
On 24 November, the National Reference Laboratory (NRL) Influenza ANSES - Ploufragan identified a strain of avian influenza (AI) H5N1 highly pathogenic (HP) in a backyard breeding counting 32 species of birds Gallus gallus hens and chickens in Dordogne.
Since that first case, several outbreaks have been confirmed by the NRL. They cover various avian species (ducks, chickens, guinea fowl, geese), various departments (Dordogne, Gers, Haute-Vienne, Landes, Pyrenees Atlantiques) and different types of virus: H5N1, H5N2 and H5N9 (see Platform animale1 epidemiological surveillance in health).
...
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS OF GECU HP AI H5 2015
1 - Summary of responses to questions made in the intermediate notes
Answer to question 1.b: Are the measures of restriction of movements of domestic carnivores provided by the decree of January 18, 2008 relevant to this virus?
The Gecu believes that in the current situation there is no evidence to suggest that dogs and cats movements restrictions are necessary and must be applied in this case, except to the infected premises, to avoid virus spreading outside livestock, cats or dogs may wander and carry the virus - mechanically.
Answer to Question 2: What are the most likely hypotheses about the origin of infection?
In the current state of knowledge, Gecu believes that the two most probable hypotheses of source of infection are (1) the circulation of low pathogens AI (LP) in poultry mutated to HP in such birds, and less likely (2) circulation in avifauna , of LP AI mutated to HP in poultry.
Answer to Question 3: What would be the surveillance measures, going beyond those provided for by the regulation, which would assess the spread of the virus and help to ensure, if no other case was revealed that the strain Highly pathogenic no longer circulates?
Given the detection of two other outbreaks after the receipt of the referral, it was agreed, in agreement with EB that this question would be reformulated and treated in a second time.
2 - Answer to questions related to zoonotic risk
2.1. Question 1: a) concerning the zoonotic potential of HPAI H5 virus.
Experts remind that the HP AI H5N1, H5N2 and H5N9 are clearly different from the highly pathogenic H5N1 Asian strain A / goose / Guangdong / 1/96. It is proper to remember that they are the only HP AI H5 described as being responsible for severe forms in humans.
In addition, elements from the whole genome sequencing of the H5N1 virus carried by ANSES Ploufragan and analyzed by the National Reference Laboratory for avian influenza and Newcastle disease and the National Reference Center Influenzae virus, lead the experts to the following conclusions:
comparing the nucleotide sequence of the sample with 150169a with recent data bases or bibliographic summaries identifying the determinants adaptation of influenza A virus to humans reveals that the virus studied has not all known determinants to facilitate the transmission of avian viruses in humans ;
however, and as a majority of low pathogenic contemporary avian viruses for birds, circulating in Europe, the virus has a number of mutations previously identified as capable of promoting the replication and / or interfere with antiviral responses in mammals, which does not exclude the onset of respiratory infection in the particular circumstances of high exposure to infected birds;
however, all segments analyzed are avian type, which allows to consider as almost nonexistent the risk of transmission to humans.
the risk of human transmission is considered even lower than before.
2.2. Question 4: on the evidence presented above, are update of previous work and recommendations of the Anses for the population necessary under the pathogenicity of the virus
2.2.1. Risk of exposure by ingestion, particularly by consumption (1) of raw and cooked food, such as meat (poultry), eggs, processed products, (2) potentially contaminated water by the avian flu, (3) food soiled by water potentially contaminated with the virus of bird flu
Experts remind that apart from a few suspicions related to the ingestion of blood and raw poultry viscera in Asia (Gambotto et al., 2008), no human cases have been confirmed for HP Asian H5N1 AI via the consumption of food or water, despite its confirmed zoonotic potential . In its notice 2005-SA-0258, which concerned the risk assessment for man via consumer goods from poultry infected with Asian H5N1 HP virus, AFSSA had thus estimated the risk to consumers at zero to negligible (the estimate negligible resulting from these rare suspicions, connected to very particular modes of consumption.
A fortiori, the molecular findings on H5N1 HP virus highlighted in Dordogne, support the assertion that the risk to consumers is still below that.
2.2.2. Risk of respiratory exposure, particularly when handling poultry and preparation of products from infected poultry
In light of the answer given in paragraph 2.1, the risk of infection by the respiratory route in these exposure conditions can not be totally excluded.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE AGENCY
The National Health Security Agency for Food, Environmental and Occupational endorses these early findings of GECU HPAI H5 2015 on the risk avian influenza. These may be supplemented in the light of new data available, both as epidemiological and genetic.
...
Notice ANSES
Referral No 2015-SA-0241
Maisons-Alfort, December 14, 2015
REVIEWS
National food safety Food Agency,
environmental and labor
risks relating to avian influenza
...
On 24 November, the National Reference Laboratory (NRL) Influenza ANSES - Ploufragan identified a strain of avian influenza (AI) H5N1 highly pathogenic (HP) in a backyard breeding counting 32 species of birds Gallus gallus hens and chickens in Dordogne.
Since that first case, several outbreaks have been confirmed by the NRL. They cover various avian species (ducks, chickens, guinea fowl, geese), various departments (Dordogne, Gers, Haute-Vienne, Landes, Pyrenees Atlantiques) and different types of virus: H5N1, H5N2 and H5N9 (see Platform animale1 epidemiological surveillance in health).
...
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS OF GECU HP AI H5 2015
1 - Summary of responses to questions made in the intermediate notes
Answer to question 1.b: Are the measures of restriction of movements of domestic carnivores provided by the decree of January 18, 2008 relevant to this virus?
The Gecu believes that in the current situation there is no evidence to suggest that dogs and cats movements restrictions are necessary and must be applied in this case, except to the infected premises, to avoid virus spreading outside livestock, cats or dogs may wander and carry the virus - mechanically.
Answer to Question 2: What are the most likely hypotheses about the origin of infection?
In the current state of knowledge, Gecu believes that the two most probable hypotheses of source of infection are (1) the circulation of low pathogens AI (LP) in poultry mutated to HP in such birds, and less likely (2) circulation in avifauna , of LP AI mutated to HP in poultry.
Answer to Question 3: What would be the surveillance measures, going beyond those provided for by the regulation, which would assess the spread of the virus and help to ensure, if no other case was revealed that the strain Highly pathogenic no longer circulates?
Given the detection of two other outbreaks after the receipt of the referral, it was agreed, in agreement with EB that this question would be reformulated and treated in a second time.
2 - Answer to questions related to zoonotic risk
2.1. Question 1: a) concerning the zoonotic potential of HPAI H5 virus.
Experts remind that the HP AI H5N1, H5N2 and H5N9 are clearly different from the highly pathogenic H5N1 Asian strain A / goose / Guangdong / 1/96. It is proper to remember that they are the only HP AI H5 described as being responsible for severe forms in humans.
In addition, elements from the whole genome sequencing of the H5N1 virus carried by ANSES Ploufragan and analyzed by the National Reference Laboratory for avian influenza and Newcastle disease and the National Reference Center Influenzae virus, lead the experts to the following conclusions:
comparing the nucleotide sequence of the sample with 150169a with recent data bases or bibliographic summaries identifying the determinants adaptation of influenza A virus to humans reveals that the virus studied has not all known determinants to facilitate the transmission of avian viruses in humans ;
however, and as a majority of low pathogenic contemporary avian viruses for birds, circulating in Europe, the virus has a number of mutations previously identified as capable of promoting the replication and / or interfere with antiviral responses in mammals, which does not exclude the onset of respiratory infection in the particular circumstances of high exposure to infected birds;
however, all segments analyzed are avian type, which allows to consider as almost nonexistent the risk of transmission to humans.
the risk of human transmission is considered even lower than before.
2.2. Question 4: on the evidence presented above, are update of previous work and recommendations of the Anses for the population necessary under the pathogenicity of the virus
2.2.1. Risk of exposure by ingestion, particularly by consumption (1) of raw and cooked food, such as meat (poultry), eggs, processed products, (2) potentially contaminated water by the avian flu, (3) food soiled by water potentially contaminated with the virus of bird flu
Experts remind that apart from a few suspicions related to the ingestion of blood and raw poultry viscera in Asia (Gambotto et al., 2008), no human cases have been confirmed for HP Asian H5N1 AI via the consumption of food or water, despite its confirmed zoonotic potential . In its notice 2005-SA-0258, which concerned the risk assessment for man via consumer goods from poultry infected with Asian H5N1 HP virus, AFSSA had thus estimated the risk to consumers at zero to negligible (the estimate negligible resulting from these rare suspicions, connected to very particular modes of consumption.
A fortiori, the molecular findings on H5N1 HP virus highlighted in Dordogne, support the assertion that the risk to consumers is still below that.
2.2.2. Risk of respiratory exposure, particularly when handling poultry and preparation of products from infected poultry
In light of the answer given in paragraph 2.1, the risk of infection by the respiratory route in these exposure conditions can not be totally excluded.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE AGENCY
The National Health Security Agency for Food, Environmental and Occupational endorses these early findings of GECU HPAI H5 2015 on the risk avian influenza. These may be supplemented in the light of new data available, both as epidemiological and genetic.
...
