tetano
Editor, Senior Moderator
J Infect Dis. 2012 Mar 27. [Epub ahead of print]
Creating a Mammalian Transmissible A/H5N1 Influenza Virus: Social Contracts, Prudence, and Alternative Perspectives.
Osterholm MT, Relman DA.
Source
Director, Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, Professor, Division of Environmental Health Sciences, School of Public Health, Adjunct Professor, School of Medicine, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455.
Abstract
Much has been written about two unpublished manuscripts submitted to Science and Nature that describe research studies where mutant derivative strains of highly-pathogenic influenza A/H5N1 were created that can be transmitted by respiratory droplet or aerosols between mammals (ferrets). (1-23) These manuscripts were referred by the United States Government to the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) to assess the dual use research implications of this work and to make recommendations regarding the responsible communication of the work. The results of the NSABB risk-benefit review process and the subsequent recommendation that neither manuscript be fully communicated in an open forum are well known to the international life sciences community.
PMID:
22454472
[PubMed - as supplied by publisher]
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22454472
Creating a Mammalian Transmissible A/H5N1 Influenza Virus: Social Contracts, Prudence, and Alternative Perspectives.
Osterholm MT, Relman DA.
Source
Director, Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, Professor, Division of Environmental Health Sciences, School of Public Health, Adjunct Professor, School of Medicine, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455.
Abstract
Much has been written about two unpublished manuscripts submitted to Science and Nature that describe research studies where mutant derivative strains of highly-pathogenic influenza A/H5N1 were created that can be transmitted by respiratory droplet or aerosols between mammals (ferrets). (1-23) These manuscripts were referred by the United States Government to the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) to assess the dual use research implications of this work and to make recommendations regarding the responsible communication of the work. The results of the NSABB risk-benefit review process and the subsequent recommendation that neither manuscript be fully communicated in an open forum are well known to the international life sciences community.
PMID:
22454472
[PubMed - as supplied by publisher]
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22454472