Mary Wilson
Well-known member
19 October 2021
DIO: https://doi.org/10.1128/mBio.01864-21
Authors: Sriharshita Musunuri, Jonas B. Sandbrink, Joshua Teperowski Monrad, Megan J. Palmer and Gregory D. Koblentz
ABSTRACT
The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the world’s vulnerability to biological catastrophe and elicited unprecedented scientific efforts. Some of this work and its derivatives, however, present dual-use risks (i.e., potential harm from misapplication of beneficial research) that have largely gone unaddressed. For instance, gain-of-function studies and reverse genetics protocols may facilitate the engineering of concerning SARS-CoV-2 variants and other pathogens. The risk of accidental or deliberate release of dangerous pathogens may be increased by large-scale collection and characterization of zoonotic viruses undertaken in an effort to understand what enables animal-to-human transmission. These concerns are exacerbated by the rise of preprint publishing that circumvents a late-stage opportunity for dual-use oversight. To prevent the next global health emergency, we must avoid inadvertently increasing the threat of future biological events. This requires a nuanced and proactive approach to dual-use evaluation throughout the research life cycle, including the conception, funding, conduct, and dissemination of research.
https://journals.asm.org/doi/epub/10.1128/mBio.01864-21
DIO: https://doi.org/10.1128/mBio.01864-21
Authors: Sriharshita Musunuri, Jonas B. Sandbrink, Joshua Teperowski Monrad, Megan J. Palmer and Gregory D. Koblentz
ABSTRACT
The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the world’s vulnerability to biological catastrophe and elicited unprecedented scientific efforts. Some of this work and its derivatives, however, present dual-use risks (i.e., potential harm from misapplication of beneficial research) that have largely gone unaddressed. For instance, gain-of-function studies and reverse genetics protocols may facilitate the engineering of concerning SARS-CoV-2 variants and other pathogens. The risk of accidental or deliberate release of dangerous pathogens may be increased by large-scale collection and characterization of zoonotic viruses undertaken in an effort to understand what enables animal-to-human transmission. These concerns are exacerbated by the rise of preprint publishing that circumvents a late-stage opportunity for dual-use oversight. To prevent the next global health emergency, we must avoid inadvertently increasing the threat of future biological events. This requires a nuanced and proactive approach to dual-use evaluation throughout the research life cycle, including the conception, funding, conduct, and dissemination of research.
https://journals.asm.org/doi/epub/10.1128/mBio.01864-21