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"Wisconsin:Flu Lab Set to Open for 1918 Pandemic Virus Reconstruction"

tropical

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Currently at FluWiki:
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United States
? Wisconsin:Flu Lab Set to Open for 1918 Pandemic Virus Reconstruction (Link= http://www.truthnews.us/?p=535 )

From:
"Alex Jone's ThruthNews.us"
Flu Lab Set to Open for 1918 Pandemic Virus Reconstruction


<!-- sphereit start -->David Wahlberg
Wisconsin State Journal
October 29, 2007

Ten-inch walls made with crack-resistant concrete. Outlets sealed with silicone.Sensors for broken windows. Infrared surveillance beams. Redundant air handling systems. A back-up generator.
UW-Madison?s $12.5 million Institute for Influenza Viral Research, nearing completion at University Research Park, will have a collection of safety and security features the university hasn?t seen before.
Many people will be watching the work of the institute, to be directed by virologist Yoshihiro Kawaoka.
The observers include health officials, who want a better understanding of the bird flu virus that is threatening a global flu epidemic. They include scientists, who are competing with Kawaoka to make discoveries about bird flu and other flu viruses.
They also include critics, who have charged Kawaoka with circumventing safety rules.
Critics objected three years ago to Kawaoka?s research at UW-Madison involving the deadly 1918 flu virus, saying his safety measures were not strict enough.
This September, they revealed that the university halted his work on components of the Ebola virus last year after the National Institutes of Health said the studies must be done in a lab more secure than any on campus.
Without proper precautions, the critics say, such viruses can escape.
?It?s a very significant and a very real risk,? said Edward Hammond, of the Austin, Texas-based Sunshine Project, which released documents about the Ebola work. ?They handle viruses that could kill tens of millions of people.?
Jan Klein, UW-Madison?s biological safety officer, said Kawaoka and other researchers at the university take adequate measures to manage the risks.
Kawaoka said his detractors didn?t understand the extent of the precautions he used for the 1918 flu virus research. After shifting the work to a higher-security lab in Canada, he started doing some of it again in Madison this year after the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention approved it.
He said the guidelines regarding the Ebola research, which he hasn?t resumed in Madison, are open to interpretation. Klein said the university may appeal the NIH?s ruling about the Ebola work.
Kawaoka, a prominent and prolific flu researcher, was being wooed to the University of Pittsburgh until UW-Madison promised him the new institute. The 28,000-square-foot facility on Science Drive, to be finished next month, will enable him to expand his studies, he said.
Kawaoka plans to study several kinds of flu viruses in the institute ? including H5N1, the bird flu virus circulating in Asia, and a reconstructed version of the 1918 flu virus, which killed some 50 million people when it spread worldwide.
?Space has been a limiting factor for our research,? Kawaoka said of the School of Veterinary Medicine lab he has been using. ?Now we?ll be able to do multiple experiments at the same time. We want to show people that the work we do is safe.?
BSL3-Ag
The institute contains lab space classified as Biosafety Level 3-Agriculture, a standard higher than any other lab at the university. BSL3-Ag is near the top of the federal government?s four-level scale for labs involving infectious agents.
Only a few BSL4 labs, in which workers don special suits with self-contained breathing devices, exist nationwide.
Several labs at UW-Madison, including some of Kawaoka?s lab space in the veterinary school, are BSL3. In those labs, researchers wear gloves and masks and the air is specially filtered.
The BSL3 Ag designation carries additional requirements, such as extra air handling systems, showers upon leaving the lab ? and in the case of bird flu research, no contact with birds for several days.
Additional features also will ensure safety, said James Corkery, president of ACS. The Madison construction management company is overseeing the remodeling of a former office building, last used by Epic Systems, to create the institute.
Corkery said the steel airlock door used to enter the BSL3 Ag lab is welded to its frame, like in a submarine.
He said petri dishes, animal cages and other lab equipment will be washed and run through autoclaves, sterilizing machines that use heat and pressure to kill germs. Liquid waste will be cooked in a separate system at 250 degrees Fahrenheit for an hour before flowing into the sewer system.
?Nothing can live after that,? Corkery said, pointing to steam tanks surrounded by stainless steel pipes in the institute?s basement.
The $12.5 million cost ? up from the $9 million cited when the university announced plans for the institute last year ? is being shared, roughly equally, by UW-Madison and the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, the university?s tech-transfer agency.
Only one other BSL3-Ag lab exists in Madison, at the National Wildlife Health Center off Schroeder Road.
CDC inspection
Though Kawaoka said he is eager to move his 18-person lab group into the institute and hire more researchers, the shift may not happen for months.
In order for him to use the H5N1 virus or the 1918 virus in the new building, the CDC must first inspect the lab and grant approval. The agency may visit in late November.
When Kawaoka applied for similar approval at his existing lab, it took a year, he said.
CDC permission to use the new space ?could take weeks, months or even one year,? he said. ?I don?t expect it to be done within this year.?
Much of the research in the institute will involve animals. Rooms are available for rodents, ferrets, poultry and monkeys.
Initially, Kawaoka said, he?ll continue three research areas: studying how and why the H5N1 virus, the 1918 virus and other flu viruses are virulent, improving techniques for making flu vaccines and screening compounds that could lead to new antiviral drugs against flu.
Though bird flu has dropped off the national news radar, Kawaoka said its threat of causing a pandemic continues. The virus has killed 204 of the 332 people known to be infected since 2003, mostly in Asia, including 31 deaths in Indonesia this year.
A single genetic change could make the virus capable of spreading easily among people, Kawaoka said. If that happens, experts say the virus could be more dangerous than the 1918 flu.
H5N1 ?is still spreading,? Kawaoka said.
 
Re: "Wisconsin:Flu Lab Set to Open for 1918 Pandemic Virus Reconstruction"

hmm, maybe Kawaoka is warning about a pandemic because he is seeking
for funding and justification of the new lab ?
 
Re: "Wisconsin:Flu Lab Set to Open for 1918 Pandemic Virus Reconstruction"

In any case, seems that the work with ebola, bird flu, and the 1918 flu will be done in an: "lab space classified as Biosafety Level 3-Agriculture",
not in a BSL4 lab (maybe will be better put more money and have a max. security, than not).

"BSL4 labs, in which workers don special suits with self-contained breathing devices..."

"In order for him to use the H5N1 virus or the 1918 virus in the new building, the CDC must first inspect the lab and grant approval. The agency may visit in late November."
 
Re: "Wisconsin:Flu Lab Set to Open for 1918 Pandemic Virus Reconstruction"

Let's hope Kawaoka uses better judgment than he did on the Ebola thing. Also, he is starting to crank a lot of press, so it is reasonable to suspect this is going to generate grant enthusiasm, plus I am sure he hopes this will overwhelm the negative press he got with the Ebola issue.
 
Re: "Wisconsin:Flu Lab Set to Open for 1918 Pandemic Virus Reconstruction"

People get all a dither about nuclear facilities being prone to accident or terrorism. But for my senseabilities, this potential biohazard is worse, FAR WORSE. There are plenty of crazy apocaliptic groupies that could let this genie out of the lab, not to mention the general unforseen accidental release.
Is the research worth the risk?
 
Re: "Wisconsin:Flu Lab Set to Open for 1918 Pandemic Virus Reconstruction"

Biosafety Level 3
BSL-3 is suitable for work with infectious agents which may cause serious or potentially lethal diseases as a result of exposure by the inhalation route (slide 41). BSL-3 laboratories should be located away from high-traffic areas. Examples of agents that should be manipulated at BSL-3 are M. tuberculosis (research activities), St. Louis encephalitis virus, and Coxiella burnetii (slide 42).
There are some specific secondary barriers needed at BSL-3 (slide 43), that tend to set these laboratories apart from BSL-2. At CDC the current main BSL-3 laboratories are located in a unique high containment building (slide 44) that also houses the BSL-4 laboratory (slide 45). A typical BSL-3 laboratory lay out is shown in slide 46. These laboratories are characterized by having a double-door entry (shown here as an ante-room; other configurations are also used). Because the agents manipulated at BSL-3 are transmissible by the aerosol route, particular attention is given to air movement in these labs. Air moves from areas of lesser contamination to areas of higher contamination, such as from the corridor into the laboratory. Air movement is also single pass; exhaust air is not recirculated to other rooms. Exhaust air does not have to be HEPA filtered, unless local conditions are such that reentrainment into building air supply systems is unavoidable.
All work that may create aerosols or splatter is done inside a biological safety cabinet (slide 47). Wall, ceiling and floor penetrations are sealed to keep aerosols in and to keep gaseous decontaminants in. The floor is monolithic, and there are continuous cove moldings that extend at least 4" up the wall. Acoustic tiles are not used in BSL-3 laboratories; ceilings should be waterproof for ease of cleaning Centrifuge tubes are placed into containment cups or heads in the BSC (slide 48), transferred to the centrifuge, spun, then returned to the BSC to be unloaded. In some laboratories the centrifuges themselves are enclosed in a vented area to minimize possible aerosol exposures created in the event of a centrifuge failure. Vacuum lines are protected with HEPA filters so that maintenance personnel are not exposed to infectious aerosols (slide 49).
Standard microbiological practices are the same as for BSL-1 and BSL-2 laboratories (slide 50). Class II type A biological safety cabinets <sup>[3]</sup> are suitable in BSL-3 laboratories. Sometimes Class II type B3 cabinets are installed, requiring thimble connection to the building exhaust systems (slide 51). Depending on the nature of the work being done in the BSL-3 laboratory, additional personnel protective devices may be worn, such as respirators (slide 52). When pulmonary protection is required, the laboratorians need to have appropriate medical evaluations and be trained in proper fit testing and care of their respirators.
Supervisors of BSL-3 laboratories should be competent scientists experienced in working with the agents (slide 53). They establish criteria for entry into the laboratory, restrict access, develop appropriate practices and procedures, and train the laboratorians. They are also responsible for developing the laboratory safety manual. The lab personnel must rigorously follow the established guidelines, demonstrate proficiency in performing their various procedures, and receive appropriate training (slide 54). They must participate in specified medical surveillance programs, and report all incidents that constitute potential exposures.


http://www.cdc.gov/OD/ohs/symp5/jyrtext.htm
 
Re: "Wisconsin:Flu Lab Set to Open for 1918 Pandemic Virus Reconstruction"

is required for work with dangerous and exotic agents that pose a high individual risk of aerosol-transmitted laboratory infections, agents which cause severe to fatal disease in humans for which vaccines or other treatments are not available, such as Bolivian and Argentine hemorrhagic fevers, dengue fever, Marburg virus, Ebola virus, hantaviruses, Lassa fever, Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever, and other various hemorrhagic diseases. When dealing with biological hazards at this level the use of a Hazmat suit and a self-contained oxygen supply is mandatory. The entrance and exit of a Level Four biolab will contain multiple showers, a vacuum room, an ultraviolet light room, and other safety precautions designed to destroy all traces of the biohazard. Multiple airlocks are employed and are electronically secured to prevent both doors opening at the same time. All air and water service going to and coming from a Biosafety Level 4 lab will undergo similar decontamination procedures to eliminate the possibility of an accidental release. Agents with a close or identical antigenic relationship to Biosafety Level 4 agents are handled at this level until sufficient data are obtained either to confirm continued work at this level, or to work with them at a lower level.
Members of the laboratory staff have specific and thorough training in handling extremely hazardous infectious agents and they understand the primary and secondary containment functions of the standard and special practices, the containment equipment, and the laboratory design characteristics. They are supervised by competent scientists who are trained and experienced in working with these agents. Access to the laboratory is strictly controlled by the laboratory director.
The facility is either in a separate building or in a controlled area within a building, which is completely isolated from all other areas of the building. A specific facility operations manual is prepared or adopted. Building protocols for preventing contamination often uses negatively pressurized facilities, which, if compromised, would severely inhibit an outbreak of aerosol pathogens.
Within work areas of the facility, all activities are confined to Class III biological safety cabinets, or Class II biological safety cabinets used with one-piece positive pressure personnel suits ventilated by a life support system. The Biosafety Level 4 laboratory has special engineering and design features to prevent microorganisms from being disseminated into the environment. The laboratory is kept at negative air pressure, so that air flows into the room if the barrier is penetrated or breached. Furthermore, an airlock is used during personnel entry and exit.


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biosafety_level
 
Re: "Wisconsin:Flu Lab Set to Open for 1918 Pandemic Virus Reconstruction"

"... pressing to relax the safety guidelines further by asking whether the study could take place in a Level 2 lab, Klein said.
That's when the university asked NIH for guidance and learned the material was restricted to a Level 4 lab."

We can only hope that there, and through all the world will be enaugh sense of the danger, and of duty to NOT RELAXE the safety guidelines, the only thing that stay between the humanity and the chimeras.

Too much strange virus outbreaks in a world today ...
:yinyang:
 
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