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Washington State H5N1/H5N5 in Humans 2025-26

[I posted this story on the 13th of November. And today, 5 days later, on November 18, the New York Post finally gets around to it. . Good Luck NYC! :rolleyes: }

Washington man ‘severely ill’ with ‘unpredictable’ virus never before seen in humans
Published Nov. 18, 2025​


In a startling first, a Washington state man has been infected with a strain of bird flu previously only detected in animals and never before in humans.

The “severely ill” man was hospitalized with a high fever, confusion and respiratory distress earlier this month and confirmed to have H5N5, a subtype of avian influenza carried by wild birds like ducks and geese.

Continued: https://nypost.com/2025/11/18/health/wa-man-severely-ill-with-virus-never-before-seen-in-humans/
 
Last edited by a moderator:
Raj Rajnarayanan
@RajlabN
#H5N5 updates 11/19/2025 H5N5 sequence from WA is now available in
@GISAID
Sample ID: A/Washington/2148/2025 GISAID ID: EPI_ISL_20252012 Clade: 2.3.4.4b; Genotype: A6 Sample collection Date 11-10-2025
Quote
Raj Rajnarayanan
@RajlabN
·
Nov 17
#H5N5 updates 11/17/2025 H5N5 sequence from Washington State is now available in @NCBI (A/Washington/2148/2025 | Host: Human; Collection date 11/10/2025; highlighted in green) Other H5N5 from North America is given for reference (mostly A6 type; from @GISAID ) 1/n
1:02 PM · Nov 19, 2025
·
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Raj Rajnarayanan
@RajlabN
PB2 mutations: Note: A/Washington/2148/2025 | Host: Human; Collection date 11/10/2025; highlighted in green 2/n
1:25 PM · Nov 17, 2025
·
1,245
Views​

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Raj Rajnarayanan
@RajlabN
·
Nov 17
#H5N5 updates 11/17/2025 H5N5 sequence from Washington State is now available in @NCBI (A/Washington/2148/2025 | Host: Human; Collection date 11/10/2025; highlighted in green) Other H5N5 from North America is given for reference (mostly A6 type; from @GISAID ) 1/n
1:02 PM · Nov 19, 2025
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Washington DOH Statement: Grays Harbor County Resident Dies From Complications of Avian Influenza





Grays Harbor County - Credit Wikipedia

#18,956

Overnight the Washington State Department of Health published their first update in a week on the nation's first human H5N5 infection, originally reported on November 13th. Sadly, this patient has died.

While the subtype is different (H5N1 vs H5N5), this case shares similarities with the nation's only other HPAI H5-related fatality; an older Louisiana man who was also likely exposed via a backyard flock, who experienced severe illness and died in early January.​


While all of the (n=41) confirmed human infections with the `bovine' B3.13 genotype have been mild, a substantial percentage of the 30+ other cases reported in the country have presented with more severe symptoms; including 2 fatalities.

First the statement from the WA DOH, which - while reassuring - disappointingly provides few details on the state's epidemiological investigation.
For immediate release: Nov. 21, 2025 (25-140)

Contact:
DOH Communications

The person was infected with the H5N5 virus; the risk to the public remains low

OLYMPIA – A Grays Harbor County resident who was undergoing treatment for H5N5 avian influenza died today. The Washington State Department of Health offers its heartfelt condolences to the person’s family and friends.

The person was an older adult with underlying health conditions. Out of respect for the family’s privacy, we are not releasing their name, gender, or age. The person had been hospitalized in King County since early November.

Testing at the UW Medicine Clinical Virology Lab identified the virus as H5N5, making this the first recorded infection with this variant in a person globally. The result was confirmed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

The risk to the public remains low. No other people involved have tested positive for avian influenza. Public health officials will continue to monitor anyone who was in close contact with the patient for symptoms to ensure that human-to-human spread has not occurred. There is no evidence of transmission of this virus between people.

The person had a backyard flock of mixed domestic birds. DOH testing identified avian influenza virus in the environment of the flock, making exposure to the domestic poultry, their environment, or wild birds the most likely source of exposure for this patient. People who had exposure to the backyard flock and environment are also being monitored for symptoms.


Avian influenza is a disease caused by influenza type A viruses, which naturally occur in wild aquatic birds around the world. These viruses can infect other bird species, and occasionally mammals, and can be deadly to domestic birds such as chickens and turkeys. On rare occasions, avian influenza viruses can infect people and make them sick.

People with backyard poultry should avoid contact with sick or dead birds and report illness in poultry to the Washington State Department of Agriculture (WSDA) by calling 1-800-606-3056 or
reporting online. Veterinariansshould report sick or dead domestic animals or livestock suspected of having avian influenza to WSDA. Avoid contact with sick or dead wildlife and report sick or dead wild birds or other animals to the Washington State Department of Fish & Wildlife. Never handle or allow pets near dead birds or other wildlife.

Avoid eating raw or undercooked food products, such as unpasteurized (raw) milk or raw cheeses, and don’t feed these products to pets.

It is especially important that people who may have exposure to domestic or wild birds get a seasonal flu vaccine. While the seasonal flu vaccine will not prevent bird flu infection, it reduces the risk of becoming sick with both human and avian influenza viruses at the same time. Though unlikely, infection with both viruses could result in the emergence of an avian influenza virus that is more easily transmitted from person to person. Seasonal flu vaccine is recommended for everyone six months and older.

Our
websiteis your source for a healthy dose of information. Get updates by following us on social media.





As has become increasingly common, we've seen very little in the way of actual details on this HPAI case. While public health officials often redact patient information over `privacy concerns', statements like `DOH testing identified avian influenza virus in the environment of the flock' seem unnecessarily vague.

They don't specify what subtype was detected (was it H5N5, H5N1, etc.), and they aren't even clear on whether these birds were infected, or if any were symptomatic or had recently died.​


Unfortunately, the USDA's Confirmations of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in Commercial and Backyard Flocks dashboard doesn't help, as it doesn't identify the subtype of any of the 1,873 flocks infected in the U.S. since 2022.






While it is reassuring when the DOH states that `No other people involved have tested positive for avian influenza.', that leaves a lot of unanswered questions.

How many `contacts' have actually been tested? What criteria was used for determining a close contact? Have any `contacts' declined testing? How long after exposure were these tests conducted? How many tests are pending? Are there plans for serological follow-ups?


While I've little doubt that the local health department is being diligent in their epidemiological investigation - given the stakes - it would be nice to have more specifics.

Hopefully, we'll get a more detailed account in an MMWR field report down the road.​


Stay tuned.



https://afludiary.blogspot.com/2025/11/washington-doh-statement-grays-harbor.html
 
November 24, 2025

First Human Dies of Rare H5N5 Bird Flu Strain. Here’s What You Need to Know
...
By Meghan Bartels edited by Tanya Lewis
...
The fatality is not a reason to panic and does not suggest the risks of bird flu are larger than scientists have believed, says Richard Webby, a virologist at St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital. “We don’t have any reason to suspect H5N5 has more or less of a pandemic risk than H5N1, and similarly, we don’t have any reason to suspect, as a whole, it causes more severe disease,” he says. “Most people’s exposure to the H5 viruses is still going to be to the H5N1 just because there’s so much more of that in the bird population.”
...
Scientists have a longstanding monitoring program for influenza viruses in wild birds that has gathered decades of data about where bird flu viruses are moving and how they are changing. This surveillance program means that Webby and his colleagues knew that H5N5 viruses had been circulating in shorebirds and gulls in eastern Canada. Webby says scientists confirmed that the virus sequenced from the fatal human case is related more closely to those from eastern Canada than to H5N1 viruses; this supports the idea that this is an existing virus that made the trek west in birds, rather than a new virus that showed up abruptly in humans.
...
Keeping backyard poultry is a known risk factor for acquiring bird flu. The prior U.S. bird flu death, which occurred in Louisiana in January, was also in a person who tended a flock of chickens. That person was also more than 65 years old and had underlying health conditions.
...

https://www.scientificamerican.com/...-bird-flu-strain-heres-what-you-need-to-know/
 
hat tip Hogvet51


snip

The “take homes” for me from this analysis are:
  1. this case is another non-reassorted spillover of an H5 2.3.4.4b virus from birds to mammals (H5N5 to a human this time); this is not a novel reassortment with enhanced mammalian or human adaptations.
  2. H5N5 has now made its way to the West Coast and into domestic poultry in at least one flock. Time will tell how successfully it further adapts and transmits versus existing successful H5N1 strains.
  3. If reassortment DOES occur, it’s more likely to occur in co-infected people (or other mammals like pigs); human vaccination can minimize risks for that unlikely event. Additionally, the N1 portion of the human vaccine may provide some protection against a potential initial human H5N1 infection.

https://hogvet51.substack.com/
 
image.png - Click image for larger version  Name:	image.png Views:	1 Size:	11.5 KB ID:	1024520

...

1st fatal H5N5 human case unlikely to spark pandemic: Experts

2025/12/01

Taipei, Nov. 29 (CNA) The world's first fatal human infection with the H5N5 avian influenza strain, reported in the United States earlier this month, appears to be an isolated case with a low risk of wider transmission, Taiwanese experts said this week.

Chao Day-yu (趙黛瑜), a professor of the Graduate Institute of Microbiology and Public Health at National Chung Hsing University (NCHU), said the infection was likely the result of a spillover pathway from wild birds to poultry and finally to humans.

Sharing her thoughts with Taiwan's Science Media Center (SMC) on Thursday, Chao said such a single, sporadic event carries a low probability of escalating into a pandemic.

Washington state health authorities confirmed on Nov. 21 that an elderly resident had died after becoming infected with the H5N5 virus -- a strain not previously known to infect humans.

Chao noted that historically, only a few avian influenza subtypes have caused significant human infections, including H5N1, which triggered an outbreak in Hong Kong in 1997, and H7N9, which has been confined to China. Other subtypes have occasionally been detected in people but have shown no signs of human-to-human transmission.

Chao cautioned, however, that avian influenza viruses are increasingly spilling over into a wider range of animal hosts. These include carnivorous and omnivorous wildlife, and even marine mammals -- a trend she said warrants heightened vigilance and preventive action.

Chao's colleague, NCHU distinguished professor Chang Poa-chun (張伯俊), added that seasonal human influenza viruses do not simply transform into avian influenza strains if passed to birds.

Such a change would require long-term, multistep evolutionary processes rather than a direct or immediate shift.

Avian influenza viruses fall under the category of influenza A, a designation that also includes other animal-origin influenza A viruses circulating in poultry and livestock such as cattle and pigs.

Any human infection with these non-seasonal strains is reported as a novel influenza A case, which is classified in Taiwan as a Category 5 notifiable infectious disease.

https://www.ocac.gov.tw/OCAC/Eng/Pages/Detail.aspx?nodeid=329&pid=81777942
 
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December 26, 2025

Updated guidance for clinical consideration of Avian Influenza
This health advisory is also available in PDF format (188 KB)

Situation
  • This message provides updated guidance on highly pathogenic avian influenza exposure screening and testing, as well as clarification on influenza subtyping guidance.
  • In November of this year, WA DOH confirmed the first known human case of H5N5 avian influenza. The patient was hospitalized with severe disease that unfortunately resulted in death.
  • Symptoms of avian influenza in humans can range from mild to severe and can be similar to seasonal influenza viruses.
  • Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and Washington Department of Health (DOH) currently consider the risk from avian influenza to be low for the general public.
Recommendations for healthcare facilities

Screening for potential exposures to avian influenza
  • Assess all patients with suspected influenza for potential exposure history to avian influenza. Epidemiologic risk factors include one or more of the following within 10 days before illness onset:
  • Direct contact with sick or dead animals, or their environments, including wild birds, backyard poultry, or livestock (such as animal exposures that agricultural and farm workers may encounter)
  • Consumption of or direct contact with raw animal products such as raw cow milk and raw pet food
  • Close contact with a symptomatic person diagnosed with avian influenza
Testing if you suspect avian influenza
  • If you suspect that a patient has avian influenza based on the epidemiologic risk factors above, contact your local health department and obtain Influenza A subtyping (see additional information below). The local health department will help determine if specific testing for avian influenza is recommended.
  • The diagnosis of avian influenza in humans can be challenging. A negative influenza result in a patient with epidemiologic risk factors for avian influenza does not rule out avian influenza. If you suspect avian influenza in a hospitalized patient:
  • After consultation, your local health department may recommend repeat influenza testing on at least two consecutive days.
  • If the patient has severe disease, consider collecting lower respiratory tract specimens for influenza testing. Lower respiratory tract specimens have a higher yield for detecting avian influenza. Test for influenza AND obtain influenza A subtyping (see additional information below).
Obtaining influenza subtyping
  • Subtyping should be obtained for patients with epidemiologic risk factors as described above. Subtyping is not being requested for all hospitalized patients.
    • Some facilities might choose to conduct routine subtyping (e.g., all patients with influenza admitted to the ICU).
    • Hospitals and laboratories participating in RESP-NET or sentinel influenza subtyping surveillance should not deviate from established program procedures.
  • If influenza subtyping is performed at your facility’s clinical or commercial laboratory, the specimen does not need to be submitted to Washington Public Health Laboratory (WAPHL) unless it is identified as unsubtypeable or as H5 or other novel influenza subtype.
  • WA DOH Public Health Laboratories (WAPHL) can support influenza subtyping for facilities without influenza subtyping capabilities.
    Follow specimen submission guidelines for all specimens submitted to WAPHL.
Reporting to Public Health
  • Immediately report any of the following to Public Health:
  • Suspected or confirmed cases of avian influenza or other novel influenza.
  • Influenza A positive specimens that are reported as "unsubtypeable" (when the subtype of influenza cannot be determined by available tests).
Isolation and personal protective equipment for suspected or confirmed avian influenza
  • Isolate patients with suspected or confirmed avian influenza in all healthcare settings.
    • If possible, isolate the patient in an airborne infection isolation room (sometimes called a negative pressure room).
    • If the patient is intubated, ensure a closed system and HEPA filter.
  • Healthcare workers should use contact and airborne precautions with eye protection, meaning a gown, gloves, respirator (fit-tested N95 or higher level of protection), and goggles or face shield.
Treatment of patients with suspected or confirmed avian influenza
  • Treat suspected avian influenza patients immediately with oseltamivir; do not wait for influenza confirmation.
  • Consider combination antiviral treatment (e.g., oseltamivir and baloxavir) for hospitalized patients with suspected or confirmed avian influenza.
  • Refer to CDC's Interim Guidance on the Use of Antiviral Medications for additional information about treating patients with suspected or confirmed avian influenza.
Information for patients
  • Advise people not to handle sick or dead birds or other wildlife.
  • Seasonal influenza vaccine is recommended for everyone 6 months of age and older.
    • Annual flu vaccination is the best way to reduce the risk of severe disease and hospitalization caused by seasonal influenza.
    • While the seasonal influenza vaccine is not intended to protect against avian influenza, it decreases the risk of people getting infected with seasonal influenza and avian influenza at the same time. These potential co-infections are an important public health concern because they could allow avian influenza viruses to gain the ability to spread efficiently from human to human.
Additional background information

Avian influenza is a disease caused by influenza type A viruses, which naturally occur in wild aquatic birds around the world. On rare occasions, avian influenza can infect people and make them sick. Most cases have occurred among people who have been exposed to sick or infected animals. The risk of human exposure to avian influenza increases in the fall and winter because migratory birds can carry the virus and spread it to domestic animals including commercial poultry, dairy farms, and backyard flocks.

Transmission of avian influenza between humans is extremely rare and has not been documented in the United States. The CDC considers the risk of avian influenza infections to be low for the general public but is closely monitoring the situation. As seasonal influenza activity increases in Washington and across the United States, the greatest risk to the general public is seasonal influenza.



Resources
https://kingcounty.gov/en/dept/dph/.../health-advisories/2025/12-26-avian-influenza

 
NEJM . Human Infection with Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N5) Virus

Thuy-Lan Lite, M.D., Ph.D.
Stephanie Goya, Ph.D.
Margaret L. Davis, M.D., M.P.H.
Amy E. Morris, M.D.
Chloe Bryson-Cahn, M.D.
Alexander Vengerovsky, M.D.
Carlos G. Corpuz, M.D.
B. Ethan Nunley, B.S.
Janine R. Maenza, M.D.
Thomas R. Hawn, M.D., Ph.D.
Andrew M. Luks, M.D.
John B. Lynch, M.D., M.P.H.

University of Washington, Seattle


Timothy M. Uyeki, M.D., M.P.H.

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta


Helen Y. Chu, M.D., M.P.H.
Alexander L. Greninger, M.D., Ph.D.
Clifford C. Sung, M.D.

University of Washington, Seattle




Sporadic human infections with avian influenza A viruses have caused a wide spectrum of illness. As these novel influenza A viruses pose pandemic potential, timely detection and characterization of such human infections are important for global public health.

In October 2025, a 75-year-old woman with Waldenström macroglobulinemia presented to a local hospital with fever and diarrhea (illness day 1). She had had lymphopenia for several years and had received treatment with rituximab and bendamustine 7 months before presentation (see the Supplementary Appendix, available with the full text of this letter at NEJM.org). She had not received the 2025–2026 influenza vaccine. Real-time reverse-transcriptase–polymerase-chain-reaction (RT-PCR) assay of a nasal swab was negative for influenza A virus, and her chest radiograph was unremarkable. She was discharged home with instructions for supportive care, with no scheduled follow-up.

Cough, pharyngitis, and progressive dyspnea subsequently developed, and the patient returned to the hospital 9 days after she had been discharged; she was admitted for acute hypoxemic respiratory failure. Computed tomography of the chest revealed bilateral ground-glass and consolidative opacities in her lungs (Fig. S1 in the Supplementary Appendix), and her trachea was intubated on illness day 11. Repeat nasal swabs were again negative for influenza A virus on days 10 and 13. Despite treatment with broad-spectrum antimicrobials and glucocorticoids, her hypoxemia worsened, and severe acute respiratory distress syndrome developed. She was transferred twice for escalating levels of care, and she ultimately arrived at a tertiary center in Seattle, Washington, on day 15 (Table S1).

In Seattle, influenza A virus was detected by RT-PCR in both nasal-swab and bronchoalveolar-lavage specimens (cycle-threshold values, 34.6 and 23.8, respectively) (Figure 1A and Table S1). Both specimens subsequently tested positive for influenza A(H5).[SUP]1[/SUP] An extended respiratory viral PCR panel was otherwise negative. Oseltamivir therapy was started on illness day 16, along with baloxavir and amantadine on day 19 (Table S2) and tocilizumab on day 22  (Fig. S2). Pneumocystis jirovecii DNA was also detected by PCR in a bronchoalveolar-lavage specimen, although a direct fluorescent antibody test was negative. This finding was thought to represent colonization or a false positive result; however, the patient received trimethoprim–sulfamethoxazole owing to the severity of her respiratory failure. Despite antimicrobial therapy, lung-protective ventilation, prone positioning, neuromuscular blockade, and inhaled epoprostenol, she remained critically ill. Her hypoxemia worsened, and she died on illness day 28, after she had been transitioned to comfort-focused care.

Influenza A virus genome sequencing of the bronchoalveolar-lavage specimen, which was completed on illness day 21, confirmed highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N5) virus, Eurasian lineage clade 6 (EA6). Viral segment sequences had approximately 99% identity to contemporary HPAI A(H5N5) viruses without evidence of reassortment (Figure 1B and Fig. S3). The A(H5) hemagglutinin was consistent with clade 2.3.4.4b, the dominant hemagglutinin clade associated with currently spreading A(H5N1) viruses. No antiviral resistance mutations were detected. Intrahost viral dynamics from serial tracheal aspirates over 9 days revealed limited adaptation to human hosts. The allele frequency of mammalian-adaptation marker polymerase basic protein 2 (PB2) E627K decreased from 42% to 9% over the same period, a finding that is in contrast to A(H5N1) spillover events, in which PB2 and hemagglutinin mutations associated with enhanced binding to human receptors have emerged (Figure 1C and Fig. S4).[SUP]2,3[/SUP]

Clinical history revealed that the patient lived on a rural property, where she had fed and handled ducks and their eggs daily, without gloves or masks. Two ducks had become ill and exhibited abnormal neurologic behaviors shortly before symptoms had developed in the patient (see video). Epidemiologic investigations are ongoing. No other cases have been identified among the patient’s close contacts or health care personnel who cared for her.

This case highlights several diagnostic and clinical challenges. First, multiple upper-respiratory-tract specimens were negative for influenza A virus despite high-burden lower respiratory tract infection, a finding that emphasizes the importance of obtaining bronchoalveolar-lavage or tracheal specimens in patients with severe pneumonia and relevant zoonotic exposures. Because of the delayed diagnosis of HPAI A(H5N5) virus infection, antiviral treatments were not initiated until late in the clinical course.[SUP]4[/SUP] Second, the identification of an HPAI A(H5N5) virus with a transient, low-frequency mammalian-associated change underscores the fact that fully avian influenza A viruses remain capable of zoonotic spillover.[SUP]5[/SUP] Finally, severe acute respiratory distress syndrome in the context of underlying hematologic cancer arouses concern that such patients may be particularly vulnerable to adverse outcomes from novel influenza A virus infections.

This report shows the importance of considering avian influenza A virus infection in patients with pneumonia and direct bird exposure, even when testing for influenza virus in upper-respiratory-tract specimens is negative.

https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMc2518178

 
MMWR: Fatal Human Case of HPAI A(H5N5) in a Backyard Flock Owner — Washington, November 2025




#19,150

As we've discussed often, it takes certain amount of luck for novel flu infections to be detected, properly treated, and then reported to the CDC. It seems likely that some number of mild illnesses go unrecognized (see MMWR: Serologic Evidence of Recent Infection with HPAI A(H5) Virus Among Dairy Workers) , and even severe cases can be misdiagnosed.

We've seen instances where patients were only diagnosed retrospectively; sometimes well after they had been treated and released from the hospital (see 2024 Missouri case).​

Standard rapid influenza tests don't distinguish between seasonal and novel flu strains, and sometimes, repeated swabs of the upper airway can fail to `capture' a deep lung infection for RT-PCR testing.

Such is the case of the fatal H5N5 case, reported last November, from Washington state, according to a detailed MMWR report published yesterday by the CDC As the graphic at the top of this blog shows, the patient repeatedly tested negative for influenza/COVID during the first 6 days of his hospitalization.

Not surprisingly, a large number (n=139) of hospital personnel and other close contacts were exposed to this patient before he was moved to an isolation unit.​

While no secondary transmissions were reported, it appears only those contacts reporting flu-like symptoms were tested by RT-PCR (NP swabs), and I could find no mention of follow-up serological testing.



Given this is the first known human infection with novel H5N5, I would have thought a wider net would have been cast. But that's just me, I guess. Perhaps there's another study in the pipeline on this.

In any event, the takeaway here appears to be that when dealing with a respiratory infection with someone with contact with poultry or wild birds, a high index of suspicion is warranted, and taking samples from both the upper and lower respiratory tract is recommended.​

Due to it length, I've just posted the summary, abstract, and a few excerpts. I'll have a postscript after you return.

Fatal Human Case of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N5) in a Backyard Flock Owner — Washington, November 2025

Weekly / May 7, 2026 / 75(17);221–225

Lynae Kibiger, MPH1; Hanna N. Oltean, PhD1,2; Lisa Leitz3; Emma Krause3; Debra Barrett3; Anna Halloran, MHPA1; Kyle Yomogida, PhD1; Beth Lipton, DVM1; Keely Paris, MPH1; Jared Keirn, MS1; Minden Buswell, DVM1; Allison Black, PhD1; Pauline Trinh, PhD1; Theresa Murray, MT1; Roberto Bonaccorso1; Leticia Banuelos1; Ethan Dieringer1; Jennifer Lenahan, MPH4; Emily Spence Davizon, MPH4; Ellyn P. Marder, DrPH2,4; Jocelyn Mullins, DVM, PhD4; Meagan Kay, DVM2,4; Eric J. Chow, MD2,4,5,6; Sandra J. Valenciano, MD4; John Lynch, MD5,7; Vanessa Makarewicz, MN7; Chloe Bryson-Cahn, MD5,7; Jennifer Hernandez7; Kyla Haggith7; Valicia Linn7; Alex L. Greninger, MD, PhD8; Stephanie Goya, PhD8; Sierra Gulla9; Jennifer Young, MPH9; Sierra Kerns-Funk, MPH10; Brianna da Silva Bhatia, MD10; Hollianne Bruce, MPH11; Krista Kniss, MPH12; Katie Reinhart, PhD12; Rachel Ohlstein13; Shannon Johnson13; Christina Schofield, MD14; Patrick Smith, DO14; Amber Itle, VMD15; Maura Gibson, DVM16; Brandi Torrevillas17; Azeza Falghoush, PhD17; Thomas B. Waltzek, DVM, PhD17; Kevin Snekvik, DVM, PhD17; Mia Torchetti, DVM, PhD16; Timothy M. Uyeki, MD12; Scott Lindquist, MD1 (
VIEW AUTHOR AFFILIATIONS)View suggested citation

Summary

What is already known about this topic?

Since 2022, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5) viruses have circulated among wild birds in the United States. Seventy human cases of influenza A(H5), most with mild illness, have been reported in the United States since 2024; 14 human influenza A(H5N1) cases were previously identified in Washington.

What is added by this report?

In November 2025, Washington reported the first human case of HPAI A(H5N5) infection worldwide. A positive laboratory result was obtained from a lower respiratory sample after multiple negative upper respiratory sample results; the patient experienced respiratory failure and died 28 days after symptom onset. The public health investigation identified approximately 135 exposed persons.

What are the implications for public health practice?

Symptom management and testing of exposed persons are critical to monitoring for human-to-human transmission of novel influenza infection. Environmental and animal investigations, including genomic analysis, can identify epidemiologic risk factors.ls

Article PDF
Full Issue PDF


Abstract

Clade 2.3.4.4b influenza A(H5N1) viruses have circulated across migratory bird flyways in the United States since 2022, including in Washington, where backyard flock detections have been reported annually. In November 2025, a Washington resident died from acute respiratory failure after receiving a positive influenza A(H5) test result at a hospital laboratory.


Washington Public Health Laboratories confirmed influenza A(H5), and genomic sequencing identified influenza A(H5N5) virus (A6 genotype). Polymerase chain reaction testing detected highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5) virus clade 2.3.4.4b from an apparently healthy backyard flock of ducks and sediment from a watering basin on the patient’s property. Six of eight gene segments from the environmental sample and one duck sample (partial neuraminidase segment) were highly genetically similar to the patient’s virus sequence.

Although existing wild bird surveillance had not detected influenza A(H5N5) virus (A6) in the U.S. Pacific Flyway, introduction via wild birds into the environment of the backyard flock was likely the source of the patient’s exposure.

The public health investigation identified approximately 135 exposed persons; symptom monitoring and influenza testing detected no additional cases. The overall risk for avian influenza A remains low among the general U.S. population; however, novel avian influenza A virus infection should be considered in persons with symptoms of influenza and potential exposures.

(SNIP)
The diagnosis of influenza A(H5N5) virus infection in the patient described in this report was complicated by early and repeated negative influenza test results from upper respiratory swab specimens. Negative influenza results from initial upper respiratory specimens have been described in three similar patients with lower respiratory tract disease hospitalized with avian influenza A(H5N1) infection (4). Thus, avian influenza virus infection should not be ruled out in hospitalized patients based on negative influenza laboratory test results from upper respiratory tract specimens if the patients have lower respiratory tract disease, relevant exposures, and no confirmed etiology for their disease. If avian influenza virus infection is suspected in a patient with severe respiratory disease, both upper and lower respiratory tract specimens should be collected for influenza testing by RT-PCR at a public health laboratory (6).

Early negative influenza results delayed initiation of isolation precautions, reporting to public health authorities, and symptom monitoring. Although isolation precautions were not established consistently until the ninth day of inpatient care, no cases among HCP were identified. Likewise, no cases were detected among family members, despite lengthy exposure to both the symptomatic patient and the property. One household member reported direct contact with the ill and dead ducks but remained asymptomatic. Establishing a tiered risk assessment for HCP exposures based on setting and PPE use allowed staff members to continue working while having their symptoms monitored and limited new HCP exposures. The investigation was complicated by its occurrence during viral respiratory season and symptom development among several persons whose symptoms were being monitored. Human-to-human transmission of avian influenza A viruses has only rarely been reported globally and has not been reported in the United States (3,7).

Timely HPAI risk evaluation is important for persons with influenza symptoms requiring hospitalization to support infection prevention and control, early notification of public health authorities, and robust epidemiologic investigation, including genomic sequencing to identify possible transmission pathways. Ill or dead animals should be reported to animal health authorities for surveillance and potential testing and to reduce human exposure. Public health guidance for evaluating suspected cases of avian influenza should include immediate isolation precautions, prompt initiation of antiviral treatment, repeated influenza testing, and specimen collection from multiple sites (2,6,8). Considering the successive influenza A–negative laboratory results in the Washington patient, sampling from both upper and lower respiratory tracts in hospitalized patients should be considered to increase the likelihood of laboratory detection.
(Continue . . . )


While the exact exposure to H5N5 remains uncertain, it is likely that unprotected (mask, eye protection, gloves) with wild backyard birds was the source of this fatal infection.
The CDC has released guidelines (see Backyard Flock Owners: Protect Yourself from Bird Flu) - but it is unknown how many backyard poultry owners have actually read it - or would bother to follow their - at times - stringent recommendations.


There are reportedly more than 11 million backyard poultry flocks in the United States, and tens of millions more in Europe and Asia. That's a lot of opportunities for spillovers.
While there's plenty of useful guidance out there, getting people to follow it is another thing entirely.


https://afludiary.blogspot.com/2026/05/mmwr-fatal-human-case-of-hpai-ah5n5-in.html
 
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