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Reports of missed mild bird flu cases raise questions about scope of spread

HenryN

Retired
Reports of missed mild bird flu cases raise questions about scope of spread

17:54:50 EDT Sep 17, 2006

Canadian Press: HELEN BRANSWELL


<!--end of storyhead--><!--updated p--><!--updated para--><!-- CPPara1-->(CP) - Recent reports from South Korea and Indonesia of after-the-fact discovery of a handful of mild human cases of H5N1 avian flu have again raised questions about whether the disease's extraordinarily high death rate is being inflated because mild cases are being missed.

<!-- CPPara1End--><!--updated p--><!--updated para--><!-- CPPara2-->Experts say the evidence to date points away from that notion. But they add that it is important to continue to search for mild cases. Understanding the true number of human infections and the range of symptoms experienced could help scientists better assess the pandemic risk posed by the virus.

<!-- CPPara2End--><!--updated p--><!--updated para--><!-- CPPara3-->As well, tracking mild cases over time could provide an early warning if important changes to H5N1 occur, they suggest. Climbing rates of mild cases might signal the virus was adapting to become a human flu strain, moving closer to triggering a flu pandemic.

<!-- CPPara3End--><!--start of p-->"We need to keep monitoring it," Dr. Michael Osterholm, director of the University of Minnesota's Center for Infectious Diseases Research and Policy, said Sunday.

<!--start of p-->"Because frankly, one of the indications that there may be a changing epidemiology (disease pattern) with this is in fact if we start seeing larger and larger percentages of individuals who are asymptomatic or only mildly ill that we can clearly confirm as having H5N1 infection."

<!--start of p-->The World Health Organization announced last week blood tests done on an Indonesian man showed he became infected, likely in May when he helped nurse his sister, a confirmed H5N1 case. The man reported having a cough and abdominal discomfort but his symptoms weren't diagnosed as H5N1-related at the time.

<!--start of p-->And South Korean officials revealed that testing of blood samples from more than 2,000 workers who culled diseased poultry in late 2003 and early 2004 showed five had developed antibodies to the virus - a sign they had been infected. An earlier round of testing in South Korea turned up four cullers with antibodies.

<!--start of p-->None of these people had serious illness at the time; none has yet been added to the WHO's official case list.

<!--start of p-->To the best of the scientific community's knowledge, the H5N1 virus is not adept at infecting people. But when it does, it appears to cause severe disease. Nearly 60 per cent of the 246 confirmed cases have died; many of the survivors battled for their lives.

<!--start of p-->But there has always been a suspicion in some quarters that a significant number of mild cases are being missed - a theory these new reports may fuel.

<!--start of p-->Many - though not all - diseases cause a spectrum of illness ranging from undetectable to life-threatening infection. With polio, for instance, it is estimated there are 200 inapparent infections for every person the virus paralyzes. On the other hand, rabies is almost 100 per cent fatal.

<!--start of p-->If the confirmed H5N1 cases were the proverbial tip of the iceberg, the death rate attributed to the virus would tumble. That in turn might ease worries about the threat posed by H5N1 - though a flu virus that killed even 10 or 20 per cent of its victims would still be a source of serious concern.

<!--start of p-->Dr. Angus Nicoll, an influenza expert with the European Centre for Disease Control, said these new asymptomatic cases don't change the fact that the bulk of evidence to date suggests such cases are rare.

<!--start of p-->A number of small studies have been done to test the blood of people who've been in contact with confirmed cases. They have turned up few or no cases that missed earlier detection.

<!--start of p-->The most recent study - published in the October issue of Emerging Infectious Diseases - looked at blood samples from 351 Cambodians who had been in contact with a man who died from the disease. None developed antibodies to the virus.

<!--start of p-->"It's still a plausible hypothesis but it's becoming a less likely one," Nicoll said of the notion that there may be a significant number of asymptomatic and mild cases of the disease.

<!--start of p-->"My bottom line would be: I'm sure we're going to find the occasional mild case. I'm sure we're going to find, eventually, an asymptomatic (case)," he said from Sweden.

<!--start of p-->"Even if you find just a few asymptomatic and mild cases, that's not going to change the our risk assessment."

http://www.cbc.ca/cp/health/060917/x091704.html
 
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Re: Reports of missed mild bird flu cases raise questions about scope of spread

niman said:
Reports of missed mild bird flu cases raise questions about scope of spread

17:54:50 EDT Sep 17, 2006

Canadian Press: HELEN BRANSWELL


<!--end of storyhead--><!--updated p--><!--updated para--><!-- CPPara1-->(<!--start of p-->"It's still a plausible hypothesis but it's becoming a less likely one," Nicoll said of the notion that there may be a significant number of asymptomatic and mild cases of the disease.
<!--start of p-->"My bottom line would be: I'm sure we're going to find the occasional mild case. I'm sure we're going to find, eventually, an asymptomatic (case)," he said from Sweden.
<!--start of p-->"Even if you find just a few asymptomatic and mild cases, that's not going to change the our risk assessment."

http://www.cbc.ca/cp/health/060917/x091704.html

These guys really don't get it. Sequence analysis of H5N1 in Indonesia suggests the human H5N1 infections are NOT coming from birds. Those exposed to the hidden reservoir are not tested.

Testing people in Cambodia, where there are few cases of humnan H5N1 would not be the likely location of mild cases.
 
Re: Reports of missed mild bird flu cases raise questions about scope of spread

1) What do you think the "hidden reservoir" is?

2) Weren't there some Chinese farmers that tested positive for antibodies to H5N1?

3) What countries would you be testing in for evidence of LPAI H5N1 in humans?


And, I agree that if there were even a low number of persons who did not die, but were infected, the risk assessment analysis should be different as the total number of cases confirmed by WHO is not a high number. It would not take, statistically, many cases of LPAI H5N1 to change the CFR, hence the risk assessment.
 
Re: Reports of missed mild bird flu cases raise questions about scope of spread

No they dont get it but glad we do. :)
Some things learned by looking at past pandemics.



Patient prognosis during pandemic influenza
One thing that is different about a major pandemic is just how hard it hits patients and how rapidly it kills. Patients affected by the flu can be broadly categorized into 3 prognostic types. The first type has a poor prognosis no matter what is done for them. The second might survive if there was full access to high technology medical care and resources. The third type is highly likely to recover from the flu as long as they are provided with consistent low-technology supportive measures that can be administered in home settings.


Type 1 patients have the poorest prognosis and almost all will die within 2 or 3 days of the development of their first symptoms. The cause of death in these patients during the 1918 flu was massive respiratory failure from overwhelming lung-destroying viral pneumonia. There was no effective treatment for this in 1918, and there is none today despite all the advances in medicine that have occurred over the last 90 years. Signs and symptoms of type 1 patients include rapid onset of severe shortness of breath, cyanosis (bluish discoloration of the skin of the hands, feet, and around the mouth and spreading centrally), or bleeding from the lungs, stomach and rectum.



Type 2 patients are similar to type 1 patients except they do not die after 3 days. Some but not many of these patients would survive if they had access to an ICU, ventilators and expert medical care but if we have a severe pandemic, those resources will not be widely available. Even if they had access to these services, many of them would die anyway. Remember, no matter what you do, they are likely to pass away in a week to 10 days after becoming ill.



Type 3 patients make up the majority of those that become ill with influenza. Fortunately, these patients have a good prognosis if they receive timely and diligent supportive care that can be provided well in a non-medical setting such as the home. Most of these pandemic flu victims will be severely ill and weakened by the infection such that they will be too ill to get out of bed. Many type 3 patients will be completely dependent on others for care. Without simple care, some of these patients will die from preventable causes like dehydration but with simple care, most of these patients will recover. No matter how good the care provided, some type 3 patients will die. This is not your fault. This happens usually because they develop a serious secondary condition that actually becomes the cause of death. Examples of these secondary conditions include bacterial pneumonia, stroke, and heart attack. There is nothing you can do but keep doing the best you can and let nature take its course.



In my opinion, as a general rule, provide everyone with the same level of supportive care. This is a rational course because it is not always possible to predict who will survive and who will not, especially early in the course of the flu.

http://www.fluwikie.com/annex/WoodsonMonograph.htm
 
Re: Reports of missed mild bird flu cases raise questions about scope of spread

Florida1 said:
1) What do you think the "hidden reservoir" is?

2) Weren't there some Chinese farmers that tested positive for antibodies to H5N1?

3) What countries would you be testing in for evidence of LPAI H5N1 in humans?


And, I agree that if there were even a low number of persons who did not die, but were infected, the risk assessment analysis should be different as the total number of cases confirmed by WHO is not a high number. It would not take, statistically, many cases of LPAI H5N1 to change the CFR, hence the risk assessment.

The reservoir is probably mammalian, and the mammal most contacted by humans is obvious.

H5N1 antibodies were found in Indian poultry workers.

Indonesia has many varieties of H5N1 in humans.
 
Re: Reports of missed mild bird flu cases raise questions about scope of spread

niman said:
Reports of missed mild bird flu cases raise questions about scope of spread

17:54:50 EDT Sep 17, 2006

Canadian Press: HELEN BRANSWELL


<!--end of storyhead--><!--updated p--><!--updated para--><!-- CPPara1-->I'm sure we're going to find, eventually, an asymptomatic (case)," he said from Sweden.

http://www.cbc.ca/cp/health/060917/x091704.html

Earth to Canada (or Sweden). Asymptomatic patients with H5N1 antibodies have been reported in Hong Kong (1997), India (2002), South Korea (2003), Japan (2204), and Vietnam (2005).
 
Re: Reports of missed mild bird flu cases raise questions about scope of spread

niman said:
The reservoir is probably mammalian, and the mammal most contacted by humans is obvious............

In addition to the normal pets, there's always the mammalian food:

<TABLE cellPadding=7><TBODY><TR><TD vAlign=top>Monkey Toes - Deep fried monkey toes, eat it off the bone.


<TABLE cellPadding=7><TBODY><TR><TD vAlign=top>Bats </TD><TD vAlign=top>In the covered market in Jogjakarta they sell them, smoked. They're only about three inches long, like skeletal brown mice.


.

</TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE>

</TD><TD vAlign=top></TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE>
 
Re: Reports of missed mild bird flu cases raise questions about scope of spread

niman said:
The reservoir is probably mammalian, and the mammal most contacted by humans is obvious.

H5N1 antibodies were found in Indian poultry workers.

Indonesia has many varieties of H5N1 in humans.

Maybe not so obvious. I thought you meant human mammals. AD apparently thought of other vectors.
 
Re: Reports of missed mild bird flu cases raise questions about scope of spread

the hidden reservoir -assuming there is one, for what we have
some evidence now- why should it be mammalean ?

It could be ducks, ducks can be asymptomatic, ducks can fly,
H5N1 was already found in lots of ducks and H5N1 does evolve
in ducks, which could explain how the virus was formed in
Indonesia prior to the first human cases in 2005.

The problem with ducks is, however that other ducks also have the
Indonesian avian virus and how do we explain why these two strains
didn't mix ? It could be some group of ducks which doesn't come into
contact with the chicken-virus-ducks but does come into contact
with other RESRRKKR-ducks.

It could be pigs. But then the virus would have circulated and
evolved in pigs prior to 2005. But virus evolution in pigs is
often slower and pigs don't come so much around as ducks.
Most pigs are domestic and pigs with unusual disease would
have been noticed. The viruses found in Indonesian pigs were chicken-viruses
AFAIK. And how do the pigs infect the humans in Java ?
The source should have been not so hard to find, if it were pigs.
If all the human cases in Java would come from a pig-source,
how could they miss it ? Maybe uncooked pork ? But then others
eating the same pork or butchers should have been infected too.

It could be cats. One cat with the human RESRRKKR sequence
had been found. We know that cats can be infected and spread
the virus from cat to cat. But this has been examined and we
should have heard about it, if that suspicion had caused evidence.
They are probably tracing possible cat-contacts of the human cases.

It could be insects. That would explain why it's so hard to find
the vector. But it should be insects then, where the virus could
evolve in 2003,2004 to form the current strain which is different
from the chicken-strain. So there should be insect-to-insect
transmission while the insects only rarely get it from chickens or ducks,
else the strains would mix which we don't observe.
And how do the humans get it from the insects ? Through blood
with mosquitos ? Or saliva from flies sitting and eating from human
food ?

It could be ... something else.
 
Re: Reports of missed mild bird flu cases raise questions about scope of spread

gsgs - maybe it's... aliens. LOL
 
Re: Reports of missed mild bird flu cases raise questions about scope of spread

My source for weird mammalian foods is:
http://www.weird-food.com/weird-food-mammal.html

Another possibility for Thailand is RAT....

<TABLE cellPadding=7><TBODY><TR><TD vAlign=top>Rat
(Thailand)</TD><TD vAlign=top>Rat (Northern Thailand, Karen Hill Tribe) In the Karen Hill Tribe village in northern Thailand (near the Mayanmar border) breakfast was described as 'small animal' which was clearly a rat, cooked whole over an open fire, then served in a bowl of extremely hot chili stock with a bowl of glutinous sticky rice. The whole family shares this one dish. The Karen people do keep domestic farm animals like pigs, chickens and buffalo, but these are only slaughtered for food on very special occasions. Everyday food is sourced from hunting in the jungle, so consists of whatever small animals end up on the wrong end of a sling shot (and these guys are good with a sling shot!). Rat was quite a tasty way to start the day, the meat tastes a bit like rabbit (and those chilies are HOT!), but needless to say I didn't eat too much...

.
</TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE>
 
Re: Reports of missed mild bird flu cases raise questions about scope of spread

gsgs said:
the hidden reservoir -assuming there is one, for what we have
some evidence now- why should it be mammalean ?

It could be ducks, ducks can be asymptomatic, ducks can fly,
H5N1 was already found in lots of ducks and H5N1 does evolve
in ducks, which could explain how the virus was formed in
Indonesia prior to the first human cases in 2005.

The problem with ducks is, however that other ducks also have the
Indonesian avian virus and how do we explain why these two strains
didn't mix ? It could be some group of ducks which doesn't come into
contact with the chicken-virus-ducks but does come into contact
with other RESRRKKR-ducks.

It could be pigs. But then the virus would have circulated and
evolved in pigs prior to 2005. But virus evolution in pigs is
often slower and pigs don't come so much around as ducks.
Most pigs are domestic and pigs with unusual disease would
have been noticed. The viruses found in Indonesian pigs were chicken-viruses
AFAIK. And how do the pigs infect the humans in Java ?
The source should have been not so hard to find, if it were pigs.
If all the human cases in Java would come from a pig-source,
how could they miss it ? Maybe uncooked pork ? But then others
eating the same pork or butchers should have been infected too.

It could be cats. One cat with the human RESRRKKR sequence
had been found. We know that cats can be infected and spread
the virus from cat to cat. But this has been examined and we
should have heard about it, if that suspicion had caused evidence.
They are probably tracing possible cat-contacts of the human cases.

It could be insects. That would explain why it's so hard to find
the vector. But it should be insects then, where the virus could
evolve in 2003,2004 to form the current strain which is different
from the chicken-strain. So there should be insect-to-insect
transmission while the insects only rarely get it from chickens or ducks,
else the strains would mix which we don't observe.
And how do the humans get it from the insects ? Through blood
with mosquitos ? Or saliva from flies sitting and eating from human
food ?

It could be ... something else.

The match of the human sequences in Java is with chicken sequences from Sumatra. There is a great deal of micing and matching, but the selection of isolates for sequencing is biased..
 
Re: Reports of missed mild bird flu cases raise questions about scope of spread

it would be interesting to know under which circumstances the samples were collected.
Also, now we have the sequences from Indonesia from humans
and some birds but not the data of the human contacts
and possible exposures which might include some of the tested birds.

So, are these finds with the chickens just random or did they
have some suspicion to test just these chickens ?
 
Re: Reports of missed mild bird flu cases raise questions about scope of spread

gsgs said:
it would be interesting to know under which circumstances the samples were collected.
Also, now we have the sequences from Indonesia from humans
and some birds but not the data of the human contacts
and possible exposures which might include some of the tested birds.

So, are these finds with the chickens just random or did they
have some suspicion to test just these chickens ?

I would think that the poultry H5N1 sequences are from dead or dying birds. There have been no reports of asymptomatic H5N1 chickens in Indonesia and the surveillance of poultry remains poor, so it is doubtful that there is any H5N1 from healthy chickens.
 
Re: Reports of missed mild bird flu cases raise questions about scope of spread

Recombinomics Commentary
February 14, 2006

In an unpublished study carried out last year by the National Institute of Animal Health in Bangkok, researchers led by virologist Sudarat Damrongwatanapokin tested 629 village dogs and 111 cats in the Suphan Buri district of central Thailand. Out of these, 160 dogs and 8 cats had antibodies to H5N1, indicating that they were infected with the virus or had been infected in the past.

The above comments on H5N1 in dogs and cats are not a surprise. H5N1 has been isolated from fatal infections of leopards and tigers in Thai zoos. H5N1 has also been isolated from a domestic cat and has been experimentally transmitted in laboratory cats.

Similarly, although an earlier report of H5N1 detected in a dog in Thailand was denied, later media reports indicated the original report was accurate and the denial was part of a cover-up.

In Croatia dogs were being destroyed and media reports included pictures of dead dogs and cats. Other unconfirmed reports indicate dead hyenas litter the roadside in Nigeria.

H3N8 has been found in racing and companion dogs in the United States providing additional evidence for expanding hosts ranges for influenza.

The large number of wild birds infected with H5N1 may provide a mechanism for infection of a wide range of carnivores. The number of countries reporting dead swans has increased dramatically in the past several days, and reports of H5N1 in the East Atlantic Flyway suggests the global spread of H5N1 will continue.

The expanded geographical reach and host range of H5N1 is cause for concern. The spread of H5N1 allows for more dual infections, recombinations, and new sequences causing new problems. Moreover, these new sequences can increase the affinity for human receptors, such as S227N, and can be generated in avian hosts infected with H5N1 and H9N2 as predicted previously.
 
Re: Reports of missed mild bird flu cases raise questions about scope of spread

Bird flu 'causes first dog death'

Wednesday, 15 March 2006

Bird flu cases have been discovered along the Caspian Sea coast

A stray dog has died of bird flu in the Caspian nation of Azerbaijan, health officials have said - thought to be the first time the virus has killed a dog. Azerbaijan reported its first three human deaths from bird flu on Monday.
The World Health Organization has yet to confirm bird flu caused the human deaths, but said the US Navy lab that carried out the tests was reliable.

The deaths of the three young Azeri women
would take the WHO total for human deaths from bird flu to 101.

There have been no confirmed cases of one person passing the virus to another. Most people who have contracted it are thought to have been in close contact with domestic poultry.

But scientists fear the virus could mutate into a form that can pass from person to person.

Germany has reported at least three cat deaths from bird flu, which has been spreading from South-East Asia since 2003.

Quarantine

The deadly H5N1 strain of the virus was discovered in migratory bird flocks in Azerbaijan last month.

The government has taken measures to quarantine the two regions where the women died, with entry and exit to their villages being controlled.

Cars were being disinfected and domestic poultry was being confined, Reuters news agency reported.

The dog that died was found in the capital Baku on 9 March, health officials said.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4811284.stm
 
Re: Reports of missed mild bird flu cases raise questions about scope of spread

Avian influenza – situation in Azerbaijan

10 March 2006

Since the beginning of March, the Ministry of Health in Azerbaijian has been investigating a cluster of 10 persons placed under observation for possible infection with the H5N1 avian influenza virus. All of these persons are from the Daikyand settlement in Salyan Rayon in the eastern part of the country.

The Salyan Rayon is located near wetlands frequented by migratory birds. Recent deaths of poultry have been reported in the Daikyand settlement, but the cause of these deaths has not yet been determined. The investigation was launched when two young women, who were neighbours, died within a week of each other. The first patient, a 17-year-old girl, died on 23 February. She was reported to have suffered for more than a year from respiratory symptoms associated with a neoplastic condition. Her death is now thought to have been caused by this pre-existing disease. As a precaution, samples have been taken and will be sent for H5N1 testing at a WHO collaborating laboratory in the United Kingdom.

The second death occurred on 3 March in a 20-year-old woman who died following rapidly progressive acute pneumonia, which is a characteristic feature in many cases of H5N1 infection.

Immediately following the second death, the Ministry of Health initiated daily house-to-house investigations, conducted by four teams of hospital staff, looking for persons in the settlement having respiratory symptoms or fever. As a result, an additional 8 persons were hospitalized for observation. Of these, six showed only mild symptoms. They have fully recovered and have now been discharged from hospital.

http://www.who.int/csr/don/2006_03_10a/en/index.html
 
Re: Reports of missed mild bird flu cases raise questions about scope of spread

Just to clarify - these excellent reports are NOT new - please check the dates:

14 February 2006
10 March 2006
15 March 2006

.
 
Re: Reports of missed mild bird flu cases raise questions about scope of spread

Dr Niman said
The reservoir is probably mammalian, and the mammal most contacted by humans is obvious.

So if it's cats or dogs wouldn't you get more cats/dogs in the sequences? sorry if this is a dumb question, this is a bit above my level of education. I only noticed the one cat sequence.
 
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