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Sequences from Tamiflu Resistant Immunocompromised Patients Released

Re: Sequences from Tamiflu Resistant Immunocompromised Patients Released

Updated H274Y travel log

gb|GQ499337.1| Influenza A virus (A/Washington/28/2009(H1N1))... 36.2 0.74
gb|GQ499335.1| Influenza A virus (A/Washington/29/2009(H1N1))... 36.2 0.74
gb|GQ463202.1| Influenza A virus (A/Hunan/SWL3/2009(H1N1)) se... 36.2 0.74
gb|CY043352.1| Influenza A virus (A/Denmark/528/2009(H1N1)) s... 36.2 0.74
gb|GQ397279.1| Influenza A virus (A/Yamaguchi/22/2009(H1N1)) ... 36.2 0.74
gb|GQ365445.1| Influenza A virus (A/Osaka/180/2009(H1N1)) seg... 36.2 0.74
gb|GQ351316.1| Influenza A virus (A/Hong Kong/2369/2009(H1N1)... 36.2 0.74
gb|EU567011.1| Influenza A virus (A/Indiana/01/2008(H1N1)) se... 36.2 0.74
gb|DQ493078.1| Influenza A virus (A/Vietnam/CL2009/2005(H5N1)... 36.2 0.74
gb|DQ250165.1| Influenza A virus (A/Vietnam/CL2009/2005(H5N1)... 36.2 0.74
 
Re: Sequences from Tamiflu Resistant Immunocompromised Patients Released

Thanks for the explanation - and sorry for posting dumb. I'm not used to "low-level" genetics, and since those occurrences are not quite common I simply assumed anything beside ATCG would be a typo.

Guess I'm up for some reading


Thank you for posting Cyril. Genetics is a complicated subject.


:)
 
Re: Sequences from Tamiflu Resistant Immunocompromised Patients Released

Don't look at me.:)

I've been trying to get the Swine Flu for three months while it is still relatively mild, but to no avail. My daughter had it, but refused to share.:confused:


Volunteer work in schools might help.
 
Re: Sequences from Tamiflu Resistant Immunocompromised Patients Released

when you have
--X--
--XY-
--XZ-

then X was probably earliest

Well, then I'm confused with respect to the distinguishing polymorphisms of the Washington/29 isolate. The NA segment has S82P which set it apart from all other Swine Flu isolates except Florida/04 and 08, two isolates that were collected in late April. So the earlier polymorphism is S82P, and the H274Y change that caused Tamiflu resistance came later.

Or, are we saying that the H274Y has been circulating since mid-April?
 
Re: Sequences from Tamiflu Resistant Immunocompromised Patients Released

Well, then I'm confused with respect to the distinguishing polymorphisms of the Washington/29 isolate. The NA segment has S82P which set it apart from all other Swine Flu isolates except Florida/04 and 08, two isolates that were collected in late April. So the earlier polymorphism is S82P, and the H274Y change that caused Tamiflu resistance came later.

Or, are we saying that the H274Y has been circulating since mid-April?
No. S82P isn't on the branch containing the Washington isolates (other than WA/59). It was added to Washington/29 LATER (after the formation of the Washington branch). S82P was apended onto the Washington backbone via recombination (which is also true fro H274Y). You might have to look at a phylogentic tree to understand what came first (on a given isolate, not the entire database).

The ordering is pretty straight forward. Those who want to ignore recombination would say that S82P on different branches is a coincindent random mutation (which becomes absurd fairly quickly, since the number of new additions is small and the "coincidences" happen over a short time frame over and over and over.....).
 
Re: Sequences from Tamiflu Resistant Immunocompromised Patients Released

Well, then I'm confused with respect to the distinguishing polymorphisms of the Washington/29 isolate. The NA segment has S82P which set it apart from all other Swine Flu isolates except Florida/04 and 08, two isolates that were collected in late April. So the earlier polymorphism is S82P, and the H274Y change that caused Tamiflu resistance came later.

Or, are we saying that the H274Y has been circulating since mid-April?

Well, given that the outbreak started in the latter part of flu season, is it unreasonable to assume that a very small population may have acquired that trait as early as April?
 
Re: Sequences from Tamiflu Resistant Immunocompromised Patients Released

Well, then I'm confused with respect to the distinguishing polymorphisms of the Washington/29 isolate. The NA segment has S82P which set it apart from all other Swine Flu isolates except Florida/04 and 08, two isolates that were collected in late April. So the earlier polymorphism is S82P, and the H274Y change that caused Tamiflu resistance came later.

Or, are we saying that the H274Y has been circulating since mid-April?
Below is the travel log of the sequences on the same branch (they all have the same polymorphism, which is also in the latest Argentina sequence at GISAID (not released to Genbank). This polymorphism (A1231G) came FIRST.

gb|GQ499337.1| Influenza A virus (A/Washington/28/2009(H1N1))... 40.1 0.047
gb|GQ499335.1| Influenza A virus (A/Washington/29/2009(H1N1))... 40.1 0.047
gb|GQ465707.1| Influenza A virus (A/Canada-NS/RV1565/2009(H1N... 40.1 0.047
gb|GQ465699.1| Influenza A virus (A/Canada-NS/RV1554/2009(H1N... 40.1 0.047
gb|GQ465698.1| Influenza A virus (A/Canada-NS/RV1551/2009(H1N... 40.1 0.047
gb|CY044165.1| Influenza A virus (A/Mexico/48N/2009(H1N1)) se... 40.1 0.047
gb|GQ433898.1| Influenza A virus (A/Jiangsu/1/2009(H1N1)) seg... 40.1 0.047
gb|GQ377086.1| Influenza A virus (A/Oregon/07/2009(H1N1)) seg... 40.1 0.047
gb|GQ377074.1| Influenza A virus (A/Washington/18/2009(H1N1))... 40.1 0.047
gb|GQ377048.1| Influenza A virus (A/Washington/17/2009(H1N1))... 40.1 0.047
gb|GQ338393.1| Influenza A virus (A/Washington/08/2009(H1N1))... 40.1 0.047
gb|GQ338371.1| Influenza A virus (A/Washington/10/2009(H1N1))... 40.1 0.047
gb|GQ323562.1| Influenza A virus (A/Florida/10/2009(H1N1)) se... 40.1 0.047
gb|GQ323543.1| Influenza A virus (A/Washington/09/2009(H1N1))... 40.1 0.047
gb|GQ323507.1| Influenza A virus (A/Washington/14/2009(H1N1))... 40.1 0.047
gb|GQ223445.1| Influenza A virus (A/GuangzhouSB/01/2009(H1N1)... 40.1 0.047
gb|GQ221696.1| Influenza A virus (A/GuangzhouSB/01/2009(H1N1)... 40.1 0.047
gb|CY040890.1| Influenza A virus (A/Mexico/47N/2009(H1N1)) se... 40.1 0.047
gb|GQ150333.1| Influenza A virus (A/Christchurch/2/2009(H1N1)... 40.1 0.047
gb|GQ132158.1| Influenza A virus (A/Canada-NS/RV1536/2009(H1N... 40.1 0.047
gb|GQ132154.1| Influenza A virus (A/Canada-NS/RV1538/2009(H1N... 40.1 0.047
gb|GQ122098.1| Influenza A virus (A/Christchurch/2/2009(H1N1)... 40.1 0.047
 
Re: Sequences from Tamiflu Resistant Immunocompromised Patients Released

Well, given that the outbreak started in the latter part of flu season, is it unreasonable to assume that a very small population may have acquired that trait as early as April?
I think there is some confusion. The two isolates from Washington are part of a large group that acquired a polymorphism represnted in the travel log above. The earliest appearance of this polymorphism was in April in Mexico (but it was also in Washington, Oregon and New Zealand by late April). This polymorphism is on a large series of Washington isoaltes, as well as Nova Scotia, and to a smaller extent Oregon, China, Florida, New Zealand, and Argentina (based on what is in the databases). H274Y could have been added at any point prior to the two Washington isolates, so it could have been in the two isolates from Mexico and in all others in travel log (but only seen in samples collected after the start of Tamiflu tratment, like the two Seattle patients).
 
Re: Sequences from Tamiflu Resistant Immunocompromised Patients Released

I think there is some confusion. The two isoaltes from Washington are part of a large group that acquired a polymorphism represnted in the travel log above. The earliest appearance of this polymorphism was in April in Mexico (but it was also in Washington, Oregon and New Zealand by late April). This polymorphism is on a large series of Washington isoaltes, as well as Nova Scotia, and to a smaller extent Oregon, China, Florida, New Zealand, and Argentina (based on what is in the databases). H274Y could have been added at any point prior to the two Washington isolates, so it could have been in the two isolates from Mexico and in all others in travel log (but only seen in samples collected after the start of Tamiflu tratment, like the two Seattle patients).

Thanks for the clarification. I was actually writing the post you just answered while you were offering the clarification to Mamabird, so it was already mooted by the time I hit submit.
 
Re: Sequences from Tamiflu Resistant Immunocompromised Patients Released

we have 950 ****** viruses now with ~6.5M nucleotides.
~1300 polymorphisms have happened already.
So, 10% that a new mutation had happened before.
But polymorphisms are not evenly distributed, multiply by roughly 3
for 30%.

--------edit------------

number of positions (out of 13139=2280+2274+2151+1701+1497+1410+982+844 in the coding region)
with mutation(s) in newflu sequences
available at genbank per 20.August 2009 for the 8 segments:
172+171+172+271+123+197+105+93 = 1304

number of position with mutations that occur at least twice:
55+50+43+96+31+70+28+27=400

number of available nucleotides: ~5.8 million
number of available viruses: 943

so the probability that any new mutation will be a singleton
is (1304-400)/1304=69% and the probability that it alread existed as a singleton
(now double) is (1304-400)/1304*400/1304=21%
 
Last edited:
Re: Sequences from Tamiflu Resistant Immunocompromised Patients Released

we have 950 ****** viruses now with ~6.5M nucleotides.
~1300 polymorphisms have happened already.
So, 10% that a new mutation had happened before.
But polymorphisms are not evenly distributed, multiply by roughly 3
for 30%.
This discussion is on one gene segment and these matches are NOT coincidences (and the same polymorphism on multiple members of the same sub-clade are not due to independent events - the above numbers are irrelevant to the current discussion, i.e. the travel log above has 21 isolates with the same NA polymorphism, which was not due to 21 independent events, but was due to ONE event, which is why they are not evenly distributed in the database). Citing irrelvant numbers is not helpful for the overall understanding of the data (although the coments do demonstrate how the numbers and statistics can be inappropriately applied to come of with "novel" interpretations of the data).
 
Re: Sequences from Tamiflu Resistant Immunocompromised Patients Released

Thanks for the clarification. I was actually writing the post you just answered while you were offering the clarification to Mamabird, so it was already mooted by the time I hit submit.
Here is a bit more detail on how the polymorphisms are ordered and why the finding of H274Y on two isolates on the same branch signal a population that already had H274Y PRIOR to treatment (but the sequences in the database are "consensus" sequences of cloned isolates, and both approaches would "erase" or hide the presence of H274Y. If 10% of the viruses had H274Y, it would not appear in the "consensus" sequence (the level ahs to be in the 30-50% range to appear as a mixed signal - which would be a Y for H274Y where a "C" is changed to "T" (Y would mean that both or present). Similarly 90% of the clones would be wild type, so unless multiple clones were sequenced, most of the time the wild type would be generated (and of course if the H274Y was in only 1%, it would be even harder to detect, unless it was selected by Tamiflu treatemnt, and the sample was collected after the start of treatment, like Washington (or the two campers in NC). The fact the 4 confirmed cases of resistance in the US were in 2 clusters of 2 alone points to a pre-existing sequence, because if it is "spontaneous" there is no reason to cluster in time and space.

The travel log presnted is for one change (A1231G) that is in 22 sequences (from 21 isolates). Thus, this is a change thet happened early (April or before) and then expanded in number and geographical reach, resulting in the polymorphism being in mulriple sequences in Mexico, as well as Washington (also multiple), Oregon, and New Zealand in April, followed by additional isolates in two locations in China as well as Argentina. Somehwere along the line, this backbone also picked up H274Y, but was not detected in any of the unselected isolates. It only appeared in two patients in Seattle after they had begun treatment, and as seen in the travel log, both samples from Washington had the defining polymorphism (A1231G). One had also acquired an additional polymorphism that was seen in a few other pandemic sequences, signaling recombination between a sequence with the original marker(A1231G), and H274Y and the rarer polymophism in the other sub-clade.
 
Re: Sequences from Tamiflu Resistant Immunocompromised Patients Released

The ordering is pretty straight forward. Those who want to ignore recombination would say that S82P on different branches is a coincindent random mutation (which becomes absurd fairly quickly, since the number of new additions is small and the "coincidences" happen over a short time frame over and over and over.....).

Hmm, there's a subtlety here I hadn't appreciated previously, and I'd like it if you could clarify matters. When you say that recombination is widespread, do you mean that a single patient gets infected by two different flu strains which then recombine, or (bearing in mind that flu transmits as a population rather than a single sequence) do you mean that there is recombination between the various sequences comprising a single infection?

Toy model here, let's have a single strain A which splits into substrains B and C. Some time after B and C have split, a given polymorphism X appears in both of them. Three possibilities:

1) The mutation X occurs twice independently in substrains B and C

2a) Mutation X occurred once on branch B. Subsequently a patient became simultaneously infected with substrains B and C, and the polymorphism recombined onto C.

2b) Mutation X occurred once in A, the common ancestor of B and C. It was not detected because it was at low levels and didn't show up in the consensus sequence. After B and C have diverged, each of them still retains a low proportion of sequences carrying polymorphism X. Subsequently X is able to separately spread to fixation within B and C, because polymorphisms are freely mobile within each individual population.


If I understand you rightly, you're saying that 2b is the major scenario. That would have significant and testable implications. In particular:

* Since the mutation is deduced to have occurred in A, all other branches from A are at risk of acquiring polymorphism X, whereas strains branching off earlier are at much less risk of acquiring X. Thus you can predict which subclades are more likely to acquire a given change.

* If you could sequence all the individual virions from a given individual, scenario 2b looks like it should make fairly strong predictions about the distribution of polymorphisms between the individual virions. For example, if you had three polymorphisms with a minor allele frequency of 1/10, then 1/1000 of the virions should have all three polymorphisms. This is not what you'd predict from a random mutation hypothesis.



In genetic terms, what scenario 2b would mean is that within a single infected individual, flu should be modelled as a panmictic, freely recombining population. Transmission between patients is equivalent to a severe population bottleneck, with a subset of the flu population being passed on. Once transmission has occurred, there is then a geographic barrier to further "interbreeding" between the daughter populations, in that they're now existing in separate people! If someone gets infected by two strains, it's the equivalent of breaking one of those geographic barriers and re-merging two populations, which may or may not subsequently be compatible enough to recombine with each other. Dual infection seems likely to be rare (but more likely in epidemic / pandemic conditions).


Can you confirm that I've understood your model correctly? Panmixis between the individual sequences present in a single infection is a lot easier to grasp than the nebulous "everything recombines with everything" vibe I get from many of the posts here (not necessarily yours).
 
Re: Sequences from Tamiflu Resistant Immunocompromised Patients Released

Hmm, there's a subtlety here I hadn't appreciated previously, and I'd like it if you could clarify matters. When you say that recombination is widespread, do you mean that a single patient gets infected by two different flu strains which then recombine, or (bearing in mind that flu transmits as a population rather than a single sequence) do you mean that there is recombination between the various sequences comprising a single infection?

Toy model here, let's have a single strain A which splits into substrains B and C. Some time after B and C have split, a given polymorphism X appears in both of them. Three possibilities:

1) The mutation X occurs twice independently in substrains B and C

2a) Mutation X occurred once on branch B. Subsequently a patient became simultaneously infected with substrains B and C, and the polymorphism recombined onto C.

2b) Mutation X occurred once in A, the common ancestor of B and C. It was not detected because it was at low levels and didn't show up in the consensus sequence. After B and C have diverged, each of them still retains a low proportion of sequences carrying polymorphism X. Subsequently X is able to separately spread to fixation within B and C, because polymorphisms are freely mobile within each individual population.


If I understand you rightly, you're saying that 2b is the major scenario. That would have significant and testable implications. In particular:

* Since the mutation is deduced to have occurred in A, all other branches from A are at risk of acquiring polymorphism X, whereas strains branching off earlier are at much less risk of acquiring X. Thus you can predict which subclades are more likely to acquire a given change.

* If you could sequence all the individual virions from a given individual, scenario 2b looks like it should make fairly strong predictions about the distribution of polymorphisms between the individual virions. For example, if you had three polymorphisms with a minor allele frequency of 1/10, then 1/1000 of the virions should have all three polymorphisms. This is not what you'd predict from a random mutation hypothesis.



In genetic terms, what scenario 2b would mean is that within a single infected individual, flu should be modelled as a panmictic, freely recombining population. Transmission between patients is equivalent to a severe population bottleneck, with a subset of the flu population being passed on. Once transmission has occurred, there is then a geographic barrier to further "interbreeding" between the daughter populations, in that they're now existing in separate people! If someone gets infected by two strains, it's the equivalent of breaking one of those geographic barriers and re-merging two populations, which may or may not subsequently be compatible enough to recombine with each other. Dual infection seems likely to be rare (but more likely in epidemic / pandemic conditions).


Can you confirm that I've understood your model correctly? Panmixis between the individual sequences present in a single infection is a lot easier to grasp than the nebulous "everything recombines with everything" vibe I get from many of the posts here (not necessarily yours).
The dual infections are quite common and I can give you a specific example with real plaque purification (cloning) to show that recombination really does happen and multiple species can be generated involving the exchange of SNPs.

It was a rather dramatic example of many of the points I have been making, and some of the results have been described

http://precedings.nature.com/documents/459/version/4

However, the data that would make you a "believer" in recombination in influenza has been block by politics (of the worst kind), but the data are quite real.

The story began when I was collaborating with NAMRU-3 on H5N1 outbreaks in Egypt. They had been only sequencing HA and I suggested that they expand the sequencing effort and the highest prioity would be NA. The timing was good becasue it was the end of 2006 and one of the first NA sequences generated was for the Ghrabiya cluster, and the NA sequence showed tamiflu resistance. It wasn't the common H274Y that has been discussed here, but was N294S, which produced somewhat weaker resistance, 10-20 fold instead of 300-1000 fold seen in H274Y. However, 10-20 fold was more than high enough for treatment problems becasue most treatments are borderline, so a requirement for 10-20X more Tamiflu would render that approved treatment level useless.

However, the remarkable aspect of the resistance was the fact that N294S was present BEFORE treatment raising concerns that the polymorphism was on a fit H5N1 and was widespread in birds. As a result, NAMRU-3, which usually focused on human cases, was getting more poultry samples. A fairly extensive seach failed to find N294S in birds or patients, but on Feb 15, a Gharbiya-like sequence was identified in a chicken in Gharbiya, but it didn't have N294S

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/nuccore...uence.Sequence_ResultsPanel.Sequence_RVDocSum

However, the NA sequence was a mixture and one position was represented with a Y and that position was polymorphic in the H5N1 sequences in Egypt (other isolates had both "C" and "T" at that position), including two other chicken isolates from Gharbiya that had 11 differences in the NA sequence.

The same was true for the HA sequence

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/nuccore...uence.Sequence_ResultsPanel.Sequence_RVDocSum

which had three positions that were represented with a "R" and all three positions were polymorphic with multiple isolates haveing A or G at all three positions, including the same two isolates from Gharbiya collected at the same time (and these two sequences, which were identical to each other had 22 differences the Gharbiya HA sequences).

However, although the three Gharbiya chicken sequences fell into two distinct groups (11 NA differences and 22 HA difference) both had picked up a synonymous NA polymorphism, G743A, which had never been seen in any prior H5N1 in Egypt. The acquistion of the same polymorphism at the same place and same time on two very distinct backgrounds (both backgrounds have been indentified earlier, based on NA and HA sequneces), was a strong signal for recombination.

In addition, the multiple mixed signals in the HA and NA sequences raised the possibility that the Tamifu resistance (N294S) was lurking below the detection level, and could be found by cloning and sequencing the clones.

Consquently the sample from the chicken with the mixture that was related to the Gharbiya cluster was plaque purified and 44 NA sequences were generated. The clones showed that the chicken was indeed infected with two major species that were in a 3:1 ratio. The dominant sequence was closely related to the Gharbiya cluster sequence, but none had N294S, and all had G743A. The minor species matched the other two chicken sequences and also didn't have N294S (as expected), but all of the minor species clones also had G743A, demonstrating that the same change had indeed been acquired by two different backgrounds, and not only were in the same place at the same time, but were also in the same chicken.

Moreover, a few of the sequences were recombinants, with 9 or 10 of the 11 positions matching one parental sequence and 1 or 2 matching the other. Thus, the plaque purified clones demonstrated recombination involving the exchange of one or two SNPs.

However, the data also said quite a bit about what was seen in a mixed sample. Even though the two NA sequences had differences at 11 positions, only 1 of the 11 showed up as a mixed signal in the "consensus" sequence. One of the plaque purified clones was still a mixture, which appeared to be a 50/50 mixture, becasue sequencing of that sample gave mixed signals at all 11 positions. However, in the uncloned sample, 10 of 11 positions were "clean" even though 1/4 of the sequences in the sample were the "other" sequence which was not present in the "consensus".

Thus, there was clear recombination in the Gharbya chicken with the Gharbiya cluster sequence, and the vast majority of the mixed positions (10/11) did not give a mixed signal in the "consensus" sequence.

As seen in the first link above, the G743A synonymous polymorphism subsequently appeared on multiple H5N1 backgrounds in Egypt, as well as very different clade 2.2 H5N1 backgrounds in Russia, Kuwait, Ghana, Ivory Coast, all at the same time (ealry 2007).

Recombination involving the acquisition of SNPs is quite real in infleunza and quite common.
 
Re: Sequences from Tamiflu Resistant Immunocompromised Patients Released

Two questions:

In addition to the Gharbiya chicken, can you point to 2 or 3 additional examples of SNP dual infection changes within a single individual also supported by subsequent testing?

What is your direct response to pjie's 2b hypothesis? S/He thinks your proposition is very unlikely, possibly based on his/her prior observations and training.

Would you present here a <focused, limited> response to the question being posed and your immediately prior answer?
 
Re: Sequences from Tamiflu Resistant Immunocompromised Patients Released

Hmm, there's a subtlety here I hadn't appreciated previously, and I'd like it if you could clarify matters. When you say that recombination is widespread, do you mean that a single patient gets infected by two different flu strains which then recombine, or (bearing in mind that flu transmits as a population rather than a single sequence) do you mean that there is recombination between the various sequences comprising a single infection?

Toy model here, let's have a single strain A which splits into substrains B and C. Some time after B and C have split, a given polymorphism X appears in both of them. Three possibilities:

1) The mutation X occurs twice independently in substrains B and C

2a) Mutation X occurred once on branch B. Subsequently a patient became simultaneously infected with substrains B and C, and the polymorphism recombined onto C.

2b) Mutation X occurred once in A, the common ancestor of B and C. It was not detected because it was at low levels and didn't show up in the consensus sequence. After B and C have diverged, each of them still retains a low proportion of sequences carrying polymorphism X. Subsequently X is able to separately spread to fixation within B and C, because polymorphisms are freely mobile within each individual population.


If I understand you rightly, you're saying that 2b is the major scenario. That would have significant and testable implications. In particular:

* Since the mutation is deduced to have occurred in A, all other branches from A are at risk of acquiring polymorphism X, whereas strains branching off earlier are at much less risk of acquiring X. Thus you can predict which subclades are more likely to acquire a given change.

* If you could sequence all the individual virions from a given individual, scenario 2b looks like it should make fairly strong predictions about the distribution of polymorphisms between the individual virions. For example, if you had three polymorphisms with a minor allele frequency of 1/10, then 1/1000 of the virions should have all three polymorphisms. This is not what you'd predict from a random mutation hypothesis.



In genetic terms, what scenario 2b would mean is that within a single infected individual, flu should be modelled as a panmictic, freely recombining population. Transmission between patients is equivalent to a severe population bottleneck, with a subset of the flu population being passed on. Once transmission has occurred, there is then a geographic barrier to further "interbreeding" between the daughter populations, in that they're now existing in separate people! If someone gets infected by two strains, it's the equivalent of breaking one of those geographic barriers and re-merging two populations, which may or may not subsequently be compatible enough to recombine with each other. Dual infection seems likely to be rare (but more likely in epidemic / pandemic conditions).


Can you confirm that I've understood your model correctly? Panmixis between the individual sequences present in a single infection is a lot easier to grasp than the nebulous "everything recombines with everything" vibe I get from many of the posts here (not necessarily yours).
Yes, scenario 2B is the "cached" system, where the low level representations of past recombinations is carried along and then suddenly reappears. That is why the newly acquired polymorphisms trace back to prior events. Thus, most of the polymorphisms in polymerase A and B2 (PA and PB2) trace back to avian, PB1 traces back to human H3N2, and the other five trace back to swine and even break down into North America and Eurasian swine. Each gene segments "remembers"' where it has been and has picked up a few mometos, which it calls upon at appropriate times (and why it is "elegant evolution" and is not monkeys banging on a keyboard).
 
Re: Sequences from Tamiflu Resistant Immunocompromised Patients Released

Two questions:

In addition to the Gharbiya chicken, can you point to 2 or 3 additional examples of SNP dual infection changes within a single individual also supported by subsequent testing?

What is your direct response to pjie's 2b hypothesis? S/He thinks your proposition is very unlikely, possibly based on his/her prior observations and training.

Would you present here a <FOCUSED, limited>response to the question being posed and your immediately prior answer?
To get the data like the Gharbiyah clusters requires cloning and dsiclosure of full sequences, which generally isn't done in influenza. However, cloning data (bits and pieces represnted by indovidual polymorphisms has been shown in Tamiflu resistance (sister of patient who who holds the record for recover after something like 90 days of hospitalization. She was in prophylactic Tamiflu and had H274Y and N294S (as well as other changes). Similar mixing and matching in combinations of recenptor bind domaun changes in H5N1 in Vietnam. Both papers by Kawaoka and both papers withheld full sequneces of clones (where recombination would be OBVIOUS).

On the second question, the skepticism is based on the misconception by non-virologists that dual (or co-infections) are rare. This misconception is supported by "clean" sequences. However, the origin sample/sequence is quite "dirty" and most sequences are cleaned up by cloning prior to publication (and more "dirt" is swept under the rug by "consensus" sequences. As seen in Gharbiya, for 10 of the 11 positions, 1/4 of the positions were the "other" polymorphism, which "disappeared" in the consensus sequences (which is all that is made public).
 
Re: Sequences from Tamiflu Resistant Immunocompromised Patients Released

so you have a 1:3 mixture of 2 viruses A and B in one chicken which differ in 11 positions in NA and
22 positions in HA, other segments not known.
You claim to have generated 44 "plaque purified" sequences of NA
of this mixture (sequences not at genbank).
You claim that "a few" of the 44 were "recombinants", having 1 or 2 polymorphisms (which ?) in NA from
A and the other 10 or 9 from B, other segments not known.

Did the "recombination" occur in the chicken or in the lab (NAMRU-3)
during the plaque-purifying process ?
Did any of these "recombinants" spread in nature or were they confirmed
by another lab ?
Does there exist any other such example, where a recombinant virus
could be cultivated and replicated ?
Should be straightforward : take 2 different viruses, grow them
simultaneously in the same egg or monkey-kidney cells or whatever.
Continue for several generations.
Then check for recombinations ans reassortments.
Has it been done ?
 
Re: Sequences from Tamiflu Resistant Immunocompromised Patients Released

so you have a 1:3 mixture of 2 viruses A and B in one chicken which differ in 11 positions in NA and
22 positions in HA, other segments not known.
You claim to have generated 44 "plaque purified" sequences of NA
of this mixture (sequences not at genbank).
You claim that "a few" of the 44 were "recombinants", having 1 or 2 polymorphisms (which ?) in NA from
A and the other 10 or 9 from B, other segments not known.

Did the "recombination" occur in the chicken or in the lab (NAMRU-3)
during the plaque-purifying process ?
Did any of these "recombinants" spread in nature or were they confirmed
by another lab ?
Does there exist any other such example, where a recombinant virus
could be cultivated and replicated ?
Should be straightforward : take 2 different viruses, grow them
simultaneously in the same egg or monkey-kidney cells or whatever.
Continue for several generations.
Then check for recombinations ans reassortments.
Has it been done ?
The two separate sequences have been reported multiple times in other isolates. The cloning was limited to the 44 isolates described.
 
Re: Sequences from Tamiflu Resistant Immunocompromised Patients Released

Did the "recombination" occur in the chicken or in the lab (NAMRU-3)
during the plaque-purifying process ?
Lab error gets real old real fast (and it was old several years ago).
 
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