tetano
Editor, Senior Moderator
Viruses
. 2023 Apr 19;15(4):1002.
doi: 10.3390/v15041002. The Role of Airborne Particles in the Epidemiology of Clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Virus in Commercial Poultry Production Units
Joe James[SUP] 1 2 [/SUP], Caroline J Warren[SUP] 1 [/SUP], Dilhani De Silva[SUP] 1 [/SUP], Thomas Lewis[SUP] 1 2 [/SUP], Katherine Grace[SUP] 3 [/SUP], Scott M Reid[SUP] 1 [/SUP], Marco Falchieri[SUP] 1 [/SUP], Ian H Brown[SUP] 1 2 [/SUP], Ashley C Banyard[SUP] 1 2 [/SUP]
Affiliations
Since October 2021, Europe has experienced the largest avian influenza virus (AIV) epizootic, caused by clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 high pathogenicity AIV (HPAIV), with over 284 poultry infected premises (IPs) and 2480 dead H5N1-positive wild birds detected in Great Britain alone. Many IPs have presented as geographical clusters, raising questions about the lateral spread between premises by airborne particles. Airborne transmission over short distances has been observed for some AIV strains. However, the risk of airborne spread of this strain remains to be elucidated. We conducted extensive sampling from IPs where clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAIVs were confirmed during the 2022/23 epizootic, each representing a major poultry species (ducks, turkeys, and chickens). A range of environmental samples were collected inside and outside houses, including deposited dust, feathers, and other potential fomites. Viral RNA (vRNA) and infectious viruses were detected in air samples collected from inside and outside but in close proximity to infected houses, with vRNA alone being detected at greater distances (≤10 m) outside. Some dust samples collected outside of the affected houses contained infectious viruses, while feathers from the affected houses, located up to 80 m away, only contained vRNA. Together, these data suggest that airborne particles harboring infectious HPAIV can be translocated short distances (<10 m) through the air, while macroscopic particles containing vRNA might travel further (≤80 m). Therefore, the potential for airborne transmission of clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAIV between premises is considered low. Other factors, including indirect contact with wild birds and the efficiency of biosecurity, represent greater importance in disease incursion.
Keywords: H5N1; aerosol; airborne; avian; avian influenza virus; droplet; dust; transmission.
. 2023 Apr 19;15(4):1002.
doi: 10.3390/v15041002. The Role of Airborne Particles in the Epidemiology of Clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Virus in Commercial Poultry Production Units
Joe James[SUP] 1 2 [/SUP], Caroline J Warren[SUP] 1 [/SUP], Dilhani De Silva[SUP] 1 [/SUP], Thomas Lewis[SUP] 1 2 [/SUP], Katherine Grace[SUP] 3 [/SUP], Scott M Reid[SUP] 1 [/SUP], Marco Falchieri[SUP] 1 [/SUP], Ian H Brown[SUP] 1 2 [/SUP], Ashley C Banyard[SUP] 1 2 [/SUP]
Affiliations
- PMID: 37112981
- DOI: 10.3390/v15041002
Since October 2021, Europe has experienced the largest avian influenza virus (AIV) epizootic, caused by clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 high pathogenicity AIV (HPAIV), with over 284 poultry infected premises (IPs) and 2480 dead H5N1-positive wild birds detected in Great Britain alone. Many IPs have presented as geographical clusters, raising questions about the lateral spread between premises by airborne particles. Airborne transmission over short distances has been observed for some AIV strains. However, the risk of airborne spread of this strain remains to be elucidated. We conducted extensive sampling from IPs where clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAIVs were confirmed during the 2022/23 epizootic, each representing a major poultry species (ducks, turkeys, and chickens). A range of environmental samples were collected inside and outside houses, including deposited dust, feathers, and other potential fomites. Viral RNA (vRNA) and infectious viruses were detected in air samples collected from inside and outside but in close proximity to infected houses, with vRNA alone being detected at greater distances (≤10 m) outside. Some dust samples collected outside of the affected houses contained infectious viruses, while feathers from the affected houses, located up to 80 m away, only contained vRNA. Together, these data suggest that airborne particles harboring infectious HPAIV can be translocated short distances (<10 m) through the air, while macroscopic particles containing vRNA might travel further (≤80 m). Therefore, the potential for airborne transmission of clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAIV between premises is considered low. Other factors, including indirect contact with wild birds and the efficiency of biosecurity, represent greater importance in disease incursion.
Keywords: H5N1; aerosol; airborne; avian; avian influenza virus; droplet; dust; transmission.