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Phillipines - Hogs Found to Have Ebola Virus

Re: Phillipines - Hogs Found to Have Ebola Virus

from: http://www.recombinomics.com/News/07240505/H5N1_Sichuan_Ebola.html



That's amazing that different pathogens can recombine like that.

.
DL145363
gttcttggtc caatcatg

gb|CY036428.1| Influenza A virus (A/unknown/New York/Sg-00388... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY036424.1| Influenza A virus (A/unknown/New York/Sg-00387... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY036385.1| Influenza A virus (A/unknown/New York/Sg-00377... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY036369.1| Influenza A virus (A/muscovy duck/New Jersey/S... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY036353.1| Influenza A virus (A/unknown/New York/Sg-00369... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU243126.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Hebei/706/2005(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU243146.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Hebei/126/2005(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|FJ434373.1| Influenza A virus (A/mute swan/Aktau/1460/2006... 36.2 0.66
gb|FJ455820.1| Influenza A virus (A/environment/Qinghai/1/200... 36.2 0.66
gb|FJ436942.1| Influenza A virus (A/swan/Mangystau/3/2006(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY036034.1| Influenza A virus (A/Muscovy duck/New York/620... 36.2 0.66
gb|FJ357069.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/MN/1/2000(H5N2)) ... 36.2 0.66
gb|FJ357099.1| Influenza A virus (A/environment/NY/98899-6/20... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY034758.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Italy/4223-2/2006... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY034679.1| Influenza A virus (A/mute swan/Michigan/451072... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY031001.1| Influenza A virus (A/turkey/England/N50-92/199... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY030993.1| Influenza A virus (A/turkey/England/N28/1973(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU636692.1| Influenza A virus (A/turkey/England/50-92/91(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU636684.1| Influenza A virus (A/turkey/England/N28/73(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU544248.1| Influenza A virus (A/spur-winged goose/Nigeria... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU544247.1| Influenza A virus (A/white-faced whistling duc... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU544244.1| Influenza A virus (A/spur-winged goose/Nigeria... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU544242.1| Influenza A virus (A/spur-winged goose/Nigeria... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU980494.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/MD/898/2002(H5N2)... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY033444.1| Influenza A virus (A/American green-winged tea... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU871921.1| Influenza A virus (A/ruddy turnstone/NJ/327/20... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU743135.1| Influenza A virus (A/emu/NY/12716/1994(H5N9)) ... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ432045.1| Influenza A virus (A/swine/Fujian/2003(H5N1)) ... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ432037.1| Influenza A virus (A/swine/Fujian/2001(H5N1)) ... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF553330.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Anhui/T5/2006(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF553329.1| Influenza A virus (A/Anhui/T2/2006(H5N1)) hema... 36.2 0.66
emb|AJ621811.3| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Primorie/2621/01(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509026.2| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/822.1/0... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028981.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Yunnan/1628/2003(... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028972.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Yunnan/971/2002(H5N1... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028971.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Yunnan/862/2002(H5N1... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028966.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hunan/378/2003(H5N1)... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028965.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hunan/300/2003(H5N1)... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028964.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hunan/1340/2002(H5N1... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028960.1| Influenza A virus (A/chukar/Shantou/4690/2003(... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028958.1| Influenza A virus (A/pheasant/Shantou/3535/200... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028957.1| Influenza A virus (A/partridge/Shantou/2886/20... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028956.1| Influenza A virus (A/silky chicken/Shantou/541... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028955.1| Influenza A virus (A/silky chicken/Shantou/540... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028954.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Shantou/133/2003(... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028952.1| Influenza A virus (A/pheasant/Shantou/4567/200... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028948.1| Influenza A virus (A/quail/Shantou/3846/2002(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028945.1| Influenza A virus (A/partridge/Shantou/1075/20... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028940.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Shantou/28/2002(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028939.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Shantou/9/2002(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028938.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Shantou/5746/2001... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028937.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Shantou/5738/2001... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028936.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Shantou/5526/2001(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028935.1| Influenza A virus (A/goose/Shantou/5456/2001(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028934.1| Influenza A virus (A/quail/Shantou/5164/2001(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028933.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Shantou/4912/2001(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028932.1| Influenza A virus (A/goose/Shantou/4885/2001(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028931.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Shantou/4407/2001(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028930.1| Influenza A virus (A/goose/Shantou/4325/2001(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028929.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Shantou/2535/2001... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028928.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Shantou/1930/2001(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028927.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Shantou/1437/2001(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028926.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Shantou/1101/2001(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028925.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Shantou/904/2001(... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU263353.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Guangxi/27/2003(H5N1... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU263345.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Guangxi/12/2003(H5N1... 36.2 0.66
dbj|AB378690.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hokkaido/201/2007(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF491876.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/ON/499/2005(H5N1)... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF591757.1| Influenza A virus (A/ostrich/South Africa/AI11... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF591749.1| Influenza A virus (A/ostrich/South Africa/AI10... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY028235.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Maryland/182/2006... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU224440.1| Zaire ebolavirus strain Mayinga, complete genome 36.2 0.66
gb|AY296077.2| Influenza A virus (A/Duck/NJ/117228-7/2001(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY296078.2| Influenza A virus (A/unknown/NY/118547-11/2001... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU051635.1| Zaire ebolavirus strain Mandza spike glycoprot... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU051634.1| Zaire ebolavirus strain Etoumbi spike glycopro... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU051633.1| Zaire ebolavirus strain CH Lossi spike glycopr... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU051632.1| Zaire ebolavirus strain GOR Ekata spike glycop... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU051631.1| Zaire ebolavirus strain GOR2 Lossi spike glyco... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU051630.1| Zaire ebolavirus strain GOR1 Lossi spike glyco... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF646274.2| Influenza A virus (A/heron/Cicurug/IPB25-RS/20... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF646272.2| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Leuwiliang/IPB3-RS/2... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF646271.2| Influenza A virus (A/goose/Leuwiliang/IPB4-RS/... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF646270.2| Influenza A virus (A/muscovy duck/Klapanunggal... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF646269.2| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Nagrak/IPB6-RS/2006(... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF646266.2| Influenza A virus (A/muscovy duck/Cileungsi/IP... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607883.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/WA/44242-264/2006... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607894.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/MD/185/2003(H5N?)... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607890.1| Influenza A virus (A/ruddy turnstone/NJ/114867... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607888.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/MN/105/2000(H5N5)... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607886.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/MN/479/2000(H5N3)... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607885.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/MN/382/2000(H5N3)... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607884.1| Influenza A virus (A/tundra swan/AK/44049-168/... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607882.1| Influenza A virus (A/northern pintail/FL/598/2... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607881.1| Influenza A virus (A/ruddy turnstone/DE/371/20... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607880.1| Influenza A virus (A/ruddy turnstone/DE/313/20... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607877.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/OH/345/1988(H5N2)... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607876.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/MN/6/2000(H5N2)) ... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607875.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/MN/410/2000(H5N2)... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607874.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/MN/168/2000(H5N2)... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607873.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/MN/166/2000(H5N2)... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607871.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/MN/113/2000(H5N2)... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607869.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/MD/866/2002(H5N2)... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607860.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/MD/185/2003(H5N2)... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607859.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/MD/865/2002(H5N2)... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607856.1| Influenza A virus (A/wood duck/MD/04-623/2004(... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607855.1| Influenza A virus (A/mute swan/MI/451072-2/200... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607854.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/PA/454069/2005(H5N1)... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF607853.1| Influenza A virus (A/black duck/NC/674-694/200... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU099317.1| Influenza A virus (A/Canada goose/AK/44075-058... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF405825.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/ON/499/2005(H5N1)... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF205596.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/MB/458/2005(H5)) ... 36.2 0.66
dbj|AB355929.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hokkaido/Vac-3/2007... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF646273.1| Influenza A virus (A/goose/Bojonggenteng/IPB2-... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF597269.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Italy/37/2002(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF597268.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Italy/36/2002(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF597267.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Italy/8/1998(H5N2... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF597266.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Italy/208/2000(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF597265.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Italy/9097/1997(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF597264.1| Influenza A virus (A/turkey/Italy/392/1997(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF597263.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Italy/312/1997(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF597262.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Italy/1980/1993(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF597261.1| Influenza A virus (A/goose/Gui Yang/3799/2005(... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF597259.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Jiang Xi/1850/2005(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF597258.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Jiang Xi/1286/2005(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF597256.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Jiang Xi/197820/2003... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF597255.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Jiang Xi/6146/2003(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF597254.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Yunnan/435/2002(H5N3... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF597253.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hong Kong/819/1980(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF597252.1| Influenza A virus (A/goose/Hong Kong/23/1978(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF597251.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hong Kong/342/1978(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF597250.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hong Kong/698/1979(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF597249.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hong Kong/394/1978(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF597248.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hong Kong/312/1978(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY022621.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Italy/22A/1998(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY022645.1| Influenza A virus (A/teal/Italy/3812/2005(H5N3... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY022637.1| Influenza A virus (A/teal/Italy/3931-38/2005(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY022629.1| Influenza A virus (A/turkey/Italy/1325/2005(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY022261.1| Influenza A virus (A/poultry/Italy/365/1997(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF670482.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Hubei/14/2004(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY022077.1| Influenza A virus (A/poultry/Italy/367/1997(H5... 36.2 0.66
emb|AM040150.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/France/05056a/2005(... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF634332.1| Influenza A virus (A/garganey/SanJiang/160/200... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF587277.1| Influenza A virus (A/Beijing/01/2003(H5N1)) se... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ826532.3| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/BC/373/2005(H5N2)... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF541407.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Viet Nam/Ncvd8/20... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF541405.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Viet Nam/Ncvd1/2003(... 36.2 0.66
gb|EF541398.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Viet Nam/342/2001(H5... 36.2 0.66
emb|AJ972673.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/France/05057b/2005(... 36.2 0.66
emb|AJ971298.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/France/05054a/2005(... 36.2 0.66
emb|AJ971297.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/France/05066b/2005(... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY021525.1| Influenza A virus (A/turkey/Italy/1258/2005(H5... 36.2 0.66
emb|AM408214.1| Influenza A virus (A/teal/Germany/WV632/2005(... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY021397.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Italy/3401/2005(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY020229.1| Influenza A virus (A/poultry/Italy/373/1997(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY018949.1| Influenza A virus (A/poultry/Italy/382/1997(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ251447.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Denmark/65047/04(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY017403.1| Influenza A virus (A/poultry/Italy/330/1997(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ914814.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Shanxi/2/2006(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997392.1| Influenza A virus (A/swine/Anhui/ca/2004(H5N1)... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997538.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Jilin/xv/2002(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997370.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Jilin/hq/2003(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997361.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Jilin/hp/2003(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997355.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Jilin/ho/2003(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997352.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Jilin/hn/2003(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997325.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Jilin/hk/2004(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997253.1| Influenza A virus (A/swine/Henan/wy/2004(H5N1)... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997262.1| Influenza A virus (A/swine/Guangxi/wz/2004(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997218.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Guangxi/wt/2004(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997522.1| Influenza A virus (A/goose/Guangdong/xb/2001(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997410.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Zhejiang/bj/2002(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997531.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Shanghai/xj/2002(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997513.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Guangxi/xa/2001(H5N1... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997547.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Jilin/xw/2003(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997377.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Jilin/hf/2002(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997283.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Jilin/hd/2002(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997268.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Jilin/ha/2003(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997318.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Jilin/hj/2003(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997308.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Jilin/hh/2002(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997396.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Hunan/fg/2004(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997182.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Jiangsu/cz1/2002(... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997147.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Hubei/wn/2003(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997133.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Hubei/wl/1997(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997122.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Hubei/wj/1997(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997219.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Henan/wu/2004(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997111.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Hubei/wi/1997(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997094.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hubei/wg/2002(H5N1))... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ997087.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Hubei/wf/2002(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ191689.1| Influenza A virus (A/curlew/Shandong/61/04(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ191688.1| Influenza A virus (A/golden mountain thrush/Fu... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY015115.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Italy/312/1997(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY015081.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Scotland/1959(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY014984.1| Influenza A virus (A/tern/South Africa/1961(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY014642.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Potsdam/1402-6/1986(... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY014640.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/New Zealand/41/1984(... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY014615.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hong Kong/205/1977(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ188908.1| Influenza A virus (A/slaty-backed gull/Shandon... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ188906.1| Influenza A virus (A/black bulbul/Fujian/439/0... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ188905.1| Influenza A virus (A/babbler/Fujian/320/04(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ851561.1| Influenza A virus (A/teal/Italy/3931/2005(H5N2... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ366322.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Vietnam/8/05(H5N1)) ... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ366314.1| Influenza A virus (A/goose/Vietnam/3/05(H5N1))... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ366306.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Vietnam/1/2005(H5N1)... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ836043.1| Influenza A virus (A/goose/Huadong/220/2004(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ838509.1| Influenza A virus (A/teal/Italy/3812/2005(H5N3... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ838508.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Italy/3401/2005(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ767725.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Shandong/K01/2004... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ497653.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Purwakarta/BBVet-... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ497642.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Malang/BBVet-IV/2... 36.2 0.66
emb|AM087222.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Germany/WV1349/0... 36.2 0.66
emb|AJ632269.3| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/France/03426a/03... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY623430.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Yichang/lung-1/04... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ023145.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/China/1/02(H5N1))... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY747617.1| Influenza A virus (A/swine/Fujian/F1/2001(H5N1... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ211925.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/luohuo/3/03/(H5N1... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ211924.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/zhoukou/2/02/(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ201829.1| Influenza A virus (A/Goose/Huadong/1/2000(H5N1... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY770079.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Hubei/489/2004(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY531029.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Denmark/64650/03(... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY747609.1| Influenza A virus (A/swine/Fujian/1/2003(H5N1)... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY684706.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Hubei/327/2004(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY653200.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Jilin/9/2004(H5N1... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY646424.1| Influenza virus A (A/swine/Shandong/2/03(H5N1)... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY651367.1| Influenza A virus (A/Dk/ST/4003/2003(H5N1)) he... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY651362.1| Influenza A virus (A/peregrine falcon/HK/D0028... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY651353.1| Influenza A virus (A/Ck/HK/2133.1/2003(H5N1)) ... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY651349.1| Influenza A virus (A/Ck/HK/YU22/2002(H5N1)) he... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY651348.1| Influenza A virus (A/SCk/HK/YU100/2002(H5N1)) ... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY651347.1| Influenza A virus (A/Ck/HK/37.4/2002(H5N1)) he... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY651346.1| Influenza A virus (A/Ck/HK/31.2/2002(H5N1)) he... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY651345.1| Influenza A virus (A/Gf/HK/38/2002(H5N1)) hema... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY639405.1| Influenza A virus (A/goose/China/F3/2004(H5N1)... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF086833.2| Zaire Ebola virus strain Mayinga, complete genome 36.2 0.66
gb|AY995896.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Sweden/64/02(H5N2... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY995895.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Sweden/58/02(H5N3... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY995891.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Sweden/39/02(H5N3... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY995885.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Sweden/21/02(H5N2... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY995884.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Sweden/7/02(H5N2)... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY995883.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Sweden/2/02(H5N2)... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY575877.1| Influenza A virus (A/Ck/HK/YU777/02 (H5N1)) he... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY575876.1| Influenza A virus (A/Ck/HK/61.9/02 (H5N1)) hem... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF046098.1| Influenza A virus (A/Hong Kong/482/97(H5N1)) h... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY354458.1| Zaire ebolavirus strain Zaire 1995, complete g... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY500365.1| Influenza A virus (A/turkey/England/N28/73 (H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF082036.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Hong Kong/915/97(... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF082039.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hong Kong/698/79(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF082042.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Potsdam/1402-6/86(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF082038.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hong Kong/205/77(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|U20460.1|IAU20460 Influenza A virus (A/tern/South Africa/6... 36.2 0.66
gb|U20475.1|IAU20475 Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hong Kong/342/... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY142960.1| Zaire Ebola virus strain Mayinga subtype Zaire... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY296084.1| Influenza A virus (A/ruddy turnstone/NJ/2242/0... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY296083.1| Influenza A virus (A/turkey/CA/D0208651-C/02(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY296075.1| Influenza A virus (A/unknown/NY/9899-6/01(H5N2... 36.2 0.66
dbj|AB241626.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hokkaido/299/04(H5N... 36.2 0.66
dbj|AB241625.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hokkaido/193/04(H5N... 36.2 0.66
dbj|AB241624.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hokkaido/101/04(H5N... 36.2 0.66
dbj|AB241622.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Mongolia/596/01(H5N... 36.2 0.66
dbj|AB241621.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Mongolia/500/01(H5N... 36.2 0.66
dbj|AB241620.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hokkaido/447/00(H5N... 36.2 0.66
dbj|AB241619.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hokkaido/69/00(H5N3... 36.2 0.66
dbj|AB241615.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Miyagi/54/76(H5N3))... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY950236.1| Influenza A virus (A/swan/Guangxi/307/2004 (H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY950235.1| Influenza A virus (A/WildDuck/Guangdong/314/20... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY950234.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Henan/16/2004 (H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY950233.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Henan/13/2004 (H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY950232.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Henan/12/2004 (H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY950231.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Henan/210/2004 (H... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY950230.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Henan/01/2004(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ387854.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Bavaria/1/2005(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ083566.1| Influenza A virus (A/Kalji Pheasant/Bangkok/Th... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ095628.1| Influenza A virus (A/Goose/Shantou/1621/05(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|L11365.1|EBORNA Zaire Ebola virus nucleoprotein, polymeras... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF499101.1| Zaire Ebola virus strain Mayinga, complete genome 36.2 0.66
gb|U31033.1|EVU31033 Zaire Ebola virus envelope glycoprotein ... 36.2 0.66
gb|U28077.1|EVU28077 Zaire Ebola virus strain Zaire95 virion ... 36.2 0.66
gb|U23187.1|EVU23187 Zaire Ebola virus Mayinga strain glycopr... 36.2 0.66
gb|U81161.1|EVU81161 Zaire Ebola virus virion spike glycoprot... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF272001.1| Zaire Ebola virus strain Mayinga, complete genome 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320927.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Hong Kongi/86.3/2... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320918.1| Influenza A virus (A/migratory duck/Jiangxi/17... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320917.1| Influenza A virus (A/migratory duck/Jiangxi/16... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320916.1| Influenza A virus (A/migratory duck/Jiangxi/16... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320915.1| Influenza A virus (A/goose/Shantou/2216/2005(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320914.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Shantou/4610/2003(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320893.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Guangxi/2439/2004... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320892.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Guangxi/2396/2004(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320891.1| Influenza A virus (A/goose/Guangxi/2383/2004(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320890.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Guangxi/2291/2004(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320889.1| Influenza A virus (A/goose/Guangxi/2112/2004(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320888.1| Influenza A virus (A/goose/Guangxi/1832/2004(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320887.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Guangxi/1793/2004(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320886.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Guangxi/1681/2004(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320885.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Guangxi/1586/2004(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320884.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Guangxi/1378/2004(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320883.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Guangxi/1311/2004(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320882.1| Influenza A virus (A/goose/Guangxi/1198/2004(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320881.1| Influenza A virus (A/goose/Guangxi/1097/2004(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320880.1| Influenza A virus (A/goose/Guangxi/914/2004(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320879.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Guangxi/668/2004(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320876.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Fujian/1042/2005(... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ320875.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Fujian/897/2005(H5N1... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ343151.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Hebei/718/2001(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF468837.1| Influenza A virus (A/Duck/Anyang/AVL-1/2001(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY075033.1| Influenza A virus (A/Duck/Hong Kong/380.5/2001... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY075030.1| Influenza A virus (A/Goose/Hong Kong/3014.5/20... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY075027.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/317.5/2... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF501235.1| Influenzavirus A (A/duck/Shanghai/1/2000) hema... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF501234.1| Influenzavirus A (A/duck/Shanghai/1/2000) hema... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY059482.1| Influenza A virus (A/Goose/Hong Kong/3014.8/20... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY059481.1| Influenza A virus (A/Duck/Hong Kong/2986.1/200... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY059480.1| Influenza A virus (A/Goose/Hong Kong/ww491/200... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY059479.1| Influenza A virus (A/Duck/Hong Kong/ww487/2000... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY059477.1| Influenza A virus (A/Duck/Hong Kong/ww382/2000... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY059476.1| Influenza A virus (A/Duck/Hong Kong/ww381/2000... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY059475.1| Influenza A virus (A/Goose/Hong Kong/ww28/2000... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY059474.1| Influenza A virus (A/Goose/Hong Kong/ww26/2000... 36.2 0.66
dbj|AB212280.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Yokohama/aq10/2003(... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF398418.1|AF398418 Influenza A virus (A/Goose/Hong Kong/3... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF398417.1|AF398417 Influenza A virus (A/Goose/Hong Kong/3... 36.2 0.66
gb|S68489.2| hemagglutinin [H5N1 avian influenza virus, A/tur... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ080022.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Henan/01/2004(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ356886.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Anhui/M(H5N1)) he... 36.2 0.66
emb|AJ305306.1|INA305306 Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Italy/8... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY006028.1| Influenza A virus (A/goose/Hong Kong/23/1978(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY005575.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Hong Kong/342/1978(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY005969.1| Influenza A virus (A/shorebird/DE/75/2004(H5N7... 36.2 0.66
gb|CY005927.1| Influenza A virus (A/shorebird/DE/101/2004(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY737304.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Guangdong/173/04(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF364334.1|AF364334 Influenza A virus (A/Goose/Guangdong/3... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF102682.1| Influenza A virus (A/Hong Kong/514/97(H5N1)) h... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF102681.1| Influenza A virus (A/Hong Kong/485/97(H5N1)) h... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF102680.1| Influenza A virus (A/Hong Kong/532/1997(H5N1))... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF102679.1| Influenza A virus (A/Hong Kong/503/97(H5N1)) h... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF102678.1| Influenza A virus (A/Hong Kong/542/97(H5N1)) h... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF102677.1| Influenza A virus (A/Hong Kong/491/97(H5N1)) h... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF102676.1| Influenza A virus (A/HongKong/97/98(H5N1)) hem... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF102675.1| Influenza A virus (A/Hong Kong/507/97(H5N1)) h... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF102674.1| Influenza A virus (A/Hong Kong/538/97(H5N1)) h... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF102673.1| Influenza A virus (A/Hong Kong/516/97(H5N1)) h... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF102672.1| Influenza A virus (A/Hong Kong/488/97(H5N1)) h... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF102671.1| Influenza A virus (A/Hong Kong/486/97(H5N1)) h... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF046097.1| Influenza A Virus (A/Hong Kong/483/97(H5N1)) h... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF046096.1| Influenza A virus (A/Hong Kong/481/97(H5N1)) h... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF046088.1| Influenza A virus (A/Hong Kong/156/97(H5N1)) h... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF082037.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Hong Kong/990/97 ... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF082035.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/786/97 ... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF082034.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/728/97 ... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF046099.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/728/97 ... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF046080.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/220/97 ... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF194992.1|AF194992 Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Italy/909... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF194991.1|AF194991 Influenza A virus (A/Guinea Fowl/Italy... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF194990.1|AF194990 Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Italy/367... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF194169.1|AF194169 Influenza A virus A/Chicken/Italy/312/... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ007623.1| Influenza A virus (A/Anas platyrhynchos/Chany ... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ003215.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Jiande/1218/2001(... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY585377.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Zhejiang/52/2000(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY585376.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Shanghai/38/2001(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY585375.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Guangxi/50/2001(H5N1... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY585374.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Guangdong/40/2000(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY585373.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Guangdong/07/2000(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY585372.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Fujian/17/2001(H5N1)... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY585371.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Zhejiang/11/2000(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY585369.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Shanghai/37/2002(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY585368.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Shanghai/35/2002(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY585367.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Shanghai/13/2001(H5N... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY585366.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Guangxi/53/2002(H5N1... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY585365.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Guangxi/35/2001(H5N1... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY585364.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Guangxi/22/2001(H5N1... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY585361.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Guangdong/12/2000(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY585360.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Guangdong/01/2001(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY585359.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Fujian/19/2000(H5N1)... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY585358.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Fujian/13/2002(H5N1)... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY585357.1| Influenza A virus (A/duck/Fujian/01/2002(H5N1)... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509039.1| Influenza A virus (A/Duck/Hong Kong/646.3/01 (... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509038.1| Influenza A virus (A/Duck/Hong Kong/573.4/01 (... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509037.1| Influenza A virus (A/Goose/Hong Kong/ww100/01 ... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509036.1| Influenza A virus (A/Goose/Hong Kong/76.1/01 (... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509035.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/893.2/0... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509034.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/891.1/0... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509033.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/876.1/0... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509032.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/873.3/0... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509031.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/879.1/0... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509030.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/867.1/0... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509029.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/858.3/0... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509028.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/830.2/0... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509027.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/829.2/0... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509025.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/715.5/0... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509024.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/SF219/0... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509023.1| Influenza A virus (A/Pigeon/Hong Kong/SF215/01... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509022.1| Influenza A virus (A/Quail/Hong Kong/SF203/01 ... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509021.1| Influenza A virus (A/Silky Chicken/Hong Kong/S... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509020.1| Influenza A virus (A/Pheasant/Hong Kong/FY155/... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509019.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/FY150/0... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509018.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/YU563/0... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509017.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/YU562/0... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF509016.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong/FY77/01... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY221529.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/HongKong/YU562/01... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY221528.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/HongKong/YU822.2/... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY221527.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/HongKong/YU822.2/... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY221526.1| Influenza A virus (A/Pheasant/HongKong/FY155/0... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY221525.1| Influenza A virus (A/Pheasant/HongKong/FY155/0... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY221524.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/HongKong/FY150/01... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY221523.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/HongKong/FY150/01... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY221522.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/HongKong/NT873.3/... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY221521.1| Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/HongKong/NT873.3/... 36.2 0.66
gb|DQ343152.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Hebei/108/02(H5N1... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF216737.1|AF216737 Influenza A virus (A/Environment/Hong ... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF216729.1|AF216729 Influenza A virus (A/Environment/Hong ... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF216721.1|AF216721 Influenza A virus (A/Environment/Hong ... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF216713.1|AF216713 Influenza A virus (A/Environment/Hong ... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF290443.1|AF290443 Influenza A virus (A/Duck/Ho Chi Minh/... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY590570.1| Influenza A virus (A/white peafowl/Thailand/CU... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF084281.1|AF084281 Influenza A virus (A/HongKong/486/97(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF084280.1|AF084280 Influenza A virus (A/HongKong/483/97(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF084279.1|AF084279 Influenza A virus (A/HongKong/481/97(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF098546.1|AF098546 Influenza A virus (A/Silky Chicken/Hon... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF098545.1|AF098545 Influenza A virus (A/Goose/Hong Kong/w... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF098544.1|AF098544 Influenza A virus (A/Duck/Hong Kong/y2... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF098543.1|AF098543 Influenza A virus (A/Duck/Hong Kong/p4... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF098542.1|AF098542 Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF098541.1|AF098541 Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF098540.1|AF098540 Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF098539.1|AF098539 Influenza A virus (A/Chicken/Hong Kong... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY684894.1| Influenza A virus (A/mallard/Netherlands/3/99(... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF084532.1|AF084532 Influenza A virus (A/HongKong/485/97(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF144305.1|AF144305 Influenza A virus (A/Goose/Guangdong/1... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF148678.1|AF148678 Influenza A virus (A/goose/Guangdong/1... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF028709.1|AF028709 Influenza A virus (A/HongKong/156/97(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF036356.1|AF036356 Influenza A virus (A/HongKong/156/97(H... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF046100.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Hong Kong/915/199... 36.2 0.66
gb|AF057291.1|AF057291 Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Hong Kong... 36.2 0.66
gb|AY741219.1| Influenza A virus (A/tree sparrow/Henan/3/2004... 36.2 0.66
 
Re: Phillipines - Hogs Found to Have Ebola Virus

DL145523
gtttttggtc caatcatg

gb|EU243133.1| Influenza A virus (A/chicken/Hebei/102/2005(H5... 36.2 0.66
gb|EU338380.1| Sudan ebolavirus isolate EBOV-S-2004 from Suda... 36.2 0.66
gb|U28134.1|EVU28134 Sudan Ebola virus strain Boniface virion... 36.2 0.66
gb|U23069.1|EVU23069 Sudan Ebola virus Maleo strain glycoprot... 36.2 0.66
 
Re: Phillipines - Hogs Found to Have Ebola Virus

Are all the ebola sequences from humans, or were any found in other African species, e.g., primates?

.
 
Re: Phillipines - Hogs Found to Have Ebola Virus

I think it's absolutely premature to state that Filoviruses and a member of Orthomyxoviruses recombined to form a new pathogen.

Why doesn't a Paramyxovirus, like Morbillivirus or a Togavirus like Rubivirus?

Further, with the aim to hit the evidence and predict a possible disaster one may speculate in every direction.

But does this exercise help?

In these times, with widespread economic recession and social turmoil in several part of the world, we are all called to maintain a sober behaviour and keep our ghosts and obsession out for some moments.

While research into novel pathogens are of undoubt interest and of great importance for humankind future, we should think to people that have to sustain themselves with agriculture and farming and try to save a bit of confidence in their hard work to survive.

I am sure that this my opinion will be unwelcomed for most part of FT members but I think it's the moment for sincere opinions and mine is absolutely sincere.

While I will accept every suggestion and critics by members and readers, I nonetheless hope at least some of you will convene that a more sober interpretation of facts is also well overdue.
 
Re: Phillipines - Hogs Found to Have Ebola Virus

Hope this isn't a repeat. I couldn't find it with a FT search.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Researchers report new species of deadly Ebola virus

Lisa Schnirring
purple-speck.gif
Staff Writer


Nov 21, 2008 (CIDRAP News) – Researchers from the United States and Uganda today released the first full scientific report on a new Ebola species that struck western Uganda late last year and was linked to 149 suspected cases and 37 deaths, at least 4 of them healthcare providers.

During the midst of the 2007 outbreak the World Health Organization announced Nov 30 that a new subtype of the virus was sickening people in Bundibugyo district.

Researchers published a detailed account today on the discovery and an analysis of genetic findings of the new subtype in the Public Library of Science Pathogens (PLoS Pathogens).

Four Ebola subtypes have previously been identified—Zaire, Sudan, Cote d'Ivoire, and Reston—but only the Zaire and Sudan subtypes have been associated with large hemorrhagic fever outbreaks in people in Africa.

The Ebola virus is highly contagious and is lethal in about 50% to 90% of cases.

Initial symptoms include fever, headache, joint and muscle aches, sore throat, and weakness, followed by diarrhea, vomiting, and stomach pain, according to the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

Some patients have both internal and external bleeding.

There is no vaccine or specific treatment for the disease.

Unusual symptoms point to new species

During the 2007 outbreak, officials were puzzled because patients had unusual initial symptoms such as vomiting and others that resembled malaria, according to previous reports. Officials didn't suspect Ebola right away, because some of the early case patients didn't have external bleeding.

In late November, health officials in Uganda sent 29 blood samples from suspect patients to the CDC. Using a broadly reactive Ebola virus antigen capture assay, the lab determined that eight specimens showed evidence of Ebola infection. However, earlier real-time reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) assays for all known Zaire and Sudan Ebola viruses and Marburg viruses had shown that the specimens were negative.

Using a less sensitive but more broadly reactive filovirus RT-PCR assay on one of the specimens, the scientists found more evidence of infection, which suggested the genetic sequence was distinct from the four known Ebola subtypes. In all, 9 of the 29 blood samples were positive for Ebola virus infection, the group reported.

Using a new metagenomics pyrosequencing method developed by 454 Life Sciences, a Roche company based in Branford, Conn., the researchers were able to rapidly sequence 70% of the virus genome to develop a draft sequence that allowed them to quickly develop real-time PCR assays specific to the new virus subtype, according to the report.

The new assays were quickly sent to the Uganda Virus Research Institute to assist with diagnosis of Ebola patients during the rest of the outbreak.

Before comparing the new subtype with other known filoviruses, the research team had to complete the entire genome of the new Ebola subtype as well as that of the Cote D'Ivoire Ebola virus. When comparing all of the species, they found that the newly discovered subtype—which they proposed naming the Bundibugyo Ebola virus—differed from the four existing types.

The investigators reported that the closest relative to the new species is the Cote d'Ivoire subtype, which shows a 32% nucleotide difference.

Unknown drug susceptibility

The group concluded that researchers who are developing vaccines against the Zaire and Sudan Ebola viruses will probably want to do cross-protection studies to determine of the vaccines can be designed to protect against the Bundibugyo subtype.

They said more studies are needed to determine the pathogenicity of the new virus and if antivirals are effective against it. According to initial findings from the outbreak, the case-fatality rate for Bundibugyo Ebola was about 36%, lower than that of the Zaire (80% to 90%) or Sudan (50% to 55%) subtypes.

Identification of the new virus highlights how quickly powerful molecular detection and characterization tools can identify new pathogens, the group wrote. However, they cautioned against solely relying on molecular techniques such as real-time PCR assays for detecting novel biodefense pathogens or conducting surveillance for emerging diseases.

Towner JS, Sealy TK, Khristova ML, et al. Newly discovered Ebola virus associated with hemorrhagic fever outbreak in Uganda. PLoS Pathog 2008 Nov;4(11) (published online Nov 21)[Full text]

See also:
Nov 21 PLoS press release
http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2008-11/plos-sdn111908.php
Dec 6, 2007, CIDRAP News story "Suspected cases rise as new Ebola strain strikes Uganda"

.
 
Re: Phillipines - Hogs Found to Have Ebola Virus

I think it's absolutely premature to state that Filoviruses and a member of Orthomyxoviruses recombined to form a new pathogen.

Why doesn't a Paramyxovirus, like Morbillivirus or a Togavirus like Rubivirus?

Further, with the aim to hit the evidence and predict a possible disaster one may speculate in every direction.

But does this exercise help?

In these times, with widespread economic recession and social turmoil in several part of the world, we are all called to maintain a sober behaviour and keep our ghosts and obsession out for some moments.

While research into novel pathogens are of undoubt interest and of great importance for humankind future, we should think to people that have to sustain themselves with agriculture and farming and try to save a bit of confidence in their hard work to survive.

I am sure that this my opinion will be unwelcomed for most part of FT members but I think it's the moment for sincere opinions and mine is absolutely sincere.

While I will accept every suggestion and critics by members and readers, I nonetheless hope at least some of you will convene that a more sober interpretation of facts is also well overdue.

Thank you Ironorehopper for the comment.

It is very important to post opposing opinions for a productive discussion.
 
Re: Phillipines - Hogs Found to Have Ebola Virus

EBOLA-RESTON, PORCINE - PHILIPPINES (03)
****************************************
A ProMED-mail post
<http://www.promedmail.org>
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
<http://www.isid.org>

[1]
Date: Sun 14 Dec 2008
Source: Philippine Daily Inquirer [edited]
<http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20081214-177900/Intl-groups-invited-over-Ebola-threat>


International groups invited over Ebola threat
----------------------------------------------
The Department of Agriculture (DA) has invited international health
organizations to conduct a risk assessment of the Ebola-Reston virus
recently discovered in the country. Agriculture secretary Arthur C Yap said
the assessment would determine the extent of the risk or threat of the
virus to animal and human health in the Philippines.

Last week [week of 8 Dec 2008], the DA and Department of Health announced
that 4 hog farms in Luzon had been infected with a low pathogenic strain of
the Ebola-Reston virus. This was the 1st case of Ebola in swine in the
country, and agriculture and health officials assured the public that it
was not a human health issue but an animal health problem. The officials
declared local pork safe for human consumption.

"While we are currently carrying out a similar effort, we are opening our
door to scrutiny by independent globally recognized health organizations to
show that the Philippines is a responsible member of the international
community," said Yap. He said the move was in line with the government
policy of transparency and the effort to engage global authorities in
containing the infection, which has so far been detected in only a few hogs
in certain parts of Luzon.

Davinio Catbagan, director of the Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI), said the
risk assessment could be conducted by the World Health Organization (WHO),
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), or the Paris-based Office
International des Epizooties (World Animal Health Organization; OIE).

Recently, the DA announced a support program to assist the hog producers
whose livestock were found to have the Ebola-Reston virus. The DA said the
government would also provide incentives to unaffected hog growers to
encourage them to participate in the government program to stamp out the
disease. The DA will field quick-response government teams led by the BAI
to help the growers whose infected hogs will be culled or destroyed. Yap
said the government would provide quarantined farms with feeds and
replacement stocks once the farms had been cleared. Under the support
program, the DA will acquire additional laboratory kits to check the
presence of the virus in swine.

The Ebola-Reston strain is different from the 3 other Ebola subtypes, which
are all potentially fatal to humans. Unlike the Zaire, Ivory Coast, and
Sudan strains, the Reston strain has not caused illness in humans who come
in contact with infected animals. This particular strain was discovered in
the Philippines in 1989 among crab-eating monkeys being exported by the
Laguna-based Ferlite Farms to the Hazleton Laboratories in Reston,
Virginia, USA.

[byline: Amy R Remo]

--
communicated by:
ProMED-mail
<promed@promedmail.org>

******
[2]
Date: Sat 13 Dec 2008
From: Patricia Doyle <dr_p_doyle@hotmail.com>


re: ProMED-mail Ebola-Reston, porcine - Philippines (02) 20081212.3910
----------------------------------------------------------------------
I wondered why Plum Island had tested pig samples for Ebola-Reston and
wondered if they found the results accidentally.

Normally, would pig samples be tested for Ebola if they were to be used in
vaccine research for PRRS [porcine reproductive respiratory syndrome]?
Perhaps, someone thought the blood samples had come from PRRS, that is,
Primate Resource Referral Service and tested for primate diseases thereby
finding Ebola-Reston in the 6 samples.

I would like to know why the pig samples were tested for a primate disease.
Is it also possible that the Ebola positive result was caused in the lab,
that is, Ebola-Reston in previous sample might have compromised the results
of the pig sample?

I would be very interested in opinions on this subject. It is a very
perplexing case.

--
Patricia A Doyle DVM, PhD
Tropical Agricultural Economics
University of West Indies
<dr_p_doyle@hotmail.com>

[Responses to Dr Doyle's query will be welcomed. It will be also
interesting to note if similar tests, in Plum Island or elsewhere, have
been carried-out in samples of PRRS-suspected porcines in/from other
countries, such as China and Viet Nam. In case affirmative, results would
be appreciated.

Subscribers may wish to visit the webpage of OIE's Working Group (WG) on
Wildlife Diseases at <http://www.oie.int/wildlife/eng/en_wildlife.htm>.
Founded in 1994, the WG informs and advises the OIE on all health problems
relating to wild animals, whether in the wild or in captivity. It has
prepared recommendations and oversees numerous scientific publications on
the surveillance and control of the most important specific wildlife
diseases; member-countries are encouraged to appoint national wildlife
focal points. The WG comprises world-leading scientific experts in their
subject areas, and meets.

In 2006, the WG published a list of diseases in mammals, birds, reptiles,
and amphibians to be covered by the recommended surveillance. The list
comprises 2 sections: the 1st section includes 44 of "OIE listed diseases"
(officially notifiable diseases of domestic animals), which may involve
wildlife as well. The 2nd sector includes "wildlife listed diseases",
namely diseases which are regarded as specifically affecting wildlife, of
which there are 24 in mammals, 8 in birds, 4 in reptiles, and 2 in
amphibians. Outbreaks of such diseases, though not listed as notifiable,
are expected to be reported by means of questionnaires distributed annually
to the member countries. Ebola is included among the mammal diseases of
this 2nd-sector list, which can be downloaded at the webpage above.

See also OIE's DG editorial of October 2008 "Improving wildlife
surveillance for its protection while protecting us from the diseases it
transmits," at <http://www.oie.int:80/eng/edito/en_edito_juil08.htm>.

In order to evaluate the realistic animal- and public-health implications
of the recent findings in the 4 Luzon pig farms, a detailed scientific
report by the investigating laboratory, including results of the agent's
genotyping, is anticipated. - Mod.AS]

[see also:
Ebola-Reston, porcine - Philippines (02) 20081212.3910
Ebola-Reston, porcine - Philippines 20081211.3896
1997
---
Ebola-Reston - Philippines (04) 19970202.0228
Ebola-Reston - Philippines (03) 19970128.0171
Ebola-Reston - Philippines (02) 19970126.0157
Ebola-Reston - Philippines 19970126.0154
1996
---
Ebola Reston - Philippines (5) 19960617.1120
Ebola Reston - Philippines (4) 19960610.1078
Ebola Reston - Philippines (3) 19960430.0832
Ebola Reston - Philippines (2) 19960426.0798
Ebola Reston - Philippines 19960424.0784]

.................arn/mj/sh
 
Re: Phillipines - Hogs Found to Have Ebola Virus

<TABLE cellSpacing=0 cellPadding=0 width="100%" border=0><TBODY><TR>Pork shipment halted <!--10 min-->
</TR><!-- headline one : end --><!-- show image if available --><TR vAlign=bottom><TD width=330>
ln-pork.jpg

</TD><TD width=10>
c.gif
</TD><TD vAlign=bottom>
c.gif

The shipment was supposed to be the Philippines' first ever pork export, but it was stopped after traces of low pathogenic Ebola-Reston virus were found on some hog farms in the country. -- PHOTO: AP
</TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE>




<!-- START OF : div id="storytext"-->MANILA- THE Philippines has stopped a shipment of 50,000 tonnes of pork to Singapore after traces of low pathogenic Ebola-Reston virus were found on some hog farms in the country, officials said on Monday.
The shipment was supposed to be the country's first ever pork export. The pork products were set to be sent to Singapore on Dec. 10 when the government voluntarily stopped the shipment due to food safety concerns, said Davinio Catbagan, director of the government's animal industry bureau.
The Philippines has informed Singapore's AgriFood and Veterinary Authority (AVA) about the Ebola-Reston virus among pigs in four northern areas in the country, Mr Catbagan said.
'We're still waiting for their reply,' Mr Catbagan told reporters.
The presence of the Ebola-Reston virus in some pigs in four farms in the country was the first such case anywhere in the world, Caroline-Ann Coulombe, a spokeswoman of the World Health Organisation (WHO) in Manila, told Reuters.
But the WHO still considered the case as a 'low public health risk' because the Ebola virus strain found in the Philippines was not known to be fatal in humans in the past, Ms Coulombe said.
The Philippines has said all tests conducted on workers from the hog farms and butchers from slaughterhouses handling the pigs from the farms yielded negative for the presence of the Ebola-Reston virus.
The Ebola-Reston virus had been previously detected in some Philippine monkeys.
'At the moment, based on historical precedence with the monkeys and based on the fact that the health and agriculture departments have been conducting tests on humans that may have been in contact with the infected pigs during those times, the WHO considers this a low public health risk,' Ms Coulombe said.
She said the WHO was informed about the Ebola-Reston virus among pigs around the third week of November but the infection was discovered as early as May this year. Laboratory results confirming the presence of Ebola-Reston virus were confirmed only in October, said Coulombe, adding the WHO was not aware of the extent of the infection among pigs. -- REUTERS

http://www.straitstimes.com/Breaking+News/Singapore/Story/STIStory_314742.html
 
Re: Phillipines - Hogs Found to Have Ebola Virus

Commentary

Ebola in Philippine Swine Increases Testing
Recombinomics Commentary 14:09
December 15, 2008

She said the WHO was informed about the Ebola-Reston virus among pigs around the third week of November but the infection was discovered as early as May this year. Laboratory results confirming the presence of Ebola-Reston virus were confirmed only in October

The above comments indicate the discovery of Ebola in Philippine swine (see updated map)was not due to a lab artifact and was disclosed long after it was initially identified. The announcement was accompanied by comments on human health linked to the Reston strain, since the Reston strain has not been shown to cause disease in humans.

However, the confirmation of Ebola in swine raises concerns of other strains in other swine. Although the Reston strain was identified in Reston, Virginia, its origin was primates from the Philippines. Thus, finding the Reston strain in Philippine swine is not as unexpected as other strains.

However, the atypical PPRS in the Philippines has been reported in other countries, including Vietnam and China, and the virus has been found in association with other bacterial or viral infections. In the Philippines, some swine had PPRS, a circovirus, and Ebola.

In China in 2005, swine deaths were associated with a bacterial infection Streptococcus suis, which was unexpected because the infection had not been previously associated with fatal infections in adult swine or humans, and several humans who had contact with the swine were fatally infected.

At the time, some media reports attributed the outbreak to Ebola and the reports cited several strains that were in circulation in China, but denied by the government.

The identification of Reston-Ebola in Philippine swine has lead to the call for more extensive screening of Ebola. In light of the reports from China, such searches should include broadly reactive probes that would not be limited to the Reston strain of Ebola.


.
 
Re: Phillipines - Hogs Found to Have Ebola Virus

EBOLA-RESTON, PORCINE - PHILIPPINES (04): REQUEST FOR INFORMATION
*****************************************************************
A ProMED-mail post
<http://www.promedmail.org>
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
<http://www.isid.org>

[In response to Pat Doyle's questions in ProMED-mail posting
20081214.3932, the following FAO (Food & Agriculture Organisation)
update has been forwarded by Stephen Apatow, for which ProMED-mail is
grateful. - Mod.AS]

Date: Mon 15 Dec 2008
Source: UN Food & Agriculture Organisation (FAO), EMPRES (Emergency
Prevention System) [edited]
<http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/programmes/en/empres/ebola_111208.html>


Ebola-Reston virus: disease situation in Philippine swine -- an
unfolding situation
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Over the last few weeks, FAO has been engaged with officials at the
Department of Agriculture in Manila and other national and
international agencies (World Health Organization, World Organisation
for Animal Health, US agencies -- Department of Agriculture and
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and Australia's Animal
Health Laboratory) to better understand the laboratory findings of
Ebola-Reston virus in pigs. It is the 1st time that this virus, a
known primate pathogen, has been identified in a food-producing animal.

This laboratory finding came about after field investigations and
sample collection was undertaken by the Bureau of Animal Industry
(BAI), Department of Agriculture of the Philippines, because of
suspected outbreaks of porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome
(PRRS), which had been affecting several swine production areas in
the Philippines characterized by greater virulence then that
described decades earlier in North America and Europe. Such increased
virulence in the PRRS virus (an arterivirus) has also been seen in
China and Viet Nam recently.

The increased awareness and investigation, prompted the BAI to send
samples to a laboratory with experience in PRRS characterization, as
well as rule out other swine pathogens, such as porcine circovirus,
classical swine fever (a pestivirus), or Nipah virus (a
paramyxovirus) using classical and molecular diagnostic laboratory techniques.

During the laboratory investigations, viral particles and generic
sequencing results showed that several of the swine samples were
indeed infected with PRRS virus, circovirus, other agents..., and
Ebola-Reston. No ebolavirus had ever been found in swine tissues before.

--
Communicated by:
Stephen M Apatow
Humanitarian Resource Institute
<s.m.apatow@humanitarian.net>

[The submitter added the following comment: "Now that we know that
the pathogen has been isolated in the mixing vessel of the pig
populations, what new genomic challenges may evolve that might
present a threat to the international community? -- One thing is
clear, we need to be on top of this game."

The FAO-EMPRES website above includes also the following Q & A, where
subscribers may find useful additional information on the issue:

- What is Ebola, what is Reston, what is Ebola-Reston?
- Sudan Ebola virus
- Tai (Ivory Coast) Ebola virus
- Bundibugyo (Uganda) Ebola virus
- And what is Marburg?
- Hunting for the Ebola reservoirs
- So what is happening in the Philippines?
- Does Reston-Ebola cause disease in pigs?
- Can humans become infected with Reston-Ebola from eating pork?
- What precautionary measures should be observed throughout the food chain?
- What about exports and imports?
- What other animals are known to be infected?

In order to evaluate the realistic animal and public health
implications of the recent findings in the 4 Luzon pig farms, a
scientific report by the investigating laboratory at the Plum Island
Animal Disease Center, including data on the agent's genotyping and
its pathogenicity in animal models, is requested.

According to an APHIS (Animal and Public Health Information System)
Emerging Disease Notice "Porcine Reproductive and Respiratory
Syndrome (PRRS) in Vietnam and China" of August 2007, samples of the
virus from the PRRS outbreak in Viet Nam "were being sent to an
international laboratory for further testing and characterization;" see
<http://www.aphis.usda.gov/vs/ceah/cei/taf/emergingdiseasenotice_files/prrschinavietnam2007.pdf>.

Detailed results of the said investigations (published or otherwise)
will be highly appreciated. It will be also interesting to note if
the samples from Viet Nam included tissues of affected porcines; in
case affirmative -- were they tested for other disease agents in
addition to the PRRS virus, and what were the results? - Mod.AS]

[see also:
Ebola-Reston, porcine - Philippines (03) 20081214.3932
Ebola-Reston, porcine - Philippines (02) 20081212.3910
Ebola-Reston, porcine - Philippines 20081211.3896
Porcine reprod. & resp. syndrome - Viet Nam (05): RFI 20080802.2362]
...................................arn/mj/dk
 
Re: Phillipines - Hogs Found to Have Ebola Virus

[Full FAO EMPRES update. See post above for ProMed commentary. IOH]

EBOLA-RESTON virus in pigs - Disease Situation in Philippine Swine - An Unfolding Situation [FAO (EMPRES)]

EBOLA-RESTON virus in pigs - Disease Situation in Philippine Swine - An Unfolding Situation

December 2008 -

Over the last few weeks, FAO has been engaged with officials at the Department of Agriculture in Manila and other national and international agencies (World Health Organization, World Organisation for Animal Health, US agencies ? Department of Agriculture and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and Australia?s Animal Health Laboratory) to better understand the laboratory findings of Ebola-Reston virus in pigs.


It is the first time that this virus, a known primate pathogen, has been identified in a food-producing animal.

This laboratory finding came about after field investigations and sample collection was undertaken by the Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI), Department of Agriculture of the Philippines, because of suspected outbreaks of Porcine Reproductive and Respiratory Syndrome (PRRS) which had been affecting several swine production areas in the Philippines characterized by greater virulence then that described decades earlier in North America and Europe.

Such increased virulence in the PRRS virus (an arterivirus) has also been seen in China and Viet Nam recently.

The increased awareness and investigation, prompted the BAI to send samples to a laboratory with experience in PRRS characterization, as well as rule out other swine pathogens, such as porcine circovirus, classical swine fever (a pestivirus), or Nipah virus (a paramyxovirus) using classical and molecular diagnostic laboratory techniques.

During the laboratory investigations, viral particles and generic sequencing results showed that several of the swine samples were indeed infected with PRRS virus, circovirus, other agents ... and Reston-Ebola.

No ebolavirus had ever been found in swine tissues before.


Questions & Answers

* What is Ebola, what is Reston, what is Ebola-Reston?

Ebola is the common term for a disease caused by a group of viruses belonging to genus Ebolavirus of the family Filoviridae to which humans and other primates are susceptible. Ebola or Ebola haemorrhagic fever is named after the Ebola River Valley, Democratic Republic of the Congo (before known as Za?re), in reference to the area where the first recognized outbreak was reported in 1976.

Ebola haemorrhagic fever can be fatal.

In humans it is characterized by fever, vomiting, diarrhoea, generalized muscle and joint pain, and sometimes internal and external bleeding. Fatality rates in humans (those that get the disease and then die from it) can be high, ranging from 50?90%. The cause of death is usually due to organ failure and blood loss. No approved vaccine is available and treatment is supportive care including infusion of intravenous fluids.

In August 2007, over 200 people became ill with Ebola virus (103 fatally) in the village of Kampungu, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The outbreak started after the funerals of two village chiefs, and 217 people in four villages fell ill. The previous recorded outbreak in DRC was in 1995 when 245 people died.

The mechanisms for the spread of Ebola virus are not fully understood. Non-human primates are believed to be infected directly from a-yet-to be identified natural reservoir. Once there is infection in the monkey, horizontal transmission (as in monkey-to-monkey) can take place after direct contact with infected blood, secretions, organs, semen or urine, or contaminated inanimate objects (contaminated food bowls, cages, etc.). Monkeys are not thought to be the reservoir themselves, based on laboratory research and field findings.

The route of transmission from animals to humans is unknown. In Africa and Asia, field investigations of the first cases of Ebola infections in humans were linked to contact with wild mammals found dead in the rainforest (gorillas, chimpanzees, monkeys, forest antelopes, duikers and porcupines) or the simple handling of infected cynomolgus macaques through direct contact with their infected blood or fresh organs.

Reston (or Reston-Ebola) virus is a filovirus of Asian origin with genetic characteristics similar to those of the virus first identified in the then Za?re. It was discovered in crab-eating macaques (Macaca fascicularis) at the Hazleton Laboratories in Reston, Virginia (USA) in 1989, where research monkeys became ill and some died. These monkeys had been imported weeks earlier from the Philippines.

Two notable differences between Reston-Ebola and other Ebola viruses are known: one, none of the African strains of Ebola shown to cause disease in humans have been found to be transmitted by the air (?airborne?), yet Reston-Ebola is; two, Reston-Ebola has not been shown to affect humans, and is of low fatality in monkeys. Co-infection of Reston-Ebola with another virus, simian haemorrhagic fever virus (SHFV), exacerbates the disease in monkeys, and its fatality rate.

Six animal caretakers in the 1989 incident seroconverted (developed an immune response as determined by antibody levels specific for the virus). One of the animal caretakers accidentally cut himself while performing a necropsy (post mortem evaluation) on an infected monkey but did not become ill. Seroconversion in humans has also been documented in the Philippines.

The Reston-Ebola virus was once again introduced through the importation of cynomolgus macaques from the Philippines to the United States in 1990 and 1996 and into Europe in 1992. The Philippines is one of the world?s major sources of cynomolgus macaques often used for important biomedical research.

Ebola is the common term for a disease caused by a group of viruses belonging to genus Ebolavirus of the family Filoviridae to which humans and other primates are susceptible. Ebola or Ebola haemorrhagic fever is named after the Ebola River Valley, Democratic Republic of the Congo (before known as Za?re), in reference to the area where the first recognized outbreak was reported in 1976.

Sudan Ebola virus
After the first cases in Za?re (now Democratic Republic of Congo), a second strain of Ebola was found also 1976, among cotton factory workers in Nzara, Sudan. In May 2004, Sudan ebolavirus was reported in Yambio County, Sudan, with five deaths resulting.

Tai (Ivory Coast) Ebola virus
In November 1994, a novel Ebola related virus was isolated from two dead chimpanzees in the Tai Forest in C?te d'Ivoire.

Bundibugyo (Uganda) Ebola virus
More recently, in November 2007, the Uganda Ministry of Health reported an outbreak of Ebola in the Bundibugyo District, from which this variant takes its name.

* And what is Marburg?

Marburg virus was actually the first haemorrhagic fever identified caused by a filovirus. In humans, Marburg haemorrhagic fever is a severe and highly fatal disease. Case fatality rates vary greatly; from 25% in the initial laboratory-associated outbreak in 1967 in Marburg and Frankfurt am Mein (Germany) to more than 80% in the Democratic Republic of Congo from 1998 to 2000. In certain cases (such as those that began in Angola in late 2004), rates can be above 80%. In the outbreak in Germany the virus was shown to have been introduced by the importation of African green (vervet) monkeys (Cercopitheceus aethiops) from Uganda.

Hunting for the Ebola reservoirs
Ebola antibodies have been found in free-living rhesus-monkeys, African green monkeys, cynomolgus monkeys and baboons. It is known that chimpanzees, gorillas, rhesus monkeys, vervet monkeys, cynomolgus monkeys, newborn mice and guinea pigs can develop clinical illness with Ebola viruses.

No ebolaviruses were found from samples taken from some 30,000 mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians, and arthropods in outbreak regions between 1976 and 1998. Nevertheless, the natural reservoir of the Ebola viruses likely resides in the rain forests of the African continent and Western Pacific, and remains to be identified.

* So what is happening in the Philippines?

Medical, veterinary and biological experts require further evaluation of the situation. Testing for the presence of the Ebola-Reston virus in swine populations, animal handlers and wildlife species will be helpful to begin to understand the laboratory findings, how the pigs may have become infected and potential spill over to humans. The research required will take time ? with the earliest results expected in weeks to months. Though it is too early to know, there are no reports of sick or ailing people that have had contact with the pigs according to the Philippine Ministry of Health and the Bureau of Animal Industry.

While it is true that there was illness and fatalities on the farms where these pigs were bred and raised, other isolated microbes may have been the route cause of the outbreaks and not the Reston-Ebola virus.

* Does Reston-Ebola cause disease in pigs?

This remains unknown although it is known that they can become infected. While it is true that there were illness and fatalities on the farms where the Reston-Ebola infected pigs were bred and raised, other isolated microbes may have been the cause of the outbreaks and not the Reston-Ebola virus acting alone. It will be important to separate the different pathogens isolated from the sick or dying pigs from the Philippines and once the different pathogens have been purified, the necessary and specific laboratory tools (called ?reagents?) can be developed to test swine and other animals throughout the Philippines and see how extensive the infection is and undertake humane laboratory controlled studies in previously non-exposed pigs.

* Can humans become infected with Reston-Ebola from eating pork?

This too is unknown. To make sweeping statements as to Yes-Risk or No-Risk based on six caretakers exposed to Reston-Ebola at this stage would be premature. The answer requires close collaboration between producers, veterinarians, health officials and market intermediaries. Studies need to be carried out in the commercial swine sectors affected, animal handlers, throughout the market chain and its intermediaries, and among consumers before full advice can be given. Using the specific Reston-Ebola reagents, investigators can retrace marketing and butchering operations to likely consumers and through interviews ask about recent illnesses in their families or close associations, perform blood tests test, and advise them about improved hygiene in general. The planned laboratory studies will also shed valuable and critical information.

The experience of the animal caretakers in Reston, Virginia, in 1989, gives an insight into the human risk and this particular filovirus ? where there was high exposure, without clinical disease, and a normal immune response.

* What precautionary measures should be observed throughout the food chain?

Sick animals, regardless of the cause, should not enter the food chain, nor should carcasses or scraps from sick or dead animals be fed to other animals or disposed of improperly. Veterinary and public health inspectors should ensure that animals destined for slaughter do not have a fever and are clinically healthy; and consumers should be cautious when prices appear too good to be true.

Handling and preparation of meat should be done in a clean environment (table tops, utensils, knives) and the meat cooked well. The above are all general principles for good hygiene and thorough cooking essential to destroy any bacteria, parasites or viruses that may be present.

Producers, marketers, butchers, market stall owners must be made aware of the situation through awareness efforts by the health authorities (veterinary and public health) as to the knowns and unknowns of this evolving situation and of their responsibility in the provision of safe food to the consumers, which also include their own families and friends.

It is not recommended to handle pork meat known to be infected with Reston-Ebola virus, since the true risk of infection and consequences are unknown.

* What about exports and imports?

It is important that when countries have an animal health problem (of known or unknown origin), they should self-impose a ban of any exports to their neighbours or trading partners immediately. Though the economic impact to the industry and producers is likely to suffer, their credibility will increase and the safety of their neighbours and trading partners remain. If a country knowingly allows for exports to continue and the disease subsequently spreads regionally or trans-continentally, the economic impact will be far greater in the mid and long term. The credibility of the country and that of any future exports will likely be held in doubt for years or decades to come. Furthermore ? and perhaps more importantly ? should the animal health problem be of a zoonotic nature (disease that can be transmitted between animals and humans) the disaster could be more than just an economic problem.

* What other animals are known to be infected?

Naturally-occurring Ebola antibodies have been found in rhesus-monkeys, African green monkeys, cynomolgus monkeys and baboons. Chimpanzees, gorillas, rhesus monkeys, vervet monkeys, cynomolgus monkeys, newborn mice and guinea pigs can develop clinical illness.

Experimentally, rabbits, pigeons and various species of mice, bats, frogs, geckos, snakes, tortoises and arthropods have been infected but did not develop clinical signs. Virus multiplication, however, was recorded in bats, snakes, mice and spiders at different levels.
-
<cite cite="http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/programmes/en/empres/ebola_111208.html">Emergency Prevention System for Transboundry Animals and Plant Pest Diseases (EMPRES)</cite>
 
Re: Phillipines - Hogs Found to Have Ebola Virus

Reuters AlertNet - Philippines asks FAO to investigate Ebola in pigs

Philippines asks FAO to investigate Ebola in pigs

17 Dec 2008 07:32:08 GMT
Source: Reuters
MANILA, Dec 17 (Reuters) -

The Philippines has asked the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) for help in stopping the spread of Ebola-Reston virus after an infection was found in some hog farms early this year, an official said on Wednesday.


The agriculture department has sent requests to the FAO to test an initial 10,000 swine in two quarantined hog farms in northern Luzon island, Davinio Catbagan, director of bureau of animal and industry, said in a statement.

"We would like to determine the source of the infection," Catbagan said.

The World Health Organisation (WHO) has said it considers the case a "low public health risk" because the Ebola virus strain found in the Philippines was not known to be fatal in humans in the past.

Catbagan said a team of experts from the FAO and the WHO would also assist in setting up diagnostic and prevention and communications plans.

The agriculture department said only six of 28 tissue samples from pigs have been found with traces of the Ebola-Reston virus when these were sent for tests at the Centre for Disease Control (CDC) in the United States in October.

An additional 94 samples collected from pigs in the affected farms in two provinces have been found to be negative for traces of Ebola-Reston virus when tested at the Research Institute for Tropical Medicine in the Philippines, the statement said.

On Monday, the Philippines announced the voluntary withdrawal of a shipment of 50,000 tonnes of pork to Singapore after traces of the low pathogenic Ebola-Reston virus were found.

The shipment was to be the country's first ever pork export.

The presence of the Ebola-Reston virus in some pigs in two commercial farms and two backyard farms in the country was the first such case anywhere in the world, Caroline-Ann Coulombe, a WHO spokeswoman in Manila, has said.

The Ebola-Reston virus had been previously detected in some Philippine monkeys.

(Reporting by Manny Mogato; Editing by Raju Gopalakrishnan and Dean Yates)
-
<cite cite="http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/MAN325485.htm">Reuters AlertNet - Philippines asks FAO to investigate Ebola in pigs</cite>
 
Re: Phillipines - Hogs Found to Have Ebola Virus

Philippines Moves to Fight Pig Ebola - WSJ.com
Philippines Moves to Fight Pig Ebola

By JONATHAN CHENG

Global health authorities are preparing an emergency mission to the Philippines after U.S. scientists discovered a strain of the Ebola virus in dead pigs there that had previously only been found in monkeys.


Unlike more-deadly strains of Ebola virus, health officials say this particular strain, known as the Reston strain, has never caused human illness or death, and it's not immediately clear there is a public-health issue.

But health officials say it is too early to rule out a possible threat to humans, and expressed concern over the fact that this incident, first revealed in an Oct. 30 teleconference between the Philippine government and U.S. health authorities, wasn't made public until a news conference for local media in Manila last week.


Farmers gather pigs for slaughter Thursday in Manila. Authorities in the Philippines sought to allay public fears about the spread of the Ebola virus.

Pigs have served as genetic mixing vessels for viruses that pass from animals to humans, which makes the Philippine discovery significant.

"When a virus jumps species, in this case from monkeys to pigs, we become concerned, particularly as pigs are much closer to humans than monkeys in their ability to harbour viruses," says Peter Cordingley, Western Pacific spokesman for the World Health Organization in Manila.

Philippine authorities say they have quarantined affected farms, canceled plans for the country's first official exports of pork, and conducted tests on hog farmers and slaughterhouse workers.

Authorities say there have been no signs of humans infection in the outbreak. It's unclear whether any infected pigs were sold for consumption. Experts say it could take weeks to determine how the pigs were infected and the threat to humans.

According to officials at the WHO, the World Organization for Animal Health and the Philippines' Bureau of Animal Industry, pig farmers in three provinces near the capital of Manila began noticing high rates of sickness and death among their livestock as early as May.

In August, Philippine authorities sent samples from the dead pigs to the Plum Island Animal Disease Center in New York, where scientists detected the presence of several diseases, including a devastating pig virus known as porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome, or blue-ear pig disease.

Weeks later, during the Oct. 30 teleconference, authorities at the Philippines' Department of Agriculture were notified that scientists had further discovered Ebola Reston virus in six of the 28 pig samples sent to the U.S.

The Philippine government waited until Dec. 10 to make the presence of Ebola Reston virus public, citing concern for the pork industry and a lack of evidence that humans were in any danger.

Davinio Catbagan, director for the Philippines' Bureau of Animal Industry, said the government first consulted with people in the swine industry and only later notified the Department of Health. Mr. Catbagan said authorities were aware of the public-health importance of the recent discovery, but that the available medical literature didn't suggest any threat to humans.

The WHO said it learned of the disease through the United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization in late November.

Concerns have been deepening across Asia about diseases among stocks of chickens and pigs, including H5N1 avian influenza and blue-ear pig disease. The latest announcement forced the Philippines to abort its first-ever commercial export of pork, which was to be made to Singapore earlier this month.

According to people at the WHO and the Paris-based World Organization for Animal Health, known by its French acronym OIE, Philippine authorities decided to go public only after being pressured by those two groups and the FAO. Dr. Bernard Vallat, director-general of the OIE, said it was "not an easy negotiation" to persuade Philippine authorities to go public with the news.

He said the pigs were most likely killed by another disease, but that the presence of the Ebola Reston virus in pigs should be investigated to assess the risk to humans.

The Ebola virus comes in five distinct strains, three of which are associated with the high-fatality outbreaks that first appeared in the Congo in 1976. In 1989, scientists discovered what would be known as the Reston strain of the Ebola virus among monkeys imported from the Philippines and kept for research in a Reston, Va., lab. A handful of humans were infected in that case, but only one person showed any symptoms, and fully recovered.

According to the WHO, the Ebola Reston virus can be identified only by laboratory testing, and anyone eating pork even from healthy pigs should cook the meat thoroughly. Meat from a sick animal should never be eaten.

According to the FAO, the Ebola Reston virus is transmitted by air, unlike African strains of the virus which are transmitted through direct contact with bodily fluids.


Write to Jonathan Cheng at jonathan.cheng@wsj.com
<cite cite="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122962795234719065.html?mod=googlenews_wsj">Philippines Moves to Fight Pig Ebola - WSJ.com</cite>
 
Re: Phillipines - Hogs Found to Have Ebola Virus

Source: http://www.pia.gov.ph/?m=12&r=&y=&mo=&fi=p081219.htm&no=20

PIA Press Release
2008/12/19

Ebola virus strain found in pig farm

Manaoag, Pangasinan (19 December) -- A 30-hectare piggery farm in barangay Parian was placed under quarantine starting on Thursday as a precautionary measure to prevent the spread of the dreaded ebola reston virus.

The move was undertaken after the Tropical Disease Institute of the Philippines (TDIP) examined all the hogs in the Lambino Farm here and found most of its swine were afflicted with ebola reston virus.

The virus was discovered when specimens of hogs being raised in the Lambino farm, located at the boundary of Manaoag to Mapandan town, were examined by TDIP in a regular field check-up of animals.

Department of Agriculture Regional Director Cipriano Santiago rushed to the farm Thursday morning along with officials of the Bureau of Animal Industry and Department of Health and municipal health office to check on the farm

Joining them in the inspection were veterinary officers of Pangasinan and Manaoag town, the municipal agriculture officer and the town police headed by Supt. Mateo Casupang.

He immediately imposed a quarantine on the farm to ensure that no hog is brought out for sale and no more hogs will come in till the area is declared safe.

Santiago said this means that the piggery farm would be closely monitored 24 hours a day to ensure that the requirement is strictly followed.

Santiago later said the ebola reston virus that attacked the swine in the Lambino Farm is a strain that affects only the hogs but not humans, which means, that the matter "is not a concern on public health but on animal health."

He called on the people not to panic because the meat of such infected animals can be eaten if washed and cooked thoroughly.

Santiago said that so far, it is only in the Lambino farm in the entire province of Pangasinan where the ebola reston virus was detected.

Dr. Raymond Veloria, municipal health officer of Manaoag, who was among those who inspected the piggery farm, said based on the findings of the TDIP most of the swine and piglets in the farm were infected by the virus.

Veloria reported that the farm has 14 sows, 11 boars, 53 growers, 70 weanlings, and 217 piglets for fattening.

The initial inventory showed there were 62 piglets suffering from diarrhea, he said.

Veloria added that based on these findings, the Municipal Health Office, together with the Department of Health and the DA, recommended that the farm be quarantined for at least one to two months.

Veloria said people should not panic because the ebola reston virus is non-pathogenic in humans and the infected piglets do not transmit the disease.

Saying that ebola virus came from monkeys and first afflicted Africans, like those from Kenya and Congo, Veloria believes an infected person or monkey from those African countries may have carried the virus to the Philippines.

Veloria revealed that per documentation, the same strain of the virus was also detected in some farms in Bulacan and Nueva Ecija. (PIA/PNA) [top]
 
Re: Phillipines - Hogs Found to Have Ebola Virus

Source: http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/12/21/08/rp-persuaded-announce-ebola-reston-virus-discovery-report

RP 'persuaded' to announce Ebola-Reston virus discovery - report


abs-cbnNEWS.com | 12/21/2008 7:28 PM


International health authorities had to ?negotiate? with Philippine officials to publicly announce that a strain of the Ebola virus was found in some dead pigs in the Philippines, this was revealed in a report published in the Web site of The Wall Street Journal (TWSJ)


The TWSJ report gave details on the discovery of the Ebola-Reston virus in some samples from dead pigs sent from the Philippines citing sources from the World Health Organization (WHO), Office International des Epizooties (OIE) or World Organization for Animal Health and the UN Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO)

The TWSJ report said that according to officials of the three international organizations and the Philippines' Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI), high rates of sickness and death among livestock were noticed by hog farmers near Manila as early as May.

Philippine authorities in August reportedly sent samples from the dead pigs to the Plum Island Animal Disease Center in New York. The scientists reportedly detected the presence of several diseases, including a devastating pig virus known as porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome (PRRS), or blue-ear pig disease.

Weeks later, during a Oct. 30 teleconference, officials of the Philippines? Department of Agriculture were notified that scientists of the US animal disease center ?had further discovered Ebola Reston virus in six of the 28 pig samples sent to the US,? said the TWSJ report.

The report said the Philippine government only announced on Decenber 10 the presence of the Ebola Reston virus. The report said the Philippine government cited ?concern for the pork industry and a lack of evidence that humans were in any danger.?

Davinio Catbagan, BAI director, was cited in the TWSJ report to have said that the Philippine government first consulted with people in the swine industry and only later notified the Department of Health. Mr. Catbagan reportedly said authorities were aware of the public-health importance of the recent discovery, but that the available medical literature didn't suggest any threat to humans.

The WHO said it learned of the disease through the UN FAO in late November, said the report.


The TWSJ report said that according to people at the WHO and OIE, Philippine authorities decided to go public only after being pressured by WHO, OIE and FAO.

Dr. Bernard Vallat, OIE director-general, in the TWSJ report was cited to have said that it was "not an easy negotiation" to persuade Philippine authorities to go public with the news.

Vallat reportedly said the pigs were most likely killed by another disease, but that the presence of the Ebola Reston virus in pigs should be investigated to assess the risk to humans.

Immediate mission
International health authorities in response were reported to be preparing an immediate mission to the Philippines after the discovery and also after Philippine authorities asked FAO for help in stopping the spread of Ebola-Reston virus.

The Philippine agriculture department has sent requests to the FAO to test an initial 10,000 swine in two quarantined hog farms in northern Luzon island, Catbagan said in a statement last week.

"We would like to determine the source of the infection," Catbagan said.

Catbagan said a team of experts from the FAO and the WHO would also assist in setting up diagnostic and prevention and communications plans.

The agriculture department said only six of 28 tissue samples from pigs have been found with traces of the Ebola-Reston strain when these were sent for tests at the Center for Disease Control (CDC) in the United States in October.

An additional 94 samples collected from pigs in the affected farms in two provinces have been found to be negative for traces of Ebola-Reston virus when tested at the Research Institute for Tropical Medicine in the Philippines, the statement said.

Philippine authorities have said they have quarantined affected farms, canceled plans for the country's first official exports of pork, and conducted tests on hog farmers and slaughterhouse workers of affected farms.

They said there have been no signs of humans infection in the outbreak. It's unclear whether any infected pigs were sold for consumption. Experts say it could take weeks to determine how the pigs were infected and the threat to humans.


Last Monday, the Philippines announced the voluntary withdrawal of a shipment of 50,000 tons of pork to Singapore after traces of the low pathogenic Ebola-Reston strain were found.

The shipment was to be the country's first-ever pork export.

Genetic mixing vessels
Health authorities said the ?Reston strain? has never caused human illness or death so far, unlike the more-deadly strains of Ebola virus, according to the report.

They, however, add that it is too early to rule out a possible threat to humans.

The WHO, in the TWSJ report, said the Philippine discovery is significant since pigs have served as genetic mixing vessels for viruses that pass from animals to humans.

"When a virus jumps species, in this case from monkeys to pigs, we become concerned, particularly as pigs are much closer to humans than monkeys in their ability to harbor viruses," said Peter Cordingley, WHO Western Pacific spokesman, in the report.


The TWSJ report said that the Ebola virus comes in five distinct strains, three of which are associated with the high-fatality outbreaks that first appeared in the Congo in 1976.

The report said that scientists in 1989 discovered what would be known as the Reston strain of the Ebola virus among monkeys imported from the Philippines and kept for research in a lab in Reston, Virginia in the USA. A handful of humans were reportedly infected in that case, but only one person showed any symptoms, and fully recovered.

The reports also said that according to WHO, the Ebola-Reston virus can be identified only by laboratory testing, and anyone eating pork even from healthy pigs should cook the meat thoroughly. Meat from a sick animal should never be eaten, said WHO.


According to the FAO, the Ebola Reston virus is transmitted by air, unlike African strains of the virus which are transmitted through direct contact with bodily fluids, said the TWSJ report. With a report from Reuters


as of 12/21/2008 7:28 PM
 
Re: Phillipines - Hogs Found to Have Ebola Virus

Source: http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/12/23/08/who-2-other-groups-tapped-probe-ebola-strain-discovery-rp

WHO, 2 other groups tapped to probe Ebola strain discovery in RP
abs-cbnNEWS.com | 12/23/2008 11:40 AM

The Philippine government is tapping experts from the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Organization for Animal Health and the World Health Organization to investigate the discovery of a strain of the Ebola virus in some dead pigs in the Philippines.

In a statement, the WHO said it will send an expert mission to work with human and animal health experts in the Philippines to further investigate the discovery of Ebola Reston virus in pigs, which was discovered by farmers near Manila as early as May.


"Although co-infection in pigs is not unusual, this is the first time globally that an Ebola-Reston virus has been isolated in swine. It is not, however, the first time that the Ebola-Reston virus has been found in the Philippines: it was found in monkeys from the Philippines in outbreaks that occurred in 1989-1990, 1992, and 1996," the WHO said in a press statement.

The WHO said the planned FAO/OIE/WHO team will work with Philippine counterparts "to address, through field and laboratory investigation, important questions as to the source of the virus, its transmission, its virulence and its natural habitat, in order to provide appropriate guidance for animal and human health protection."

"Until these questions can be answered, the FAO and WHO stressed the importance of carrying out basic good hygiene practices and food handling measures," the WHO said.


WHO said an increase in pig mortality on swine farms in the provinces of Nueva Ecija and Bulacan in 2007 and 2008 prompted the Philippine government to initiate laboratory investigations. Samples taken from ill pigs in May, June and September 2008 were sent to international reference laboratories, which confirmed in late October that the pigs were infected with a highly virulent strain of Porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome (PRRS) as well as the Ebola-Reston virus.

The Ebola virus belongs to the Filoviridae family (filovirus) and is comprised of five distinct species: Za?re, Sudan, C?te d?Ivoire, Bundibugyo and Reston. Za?re, Sudan and Bundibugyo species have been associated with large Ebola hemorrhagic fever (EHF) outbreaks in Africa with high case fatality ratio (25?90%) while C?te d?Ivoire and Reston have not. Reston species can infect humans but no serious illness or death in humans have been reported to date.

The Department of Health of the Philippines has reported that initial laboratory tests on animal handlers and slaughterhouse workers who were thought to have come into contact with infected pigs were negative for Ebola Reston infection, and that additional testing is ongoing.

The Bureau of Animal Industry has notified the OIE that all infected animals were destroyed and buried or burned, the infected premises and establishments have been disinfected and the affected areas are under strict quarantine and movement control. Vaccination of swine against PRRS is ongoing in the Province of Bulacan. PRRS is not transmissible to humans.


Ebola viruses are normally transmitted via contact with the blood or other bodily fluids of an infected animal or person. In all situations, even in the absence of identified risks, meat handling and preparation should be done in a clean environment (table top, utensils, knives) and meat handlers should follow good personal hygiene practices (e.g. clean hands, clean protective clothing). In general, hands should be regularly washed while handling raw meat.

Pork from healthy pigs is safe to eat as long as either the fresh meat is cooked properly (i.e. 70?C in all part of the food, so that there is no pink meat and the juices run clear), or, in the case of uncooked processed pork, national safety standards have been met during production, processing and distribution.

Meat from sick pigs or pigs found dead should not be eaten and should not enter the food chain or be given to other animals. Ill animals should be reported to the competent authorities and proper hygiene precautions and protection should be taken when destroying and disposing of sick or dead pigs. The Philippines Department of Agriculture has advised the Philippine public to buy its meat only from National Meat Inspection Services certified sources.

As a general rule, proper hygiene and precautionary measures (wearing gloves, goggles and protective clothing) should also be exercised when slaughtering or butchering pigs. This applies both to industrial and home-slaughtering of pigs. Children and those not involved in the process of slaughtering should be kept away.
 
Re: Phillipines - Hogs Found to Have Ebola Virus

FAONewsroom: First detection of Ebola-Reston virus in pigs

First detection of Ebola-Reston virus in pigs

23-12-2008

Manila/Roma, 23 December 2008 -

Following the detection of the Ebola-Reston virus in pigs in the Philippines, FAO, the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) and the World Health Organization (WHO) announced today that the government of the Philippines has requested the three agencies send an expert mission to work with human and animal health experts in the Philippines to further investigate the situation.


An increase in pig mortality on swine farms in the provinces of Nueva Ecija and Bulacan in 2007 and 2008 prompted the Government of the Philippines to initiate laboratory investigations.

Samples taken from ill pigs in May, June and September 2008 were sent to international reference laboratories which confirmed in late October that the pigs were infected with a highly virulent strain of Porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome (PRRS) as well as the Ebola-Reston virus.

Ebola-Reston in swine
Although co-infection in pigs is not unusual, this is the first time globally that an Ebola-Reston virus has been isolated in swine.

It is not, however, the first time that the Ebola-Reston virus has been found in the Philippines: it was found in monkeys from the Philippines in outbreaks that occurred in 1989-1990, 1992, and 1996.

The Ebola virus belongs to the Filoviridae family (filovirus) and is comprised of five distinct species: Za?re, Sudan, C?te d'Ivoire, Bundibugyo and Reston.

Za?re, Sudan and Bundibugyo species have been associated with large Ebola hemorrhagic fever (EHF) outbreaks in Africa with high case fatality ratio (25-90%) while C?te d'Ivoire and Reston have not.

Reston species can infect humans but no serious illness or death in humans have been reported to date.

Since being informed of this event in late November, FAO, OIE and WHO have been making every effort to gain a better understanding of the situation and are working closely with the Philippines Government and local animal and human health experts.

The Department of Health of the Philippines has reported that initial laboratory tests on animal handlers and slaughterhouse workers who were thought to have come into contact with infected pigs were negative for Ebola-Reston infection, and that additional testing is ongoing.

The Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI) of the Philippines Department of Agriculture has notified the OIE that all infected animals were destroyed and buried or burned, the infected premises and establishments have been disinfected and the affected areas are under strict quarantine and movement control.

Vaccination of swine against PRRS is ongoing in the Province of Bucalan.

PRRS is not transmissible to humans.

The planned joint FAO/OIE/WHO team will work with country counterparts to address, through field and laboratory investigation, important questions as to the source of the virus, its transmission, its virulence and its natural habitat, in order to provide appropriate guidance for animal and human health protection.

Basic good hygiene
Until these questions can be answered, the FAO and WHO stressed the importance of carrying out basic good hygiene practices and food handling measures.

Ebola viruses are normally transmitted via contact with the blood or other bodily fluids of an infected animal or person. In all situations, even in the absence of identified risks, meat handling and preparation should be done in a clean environment (table top, utensils, knives) and meat handlers should follow good personal hygiene practices (e.g. clean hands, clean protective clothing).

In general, hands should be regularly washed while handling raw meat.

Pork from healthy pigs is safe to eat as long as either the fresh meat is cooked properly (i.e. 70?C in all part of the food, so that there is no pink meat and the juices run clear), or, in the case of uncooked processed pork, national safety standards have been met during production, processing and distribution.

Meat from sick pigs or pigs found dead should not be eaten and should not enter the food chain or be given to other animals.

Ill animals should be reported to the competent authorities and proper hygiene precautions and protection should be taken when destroying and disposing of sick or dead pigs.

The Philippines Department of Agriculture has advised the Philippine public to buy its meat only from National Meat Inspection Services certified sources.

As a general rule, proper hygiene and precautionary measures (wearing gloves, goggles and protective clothing) should also be exercised when slaughtering or butchering pigs. This applies both to industrial and home-slaughtering of pigs.

Children and those not involved in the process of slaughtering should be kept away.
-
<cite cite="http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/9025/icode/">FAONewsroom: First detection of Ebola-Reston virus in pigs</cite>
 
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