Mary Wilson
New member
Published 19 October 2021
https://doi.org/10.1128/mBio.01864-21
Sriharshita Musunuri[SUP]a[/SUP], Jonas B. Sandbrink[SUP]b,c[/SUP], Joshua Teperowski Monrad[SUP]b,d,e[/SUP], Megan J. Palmer[SUP]f,g[/SUP], and Gregory D. Koblentz[SUP]h[/SUP]
ABSTRACT
The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the world’s vulnerability to biological catastrophe and elicited unprecedented scientific efforts. Some of this work and its derivatives, however, present dual-use risks (i.e., potential harm from misapplication of beneficial research) that have largely gone unaddressed. For instance, gain-of-function studies and reverse genetics protocols may facilitate the engineering of concerning SARS-CoV-2 variants and other pathogens. The risk of accidental or deliberate release of dangerous pathogens may be increased by large-scale collection and characterization of zoonotic viruses undertaken in an effort to understand what enables animal-to-human transmission. These concerns are exacerbated by the rise of preprint publishing that circumvents a late-stage opportunity for dual-use oversight. To prevent the next global health emergency, we must avoid inadvertently increasing the threat of future biological events. This requires a nuanced and proactive approach to dual-use evaluation throughout the research life cycle, including the conception, funding, conduct, and dissemination of research.
PERSPECTIVE
The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed the world’s vulnerability to biological threats and will shape pandemic preparedness efforts for decades to come. Recent discussions have particularly emphasized biosafety risks associated with gain-of-function experiments and accidental pathogen release (1). However, global health security leaders have also cautioned that the COVID-19 pandemic may increase the threat from deliberate biological events, i.e., biosecurity risks, by potentially inspiring malicious actors (2–4). These warnings come against the backdrop of existing global vulnerabilities to potential biosecurity risks, as both the WHO Joint External Evaluations and the inaugural 2019 Global Health Security Index have identified inadequate capacity and policies for biosecurity in the vast majority of countries (5, 6). ...
https://journals.asm.org/doi/epub/10.1128/mBio.01864-21
https://doi.org/10.1128/mBio.01864-21
Sriharshita Musunuri[SUP]a[/SUP], Jonas B. Sandbrink[SUP]b,c[/SUP], Joshua Teperowski Monrad[SUP]b,d,e[/SUP], Megan J. Palmer[SUP]f,g[/SUP], and Gregory D. Koblentz[SUP]h[/SUP]
ABSTRACT
The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the world’s vulnerability to biological catastrophe and elicited unprecedented scientific efforts. Some of this work and its derivatives, however, present dual-use risks (i.e., potential harm from misapplication of beneficial research) that have largely gone unaddressed. For instance, gain-of-function studies and reverse genetics protocols may facilitate the engineering of concerning SARS-CoV-2 variants and other pathogens. The risk of accidental or deliberate release of dangerous pathogens may be increased by large-scale collection and characterization of zoonotic viruses undertaken in an effort to understand what enables animal-to-human transmission. These concerns are exacerbated by the rise of preprint publishing that circumvents a late-stage opportunity for dual-use oversight. To prevent the next global health emergency, we must avoid inadvertently increasing the threat of future biological events. This requires a nuanced and proactive approach to dual-use evaluation throughout the research life cycle, including the conception, funding, conduct, and dissemination of research.
PERSPECTIVE
The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed the world’s vulnerability to biological threats and will shape pandemic preparedness efforts for decades to come. Recent discussions have particularly emphasized biosafety risks associated with gain-of-function experiments and accidental pathogen release (1). However, global health security leaders have also cautioned that the COVID-19 pandemic may increase the threat from deliberate biological events, i.e., biosecurity risks, by potentially inspiring malicious actors (2–4). These warnings come against the backdrop of existing global vulnerabilities to potential biosecurity risks, as both the WHO Joint External Evaluations and the inaugural 2019 Global Health Security Index have identified inadequate capacity and policies for biosecurity in the vast majority of countries (5, 6). ...
https://journals.asm.org/doi/epub/10.1128/mBio.01864-21
