Mary Wilson
Well-known member
FROM RELYING ON RESPONSE TO REDUCING
THE RISK AT SOURCE OHHLEP whitepaper/Opinion piece
Authored by the members of the One Health High-Level Expert Panel (OHHLEP):
Wanda Markotter*, Thomas C. Mettenleiter*, Wiku B. Adisasmito, Salama Almuhairi, Casey Barton Behravesh, Pépé Bilivogui, Salome A. Bukachi, Natalia Casas, Natalia Cediel Becerra, Dominique F. Charron, Abhishek Chaudhary, Janice R. Ciacci Zanella, Andrew A. Cunningham Osman Dar, Nitish Debnath, Baptiste Dungu, Elmoubasher Farag, George F. Gao, David T. S. Hayman, Margaret Khaitsa, Marion P. G. Koopmans, Catherine Machalaba, John S. Mackenzie, Serge Morand, Vyacheslav Smolenskiy, Lei Zhou
*Corresponding authors
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
The devastating impact of COVID-19 on human health globally has prompted extensive discussions on how to better prepare for and safeguard against the next pandemic. Zoonotic spillover of pathogens from animals to humans is recognised as the predominant cause of emerging infectious diseases and as the primary cause of recent pandemics [1]. This spillover risk is increased by a range of factors (called drivers) that impact the nature, frequency and intensity of contact between humans and wild animals. Many of these drivers are related to human impact, for instance, deforestation and changes in land use and agricultural practices. While it is clear that the triad of prevention-preparedness-response (P-P-R) is highly relevant, there is much discussion on which of these three strategic activities in the eld of emerging infectious disease should be prioritized and how to optimally target resources. For this, it is important to understand the scope of the respective activity and the consequences of prioritization. Already, the Pandemic Fund and forthcoming global Pandemic instrument appear primarily focused on the early detection, and reaction to the appearance of human illnesses, often with explicit focus only on action to be taken once pathogen spillover and spread have occurred. Strategies to reduce the probability of spillover events are under-prioritised and under-utilized, as highlighted by recent infectious disease crises such as Ebola and Mpox epidemics, and have been lost in overall preparedness discussions and recovery nancing. This ‘more of the same’ focus suggests that it is politically more expedient to allocate nancial resources to deal with a problem once it has arisen, rather than taking the steps necessary to reduce the risk of it occurring in the first place. ...
https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/defa...spillover.pdf?sfvrsn=652707eb_1&download=true
THE RISK AT SOURCE OHHLEP whitepaper/Opinion piece
Authored by the members of the One Health High-Level Expert Panel (OHHLEP):
Wanda Markotter*, Thomas C. Mettenleiter*, Wiku B. Adisasmito, Salama Almuhairi, Casey Barton Behravesh, Pépé Bilivogui, Salome A. Bukachi, Natalia Casas, Natalia Cediel Becerra, Dominique F. Charron, Abhishek Chaudhary, Janice R. Ciacci Zanella, Andrew A. Cunningham Osman Dar, Nitish Debnath, Baptiste Dungu, Elmoubasher Farag, George F. Gao, David T. S. Hayman, Margaret Khaitsa, Marion P. G. Koopmans, Catherine Machalaba, John S. Mackenzie, Serge Morand, Vyacheslav Smolenskiy, Lei Zhou
*Corresponding authors
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
The devastating impact of COVID-19 on human health globally has prompted extensive discussions on how to better prepare for and safeguard against the next pandemic. Zoonotic spillover of pathogens from animals to humans is recognised as the predominant cause of emerging infectious diseases and as the primary cause of recent pandemics [1]. This spillover risk is increased by a range of factors (called drivers) that impact the nature, frequency and intensity of contact between humans and wild animals. Many of these drivers are related to human impact, for instance, deforestation and changes in land use and agricultural practices. While it is clear that the triad of prevention-preparedness-response (P-P-R) is highly relevant, there is much discussion on which of these three strategic activities in the eld of emerging infectious disease should be prioritized and how to optimally target resources. For this, it is important to understand the scope of the respective activity and the consequences of prioritization. Already, the Pandemic Fund and forthcoming global Pandemic instrument appear primarily focused on the early detection, and reaction to the appearance of human illnesses, often with explicit focus only on action to be taken once pathogen spillover and spread have occurred. Strategies to reduce the probability of spillover events are under-prioritised and under-utilized, as highlighted by recent infectious disease crises such as Ebola and Mpox epidemics, and have been lost in overall preparedness discussions and recovery nancing. This ‘more of the same’ focus suggests that it is politically more expedient to allocate nancial resources to deal with a problem once it has arisen, rather than taking the steps necessary to reduce the risk of it occurring in the first place. ...
https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/defa...spillover.pdf?sfvrsn=652707eb_1&download=true