Re: Wild Birds with H5N1 in England 2008
SOP
Elimination of confirmed H5N1 by limiting testing.
SOP
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Wild Birds with H5N1 in England 2008
- Thread starter HenryN
- Start date
Giuseppe
Emeritus
Re: Wild Birds with H5N1 in England 2008
FROM DEFRA:
-
INFORMATION BULLETIN - Ref: 71/08
Date: 5 March 2008Nobel House, 17 Smith Square, London SW1P 3JR
Out of hours telephone 020 7270 8960
Avian influenza update: wild bird control area lifted
Defra has today confirmed that the Wild Bird Control Area put in place in Dorset on 29 February for highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza has been lifted.
This follows confirmation of H5N1 in a Canada goose in the existing Wild Bird Monitoring Area on 29 February. The lifting of the Control Area today is based on an assessment of risk and of the disease situation.
The Wild Bird Monitoring Area will also reduce in size today, based on expert advice on the area most at risk from disease. The Monitoring Area must remain in place for at least 30 days following the collection of the last positive sample.
Surveillance for disease in the Wild Bird Monitoring Area is ongoing, and new restrictions may need to be reintroduced should the risk of disease increase. The UK is at a constant but low level of risk of the introduction of highly pathogenic avian influenza, with a slight increase in risk during winter and spring migration.
Bird keepers across the country are reminded to practice good biosecurity and remain vigilant for any signs of disease.
Highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza was first confirmed in wild birds in the Dorset area on 10 January and to date 11 cases have been identified in wild birds.
Further information
Information is available from the Defra Helpline (08459 33 55 77) - see www.defra.gov.uk for current opening hours. Bird keepers can also call the Animal Health recorded information line for the latest updates on 0844 884 4600.
The details on the measures that apply in the current zones can be found on the Defra website at www.defra.gov.uk/avianflu/
-
http://www.defra.gov.uk/news/2008/080305a.htm
------
FROM DEFRA:
-
INFORMATION BULLETIN - Ref: 71/08
Date: 5 March 2008Nobel House, 17 Smith Square, London SW1P 3JR
Out of hours telephone 020 7270 8960
Avian influenza update: wild bird control area lifted
Defra has today confirmed that the Wild Bird Control Area put in place in Dorset on 29 February for highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza has been lifted.
This follows confirmation of H5N1 in a Canada goose in the existing Wild Bird Monitoring Area on 29 February. The lifting of the Control Area today is based on an assessment of risk and of the disease situation.
The Wild Bird Monitoring Area will also reduce in size today, based on expert advice on the area most at risk from disease. The Monitoring Area must remain in place for at least 30 days following the collection of the last positive sample.
Surveillance for disease in the Wild Bird Monitoring Area is ongoing, and new restrictions may need to be reintroduced should the risk of disease increase. The UK is at a constant but low level of risk of the introduction of highly pathogenic avian influenza, with a slight increase in risk during winter and spring migration.
Bird keepers across the country are reminded to practice good biosecurity and remain vigilant for any signs of disease.
Highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza was first confirmed in wild birds in the Dorset area on 10 January and to date 11 cases have been identified in wild birds.
Further information
Information is available from the Defra Helpline (08459 33 55 77) - see www.defra.gov.uk for current opening hours. Bird keepers can also call the Animal Health recorded information line for the latest updates on 0844 884 4600.
The details on the measures that apply in the current zones can be found on the Defra website at www.defra.gov.uk/avianflu/
-
http://www.defra.gov.uk/news/2008/080305a.htm
------
Re: Wild Birds with H5N1 in England 2008
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ILCHESTER Four cygnets hatched from a nest of seven eggs, above, are the earliest arrivals at the Abbotsbury Swannery in Dorset since records were first kept more than 600 years ago.
Traditionally, the Benedictine monks who founded the swannery regard the first hatching as a sign that summer has arrived. This does not usually happen until mid-May, according to detailed records kept by the monks since 1393. The year?s first hatching has come as a boost to the swannery soon after it was given the all-clear after an outbreak of the H5N1 strain of bird flu. Ten birds died of the flu, which can be fatal to humans. Staff were given antiflu jabs and Tamiflu tablets as a precaution. Defra set up a control and monitoring zone around the attraction from January until the all-clear was given in March.
John Houston, the swannery?s manager, said of the hatching: ?This is wonderful news and has lifted all the doom and gloom that has been about because of bird flu. We have been checking the records and we can?t find a cygnet that has hatched earlier. We can only put it down to the mild winter.? He said it was too early to tell what gender the cygnets were.
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/environment/article3835203.ece
<!-- Remove following <div> to not show photographer information --><!-- Remove following <div> to not show image description --><!-- Remove following <div> to not show enlarge option --><!----><SCRIPT type=text/javascript><!--fCreateImageBrowser(nSelectedArticleImage,'landscape',"/tol/");//--></SCRIPT>
ILCHESTER Four cygnets hatched from a nest of seven eggs, above, are the earliest arrivals at the Abbotsbury Swannery in Dorset since records were first kept more than 600 years ago.
Traditionally, the Benedictine monks who founded the swannery regard the first hatching as a sign that summer has arrived. This does not usually happen until mid-May, according to detailed records kept by the monks since 1393. The year?s first hatching has come as a boost to the swannery soon after it was given the all-clear after an outbreak of the H5N1 strain of bird flu. Ten birds died of the flu, which can be fatal to humans. Staff were given antiflu jabs and Tamiflu tablets as a precaution. Defra set up a control and monitoring zone around the attraction from January until the all-clear was given in March.
John Houston, the swannery?s manager, said of the hatching: ?This is wonderful news and has lifted all the doom and gloom that has been about because of bird flu. We have been checking the records and we can?t find a cygnet that has hatched earlier. We can only put it down to the mild winter.? He said it was too early to tell what gender the cygnets were.
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/environment/article3835203.ece
Shiloh
Editor, Senior Moderator
Re: Wild Birds with H5N1 in England 2008
Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/dorset/7422971.stm
Wednesday, 28 May 2008 09:38 UK
Record year for Bird Flu swannery
A record number of cygnets have been born at a Dorset swannery that was hit with Bird Flu earlier this year.
Ten wild mute swans and a Canada goose tested positive for the virulent H5N1 strain of the disease at Abbotsbury Swannery during the January outbreak.
Less than six months later it is having one of its busiest hatching seasons ever, after being reopened in March.
The swannery, which is home to a herd of 800 wild swans, is expecting more than 600 cygnets this season.
The outbreak was probably introduced by an infected migratory bird, Defra said.
An epidemiology report found the strain of the virus was similar to that found in Europe in the latter part of 2007.
Swan herder David Wheeler said: "It was a grim time, we were very worried.
"We half expected to lose a lot of swans but it just seemed to be one or two birds over the whole of the lagoon."
Scientists believe the Abbotsbury swans may have developed some kind of immunity to the disease, which prevented it from spreading much further.
They claim it also explains why the new cygnets have been protected.
John Houston, manager of the swannery, said the birth of the cygnets showed nature reserves can "bounce back" from Bird Flu.
"Back in the January days it was all gloom and doom," he said.
"It really was hard to envisage that here we are today in May with the biggest hatching of cygnets at Abbotsbury that we've ever had.
"We would never have thought that was possible in January.
"We've learnt that it isn't the end of the world, that nature reserves can bounce back from this, as we see today."
Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/dorset/7422971.stm
Wednesday, 28 May 2008 09:38 UK
Record year for Bird Flu swannery
A record number of cygnets have been born at a Dorset swannery that was hit with Bird Flu earlier this year.
Ten wild mute swans and a Canada goose tested positive for the virulent H5N1 strain of the disease at Abbotsbury Swannery during the January outbreak.
Less than six months later it is having one of its busiest hatching seasons ever, after being reopened in March.
The swannery, which is home to a herd of 800 wild swans, is expecting more than 600 cygnets this season.
The outbreak was probably introduced by an infected migratory bird, Defra said.
An epidemiology report found the strain of the virus was similar to that found in Europe in the latter part of 2007.
Swan herder David Wheeler said: "It was a grim time, we were very worried.
"We half expected to lose a lot of swans but it just seemed to be one or two birds over the whole of the lagoon."
Scientists believe the Abbotsbury swans may have developed some kind of immunity to the disease, which prevented it from spreading much further.
They claim it also explains why the new cygnets have been protected.
John Houston, manager of the swannery, said the birth of the cygnets showed nature reserves can "bounce back" from Bird Flu.
"Back in the January days it was all gloom and doom," he said.
"It really was hard to envisage that here we are today in May with the biggest hatching of cygnets at Abbotsbury that we've ever had.
"We would never have thought that was possible in January.
"We've learnt that it isn't the end of the world, that nature reserves can bounce back from this, as we see today."
Commonground
Senior Moderator
Re: Wild Birds with H5N1 in England 2008
Of AI virus can be circulated by the British poultry
Written by Teresa Neves
Wednesday, 25 June 2008
The poultry farmers throughout the United Kingdom should remain alert and not neglecting if, perhaps, some health problem seen not respond to conventional treatments. In this case, the possibility of occurrence of low pathogenic Avian influenza should not be discarded.
The warning, launched by British Farmers Guardian, part of epidemiologists from DEFRA (acronym in English, the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs of the United Kingdom), for whom a strain of low pathogenicity, not yet identified, the virus of Avian influenza can be in circulation in the local poultry.
Indications to this effect are present in a report prepared by the National Emergency Epidemiology Group (NEEG, the body of DEFRA). It notes that the clinical evidence obtained from all the records raised suggest that the outbreak of highly pathogenic (caused by a strain of the H7N7 type virus of Avian Influenza) occurred in a commercial laying farm (25 one thousand birds) located in Banbury, north of Oxfordshire, "comes from a strain of low pathogenicity to own pre-existing outbreak."
In the case in staff, were observed increase in mortality (2.5% in one of four warehouses that make up the barn) and fall in productivity of eggs two weeks before the birds begin to produce high mortality (first days of June this), when then was diagnosed the presence of the H7N7 strain of the virus of AI. That has raised the suspicion of possible presence of low pathogenic strains of the disease throughout the UK.
Last week the report indicates that it is observed that clinical signs associated with the infection of low pathogenicity are quite variable, showing since "no" to a high mortality: "The low pathogenic Avian influenza can be confused with (or their identification may be complicated by the presence of) various diseases with respiratory or enteric signs. In any avian disease that resists the preventive and therapeutic treatments should be suspected the presence of diseases aviarias of mandatory reporting, included here, now, the low pathogenic Avian Influenza. "
The study also indicates released two hypothetical sources of infection. In one, the virus can be transmitted by contact between wild birds and poultry trade created outdoors (the famous creations "free-range" recommended, especially by NGOs British animal welfare). The evaluation is another option for the existence of an unidentified source of infection. Here the spread may be linked to several factors, including the collection of eggs from vehicles, distribution of rations, or even to collect manure, and the transit of people.
http://translate.google.com/transla...temid=0&hl=en&ie=UTF8&sl=pt&sl=es&tl=en&tl=en
Of AI virus can be circulated by the British poultry
Written by Teresa Neves
Wednesday, 25 June 2008
The poultry farmers throughout the United Kingdom should remain alert and not neglecting if, perhaps, some health problem seen not respond to conventional treatments. In this case, the possibility of occurrence of low pathogenic Avian influenza should not be discarded.
The warning, launched by British Farmers Guardian, part of epidemiologists from DEFRA (acronym in English, the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs of the United Kingdom), for whom a strain of low pathogenicity, not yet identified, the virus of Avian influenza can be in circulation in the local poultry.
Indications to this effect are present in a report prepared by the National Emergency Epidemiology Group (NEEG, the body of DEFRA). It notes that the clinical evidence obtained from all the records raised suggest that the outbreak of highly pathogenic (caused by a strain of the H7N7 type virus of Avian Influenza) occurred in a commercial laying farm (25 one thousand birds) located in Banbury, north of Oxfordshire, "comes from a strain of low pathogenicity to own pre-existing outbreak."
In the case in staff, were observed increase in mortality (2.5% in one of four warehouses that make up the barn) and fall in productivity of eggs two weeks before the birds begin to produce high mortality (first days of June this), when then was diagnosed the presence of the H7N7 strain of the virus of AI. That has raised the suspicion of possible presence of low pathogenic strains of the disease throughout the UK.
Last week the report indicates that it is observed that clinical signs associated with the infection of low pathogenicity are quite variable, showing since "no" to a high mortality: "The low pathogenic Avian influenza can be confused with (or their identification may be complicated by the presence of) various diseases with respiratory or enteric signs. In any avian disease that resists the preventive and therapeutic treatments should be suspected the presence of diseases aviarias of mandatory reporting, included here, now, the low pathogenic Avian Influenza. "
The study also indicates released two hypothetical sources of infection. In one, the virus can be transmitted by contact between wild birds and poultry trade created outdoors (the famous creations "free-range" recommended, especially by NGOs British animal welfare). The evaluation is another option for the existence of an unidentified source of infection. Here the spread may be linked to several factors, including the collection of eggs from vehicles, distribution of rations, or even to collect manure, and the transit of people.
http://translate.google.com/transla...temid=0&hl=en&ie=UTF8&sl=pt&sl=es&tl=en&tl=en
Oracle
Well-known member
Re: Abbotsbury Swannery
Re: Abbotsbury Swannery
Not to put a damper on matters, but..
The record population of mature swans and cygnets at the Dorset Swannery should NOT be lauded. <i>This is a wake-up call. </i>
The growing density of swans at Abbottsbury is strong risk factor for disease outbreak.
Swans are NOT social birds, especially breeding pairs. Swans are naturally aggressive and territorial when breeding. These swans have developed unusual behavioral mechanisms to diffuse this natural aggression in a colony setting.
This crowding exerts an immunosuppressive effect on the colony, putting young birds and those already infected with mild bacterial disease at risk.
There are only two such large breeding aggregates in the world.
PAY ATTENTION DEFRA.
Re: Abbotsbury Swannery
Not to put a damper on matters, but..
The record population of mature swans and cygnets at the Dorset Swannery should NOT be lauded. <i>This is a wake-up call. </i>
The growing density of swans at Abbottsbury is strong risk factor for disease outbreak.
Swans are NOT social birds, especially breeding pairs. Swans are naturally aggressive and territorial when breeding. These swans have developed unusual behavioral mechanisms to diffuse this natural aggression in a colony setting.
This crowding exerts an immunosuppressive effect on the colony, putting young birds and those already infected with mild bacterial disease at risk.
There are only two such large breeding aggregates in the world.
PAY ATTENTION DEFRA.
Re: Wild Birds with H5N1 in England 2008
Seems that DEFRA has pulled the report. I got the googel entry, but no page listed in DEFRA:
[PDF] Epidemiology report - Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H7N7 ...File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat
HPAIH7N7 Defra Epi Report. 15.30 23June08. Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H7N7, June 2008. Epidemiology Report. Situation at 12.30 Wednesday 11 June ...
www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/diseases/notifiable/disease/ai/pdf/epi-report080617v1-1.pdf -
Seems that DEFRA has pulled the report. I got the googel entry, but no page listed in DEFRA:
[PDF] Epidemiology report - Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H7N7 ...File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat
HPAIH7N7 Defra Epi Report. 15.30 23June08. Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H7N7, June 2008. Epidemiology Report. Situation at 12.30 Wednesday 11 June ...
www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/diseases/notifiable/disease/ai/pdf/epi-report080617v1-1.pdf -
Gert van der Hoek
In Memoriam - Editor, Senior Moderator
Re: Wild Birds with H5N1 in England 2008
Still available via these links:
http://216.239.59.104/search?q=cach...Avian+Influenza+H7N7&hl=nl&ct=clnk&cd=2&gl=nl
and PDF:
http://influenza.bvsalud.org/lildbi/docsonline/7/8/087-HPAI_H7N7_Oxfordshire_NEEG_June_2008.pdf
Still available via these links:
http://216.239.59.104/search?q=cach...Avian+Influenza+H7N7&hl=nl&ct=clnk&cd=2&gl=nl
and PDF:
http://influenza.bvsalud.org/lildbi/docsonline/7/8/087-HPAI_H7N7_Oxfordshire_NEEG_June_2008.pdf
Re: Wild Birds with H5N1 in England 2008
Thanks, Dutchy.
Below is an excerpt about the apparent development of an LP virus into a HP virus:
We suggest that after a period of approximately 7-10 days following the observed
onset of clinical signs in Shed 1 a mutation to virulence of the presumed LP H7 virus
to the highly pathogenic form occurred in Shed 3 during successive rounds of viral
replication and transmission cycles in a partially immune poultry population. During
these replication and transmission cycles random mutations to the virus genome can
occur. Whether or not these mutations become fixed in the population depends on a
number of factors, some described below. Acquisition of this genotype may have
been driven by synergistic host: pathogen interactions, including:
i. Adaptation and selection of the virus by serial passage within the
poultry host population.
ii. The combination and inter-relationship of viral genes, not least the HA
and NA.
iii. Host immune function and status - a partially immune poultry
population providing a further selection pressure in proximity to a fully
susceptible poultry population
This presumed progressive mutation and host adaptation of the LP virus during
onward transmission from Shed 1 to other Sheds was also proposed during the LPAI
H7N3 outbreak in Dereham, Norfolk during May 2006 (Defra, 2006).
34. Spread of H7N7 HPAI virus may then have occurred between Shed 3 and Shed 4,
infecting a fully susceptible population with the resultant acute and severe clinical
presentation. Coincident with the spread of HP virus infection from Shed 3 to Shed 4,
spread of the HP virus apparently also occurred to (and possibly between) Shed 1
and Shed 2 resulting in H7 super-infection.
35. Analysis to confirm the order of infection of the sheds, considering the virology
results, the seroprevalence at the time of culling in comparison to that two days
earlier, and the husbandry routine on farm is in progress. Further hypotheses, i.e. the
unique introduction of HPAI in the premises without involvement of LPAI, have not
been ruled out at the time of writing.
Thanks, Dutchy.
Below is an excerpt about the apparent development of an LP virus into a HP virus:
We suggest that after a period of approximately 7-10 days following the observed
onset of clinical signs in Shed 1 a mutation to virulence of the presumed LP H7 virus
to the highly pathogenic form occurred in Shed 3 during successive rounds of viral
replication and transmission cycles in a partially immune poultry population. During
these replication and transmission cycles random mutations to the virus genome can
occur. Whether or not these mutations become fixed in the population depends on a
number of factors, some described below. Acquisition of this genotype may have
been driven by synergistic host: pathogen interactions, including:
i. Adaptation and selection of the virus by serial passage within the
poultry host population.
ii. The combination and inter-relationship of viral genes, not least the HA
and NA.
iii. Host immune function and status - a partially immune poultry
population providing a further selection pressure in proximity to a fully
susceptible poultry population
This presumed progressive mutation and host adaptation of the LP virus during
onward transmission from Shed 1 to other Sheds was also proposed during the LPAI
H7N3 outbreak in Dereham, Norfolk during May 2006 (Defra, 2006).
34. Spread of H7N7 HPAI virus may then have occurred between Shed 3 and Shed 4,
infecting a fully susceptible population with the resultant acute and severe clinical
presentation. Coincident with the spread of HP virus infection from Shed 3 to Shed 4,
spread of the HP virus apparently also occurred to (and possibly between) Shed 1
and Shed 2 resulting in H7 super-infection.
35. Analysis to confirm the order of infection of the sheds, considering the virology
results, the seroprevalence at the time of culling in comparison to that two days
earlier, and the husbandry routine on farm is in progress. Further hypotheses, i.e. the
unique introduction of HPAI in the premises without involvement of LPAI, have not
been ruled out at the time of writing.
Oracle
Well-known member
Re: Wild Birds with H5N1 in England 2008
The proximity to the pond (see Fig 1) and stream of the primary infected sheds and the poultry operation owners idiocy in stocking the pond with 100 mallards for hunting the previous year (hundreds of them, of which some 30 remained prior to HPAI outbreak report) made for interesting reading. Note that the farm otherwise employed recommended biosecurity measures.
Wildfowl proximity, known HPAI carrier (Mallards) to affected sheds in order of infection. Check.
Colluding factors: (1) proximity to large flock of ducks and pheasants on adjacent property. "The adjacent premises keeps 2150 pheasants and 600
ducks", and (2) foxes were known to frequently visit the affected farm.
Former is more likely to be a source of LPAI to the target farm, rather than the latter, although foxes might carry HPAI asymptomatically, especially if there are one or more females with litters living nearby. See: cats and Q-Fever citations, PubMed).
"The most significant feature of the last two weeks of May was the heavy rainfall which occurred between 25 and 28 May (Appendix 4). Rainfall was recorded on 66 hours out of a maximum of 96 hours. On these four days alone around 130% of an average May rainfall was recorded."
Weather conditions, period of heavy rainfall with heavy winds. Check.
Slow response to report preliminary flock symptoms (egg drop and deaths (two weeks, AGAIN, see Fig 3). "Birds in shed 1 appeared to recover" - despite the concurrent onset of die off in another shed. BS excuse by owner for late reporting. Check.
But here is the kicker that probably pushed LPAI to HPAI (see item 55): bird dropping fell through the mesh floor to the ground below, where it was allowed to collect until the grow-up cycle was finished, when the shed was simply picked up and moved to another location. The birds are STANDING over the viral-infected fecal matter and piss, plus feathers.
Retention of contaminated fecal/bedding materials within shed immediate to LPAI-to-HPAI transition. Check.
Interesting conclusion (item 35): did they find evidence of AI co-infection?
The proximity to the pond (see Fig 1) and stream of the primary infected sheds and the poultry operation owners idiocy in stocking the pond with 100 mallards for hunting the previous year (hundreds of them, of which some 30 remained prior to HPAI outbreak report) made for interesting reading. Note that the farm otherwise employed recommended biosecurity measures.
Wildfowl proximity, known HPAI carrier (Mallards) to affected sheds in order of infection. Check.
Colluding factors: (1) proximity to large flock of ducks and pheasants on adjacent property. "The adjacent premises keeps 2150 pheasants and 600
ducks", and (2) foxes were known to frequently visit the affected farm.
Former is more likely to be a source of LPAI to the target farm, rather than the latter, although foxes might carry HPAI asymptomatically, especially if there are one or more females with litters living nearby. See: cats and Q-Fever citations, PubMed).
"The most significant feature of the last two weeks of May was the heavy rainfall which occurred between 25 and 28 May (Appendix 4). Rainfall was recorded on 66 hours out of a maximum of 96 hours. On these four days alone around 130% of an average May rainfall was recorded."
Weather conditions, period of heavy rainfall with heavy winds. Check.
Slow response to report preliminary flock symptoms (egg drop and deaths (two weeks, AGAIN, see Fig 3). "Birds in shed 1 appeared to recover" - despite the concurrent onset of die off in another shed. BS excuse by owner for late reporting. Check.
But here is the kicker that probably pushed LPAI to HPAI (see item 55): bird dropping fell through the mesh floor to the ground below, where it was allowed to collect until the grow-up cycle was finished, when the shed was simply picked up and moved to another location. The birds are STANDING over the viral-infected fecal matter and piss, plus feathers.
Retention of contaminated fecal/bedding materials within shed immediate to LPAI-to-HPAI transition. Check.
Interesting conclusion (item 35): did they find evidence of AI co-infection?
Re: Wild Birds with H5N1 in England 2008
I am confused
and then
They obviously have some sequences if they can generate phylogenic analysis and if they have enough to state
"the Haemagglutinin gene of the virus has undergone progressive mutations with successive rounds of replication and adaptation in the poultry host."
then why - when the rest of the report is so comprehensive - is this vital data not included. They talk as if they dont know if it was LP going to HP, or two independent introduction, but if they have before and after (LP & HP) sequences this should be obvious.
"the Haemagglutinin gene of the virus has undergone progressive mutations with successive rounds of replication and adaptation in the poultry host."
then why - when the rest of the report is so comprehensive - is this vital data not included. They talk as if they dont know if it was LP going to HP, or two independent introduction, but if they have before and after (LP & HP) sequences this should be obvious.
