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ProMED: 2001 US Anthrax attacks back into unsolved category

alert

Senior Moderator
http://www.promedmail.org/pls/otn/f..._BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1000,81074

Archive Number 20100125.0281
Published Date 25-JAN-2010
Subject PRO/AH> Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA


ANTHRAX, HUMAN, 2001 - USA
***************************
A ProMED-mail post
<http://www.promedmail.org>
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
<http://www.isid.org>

Date: 24 Jan 2010
Source: The Wall Street Journal [edited]
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704541004575011421223515284.html?mod=googlenews_wsj>


The anthrax attacks remain unsolved. The FBI disproved its main
theory about how the spores were weaponized
.

The investigation of the 2001 anthrax attacks ended as far as the
public knew on 29 Jul 2008 with the death of Bruce Ivins, a senior
biodefense researcher at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of
Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) in Fort Detrick, Md. The cause of
death was an overdose of the painkiller Tylenol. No autopsy was
performed, and there was no suicide note.

Less than a week after his apparent suicide, the FBI declared Ivins
to have been the sole perpetrator of the 2001 anthrax attacks and the
person who mailed deadly anthrax spores to NBC, the New York Post,
and Senators Tom Daschle and Patrick Leahy. These attacks killed 5
people, closed down a Senate office building, caused a national
panic, and nearly paralyzed the postal system.

The FBI's 6-year investigation was the largest inquest in its
history, involving 9000 interviews, 6000 subpoenas, and the
examination of tens of thousands of photocopiers, typewriters,
computers and mailboxes. Yet it failed to find a shred of evidence
that identified the anthrax killer or even a witness to the mailings.
With the help of a task force of scientists, it found a flask of
anthrax that closely matched through its genetic markers the anthrax
used in the attack.

This flask had been in the custody of Ivins, who had published no
fewer than 44 scientific papers over 3 decades as a microbiologist,
and who was working on developing vaccines against anthrax. As
custodian, he provided samples of it to other scientists at Fort
Detrick, the Battelle Memorial Institute in Columbus, Ohio, and other
facilities involved in anthrax research.

According to the FBI's reckoning, over 100 scientists had been given
access to it. Any of these scientists (or their co-workers) could
have stolen a minute quantity of this anthrax and, by mixing it into
a media of water and nutrients, used it to grow enough spores to
launch the anthrax attacks.

Consequently, Ivins, who was assisting the FBI with its
investigation, as well as all the scientists who had access to the
anthrax, became suspects in the investigation. They were intensely
questioned, given polygraph examinations, and played off against one
another in variations of the prisoner's dilemma game. Their labs,
computers, phones, homes and personal effects were scrutinized for
possible clues.

As the so-called Amerithrax investigation proceeded, the FBI ran into
frustrating dead ends, such as its relentless 5-year pursuit of
Steven Hatfill, which ended with an apology in 2007 and Mr. Hatfill
receiving a USD 5.8 million settlement from the U.S. government as
compensation. Another scientist, Perry Mikesell, became so stressed
by the FBI's games that he began to drink heavily and died of a heart
attack in October 2002.

Eventually, the FBI zeroed in on Ivins. Not only did he have access
to the anthrax, but FBI agents suspected he had subtly misled them
into their Hatfill fiasco. A search of his email turned up
pornography and bizarre emails which, though unrelated to anthrax,
suggested that he was a deeply disturbed individual.

The FBI turned the pressure up on him, isolating him at work and
forcing him to spend what little money he had on lawyers to defend
himself. He became increasingly stressed. His therapist reported that
Ivins seemed obsessed with the notion of revenge and even homicide.
Then came his suicide (which, as Eric Nadler and Bob Coen show in
their documentary "The Anthrax War," was one of 4 suicides among
American and British biowarfare researchers in past years).

Since Ivins's odd behavior closely fit the FBI's profile of the mad
scientist it had been hunting, his suicide provided an opportunity to
close the case. So it held a congressional briefing in which it all
but pronounced Ivins the anthrax killer. But there was still a vexing
problem: Silicon.

Silicon was used in the 1960s to weaponize anthrax. Through an
elaborate process, anthrax spores were coated with the substance to
prevent them from clinging together so as to create a lethal aerosol.
But since weaponization was banned by international treaties,
research anthrax no longer contains silicon, and the flask at Fort
Detrick contained none.

Yet the anthrax grown from it had silicon, according to the U.S.
Armed Forces Institute of Pathology. This silicon explained why, when
the letters to Sens. Leahy and Daschle were opened, the anthrax
vaporized into an aerosol. If so, then somehow silicon was added to
the anthrax. But Ivins, no matter how weird he may have been, had
neither the set of skills nor the means to attach silicon to anthrax spores.

At a minimum, such a process would require highly specialized
equipment that did not exist in Ivins's lab or, for that matter,
anywhere at the Fort Detrick facility. As Richard Spertzel, a former
biodefense scientist who worked with Ivins, explained in a private
briefing on 7 Jan 2009, the lab didn't even deal with anthrax in
powdered form, adding, "I don't think there's anyone there who would
have the foggiest idea how to do it." So while Ivins's death provided
a convenient fall guy, the silicon content still needed to be explained.

The FBI's answer was that the anthrax contained only traces of
silicon, and those, it theorized, could have been accidentally
absorbed by the spores from the water and nutrient in which they were
grown. No such nutrients were ever found in Ivins's lab, or, for that
matter, did anyone ever see Ivins attempt to produce any unauthorized
anthrax (a process which would have involved him using scores of
flasks.) But since no one knew what nutrients had been used to grow
the attack anthrax, it was at least possible that they had traces of
silicon in them that accidentally contaminated the anthrax.

Natural contamination was an elegant theory that ran into problems
after Congressman Jerry Nadler pressed FBI Director Robert Mueller in
September 2008 to provide the House Judiciary Committee with a
missing piece of data: the precise percentage of silicon contained in
the anthrax used in the attacks.

The answer came 7 months later on 17 Apr 2009. According to the FBI
lab, 1.4 percent of the powder in the Leahy letter was silicon. "This
is a shockingly high proportion," explained Stuart Jacobson, an
expert in small particle chemistry. "It is a number one would expect
from the deliberate weaponization of anthrax, but not from any
conceivable accidental contamination."

Nevertheless, in an attempt to back up its theory, the FBI contracted
scientists at the Lawrence Livermore National Labs in California to
conduct experiments in which anthrax is accidentally absorbed from a
media heavily laced with silicon. When the results were revealed to
the National Academy Of Science in September 2009, they effectively
blew the FBI's theory out of the water.

The Livermore scientists had tried 56 times to replicate the high
silicon content without any success. Even though they added
increasingly high amounts of silicon to the media, they never even
came close to the 1.4 percent in the attack anthrax. Most results
were an order of magnitude lower, with some as low as .001 percent.

What these tests inadvertently demonstrated is that the anthrax
spores could not have been accidentally contaminated by the nutrients
in the media. "If there is that much silicon, it had to have been
added," Jeffrey Adamovicz, who supervised Ivins's work at Fort
Detrick, wrote to me last month [December 2009]. He added that "the
silicon in the attack anthrax could have been added via a large
fermentor, which Battelle and other labs use, but we did not use a
fermentor to grow anthrax at USAMRIID ... [and] we did not have the
capability to add silicon compounds to anthrax spores."

If Ivins had neither the equipment nor skills to weaponize anthrax
with silicon, then some other party with access to the anthrax must
have done it. Even before these startling results, Sen. Leahy had
told Director Mueller, "I do not believe in any way, shape, or manner
that [Ivins] is the only person involved in this attack on Congress."

When I asked an FBI spokesman this month [January 2010] about the
Livermore findings, he said the FBI was not commenting on any
specifics of the case other than those discussed in the 2008 briefing
(which was about a year before Livermore disclosed its results). He
stated: "The Justice Department and the FBI continue working to
conclude the investigation into the 2001 anthrax attacks. We
anticipate closing the case in the near future."

So, even though the public may be under the impression that the
anthrax case had been closed in 2008, the FBI investigation is still
open, and, unless it can refute the Livermore findings on the
silicon, it is back to square one.

[Byline: Edward Jay Epstein]

--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail <promed@promedmail.org>

[A search has been done to find the published research which is the
basis of Edward Epstein's article, but it has not been found. If
anyone has a reference to it, it would be gratefully received and
posted. This is not to doubt the scientific basis of this article,
just to provide the standard underpinnings.

Early on, we commented that there was a silicon disparity between the
letter fill and routine cultures. And after a vast amount of FBI
investigation and ancillary research, we are right back at the
beginning in ignorance of the identity of the perpetrator(s) of this
2001 event. But one might suggest that if the silicon content was a
surprise to the Lawrence Livermore researchers, it is also a surprise
to whoever grew up the material used in the letters. It is a
technical "fingerprint" of no insignificant value in eventually
tracing whoever is responsible, a brand on the perpetrators. Like
many others, I am convinced of the innocence of Bruce Ivins in this
matter. - Mod.MHJ
]
 
Re: ProMED: 2001 US Anthrax attacks back into unsolved category

Source: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/19/AR2010021902369.html

FBI closes investigation into 2001 anthrax attacks
By Joby Warrick
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, February 19, 2010; 4:58 PM

The FBI officially closed its eight-year investigation of the 2001 anthrax attacks on Friday after concluding that Army scientist Bruce Ivins acted alone in preparing and mailing the deadly spores that killed five people and terrorized the nation.

The long-delayed end to the case known as Amerithrax was accompanied by the release of hundreds of pages of documents -- many of them not previously public -- describing in unprecedented detail how agents tied the eccentric Maryland scientist to the country's worst bioterrorist attack, and ruled out other potential suspects.

The validity of the FBI's case will never be tested in court because Ivins, a specialist in anthrax vaccines at Frederick's Fort Detrick Army base, committed suicide in 2008 as investigators were preparing to charge him.

The documents reveal for the first time that Ivins, a man with a long history of mental and emotional disorders, confided before his death that he was worried he might have committed acts he said he could not recall.

"It worries me when I wake up in the morning and I've got all my clothes on and my shoes on and my car keys are right beside there," he said in a tape-recorded conversation with an unidentified FBI witness in June 2008. Referring to the anthrax attacks, Ivins then said he was "not a killer at heart" and added, "I, in my right mind, wouldn't do it."

A 96-page Justice Department summary of the investigation concludes that Ivins hatched the scheme in an attempt to create a scare that would drive interest in an anthrax vaccine program he had helped create. The anthrax bacteria used in the attack originated in his lab, and Ivins was one of a small number of scientists with both access to the spores and the skills needed to create the deadly power sent to news-media and U.S. Senate offices in September and October, 2001, investigators determined.

The new documents also suggest for the first time that Ivins, who had a known fascination with hidden codes and ciphers, may have sent a hidden message in the hand-written labels on the anthrax envelopes sent to NBC anchor Tom Brokaw. The bioterrorist darkened the letters "A" and "T" in certain words in a manner which, when analyzed together, appears to spell out chains of amino acids, the building blocks of DNA. Each of the chains is in turn is associated with a letter of the alphabet.

"From this analysis, two possible hidden meanings emerged: (1) 'FNY' -- a verbal assault on New York, and (2) 'PAT,'" the Justice summary said. Pat was the nickname of a former co-worker to whom Ivins was said to a have obsessive emotional attachment.

The FBI's handling of investigation has been criticized by Ivins's colleagues and by independent analysts who have pointed out multiple gaps, including a lack of hair, fiber other physical evidence directly linking Ivins to the anthrax letters. But despite long delays and false leads, Justice officials on Friday expressed satisfication with the outcome.

The evidence "established that Dr. Ivins, alone, mailed the anthrax letters," the Justice summary stated.

Staff writers Peter Finn and Carrie Johnson and researcher Julie Tate contributed.
 
Re: ProMED: 2001 US Anthrax attacks back into unsolved category

http://www.promedmail.org/pls/otn/f..._BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1000,81634

Archive Number 20100305.0727
Published Date 05-MAR-2010
Subject PRO/AH> Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (03)

ANTHRAX, HUMAN, 2001 - USA (03)
***********************************
A ProMED-mail post
<http://www.promedmail.org>
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
<http://www.isid.org>

[1]
Date: 24 Feb 2010
Source: New York Times
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/25/us/25iht-letter.html>


Haste Leaves Anthrax Case Unconcluded
------------------
Probably not very many readers of this space are subscribers to the
scientific journal Aerosol Science and Technology. Neither am I. But
an article in that publication published in March 2008 has acquired
considerable significance in light of the announcement by the F.B.I.
last week that it would close its 9-year investigation of the 2001
anthrax attacks in the United States.

Aerosol Science and Technology reported on an attempt by a group of
scientists at the Dugway Proving Ground in Utah to reproduce the dry,
powderized substance that was found in one of the anthrax-laden
envelopes mailed by the perpetrator of the attacks, in which 5 people
were killed, 17 were sickened and the country, reeling from the Sept.
11 attacks of just a few weeks before, was sent into high alert.

The title of the paper, "Development of an Aerosol System for
Uniformly Depositing Bacillus Anthrax Spore Particles on Surfaces,"
demonstrated that to create anthrax in a dry aerosol form of the sort
that can be dispersed through the air is a long and difficult process
involving a lot of highly specialized machinery.

The original culture has to be incubated; spore pellets are then
collected with a centrifuge; those spores are dried "by a proprietary
azeotropic method," before an "amorphous silica-based flow enhancer"
is added to turn the otherwise sticky anthrax spores into an aerosol,
after which the material has to be passed through a series of ever
finer mesh screens that are activated by a pneumatic vibrator.

The point, as one scientist specializing in fine particle chemistry
told me, blows a large hole through the 92-page summary of the
investigation released last week by the F.B.I. and the Justice
Department, the main conclusion of which is that Bruce E. Ivins, a
scientist at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious
Diseases at Fort Detrick, in Maryland, was the anthrax mailer.

"Note that the proprietary azeotropic drying technique and the
pneumatic mill are both superspecialized pieces of equipment, neither
of which is at Detrick," the specialist in fine particles, Stuart
Jacobsen, said in an e-mail message.

But the F.B.I.'s entire case against Mr. Ivins is that he was able to
manufacture the anthrax used in the attacks at his Fort Detrick lab,
working late at night on the days before the actual anthrax mailings
so nobody would see what he was doing.

At 1st, reading the F.B.I. report is to be swept up in the conclusion
that the perpetrator of the deadly anthrax attacks was indeed Mr.
Ivins. After all, somebody did mail the envelopes containing deadly
anthrax bacilli. Mr. Ivins had worked for 27 years on anthrax, and,
indeed, he had created the very flask of anthrax bacillus that, using
cutting-edge scientific techniques, the F.B.I. determined to be the
sole source of the material used in the attacks.

Several hundred other scientists over the years have had access to
the material in that particular flask, but according to the F.B.I.,
all of them except for Mr. Ivins were exonerated. Mr. Ivins committed
suicide 2 years ago just as prosecutors were moving to indict him --
an act that seems, under the circumstances, to be highly incriminating.

And yet, when you look a bit closer at the F.B.I.'s report, doubts
persist, and they lend a good deal of credibility to the arguments of
those, including some of Mr. Ivins's former colleagues, that the
F.B.I.'s case, as Representative Rush D. Holt of New Jersey put it
last week, is "barely circumstantial."

The report, for example, makes much of the fact that Mr. Ivins worked
late at night in his lab in the days prior to the mailing of the
anthrax, something he had not usually done, and that he had no alibi
for what the F.B.I. report calls the "mailing windows," the stretches
of time when the perpetrator of the attacks deposited the
anthrax-laden envelopes into a post office box in Princeton, New
Jersey, a three-hour drive from Mr. Ivins's lab.

That information seems very damning at 1st glance, but according to
Jeffrey Adamovicz, Mr. Ivins's supervisor at Usamriid, as the Fort
Detrick facility is known, the F.B.I.'s claim that Mr. Ivins rarely
worked at night -- and only did so in the days before the anthrax was
mailed -- is simply untrue.

"Although I cannot directly dispute the hours the F.B.I. has shown
for access to B3/4" -- Mr. Ivins's anthrax lab -- "Bruce was well
known for working late and early," Mr. Adamovicz said in an e-mail
message this week. "He may not have been in B3/4 but instead in his
office or the BSL-2 labs. I think a broader examination of his access
to all areas of the lab would confirm this."

Beyond that, Mr. Adamovicz said, "the F.B.I. seems to be locked into
the concept that the spores had to be prepared in the week before
each of the mailings."

"I'm unclear as to why they believe this other than that period
matches to hours that Bruce was in suite B3/4 at night," he said.
"These spore preps could have been made anytime between 1997 and
2001, in my estimation."

But most important is the failure of the F.B.I. to demonstrate that
the anthrax used in the attack was actually produced in Mr. Ivins's
lab at Fort Detrick, or even that it could have been produced there.
In a recent opinion article in The Wall Street Journal that poked
holes in the F.B.I.'s case, an investigative reporter, Edward Jay
Epstein, cites a letter written by the F.B.I. director, Robert S.
Mueller III, in which Mr. Mueller says that the mailed anthrax
contained 1.4 percent silicon -- without which the anthrax would be a
clumpy, sticky mess, according to Dr. Jacobsen, the fine-particles specialist.

Mr. Adamovicz said in his e-mail message: "This is very strong
evidence that a process more sophisticated than Bruce Ivins or
Usamriid possessed was used in making the spore preparations. I and
others have calculated that it would take several weeks to months to
grow the 5-10 grams of spores required for the letters using common
lab protocols and laboratory capabilities present in Usamriid for
growing spores." He added, "The F.B.I. to date has provided no
information on how this could be done."

The point is not that Mr. Ivins wasn't the anthrax mailer. Perhaps he
was. But some of the F.B.I.'s arguments seem like conclusions in
search of arguments, while other aspects of the report -- notably its
failure to deal with the silicon question -- are conspicuously incomplete.

[Byline: Richard Bernstein]

--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail
<promed@promedmail.org>

******
[2]
Date: 3 Mar 2010
Source: Senator Holt News Release [edited]
<http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/nj12_holt/030310.html>


Following the recent decision by the FBI to close its investigation
into the 2001 anthrax letter attacks, Rep. Rush Holt (NJ-12) called
for new Congressional investigations into the government's handling
of the attacks. The attacks evidently originated from a postal box in
Holt's Central New Jersey congressional district, killing 5 and
disrupting the lives and livelihoods of many of his constituents. The
attacks greatly contributed to the national fear of terrorism and
affected the response of our nation to these attacks. Holt has
consistently raised questions about the federal investigation into
the attacks. Last week, he succeeded in including language in the
2010 Intelligence Authorization Bill that would require the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community to examine the possibility of a
foreign connection to the 2001 anthrax attacks.

"The American people need credible answers to all of these and many
other questions. Only a comprehensive investigation, either by the
Congress or through the independent commission I've proposed in the
Anthrax Attacks Investigation Act (H.R. 1248), can give us those
answers," Holt said in a letter to the Chairmen of the House
Committees on Homeland Security, Judiciary, Intelligence, and
Oversight and Government Reform.

A copy of his letter is below:

Dear Chairmen Thompson, Conyers, Reyes, and Towns, I am writing to
ask that your committees, either individually or jointly, conduct a
probing investigation of our government's handling of what has been
known as the "Amerithrax" investigation.

As you are aware, last week the Federal Bureau of Investigation
announced it was formally closing its investigation into the 2001
anthrax letter attacks, commonly known as the "Amerithrax"
investigation. The Bureau has maintained since his suicide in 2008
that the late Dr. Bruce Ivins was their principal suspect in the
attacks, a conclusion reaffirmed by the FBI when it closed the case
last week, despite the fact that the FBI's entire case against Ivins
is circumstantial, and that the science used in the case is still
being independently evaluated.

To date, there has been no comprehensive examination of the FBI's
conduct in this investigation, and a number of important questions
remain unanswered. We don't know why the FBI jumped so quickly to the
conclusion that the source of the material used in the attacks could
only have come from a domestic lab, in this case, Ft. Dietrick. We
don't know why they focused for so long, so intently, and so
mistakenly on Dr. Hatfill. We don't know whether the FBI's assertions
about Dr. Ivins' activities and behavior are accurate. We don't know
if the FBI's explanation for the presence of silica in the anthrax
spores is truly scientifically valid. We don't know whether
scientists at other government and private labs who assisted the FBI
in the investigation actually concur with the FBI's investigative
findings and conclusions. We don't know whether the FBI, the
Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Health and Human
Services, and the U.S. Postal Service have learned the right lessons
from these attacks and have implemented measures to prevent or
mitigate in the future such bioterror attacks.

The American people need credible answers to all of these and many
other questions. Only a comprehensive investigation, either by the
Congress, or through the independent commission I've proposed in the
Anthrax Attacks Investigation Act (H.R. 1248), can give us those answers.

As you may know, my interest in this matter is both professional and
personal. The attacks originated from a postal box in my Central New
Jersey congressional district, and they disrupted the lives and
livelihood of my constituents. For months, Central New Jersey
residents lived in fear of a future attack and the possibility of
receiving cross-contaminated mail. Mail service was delayed, and
businesses in my district lost millions. Further, my own
Congressional office in Washington, D.C. was shut down after it was
found to be contaminated with anthrax.

Given its track record in this investigation, I believe it is
essential that the Congress not simply accept the FBI's assertions
about Dr. Ivins' alleged guilt. Accordingly, I ask that your
committees investigate our government's handling of the attacks, the
subsequent investigation, and any lessons learned and changes in
policies and procedures implemented in the wake of the attacks.

Sincerely,

Rush Hold, Member of Congress

--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail
<promed@promedmail.org>

[Other newspaper reports on this are:

The Baltimore Sun, 26 Feb 2010 "Bill for more investigation of '01
anthrax cases passes House"
<http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/bal-md.briefs261feb26,0,2361710.story>.

New York Times Editorial "The F.B.I.'s Anthrax Case" New York Times,
Sat 27 Feb 2010 <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/28/opinion/28sun2.html>.

Associated Press, 3 Mar 2010 "NJ Congressman calls for probe into FBI
anthrax investigation"
<http://www.dailyrecord.com/article/20100303/UPDATES01/100303036/NJ-congressm
an-calls-for-probe-into-FBI-anthrax-investigation->.]

[see also:
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (02): FBI case closed 20100219.0575
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA 20100125.0281
2009
----
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (03): NAS review 20090507.1707
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (02): evidence 20090227.0817
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA: review 20090104.0033
2008
----
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (12): comment 20080928.3074
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (11): review 20080924.3019
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (10): evidence 20080828.2696
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (09): evidence 20080819.2591
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (08): evidence, drugs 20080818.2566
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (07): letters, evidence 20080812.2492
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (06): letters, evidence 20080811.2488
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (05): letters, evidence 20080807.2428
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (04): letters, evidence 20080806.2412
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (03) 20080805.2406
Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (02): letters, evidence 20080805.2392
Anthrax, human - USA 2001: letters, new suspect 20080803.2371
 
Re: ProMED: 2001 US Anthrax attacks back into unsolved category

Colleague Disputes Case Against Anthrax Suspect

By SCOTT SHANE
Published: April 22, 2010
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/23/us/23anthrax.html?th&emc=th
WASHINGTON ? A former Army microbiologist who worked for years with Bruce E. Ivins, whom the F.B.I. has blamed for the anthrax letter attacks that killed five people in 2001, told a National Academy of Sciences panel on Thursday that he believed it was impossible that the deadly spores had been produced undetected in Dr. Ivins?s laboratory, as the F.B.I. asserts.

Asked by reporters after his testimony whether he believed that there was any chance that Dr. Ivins, who committed suicide in 2008, had carried out the attacks, the microbiologist, Henry S. Heine, replied, ?Absolutely not.? At the Army?s biodefense laboratory in Maryland, where Dr. Ivins and Dr. Heine worked, he said, ?among the senior scientists, no one believes it.?
Dr. Heine told the 16-member panel, which is reviewing the F.B.I.?s scientific work on the investigation, that producing the quantity of spores in the letters would have taken at least a year of intensive work using the equipment at the army lab. Such an effort would not have escaped colleagues? notice, he added later, and lab technicians who worked closely with Dr. Ivins have told him they saw no such work.
.....

Asked why he was speaking out now, Dr. Heine noted that Army officials had prohibited comment on the case, silencing him until he left the government laboratory in late February. He now works for Ordway Research Institute in Albany.
Dr. Heine said he did not dispute that there was a genetic link between the spores in the letters and the anthrax in Dr. Ivins?s flask ? a link that led the F.B.I. to conclude that Dr. Ivins had grown the spores from a sample taken from the flask. But samples from the flask were widelyshared, Dr. Heine said. Accusing Dr. Ivins of the attacks, he said, was like tracing a murder to the clerk at the sporting goods shop who sold the bullets.
 
Re: ProMED: 2001 US Anthrax attacks back into unsolved category

Yet the anthrax grown from it had silicon, according to the U.S.
Armed Forces Institute of Pathology.

Consider the source on that and related spin. Even if the anthrax had silicon in it, Ivins or anyone with his knowledge could have added it as a calculated effort to misdirect after the fact. Besides, it looks like WSJ was regurgitating old, discredited theory there, anyway.

http://www.anthraxinvestigation.com/
Conspiracy Theorists and True Believers

Because they often support each other in opposing the FBI's official findings, it is sometimes difficult to tell a Conspiracy Theorist from a True Believer. But, there is really are very distinct differences:

Conspiracy theorists often do not know or care who sent the anthrax letters, they only know that "the government" cannot be trusted, "the government" is lying about something, and they want to expose it.

True Believers feel they know beyond any doubt who sent the anthrax letters, and anyone who does not believe as they believe - including the FBI - is just not looking at the right facts.

Both will do anything and everything they can to get the undecided and uncertain to join with their cause. And there are differences in their tactics as the go about their recruiting:
The #1 tactic used by conspiracy theorists is junk science. They wildly misinterpret facts about the case, they claim their bizarre misinterpretations prove something, and they demand that those misinterpretations and baseless claims be either accepted or disproven.

The #1 tactic used by True Believers is to accuse the non-believer of being "closed minded" and to wear down the non-believer as he tries to prove he is not "closed minded."

There's really no point to arguing with a True Believer. Back in 1951, Eric Hoffer published his landmark book "The True Believer" in which he stated that the only way to change a True Believer's mind is to convert him to a different belief. So, unless you are prepared to do that, it's best to just avoid them. They will bury you in irrelevant facts if you don't avoid them, they'll claim that if you do not read everything they read and interpret everything the way they interpret them, then you are ill-informed and your opinion is worthless.

Conspiracy theorists, however, appear ready to debate some of the relevant facts of the case. They just move on to different facts if they are proven wrong about their first set of facts. Example:

The initial theory about the anthrax being "weaponized" was that the attack spores were coated with bentonite and the government was covering up that fact. That theory was quickly shown to be false. When the next theory that the attack spores were coated with fumed silica was also disproved, they moved on to a new theory that the attack spores had tiny particles of silica glued to them to defeat van der Waals forces. When that was shown to be nonsense, they moved on to a theory that the spores were treated with a waterproofing substance that would coat the spore coat without leaving any trace on the exosporium.
Time will tell what 2010 has in store. Hopefully, the FBI will very soon close their case against Dr. Ivins and release all or nearly all the evidence they accumulated against Dr. Ivins. The conspiracy theorists and True Believers seem to have a few followers in Congress. Perhaps there will also be some Congressional hearings. I hope so. Congressional hearings seem to be the only way to clarify certain details about others caught up in the investigation.
 
Re: ProMED: 2001 US Anthrax attacks back into unsolved category

http://www.promedmail.org/pls/otn/f..._BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1000,82406

Archive Number 20100424.1326
Published Date 24-APR-2010
Subject PRO> Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (05)


ANTHRAX, HUMAN, 2001 - UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (05)
****************************************************
A ProMED-mail post
<http://www.promedmail.org>
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
<http://www.isid.org>

Date: 23 Apr 2010
Source: The New York Times [edited]
<http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/23/us/23anthrax.html>


Colleague disputes case against anthrax suspect
-----------------------------------------------
A former Army microbiologist who worked for years with Bruce E Ivins, whom
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has blamed for the anthrax letter
attacks that killed 5 people in 2001, told a National Academy of Sciences
panel on Thursday [22 Apr 2010] that he believed it was impossible that the
deadly spores had been produced undetected in Dr Ivins's laboratory, as the
FBI asserts.

Asked by reporters after his testimony whether he believed that there was
any chance that Dr Ivins, who committed suicide in 2008, had carried out
the attacks, the microbiologist, Henry S Heine, replied, "Absolutely not."

Dr Heine told the 16-member panel, which is reviewing the FBI's scientific
work on the investigation, that producing the quantity of spores in the
letters would have taken at least a year of intensive work using the
equipment at the army lab. Such an effort would not have escaped
colleagues' notice, he added later, and lab technicians who worked closely
with Dr Ivins have told him they saw no such work.

He told the panel that biological containment measures where Dr Ivins
worked were inadequate to prevent the spores from floating out of the
laboratory into animal cages and offices. "You'd have had dead animals or
dead people," he said. The public remarks from Dr Heine, 2 months after the
Justice Department officially closed the case, represent a major public
challenge to its conclusion in one of the largest, most politically
delicate and scientifically complex cases in FBI history. The FBI declined
to comment on Dr Heine's remarks on Thursday. In its written summation of
the case in February [2010], the bureau said Dr Ivins's lab technicians
grew anthrax spores that the technicians incorrectly believed were added to
Dr Ivins's main supply flask. But the summary said the spores were never
added to the flask, suggesting that surplus spores might have been diverted
by Dr Ivins for the letters.

Some scientists and members of Congress protested in February when the
Justice Department closed the case, saying it should have waited for the
academy panel's conclusions. The FBI asked the panel last year to review
the bureau's scientific work on the case, though not its conclusion on the
perpetrator's identity.

Members of the panel, whose chairwoman is Alice P Gast, a chemical engineer
and president of Lehigh University, declined to comment on Dr Heine's
testimony or his remarks to reporters. The panel is expected to complete
its report this fall. Since shortly after Dr Ivins took a lethal dose of
Tylenol [paracetamol/acetaminophen] in July 2008 and the Justice Department
first named him as the anthrax mailer, some former colleagues have rejected
the FBI's conclusion and said they thought he was innocent. They have
acknowledged, as Dr Heine did on Thursday, that they wanted to clear the
name of their friend and defend their laboratory, the United States Army
Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases. Dr Heine said he had
been treated as a suspect himself at one point and understood the pressure
Dr Ivins was under. Asked why he was speaking out now, Dr Heine noted that
Army officials had prohibited comment on the case, silencing him until he
left the government laboratory in late February. He now works for Ordway
Research Institute in Albany.

Dr Heine said he did not dispute that there was a genetic link between the
spores in the letters and the anthrax in Dr Ivins' flask -- a link that led
the FBI to conclude that Dr Ivins had grown the spores from a sample taken
from the flask. But samples from the flask were widely shared, Dr Heine
said. Accusing Dr Ivins of the attacks, he said, was like tracing a murder
to the clerk at the sporting goods shop who sold the bullets. "Whoever did
this is still running around out there," Dr Heine said. "I truly believe that."

[byline: Scott Shane]

--
communicated by:
ProMED-mail
<promed@promedmail.org>

[A radio interview with Hank Heine was broadcast on Bob Miller's "Morning
Express" show on WFMD (AM930) on 23 Feb 2010:
<http://wfmd.com/cc-common/podcast/single_podcast.html?podcast=bobcast.xml>.
In it he comments more fully on the limited facilities in working order in
the BSL 3 laboratory for culturing the necessary volume of spores to load
the letters. A 2nd broadcast (same link) on Wed 21 Apr 2010 goes further.

Also, a ProPublica interview by Gary Matsumoto of Henry Heine after he gave
his evidence to the NAS panel includes specific details of the necessary
fermentation not given in the NYT report above:
<http://www.propublica.org/article/colleague-says-anthrax-numbers-add-up-to-unsolved-case>.

One by one Bruce Ivin's colleagues are coming forward with public
statements similar to this by Hank Heine: For example, Norman Covert, a
local representative on the USAMRIID Animal Care and Use Committee, 4 Mar
2010: <http://www.thetentacle.com/ShowArticle.cfm?mydocid=3637> and on 12
Mar 2010: <http://www.thetentacle.com/ShowArticle.cfm?mydocid=3651>. "The
Tentacle" is a Frederick County news and commentary website. - Mod.MHJ
 
Re: ProMED: 2001 US Anthrax attacks back into unsolved category

http://www.promedmail.org/pls/apex/..._BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1000,89435

Archive Number 20110721.2203
Published Date 21-JUL-2011
Subject PRO/AH> Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (04)

ANTHRAX, HUMAN, 2001 - USA (04)
*******************************
A ProMED-mail post
<http://www.promedmail.org>
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
<http://www.isid.org>

Date: 20 Jul 2011
Source: CIDRAP News [edited]
<http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/bt/anthrax/news/jul2011anthrax-br.html>


The Department of Justice (DOJ) yesterday [19 Jul 2011] sought to
settle confusion over court documents in the civil trial related to an
anthrax victim's death, which initially seemed to undercut earlier FBI
findings about government microbiologist Bruce Ivins' role in the 2001
anthrax letter attacks.

Court documents in the trial that portrayed the DOJ as casting doubt
on Ivins' ability to make anthrax powder at the US Army Medical
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases lab in Fort Detrick, Md.,
were 1st reported on by an investigative group from ProPublica, an
independent, nonprofit journalism group; the Public Broadcasting
Service (PBS) program Frontline, and McClatchy Newpapers. The DOJ
documents were filed on 15 Jul 2011 in a US District Court case in
Florida brought by the family of a Boca Raton photographer who was the
1st of 5 people to die in the anthrax attacks, the investigative team
reported in their original 18 Jul 2011 report.

In a 2nd report yesterday [19 Jul 2011], the investigative group said
that the DOJ filed a 7-page correction that retracts statements
questioning the FBI's findings but does not strike testimony from
individual government researchers who challenged the FBI's findings
about Ivins.

The DOJ's original 15 Jul 2011 court filings said the biocontainment
area of Ivins' lab did not contain the equipment he'd need to
transform liquid anthrax into powder and did not explain how he could
have prepared it, according to the investigative group's 1st report.

The DOJ's assertions appeared to be a startling new development in
the anthrax case and, according to the investigative report, raised
complaints at the FBI and among prosecutors who handled the criminal
case.

Ivins committed suicide in July 2008 while the FBI was preparing to
file charges against him. One month later, the FBI announced its
conclusion that Ivins perpetrated the attacks in the fall of 2001,
which led to 22 anthrax cases and 5 deaths. After some experts
disputed the FBI's findings, FBI Director Robert Mueller asked the
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to conduct an independent
scientific review.

In February 2011, the NAS released its review, saying that the
available scientific evidence by itself was not adequate to allow a
definitive conclusion about the source of the anthrax spores used in
the attack. Though the FBI's methods did show genetic similarities
between the letter samples and anthrax spores that were stored in a
flask in Ivins' lab, the methods didn't rule out possible explanations
other than a direct link.

Yesterday [19 Jul 2011], DOJ spokesman Dean Boyd said in a statement
that DOJ civil division attorneys submitted "inaccurate information"
in the 15 Jul 2011 court filings and that the DOJ and the FBI back
their findings that Ivins had the equipment needed to make the spores,
according to the ProPublica report. Yesterday's [19 Jul 2011]
correction said Ivins had ordered his own lyophilizer machine, which
could be used to dry anthrax spores, and that it was labeled as
"property of Bruce Ivins" and kept in a nearby biocontainment suite,
the report said.

Boyd's statement said the DOJ and FBI "have never wavered from the
view that Dr. Ivins mailed the anthrax letters," according to the
ProPublica report.

The investigative reporters and other media outlets have suggested
that the DOJ is likely poking holes in the case against Ivins as a
strategy to defend the government in the civil suit, which claims
negligence. For example, the Frederick (Md.) News Post reported
yesterday [19 Jul 2011] that in a motion to dismiss the case, the DOJ
argues that any doubt about Ivins' guilt would make it more difficult
for the victim's family to show government negligence.

The ProPublica group said it's unclear how the DOJ's civil court
filings came to be so at odds with the case put forward by its
prosecutors, and that the DOJ has not offered an explanation.

Links:
18 Jul 2011 ProPublica report
<http://www.propublica.org/article/justice-department-filing-casts-doubt-on-guilt-of-bruce-ivins-accused-in-an>
19 Jul 2011 ProPublica report
<http://www.propublica.org/article/justice-department-retracts-court-filings-
that-undercut-fbis-anthrax-case>
15 Feb 2011 CIDRAP News story "NRC: Data insufficient for firm
conclusion in anthrax case"
<http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/bt/anthrax/news/feb1511anthrax.html>
19 Jul 2011 Frederick News Post story
<http://www.fredericknewspost.com/sections/news/displayUpdate.htm?StoryID=123851>.

[Byline: Lisa Schnirring]

--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail <promed@promedmail.org>

[Let me make it clear: My interest in this investigation is that as
long as there are any serious doubts as to what happened in 2001,
which increasingly there are, this event can be repeated. If you don't
know what happened, you cannot come up with a cost-effective
preventive decision and actions. A firm belief is not the same as hard
knowledge, and the Bruce Ivins hypothesis is presently in doubt.

There are a few other links for those interested:
Miami Herald, 20 Jul 2011
<http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/07/20/2323459/justice-department-waffling-in.html#storylink=misearch>
Wired, 20 Jul 2011
<http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/07/justice-department-trips-in-anthrax-case-again/>

Sorry if it is getting repetitive. A documentary on this subject is
due to be broadcast by PBS sometime in September 2011. - Mod.MHJ]
 
Re: ProMED: 2001 US Anthrax attacks back into unsolved category

http://promedmail.org/pls/apex/f?p=..._BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1000,90621

Archive Number 20111010.3034
Published Date 10-OCT-2011
Subject PRO/AH> Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (07)

ANTHRAX, HUMAN, 2001 - USA (07)
*******************************
A ProMED-mail post
<http://www.promedmail.org>
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
<http://www.isid.org>

[1]
Date: Sun 9 Oct 2011
Source: The New York Times [edited]
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/10/science/10anthrax.html>


Scientists' analysis disputes FBI closing of anthrax case
---------------------------------------------------------
A decade after wisps of anthrax sent through the mail killed 5 people,
sickened 17 others, and terrorized the nation, biologists and chemists
still disagree on whether federal investigators got the right man and
whether the FBI's long inquiry brushed aside important clues. Now, 3
scientists argue that distinctive chemicals found in the dried anthrax
spores -- including the unexpected presence of tin -- point to a high
degree of manufacturing skill, contrary to federal reassurances that
the attack germs were unsophisticated. The scientists make their case
in a coming issue of the Journal of Bioterrorism & Biodefense.

FBI documents reviewed by The New York Times show that bureau
scientists focused on tin early in their 8-year investigation, calling
it an "element of interest" and a potentially critical clue to the
criminal case. They later dropped their lengthy inquiry, never
mentioned tin publicly, and never offered any detailed account of how
they thought the powder had been made.

The new paper raises the prospect -- for the 1st time in a serious
scientific forum -- that the Army biodefense expert identified by the
FBI as the perpetrator, Bruce E Ivins, had help in obtaining his germ
weapons or conceivably was innocent of the crime.

Both the chairwoman of a National Academy of Science panel that spent
a year and a half reviewing the FBI's scientific work and the director
of a new review by the Government Accountability Office [GAO] said the
paper raised important questions that should be addressed. Alice P
Gast, president of Lehigh University and the head of the academy
panel, said that the paper "points out connections that deserve
further consideration." Dr Gast, a chemical engineer, said the
"chemical signatures" in the mailed anthrax and their potential value
to the criminal investigation had not been fully explored. "It just
wasn't pursued as vigorously as the microbiology," she said, alluding
to the analysis of micro-organisms. She also noted that the academy
panel suggested a full review of classified government research on
anthrax, which her panel never saw.

In interviews, the 3 authors said their analysis suggested that the
FBI might have pursued the wrong suspect and that the case should be
reopened. Their position may embolden calls for a national commission
to investigate the 1st major bioterrorist attack in American history.

But other scientists who reviewed the paper said they thought the tin
might be a random contaminant, not a clue to complex processing. And
the Justice Department has not altered its conclusion that the deadly
letters were mailed by Dr Ivins, an Army anthrax specialist who worked
at Fort Detrick, Maryland, and killed himself in 2008 as prosecutors
prepared to charge him.

Dean Boyd, a Justice Department spokesman, said the paper provided "no
evidence whatsoever that the spores used in the mailings were
produced" at a location other than Fort Detrick. He said investigators
believe Dr Ivins grew and dried the anthrax spores himself.
"Speculation regarding certain characteristics of the spores is just
that -- speculation," Mr Boyd said. "We stand by our conclusion."

The tin is surprising because it kills micro-organisms and is used in
antibacterial products. The authors of the paper say its presence in
the mailed anthrax suggests that the germs, after cultivation and
drying, got a specialized silicon coating, with tin as a chemical
catalyst. Such coatings, known in industry as microencapsulants, are
common in the manufacture of drugs and other products.

"It indicates a very special processing, and expertise," said Martin E
Hugh-Jones, lead author of the paper and a world authority on anthrax
at Louisiana State University. The deadly germs sent through the mail
to news organizations and 2 United States senators, he added, were
"far more sophisticated than needed." In addition to Dr Hugh-Jones,
the authors of the new paper are Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, a biologist,
and Stuart Jacobsen, a chemist; both have speculated publicly about
the case and criticized the FBI for years.

In 2008, days after Dr Ivins's suicide, the bureau made public a
sweeping but circumstantial case against him. Last year [2010], the
bureau formally closed the case, acknowledging that some scientific
questions were unanswered but asserting that the evidence against Dr
Ivins was overwhelming. Investigators found that the microbiologist
had worked unusual late-night hours in his lab in the days before each
of the 2 known anthrax mailings in September and October 2001; that he
often mailed letters and packages under assumed names; that he had a
history of homicidal threats and spoke of "Crazy Bruce" as a
personality that did things he later could not remember. Dr Ivins had
hidden from family and friends an obsession with a sorority -- Kappa
Kappa Gamma -- with an office near the Princeton, New Jersey, mailbox
where the letters were mailed. The FBI recorded Dr Ivins's speaking
ambiguously to a friend that he did "not have any recollection" of
mailing the letters, that he was "not a killer at heart" and that "I,
in my right mind, wouldn't do it."

Yet no evidence directly tied Dr Ivins to the crime. Some of the
scientist's former colleagues have argued that he could not have made
the anthrax and that investigators hounded a troubled man to death.
They noted that the FBI pursued several other suspects, most
notoriously another former Army scientist, Dr Steven J Hatfill, whom
the bureau eventually exonerated and paid a USD 4.6 million legal
settlement.

In its report last February [2011], the National Academy of Sciences
panel sharply criticized some of the FBI's scientific work, saying the
genetic link between the attack anthrax and a supply in Dr Ivins's lab
was "not as conclusive" as the bureau asserted.

If the authors of the new paper are correct about the silicon-tin
coating, it appears likely that Dr Ivins could not have made the
anthrax powder alone with the equipment he possessed, as the FBI
maintains. That would mean either that he got the powder from
elsewhere or that he was not the perpetrator. If Dr Ivins did not make
the powder, one conceivable source might be classified government
research on anthrax, carried out for years by the military and the
Central Intelligence Agency. Dr Ivins had ties to several researchers
who did such secret work.

The Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of
Congress, is conducting its own review of the anthrax evidence. Nancy
Kingsbury, the official overseeing the project, said the agency had
spoken with the paper's authors and judged that "their questions are
reasonable."

Beyond the world of forensics, tin is a humdrum additive used to kill
micro-organisms in products like paint, wood preservatives, and even
toothpaste. But microbiologists say that the nutrients and additives
used to grow _Bacillus anthracis_, the anthrax bacteria, are typically
free of tin. So in late 2002, when the FBI found significant
quantities of tin in the mailed powders, it set out to find its
source. By 2003, the bureau was calling tin "an element of interest"
-- echoing its terminology for human suspects -- according to
disclosures culled from 9600 pages of FBI documents by The Times.

Over the years, the bureau performed hundreds of tests to explore
tin's use in microbiology and significance in the attack germs. It
also hunted for clues to how the spores had become laced with silicon,
which the United States had used decades ago as a coating in germ
weapons. In 2005, scientists at an internal FBI symposium called tin a
possible fingerprint of the attack germs.

After that, the forensic clue disappeared from public discussion,
except for a passing mention in a 2009 press release. "Although the
chemical fingerprint of the spores is interesting," the release said,
"it was not relevant to the investigation."

In the end, the FBI -- without alluding to its private tin labors --
declared publicly that the attack germs had no special coating, saying
that conclusion supported its finding that Dr Ivins had grown and
dried the spores alone, using standard equipment in his lab at Fort
Detrick.

Several anthrax scientists who reviewed the new paper at the request
of The Times said they believed it neglected the possibility that the
tin and silicon were meaningless contaminants rather than
sophisticated additives. Johnathan L Kiel, a retired Air Force
scientist who worked on anthrax for many years, said that the spores
"pick up everything" and that the silicon might be residue of a
commercial product used on laboratory glassware to keep spores from
sticking. He said tin might even be picked up from metal lab
containers, though he has not tested that idea. "It doesn't have to be
some super-secret process," Dr Kiel said. Other experts suggested that
the tin might have come from anti-foam products, disinfectants, or
water.

The trouble with such conjecture is that the FBI spent years testing
for tin in microbiology lab supplies -- and reported none, according
to bureau documents.

Dr Gast, the head of the National Academy of Sciences panel, noted
that her group strongly recommended that future investigations of the
attacks examine the government's classified work on anthrax. She
called access to secret records "an important aspect of providing more
clarity on what we know and what we don't know."

[Byline: William J Broad, Scott Shane]

--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail
<promed@promedmail.org>

******
[2]
Date: Sun 9 Oct 2011
Source: The Baltimore Sun [edited]
<http://www.baltimoresun.com/entertainment/tv/z-on-tv-blog/bal-frontline-anthrax-files--fbi-suicide-fort-detrick-scientist-20111009,0,4090742.story>


Frontline's 'Anthrax Files' takes hard look at FBI role in suicide of
Ft Detrick scientist
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Tuesday night [11 Oct 2011] at 9, the series [Public Television's
Frontline] revisits Ft Detrick in Frederick, Maryland, and the case of
anthrax researcher Bruce Ivins who killed himself in 2008 as the FBI
zeroed in on him as its prime suspect in the case of deadly envelopes
of anthrax sent through the mail.

According to this hard-edged report done in partnership with McClatchy
Newspapers and Propublica, the FBI did more than zero in. Under
tremendous pressure to solve the case that started in 2001 with
anthrax mailed to US senators and network anchors, the agency squeezed
Ivins hard -- using every trick in the book to get a confession out of
him even as he insisted on his innocence to the end.

Ivins was a troubled guy with some distinctive kinks, the report
acknowledges, but even FBI consultants in the case now admit that the
agency overstated its evidence and never found a smoking gun to prove
the researcher's guilt. In fact, evidence was revealed last summer
[2011] that shows Ivins did not have the equipment needed to make the
powdery kind of anthrax sent through the mail. That didn't stop the
FBI then -- or now -- in acting like it found its man.

"The Anthrax Files" is chilling report on several fronts. First, it is
a reminder of what paranoid and scary times have been living though
since 2001 when the envelopes first appeared -- and the horrible
events we just commemorated took place on 11 Sep 2001. These are
indeed dark times, and with the economy getting worse and worse, there
seems to be no light anywhere in sight.

Second, the report shows how a federal agency can shred an
individual's life -- with or without the proper evidence to convict.
"The Anthrax Files" suggests that anyone with the psychological issues
Ivins had might have cracked under the weight of the FBI invading his
privacy, exposing his secrets, and ultimately getting him kicked out
of the community of researchers that he called home at Ft Detrick.

And finally, this is a chilling report, because if Ivins was not the
person who sent the anthrax, then that killer is still on the loose.
And we are left with an FBI that not only failed to solve such a huge
case, but also overstated and maybe lied about what it did
accomplish.

[Byline: David Zurawik]

--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail
<promed@promedmail.org>

[The joint paper is due to be published in mid-November 2011 by the
Journal of Bioterrorism & Biodefense
(<http://www.omicsonline.org/SpecialissueJBTBD.php>).

There are 2 aspects to this paper; [1] It proposes a hypothesis as to
the nature of the anthrax spores in the letters, that is, that they
were microencapsulated. It would be very straightforward for the GAO
committee to test this hypothesis and see if the test product matches
either of the letter content products -- 2 preparations were used, one
coarse, the other more refined. This would also efficiently deal with
the criticisms voiced by the Department of Justice in defending their
position, which in fact are addressed in our paper. [2] Then, if we
are correct, it would be straightforward to examine the necessary
invoices by the companies producing the relevant chemicals in, say,
1999-2001, for laboratories working with _B. anthracis_ and check
quarterly and annual progress reports of relevant projects to the
funding agency or agencies. The latter would contain names, ranks, and
serial numbers of personnel involved.

And lastly, I would like to point out that the 2nd posting of
anthrax-spore letters (to Senators Leahy and Daschle) was on 9 Oct
2001, 4 days after Bob Stevens had died while under treatment for
pneumonic anthrax and reported widely. The perpetrator(s) knew then
that further deaths were not unlikely. He or they committed murder, it
was no longer a 'political' statement. - Mod.MHJ]
 
Re: ProMED: 2001 US Anthrax attacks back into unsolved category

The presence of tin without an explanation of a way for it to be an accidental contaminant in no way convinces me that the anthrax was actually weaponized. I think the anthrax terrorist was smart enough to simply add a tin contaminant to the anthrax envelopes to make it look like it was weaponized.

And the theory that there was secret cabal of CIA/military scientists that set Ivins up as a patsy does not make sense to me, especially in light of the tin contaminant. If Ivins was not capable of weaponizing anthrax to that degree, then his hypothetical conspirators would NOT have either given him, or suggested that he create, a concoction that could have been used to construct a defense for Ivins and a conspiracy theory pointing the finger back at that hypothetical cabal.

I can understand wanting access to the investigation documents, but whoever committed these atrocious murders that terrorized and twisted this country and diverted untold amounts of money from being spent on legitimate needs - is or was a highly intelligent person. I doubt there will ever be iron-clad proof that will satisfy everyone regarding the guilt of the 2001 anthrax killer/terrorist.
 
Re: ProMED: 2001 US Anthrax attacks back into unsolved category

Source: http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/201...-trails-of-anthrax-and-cholera?ps=sh_stcathdl

Disease Detective Hot On The Trails Of Anthrax And Cholera
Partner content from:
by Peggy Girshman
04:26 pm
October 17, 2011


Ten years after the anthrax attacks and three years after the FBI named a chief suspect in the case, speculation about the origin of the deadly letters hasn't completely died out. An investigative report last week and follow-up coverage in Sunday's Los Angeles Times cast doubt on whether the FBI had an airtight case against Bruce Ivins, the biologist who killed himself before he was arrested and charged in the attacks, which killed five people.

Paul Keim is a geneticist and director of the lab at Northern Arizona University that matched the strain of anthrax in the deadly letters to anthrax in Ivins' lab. He's also a researcher at TGen, a biomedical research institute...
 
Re: ProMED: 2001 US Anthrax attacks back into unsolved category

http://promedmail.org/pls/apex/f?p=..._BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1000,90729

Archive Number 20111017.3112
Published Date 17-OCT-2011
Subject PRO> Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (08): spore characteristics

ANTHRAX, HUMAN, 2001 - USA (08): SPORE CHARACTERISTICS
******************************************************
A ProMED-mail post
<http://www.promedmail.org>
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
<http://www.isid.org>

Date: 17 Oct 2011
Source: Journal of Bioterrorism & Biodefense [edited]
<http://www.omicsonline.org/ArchiveJBTBD/ArticleinpressJBTBD.php>
<http://www.omicsonline.org/2157-2526/2157-2526-S3-001.pdf>


ME Hugh-Jones, BH Rosenberg, S Jacobsen, 2011. The 2001 anthrax
attack: Key observations. Journal of Bioterrorism & Biodefense,
Special Issue 3, 2011, <http://dx.doi.org/10.4172/2157-2526.S3-001>
--------------------------------------
Abstract
Unresolved scientific questions, remaining 10 years after the anthrax
attacks, 3 years after the FBI accused a dead man of perpetrating the
2001 anthrax attacks single-handedly, and more than a year since they
closed the case without further investigation, indictment or trial,
are perpetuating serious concerns that the FBI may have accused the
wrong person of carrying out the anthrax attacks. The FBI has not
produced concrete evidence on key questions:

- Where and how were the anthrax spores in the attack letters
prepared? There is no material evidence of where the attack anthrax
was made, and no direct evidence that any specific individual made the
anthrax, or mailed it. On the basis of a number of assumptions, the
FBI has not scrutinized the most likely laboratories.

- How and why did the spore powders acquire the high levels of silicon
and tin found in them? The FBI has repeatedly insisted that the
powders in the letters contained no additives, but they also claim
that they have not been able to reproduce the high silicon content in
the powders, and there has been little public mention of the
extraordinary presence of tin. All the available evidence can be
explained by the hypothesis that the spore coats were silicone-coated
using a tin catalyst. Chemical details are presented here.

- Where did the anthrax spores become contaminated by a rare strain of
_B. subtilis_? The FBI never located the source of the strain, but
they never searched in the most likely places.

Once the method of preparation of the attack anthrax is understood,
the questions of who made it, and where, will be rapidly resolved. The
publicly-known evidence related to these questions is compiled here,
with full documentation.

--
communicated by:
ProMED-mail <promed@promedmail.org>

[The attack anthrax spores have been found to contain silicon, oxygen
and tin on the surface of the spore coats, unlike normal anthrax
spores. Because tin is toxic, and is present in substantial amounts,
it must have been added after the spores were grown. Although silicon
occasionally occurs naturally on the spore coats of anthrax spores,
the amount of silicon on the attack spore coats was much greater than
that on other spores, even those with the highest amounts, which
implies that silicon may also have been an additive. The elements
present on the spore coats suggest that the spores may be
silicone-coated. Tin is a catalyst for cross-linking silicone
polymers. The small, silicon and oxygen-containing molecules that
react to form the polymerized coating can pass through the outer
membrane of the spore (the exosporium) to reach the spore coat, where
moisture is present to complete the reaction.

Unlike the anthrax powders in the Senate letters, the powders in the
earlier attack letters were impure and contained cellular debris,
which could also react with the additives; as a result, the bulk NY
Post letter powder has a much higher silicon and tin content than the
bulk Senate powders. Put another way, 2 separate preparations were
used. This is reinforced by the finding of the _B. subtilis_
contaminant in the coarse powder but not in the finer, nor in the
presumed source flask RMR 1029.

Microencapsulation with silicone has been used to confer high
stability on biologicals, protecting them from environmental hazards,
not a property relevant to their use in the letter attacks, but of
interest to bio-defense. (The assumption that additives must
necessarily be related to dispersibility does not necessarily apply in
the case of anthrax spores, which are surrounded by the exosporium.)
If the attack spores were microencapsulated, they were probably made
for some purpose other than letter attacks. For example, DARPA's
project on CBW detection was planning to look at microencapsulated
pathogens in 2001. - Mod.MHJ]
 
Re: ProMED: 2001 US Anthrax attacks back into unsolved category

Put another way, 2 separate preparations were
used. This is reinforced by the finding of the _B. subtilis_
contaminant in the coarse powder but not in the finer, nor in the
presumed source flask RMR 1029.

I remember reading about some details that made me think that there were 2 separate batches.

This timeline shows two separate stints of nighttime lab activity for Ivins:

http://www.cbsnews.com/elements/2008/08/01/in_depth_us/timeline4314016.shtml

Also interesting about that timeline is that Hatfill's legal team was working very hard to uncover the identities of government sources that leaked info to reporters he was suing for defamation. The government made a 5.8 million settlement to him that ended that effort just a month before Ivins committed suicide.

Just saw this news that the widow of the Florida journalist killed by anthrax in the first batch of letters sent out has been offered a $50 million settlement by 'the government' to settle her lawsuit alleging lax security at a 'biological weapons' laboratory in Maryland.

http://www.menafn.com/qn_news_story.asp?storyid={88879335-9d81-4814-902a-eec48116714f}

An attorney quoted in the article said that if the lawsuit went to trial, it would also have tested the FBI's claims that Ivins was the sole perpetrator of the attacks.
 
Re: ProMED: 2001 US Anthrax attacks back into unsolved category

http://www.promedmail.org/

Published Date: 2012-05-10 18:04:59
Subject: PRO/AH/EDR> Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA: chemical evidence
Archive Number: 20120510.1129210

ANTHRAX, HUMAN, 2001 - USA: CHEMICAL EVIDENCE
*********************************************
A ProMED-mail post
http://www.promedmail.org
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
http://www.isid.org

Date: Thu 10 May 2012
Source: Journal of Forensic Sciences [edited]
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1556-4029.2012.02128.x/full [subscription required for full text]


[Ref: Swider C, Maguire K, Rickenbach M, et al: Trace detection of meglumine and diatrizoate from _Bacillus_ spore samples using liquid chromatography/mass spectrometry. J Forensic Sci. 2012 Apr 26. doi: 10.1111/j.1556-4029.2012.02128.x. [Epub ahead of print]
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Laboratory Division, Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear Sciences Unit, 2001 Investigation Parkway, Quantico, VA 22135, USA

Abstract
--------
Following the 11 Sep 2001 terrorist attacks, letters containing _Bacillus anthracis_ were distributed through the United States postal system killing 5 people. A complex forensic investigation commenced to identify the perpetrator of these mailings. A novel liquid chromatography/mass spectrometry protocol for the qualitative detection of trace levels of meglumine and diatrizoate in dried spore preparations of _B. anthracis_ was developed. Meglumine and diatrizoate are components of radiographic imaging products that have been used to purify bacterial spores. 2 separate chromatographic assays using multiple mass spectrometric analyses were developed for the detection of meglumine and diatrizoate. The assays achieved limits of detection for meglumine and diatrizoate of 1.00 and 10.0 ng/mL, respectively. _Bacillus cereus_ T strain spores were effectively used as a surrogate for _B. anthracis_ spores during method development and validation. This protocol was successfully applied to limited evidentiary _B. anthracis_ spore material, providing probative information to the investigators.

Introduction
------------
In the weeks following the 11 Sep 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, 4 letters containing _Bacillus anthracis_ spores were collected. These letters were addressed to 2 media outlets in New York City and to 2 members of the United States Senate in Washington, DC. As a result of the distribution of these letters through the United States Postal System, 5 victims died and at least 17 victims demonstrated symptoms of inhalational or cutaneous anthrax.

The investigation to determine the individual(s) responsible for the most disruptive terrorist attack on the United States involving the use of a biological agent was conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the United States Postal Inspection Service (USPIS). Because of unprecedented challenges, this was among the most complex investigations the FBI or the USPIS had ever conducted. The investigation team, known as the Amerithrax Task Force, worked with subject matter experts and the scientific community to develop novel analytical/forensic assays to leverage all possible information from the evidentiary _B. anthracis_ spore materials.

The _B. anthracis_ spores recovered from the letters were determined to be of the Ames strain and were of a high degree of purity. While the spores recovered from the mailings to media outlets in New York City were characteristically different (for example, off-white in color, more granular, some cellular debris, and growth media components present) from the spores sent to Washington, DC., both had high colony-forming units (CFU) per gram of material, on the order of 1011 CFU/g, indicating that both were high-quality spore preparations. Spores of such purity are often used in conducting aerosol challenges to minimize the incidence of nebulizer obstruction by cellular debris or growth media components during an experiment.

The investigation determined that some laboratories conducting _B. anthracis_ research with the Ames strain were purifying spores using a density gradient of RenoCal-76(R) or similar products. Meglumine diatrizoate and sodium diatrizoate are the primary constituents in RenoCal-76(R), Hypaque-76(R), and Renografin-60(R), which are commercially available radiographic imaging products. In addition, meglumine diatrizoate, meglumine, and sodium diatrizoate are readily available from commercial chemical suppliers. The literature reports, as early as 1966, the use of products containing meglumine diatrizoate in spore purification.

The Ames _B. anthracis_ used in the New York City and Washington, DC mailings had a number of identified morphological variants, which were isolated and their complete genomes sequenced. The sequences of these variants were compared to the wild-type Ames _B. anthracis_, and a number of genetic differences were identified. Assays were used to screen over 1000 samples of Ames _B. anthracis_ collected from research institutions within the United States and internationally. Of the samples screened, all samples positive for all of the genetic markers were determined to originate from a common source of spores, known as RMR-1029. The RMR-1029 spores were known, from laboratory records, to have been purified using a density gradient of RenoCal-76(R). Some investigative questions became: "Were the evidentiary spores from the mailings directly diverted from RMR-1029? Could an analytical method identify residual RenoCal-76? in a spore preparation known to be purified using RenoCal-76(R)?"

This paper describes the development, validation, and application of a novel, highly sensitive protocol using liquid chromatography/mass spectrometry (LC/MS) with electrospray ionization (ESI) to detect trace amounts of meglumine and/or diatrizoate, components of RenoCal-76(R), in a single spore sample preparation. This analytical capability was applied to limited evidentiary spore material and RMR-1029 to provide probative information about a possible production method of the evidentiary samples. During the investigation, it was determined that the number of researchers who used gradients of RenoCal-76(R), or similar products, to purify spores and who had access to the Ames strain of _B. anthracis_ was limited. Therefore, if meglumine and diatrizoate were identified in the _B. anthracis_ spores used in the mailings, the number of potential sources for the spore material could be significantly reduced.

Conclusions
-----------
A sensitive and selective analytical protocol has been developed for the detection of meglumine and diatrizoate in samples of _Bacillus_ spores. A tiered approach of capturing chromatographic separation, full-scan MS, MS2, and MS4 data was developed for both meglumine and diatrizoate. System carryover concerns with meglumine were resolved by changing the stationary and mobile phases. The method validation demonstrated both sensitivity and selectivity by obtaining detection limits of meglumine and diatrizoate at concentrations ranging from 1.00 to 10.0 ng/mL. Maximizing the data that could be derived from the analysis of a few milligrams of evidentiary material was paramount to the FBI. The application of this novel method proved to be a valuable tool during the investigation. As the genetic data that linked the _B. anthracis_ spore material from the mailings to RMR-1029 was being compiled, investigators were uncertain whether an aliquot of RMR-1029 was used directly. The absence of meglumine and diatrizoate on the evidentiary material, using the protocol described herein and when taken together with other forensic examinations, was supportive to the investigation in indicating that the evidentiary spore material was not diverted directly from RMR-1029.

--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail
<promed@promedmail.org>

[The key sentence is the last: "The absence of meglumine and diatrizoate on the evidentiary material ... was supportive to the investigation in indicating that the evidentiary spore material [in the letters] was not diverted directly from RMR-1029." So Bruce Ivins could not have brewed up these spores working after hours as proposed by the FBI. It had to have been done elsewhere in an institute that did not employ "RenoCal-76(R) or similar products to purify spores."

It is hard to understand why it has taken so long for this information to be published, more than 10 years since the events of October 2001. One can think of various scenarios but Swider and her colleagues, and their superiors, are to be congratulated on their institutional courage as there must have been pressures to not do so. - Mod.MHJ]
 
Re: ProMED: 2001 US Anthrax attacks back into unsolved category

I'd need more information than I have to draw the moderator's conclusion:
So Bruce Ivins could not have brewed up these spores working after hours as proposed by the FBI. It had to have been done elsewhere in an institute that did not employ "RenoCal-76(R) or similar products to purify spores.

I'd have to have it ruled out that purification via another means was not available to the individual at the employers institute, or elsewhere.

Also, isn't the research examining only the 'purified' anthrax? Wasn't a cruder version of the same strain used in some letters? I have always wondered about that. It doesn't rule out one letter sender, but opens the door to the possibility there was a partner, or someone acting alone for their own motives. Sometimes that happens in serial murder cases where another criminal tries to use the first criminal's crimes as a cloak for his own.

So I'm open to the possibility that even if Ivins did some anthrax mailings, he may have not been the sole perpetrator, or after reading the case file snippet below, especially the last sentence, perhaps he was totally innocent.

FBI vault: AMERITHRAX;
MAJOR CASE 184

FBIIvinsfile1.jpg

FBIIvinsfile2.jpg

FBIIvinsfile3.jpg
 
Re: ProMED: 2001 US Anthrax attacks back into unsolved category

http://www.promedmail.org/

Published Date: 2012-05-13 17:19:51
Subject: PRO/AH> Anthrax, human, 2001 - USA (02): chemical RFI
Archive Number: 20120513.1131856

ANTHRAX, HUMAN, 2001 - USA (02): CHEMICAL REQUEST FOR INFORMATION
*****************************************************************
A ProMED-mail post
http://www.promedmail.org
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
http://www.isid.org

Date: May 11, 2012
From: Dennis H. Grant, MD

I have been following the reports on Promed about the anthrax attack, as well as reviewing the FBI report, and recent books written about the events, and have pieced together some interesting, hopefully relevant thoughts.

The recent posting about the lack of meglumine and diatrizoate on the evidentiary spores matches a statement from the DOJ/FBI report (1) that indicates that there were no traces of renografin on the mailing material, a substance that apparently contains meglumine and diatrizoate. According to the recent post, the RMR-1029 flask contained spores that had been purified using materials containing these substances, indicating that direct use of these spores was not involved.

Basically this inconsistency runs against the FBI finding that the genetic analysis of the evidentiary spores linked RMR-1029 flash to the attack. The quote from the FBI report indicates that water purification could have been used to purify the evidentiary spores, accounting for the lack of renografin substances. The question becomes, then, whether water washing of the spores from RMR-1029 could have removed traces of meglumine or diatrizoate from the spores, still linking Dr. Ivans to the attack.

I could not find in the FBI report something to say that washing spores from RMR-1029 could have removed the renografin (meglumine or diatrizoate). Would anyone have the answer to this? Otherwise, Dr. Ivans would have had to obtain fresh spores, equal genetically to those found by the FBI, and then water washed them for purification purposes. I wonder about the probability of this.

Now, having read the 2 books on the investigation, "American Anthrax," by Jeanne Guillemin, and "The Mirage Man," by David Willman, I am of the impression that the FBI used the Reid method of interrogation on Dr. Ivans, i.e., one which basically involves 1st interviews, followed by accusatory interrogation once they have felt they have found the perpetrator of a crime, in order to extract a confession. In reading the accounts, I often wondered why an indictment was not pursued considering the circumstantial evidence. Perhaps the reason was that the inconsistency was known by authorities, could not adequately be explained, and thus would have had to be revealed to the defense as exculpatory evidence.

My own thought is that the case is not yet closed.

Footnote:
(1) "An expert microbiologist from Dugway stated that these hours (comment: a period of 69 hours that occurred between the 1st and 2nd mailings, a time assumed to be used for further purification of spores, and a time for which Dr. Ivins could not account to any degree) were consistent with someone preparing the anthrax letters. He specifically noted that the spore-washing process would take some time, especially if the mailer were not using a density gradient to clean the spores. This is significant because there are no traces of renografin on the mailing material, which means that the spores could have simply been water-purified, as opposed to this other measure. The expert noted that with respect to the material in the 1st mailings, he would have been "embarrassed to send that out" because it was so granular - further support for the notion that the additional time expended in preparing the 2nd round of materials may have been due to further washing/purifying of the spores" (From United States Department of Justice, Ameritrax Investigation Summary, February 10, 2010, page 32).

--
Dennis H. Grant, MD
(Retired from federal employment - Army, IHS, VA), specialty psychiatry
4211 E Paradise Dr.
Phoenix, Arizona 85028
grantde@att.net

[Dennis raises the question whether the renografin (meglumine or diatrizoate) could have been washed off during washing the spores. A fair question and if there any members with sound expert knowledge on this subject, we would be glad to hear from them.

If the renografin chemicals cannot be removed by washing this would put the letter spores' origin immediately away from the RMR-1029 flask, even if cultured from a common source or from material shared taken from the flask. I would remind members that the letter contents had a _B. subtilis_ contaminant, which was not found in the contents of the RMR-1029 flask. While the FBI dismissed the importance of this contaminant Bacillus it has the potential of being an institutional fingerprint. - Mod MHJ]
 
Re: ProMED: 2001 US Anthrax attacks back into unsolved category

So I'm open to the possibility that even if Ivins did some anthrax mailings, he may have not been the sole perpetrator, or after reading the case file snippet below, especially the last sentence, perhaps he was totally innocent.
In Emily's document you will see the line:
Ivin's provided a copy of the denial of export to SA (blank) (big blank)

Coming from a counterterrorism background, I would like to suggest that the editor of the document assumed SA was "service agreement", when it could very well be abbreviated Sauudi Araabia.
The FBI was instructed to stay clear of that route in other cases for diplomatic reasons, not uncommon for the timeframe.

Emergent BioSolutions worked on an anthrax vaccine. Issued a warning in 1999 of the biological threats in the Midddlle Eaast (including SA) and vaccinated the US military personnel. They have the means.

Is there any possible connection?
 
Re: ProMED: 2001 US Anthrax attacks back into unsolved category

In Emily's document you will see the line:
Ivin's provided a copy of the denial of export to SA (blank) (big blank)

Coming from a counterterrorism background, I would like to suggest that the editor of the document assumed SA was "service agreement", when it could very well be abbreviated Sauudi Araabia.
The FBI was instructed to stay clear of that route in other cases for diplomatic reasons, not uncommon for the timeframe.

Emergent BioSolutions worked on an anthrax vaccine. Issued a warning in 1999 of the biological threats in the Midddlle Eaast (including SA) and vaccinated the US military personnel. They have the means.

Is there any possible connection?

Most likely not. "SA" is either an individual's initials or an acronym e.g. Special Agent. The blank following SA most likely is the surname of an individual.

The image below is page 3 from the 1/23/2002 report in the link posted by Emily above. As you can see near the bottom of the page SA is always followed by a blank (surname?) and from the context it is clear that SA is an individual, not a Middle East country.

Ivins 1 23 2002 page 3.webp
 
Re: ProMED: 2001 US Anthrax attacks back into unsolved category

I think Al is right that 'SA' is an acronym for 'special agent' or some other FBI title. The first page of the PDF says that 'SA [ redacted text missing]' is the contact for the investigative field squad.

Welcome and thanks for raising the question, jjane. :) I originally read the 'SA' to be a location abbreviation of some sort, too.
 
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