tetano
Editor, Senior Moderator
George Dehner
Department of History, 1845 Fairmount, Wichita State University, Wichita, Kansas 67260-0045
Correspondence: Email: george.dehner@wichita.edu
Abstract
The discovery of a novel influenza strain at Fort Dix, New Jersey, in 1976?dubbed Swine Flu?prompted differing responses from national and international health organizations. The United States crafted a vaccination campaign to inoculate every citizen; conversely, the World Health Organization (WHO) recommended a ?wait and see? policy. An examination of the WHO conference that issued the influenza policy reveals the decision was driven by the limits of its member states' ability to produce inactivated vaccine and concern over the premature use of unstable live-virus vaccines. The WHO recommendation's reliance upon an uneven surveillance system would have replicated the 1957 and 1968 vaccination failures if a pandemic had appeared.
http://jhmas.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/jrq002v1
Department of History, 1845 Fairmount, Wichita State University, Wichita, Kansas 67260-0045
Correspondence: Email: george.dehner@wichita.edu
Abstract
The discovery of a novel influenza strain at Fort Dix, New Jersey, in 1976?dubbed Swine Flu?prompted differing responses from national and international health organizations. The United States crafted a vaccination campaign to inoculate every citizen; conversely, the World Health Organization (WHO) recommended a ?wait and see? policy. An examination of the WHO conference that issued the influenza policy reveals the decision was driven by the limits of its member states' ability to produce inactivated vaccine and concern over the premature use of unstable live-virus vaccines. The WHO recommendation's reliance upon an uneven surveillance system would have replicated the 1957 and 1968 vaccination failures if a pandemic had appeared.
http://jhmas.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/jrq002v1