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UK: A Framework for Planners Preparing to Manage Deaths

hawkeye

Well-known member
hat-top to birdflunewsflash.wordpress.com

This document raises some serious questions. Once again, as a someone once told me, they don't write these documents for fun:



Document Link





2.2.3
Three projected scenarios have been given. However, it should
be noted that the national planning assumptions are meant
only to be estimated projections. Therefore, plans need to be
flexible and to able to adapt to locally emerging scenarios.

2.2.4 The base case scenario may see around 48,000 additional
deaths across England and Wales, based on a clinical attack
rate of 25% and a case fatality rate of 0.4%.

2.2.5
A prudent worse case scenario may result in around 320,000
additional deaths across England and Wales, based on a clinical
attack rate of 25% and a case fatality rate of 2.5%.

2.2.6
The reasonable worse case scenario could produce around
650,000 additional deaths across England and Wales, based on
a clinical attack rate of 50% and a case fatality rate of 2.5%.

2.2.7 Local planners are advised to plan for both all additional deaths
occurring in one wave – or for additional deaths to be spread
over two or more waves.

---

2.4.1 Trigger points for different ways of working are likely to vary.
For some, it will be the scale of increased deaths that will be the
tipping point. Limited storage space at local mortuaries and
funeral parlours may be the tipping point. For others,
absenteeism might be the tipping point. But it is likely that a
combination of a number of pressure points would see the
activation of different ways of working in most local areas.


3.6.1 The UK Chief Medical Officer will announce when the first case
occurs in the UK.
Working to the UK alert level system (as set
out in the draft document, A National Framework for
Responding to an Influenza Pandemic), plans will need to be
put into action at local, regional, and national levels.

- Increasing mortuary space.
- Additional space will be required for vehicles to unload / load.
 
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