Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

[Pathfinder]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

As flu scientists meet, question looms: When will bird flu studies resume?

Helen Branswell, The Canadian Press
Published Friday, Jul. 27, 2012 12:49PM EDT
Last Updated Friday, Jul. 27, 2012 12:50PM EDT

Six months after leading influenza scientists announced they would voluntarily halt research into what it takes to make bird flu viruses transmit among mammals, it's still not clear when and how the cease-work order will be lifted.

Figuring out what an acceptable path towards that end might be will likely occupy considerable time and brain power as many of the researchers capable of doing this work meet in New York next week.

"I very much hope ... that no decision is made at that meeting," microbiologist David Relman says of the annual gathering of the Centers of Excellence for Influenza Research and Surveillance.
...
"I think the most important point is that this can't be a self-proclaimed decision or assessment by a very narrow group of people behind closed doors. This has to be an open process," insists Relman, who teaches at Stanford University in California.
...
Even some flu experts worry about the work.

"Where's this going to take us?" asks Dr. Ilaria Capua, an outspoken Italian researcher who runs an avian influenza reference laboratory for the Food and Agriculture Organization in Padua.

"When are we going to have another moratorium because somebody else comes up with a virus that we don't want to have in many labs around the world?"
...
Capua says it's unfortunate that in the time since the moratorium was announced, there wasn't a greater effort to resolve questions like whether there is a line that ought to be drawn and if so, where it is.
...

Full text:
http://www.ctvnews.ca/health/as-flu...ms-when-will-bird-flu-studies-resume-1.895533

 

[gsgs]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22528161
Reverse genetics of influenza viruses. Neumann G, Ozawa M, Kawaoka Y.
The ability to modify influenza viruses at will has revolutionized influenza research.
Reverse genetics has been used to generate mutant or reassortant influenza viruses
to assess their replication, virulence, pathogenicity, host range, and transmissibility.

 

[Pathfinder]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Research Moratoriums And Recipes For Superbugs: Bird Flu In 2012

by Nell Greenfieldboyce
December 31, 2012 3:30 AM

For scientists who study a dangerous form of bird flu, 2012 is ending as it began — with uncertainty about what the future holds for their research, but a hope that some contentious issues will soon be resolved.
...
Officials have drawn up a set of draft criteria for making decisions, and they want to know what people think. They're accepting emailed comments until Jan. 10.

At the same time, government officials are finishing up a review of what kind of lab safety measures should be used when doing this type of work.
Fouchier, for one, says it's still unclear to him how things will go.

"It's critical who is going to do the vetting on this research, who decides what can be done and what cannot be done," Fouchier says. "If you ask infectious disease specialists about what should be done, you're going to get different answers than if you ask security specialists."
...

Full text:
http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/201...ms-and-recipes-for-superbugs-bird-flu-in-2012

 

[Pathfinder]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Panels III and IV: Perspectives on the Proposed Framework and on the Case Studies

Submit comments on the draft HHS Framework by January 10, 2013 to:
HHS-Framework-H5N1@mail.nih.gov


http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/biosecurity/meetings/Dec2012/Panel_34-H5N1_Workshop_Summary_Slides.pdf

 

[Pathfinder]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

H5N1 virus: Transmission studies resume for avian flu

Ron A. M. Fouchier,<SUP>1</SUP>

<LI class=vcard>Adolfo Garc?a-Sastre,<SUP>2</SUP><LI class="vcard c1 no-comma">Yoshihiro Kawaoka<SUP>3</SUP><LI class="vcard last-author no-comma">& 37 co-authors

• Affiliations
• Corresponding author

<DL class="citation dates"><DT>Journal name:<DD class=journal-title>Nature<DT>Year published:<DD>(2013)<DT>DOI:<DD class=doi>doi:10.1038/nature11858<DT class="published-online first"><DT class="published-online first">Published online 23 January 2013 </DT></DL>...
Because H5N1 virus-transmission studies are essential for pandemic preparedness and understanding the adaptation of influenza viruses to mammals, researchers who have approval from their governments and institutions to conduct this research safely, under appropriate biosafety and biosecurity conditions, have a public-health responsibility to resume this important work. Scientists should not restart their work in countries where, as yet, no decision has been reached on the conditions for H5N1 virus transmission research. At this time, this includes the United States and US-funded research conducted in other countries. Scientists should never conduct this type of research without the appropriate facilities, oversight and all necessary approvals.

We consider biosafety level 3 conditions with the considerable enhancements (BSL-3+) as outlined in the referenced publications<SUP>11, 12, 13</SUP> to be appropriate for this type of work, but recognize that some countries may require BSL-4 conditions in accordance with applicable standards (such as Canada). We fully acknowledge that this research ? as with any work on infectious agents ? is not without risks. However, because the risk exists in nature that an H5N1 virus capable of transmission in mammals may emerge, the benefits of this work outweigh the risks.

Full text:
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/nature11858.html

<DL class="citation dates"><DD><DD></TIME></DD></DL></TIME>

 

[gsgs]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

> However, because the risk exists in nature that an H5N1 virus
> capable of transmission in mammals may emerge, the benefits
> of this work outweigh the risks.

this "outweighting" however can only be decided by actually
doing some "weighting" of the risks, and not just listing the two.

 

[Pathfinder]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

January 23rd, 2013
01:00 PM ET

Bird flu research resumes - but not in U.S.

... United States has been unclear about how long it will be before it issues official guidelines for conditions under which H5N1 transmission research can continue, the letter says. As such, laboratories in the United States and facilities abroad that receive U.S. funding should not proceed with their transmission studies.
...
Kawaoka cannot continue his research in Wisconsin, funded by the National Institutes of Health, pending further guidance from the United States. Fouchier also receives some NIH funding, but the rest is supported by the European Union and other organizations, so his group can continue studying avian flu using those non-U.S. resources.
...
Fouchier's group is not restarting experiments immediately, but probably within the next few weeks, he said. His group will attempt to nail down exactly how many mutations - and which - are sufficient to make the H5N1 avian flu virus airborne, and whether these particular mutations can also make other bird flu viruses airborne.

Avian flu strains from Indonesia and Vietnam has been studied in the context of mutations so far. But, says Fouchier, "there are other genetic lineages of H5N1 in Egypt, in China, for instance, that we would like to test whether also, in these countries, viruses may emerge with an airborne transmission phenotype."
...

Full text:
http://thechart.blogs.cnn.com/2013/01/23/bird-flu-research-resumes-but-not-in-u-s/

 

[Pathfinder]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Leading scientists condemn decision to continue controversial research into deadly H5N1 bird-flu virus
...
Steve Connor
Wednesday 23 January 2013
...
Forty of the world?s most prominent flu researchers have decided to lift their voluntary moratorium on studies into the airborne transmission of the H5N1 strain of bird-flu, which they imposed upon themselves last January following public outrage over the work.
...
Sir Richard Roberts, who won the Nobel Prize in medicine in 1993...
?The decision to lift the moratorium, which seems to have been made a small group of self-interested scientists, makes a mockery of the concept of informed consent,? Sir Richard said.
...
Simon Wain-Hobson, professor of virology at the Pasteur Institute in Paris, said he was taken by surprise by the suddenness of the announcement to end the moratorium.

?There has been no consultation with any virologist outside the flu community on this and, as a virologist, I?m not convinced of the benefits of this research,? Professor Wain-Hobson said.

?The risks are clear for all to see and the benefits are qualitative, and that?s rather weak.Civil scientists are not here to increase the risk from microbes. We are not here to make the microbial world more dangerous,? he said.
...

Full text:
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/s...h-into-deadly-h5n1-birdflu-virus-8463863.html

 

[Giuseppe]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

The issue will remain open since - luckily - good science has to be made for open discussion and debate.

The possible public health consequences of a deliberate or erroneous release into the environment of these chimera viruses should be addressed properly and evalutated by all shareholders.

 

[gsgs]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

we need a global organization to handle these things.

Every country has different rules and arguments ...
but the risks affect the whole world

 

[Pathfinder]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Research to Resume on Modified, Deadlier Bird Flu

By DENISE GRADY
Published: January 23, 2013

During a telephone news conference on Wednesday, Ron Fouchier... said the scientists were lifting the moratorium without waiting for guidelines from the United States.

?How long do you want us to wait?? Dr. Fouchier asked. ?If this was the Netherlands, would the U.S. wait? Should all countries really wait for the U.S., and why??
...
He said other scientists could be given samples of the mutant virus for research only with the permission of Erasmus Medical Center, the National Institutes of Health and virus experts at the Mount Sinai Medical Center in Manhattan.

Full text:
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/24/h...y-bird-flu-to-resume-after-safety-debate.html

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 40 scientists co-authors to the Correspondence by countries:

25 USA
3 China
2 Netherlands
2 Hong Kong
2 Germany
2 UK
1 Italy
1 Russia
1 Japan
1 Canada


Supplementary information to:
Transmission studies resume for avian flu

Full list of co-authors to a Correspondence published online ahead of print in Nature;
http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nature11858 (2013).

Wendy S. Barclay Department of Medicine, Imperial College London,
UK.
w.barclay@imperial.ac.uk

Nicole M. Bouvier Division of Infectious Diseases and Department of
Microbiology, Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, NY
10029, USA.
nicole.bouvier@mssm.edu

Ian H. Brown Virology Department, Animal Health and Veterinary
Laboratories Agency, Addlestone,UK.
ian.brown@ahvla.gsi.gov.uk

Ilaria Capua Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale delle Venezie,
Padova, Italy.
icapua@izsvenezie.it

Hualan Chen Harbin Veterinary Research Institute, Harbin, China.
hlchen1@yahoo.com

Richard W. Compans Influenza Pathogenesis and Immunology
Research Center, Emory University School of Medicine, Atlanta,
GA30322, USA.
rcompan@emory.edu

Robert B. Couch Department of Molecular Virology & Microbiology,
Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, TX 77030, USA.
rcouch@bcm.edu

Nancy J. Cox Influenza Division, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, Atlanta, GA30333, USA.
njc1@cdc.gov

Peter C. Doherty Dept of Immunology, St Jude Children?s Research
Hospital, Memphis, TN 38105, USA.
peter.doherty@stjude.org

Ruben O. Donis Molecular Virology and Vaccines Branch, Influenza
Division, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA
30333, USA.
rvd6@cdc.gov

Heinz Feldmann Laboratory of Virology, National Institute of Allergy
and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health, Rocky Mountain
Laboratories, Hamilton, MT 59840, USA.
feldmannh@niaid.nih.gov

Ron A. M. Fouchier Dept Virology, Erasmus MC, Rotterdam, the
Netherlands.
r.fouchier@erasmusmc.nl

Adolfo Garc?a-Sastre Department of Microbiology, Icahn School of
Medicine at Mount Sinai, New York, NY 10029, USA.
adolfo.garcia-sastre@mssm.edu

Yi Guan State Key Laboratory of Emerging Infectious Diseases, School
of Public Health, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong.
yguan@hku.hk

Jacqueline M. Katz Immunology and Pathogenesis Branch, Influenza
Division, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA
30333, USA.
jmk9@cdc.gov

Yoshihiro Kawaoka* Department of Pathobiological Sciences,
School of Veterinary Medicine, University of Wisconsin?Madison,
Madison, WI 53711, USA.
*Corresponding author: kawaokay@svm.vetmed.wisc.edu

Oleg. I. Kiselev D. I. Ivanovsky Institute of Virology, Ministry of Public
Health, Moscow, Russia.
office@influenza.spb.ru

Hans-Dieter Klenk Institut f?r Virologie, Marburg, Germany.
klenk@staff.uni-marburg.de

Gary Kobinger National Microbiology Laboratory, Public Health
Agency of Canada, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada.
gary.kobinger@phac-aspc.gc.ca

Jinhua Liu Department of Preventive Veterinary Medicine, China
Agricultural University, Beijing, China.
ljh@cau.edu.cn

Xiufan Liu Animal Infectious Disease Laboratory,
School of Veterinary Medicine, Yangzhou University,Yangzhou,
Jiangsu, China.
xfliu@yzu.edu.cn

Anice Lowen Department of Microbiology and Immunology, Emory
University School of Medicine, Atlanta, GA30322, USA.
anice.lowen@emory.edu

Thomas C. Mettenleiter Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Greifswald-Insel
Riems, Germany.
thomas.mettenleiter@fli.bund.de

Albert D. M. E. Osterhaus Department of Virology, Erasmus MC,
Rotterdam, the Netherlands
a.osterhaus@erasmusmc.nl

Peter Palese Department of Microbiology, Icahn School of Medicine at
Mount Sinai, New York, NY 10029, USA.
peter.palese@mssm.edu

J. S. Malik Peiris Centre of Influenza Research, School of Public Health,
The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong.
malik@hkucc.hku.hk

Daniel R. Perez Department of Veterinary Medicine, University of
Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, USA.
dperez1@umd.edu

Juergen A. Richt College of Veterinary Medicine, Kansas State
University, Kansas, KS 66506, USA.
jricht@vet.k-state.edu

Stacey Schultz-Cherry Department of Infectious Disease, St. Jude
Children?s Research Hospital, Memphis, TN 38105, USA.
stacey.schultz-cherry@stjude.org

John Steel Department of Microbiology and Immunology, Emory
University, School of Medicine, Atlanta, GA 30322, USA.
john.steel@emory.edu

Kanta Subbarao Emerging Respiratory Viruses Section, Laboratory
of Infectious Diseases, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, MD 20892, USA.
ksubbarao@niaid.nih.gov

David E. Swayne Southeast Poultry Research Laboratory, USDA/
Agricultural Research Service, Athens, GA30605, USA.
david.swayne@ars.usda.gov

Toru Takimoto Department of Microbiology & Immunology,
University of Rochester Medical Center, Rochester, NY 14642, USA.
toru_takimoto@urmc.rochester.edu

Masato Tashiro Influenza Virus Research Center, National Institute of
Infectious Diseases, Tokyo, 208-0011, Japan.
mtashiro@nih.go.jp

Jeffery K. Taubenberger Viral Pathogenesis and Evolution Section,
Laboratory of Infectious Diseases, National Institute of Allergy
and Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda,
MD 20892, USA.
taubenbergerj@niaid.nih.gov

Paul G. Thomas Department of Immunology, St. Jude Children?s
Research Hospital, Memphis, TN 38105, USA.
paul.thomas@stjude.org

Ralph A. Tripp Dept Infectious Diseases, College of Veterinary
Medicine, University of Georgia, Athens, GA 30602, USA.
ratripp@uga.edu

Terrence M. Tumpey Influenza Division, Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, Atlanta, GA 30333, USA.
tft9@cdc.gov

Richard J. Webby Department of Infectious Disease, St. Jude Children?s
Research Hospital, Memphis, TN 38105, USA.
richard.webby@stjude.org

Robert G. Webster Division of Virology, Department of Infectious
Diseases, St. Jude Children?s Research Hospital, Memphis, TN 38105,
USA.
robert.webster@stjude.org

http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/extref/nature11858-s1.pdf

 

[Treyfish]

Statement of Drs. Collins and Fauci concerning intention to lift moratorium

Statement of Drs. Collins and Fauci concerning intention to lift moratorium

Statement of Drs. Collins and Fauci concerning intention to lift moratorium

January 25, 2013

One year ago, scientists in the H5N1 influenza research community announced that they would voluntarily suspend certain ?gain-of-function? experiments involving highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 viruses pending a broad international dialogue about the future direction of this research.

That dialogue ? which has included experts in the life sciences, public health, biosecurity, biosafety, law, and science policy communities ? has been highly productive, with numerous meetings and publications helping to clarify the most critical issues associated with this type of research.

Countries where this research is (or might be) conducted have had the opportunity to review their policies and parameters for funding, conducting, and communicating about this research. In this context, the H5N1 influenza research community has announced their intention and support for resuming their research in those countries with final guidelines in place.

The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has worked in a transparent and collaborative fashion to develop a framework for reviewing funding decisions regarding research that might increase mammalian transmission of HPAI H5N1 viruses by respiratory droplets. We anticipate that the final framework for HHS funding decisions regarding HPAI H5N1 gain-of-function experiments will be complete in the next several weeks. In the meantime, U.S.-funded researchers (both those working in the United States, including those in government laboratories, as well as those working overseas) have agreed not to resume these types of HPAI H5N1 gain-of-function experiments pending finalization of the HHS Framework.

Understanding how influenza viruses become human pandemic threats is vitally important to global health preparedness. We applaud the international H5N1 influenza research community for the spirit in which they instituted this extended ?pause? on their work, which has provided time for thoughtful consideration of its implications.

Francis S. Collins, M.D., Ph.D.
Director, National Institutes of Health

Anthony S. Fauci, M.D.
Director, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases
National Institutes of Health :tiphat:http://www.nih.gov/about/director/01252012_h5n1_statement.htm

 

[Pathfinder]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Suspended bird flu research resumes

<TABLE class=event-details cellSpacing=0><TBODY><TR><TH vAlign=top>Date:</TH><TD vAlign=top>28 Jan 2013</TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE>...
After a year of extensive discussions about how such research should be conducted, the moratorium was finally lifted last week. Professor Wendy Barclay, from the Department of Medicine at Imperial College London, is a signatory on the http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/nature11858.htmlletter in Nature announcing the resumption of this research. Here she explains why the work was suspended and why it will now continue.

"The moratorium on research with H5N1 highly pathogenic influenza viruses leading to increased transmissibility in mammals was put in place last year by an international collection of influenza virologists. The stimulus for this voluntary pause in research in one specific area was the revelation that two labs had actually generated recombinant viruses with increased transmissibility. Several other labs along with these two had been working in this area for some years, publishing and presenting their work openly, but only when efforts yielded up a positive result did anyone really notice. Then there was a knee jerk response from certain quarters previously naive of this approach, expressing horror that scientists were brewing up deadly diseases. It became clear that the public needed reassurance and justification about these experiments.
...
Now the scientists suggest it is time to move on, go back to the very safe bench they were working at, taking on board the comments of the past year which will undoubtedly have focused their minds on the key questions they hope now to address. H5N1 has not stood still during this year, but thankfully it has also not made any significant evolutionary jumps either. Evidence suggests the virus continues to drift antigenically especially in places like Egypt, but also that clinical management of patients caught early in the infection is improving their chances of survival. The information learned from the two publications that finally made it into Nature and Science last year has been processed by the influenza community and has been hugely informative, not only for understanding the risks from H5N1 but also for illuminating how other subtypes of flu might species jump and even for assessing the zoonotic risks from other pathogens. The lifting of the moratorium will undoubtedly lead to more scientific revelations that will have direct consequence for human and animal health."

Full text:
http://www3.imperial.ac.uk/newsandeventspggrp/imperialcollege/newssummary/news_28-1-2013-15-6-41

 

[gsgs]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

strange how they formulate it.
What I recall is, that NSABB first discouraged publishing, then recommended
publishing of a modified paper where the mutations were left out and only
given to a few selected labs, but then
realized that this was not practicable for legal (US) reasons because other
scientists could require the information through a freedom-of-information-act
request.,
Is it too much required, that USA change their laws in this respect ?
How do they handle military secrets or "cables" or such where they are
so sensitive ?

I do not see how publishing the mutations might help those who might become infected
with H5N1 in the current phase. And why even consider this, when the possible H5N1 pandemic affects
billions vs. a few hundred infected each year.
Should we later find an application, that really makes use of there mutations
and that requires publication thereof and international brought cooperation,
then the mutations can still be published

 

[JJackson]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

GS
There is a bit more to it, legally, than just the US domestic law.

The WHO concluded a legal framework involving the nation states, pharmaceutical companies and other interested parties after the sequence release stand-off between the poor countries lead by Indonesia and the richer countries - hosting the vaccine producers/antiviral manufactures - lead by the US.

The crux of the issue was that Indonesia, and others, were supplying biological samples and sequences free of charge to WHO - who then gave them to others who sequenced them and used them to develop drugs and vaccines - but Indonesia et al got nothing out of it and could not afford the prices these entities charged for the resultant data and products.

The new system requires Nation States to sign up to participate and if they do so they must provide specimens and sequence data which the participating states can access. Commercial interests and universities can also sign up to access the biological material must return sequences and findings to the database. If they make commercial gain they agree to contribute commensurately. These funds are used to make vaccines available to those members who would not otherwise be able to afford them. All parties sign non disclosure agreements so nothing can be shared outside the closed group of signatories.

This agreement was tortuous to negotiate and failure to let some participating countries, and their universities, access to research results based on submitted biological materials is in contravention of the agreement and could unravel the whole thing.

 

[gsgs]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

we're talking about relatively small economical gains as compared to the possible damage.
And this was not the argument of the NSABB why they changed their mind.

> but Indonesia et al got nothing out of it

how much did they require ? Maybe some CSL stocks would have been
appropriate.

> The new system requires Nation States to sign up to participate and if they
> do so they must provide specimens and sequence data which the participating states can access

all of it ? You can't know, what they have

> These funds are used to make vaccines available to those members who would not
> otherwise be able to afford them.

de facto a H5N1 tax, to discourage companies from developing H5-vax.
Better give Indonesia et.al some money directly. You could declare it as H5N1 eradication help or such

> All parties sign non disclosure agreements so nothing can be shared outside the
> closed group of signatories.

this cannot be controlled. Some will be working on it in lower biosafety

> This agreement was tortuous to negotiate and failure to let some participating countries,
> and their universities, access to research results based on submitted biological
> materials is in contravention of the agreement and could unravel the whole thing

modify the whole thing a bit.It cannot be in the interest of either signing party that
those mutations and results become public

The process was still that NSABB first wanted to censor it and wanted the mutations to
be available only to selected groups. Then they figured out that this won't work because
of US-laws, so they changed their minds.

## Osterholm in his bias-criticism letter:
http://www.nature.com/news/bias-accusation-rattles-us-biosecurity-board-1.10454
When the US government asked the NSABB in autumn of 2011 to review the papers
for publication, the board suggested that the papers be published in redacted form,
stripped of details that would allow people to recreate the viruses.
...
Before the (deciding 29.-30.March 2012-) meeting, assessments deemed the NSABB?s
proposed redactions too difficult to facilitate. The NSABB had recommended that
only brief announcements of the findings be published and that only qualified,
vetted experts be allowed access to the full data and methods.
Officials essentially took that option off the table, meaning that NSABB members
would have to vote either for full publication or no publication. Osterholm writes
that this all-or-nothing approach merely ?kicked the can down the road?, ....

## to which Patterson replied:

http://blogs.nature.com/news/files/2012/05/Response-to-Dr-Osterholm-04-25-2012.pdf

For instance, it was explained that the Government is exploring the feasibility of developing
a mechanism for controlled access to sensitive scientific information for those with a legitimate
need to know, in cases where certain details are redacted from a manuscript, and this would
be a way for the full information to reach relevant communities. However, the Government
noted that there were complex legal and practical issues still to be addressed and thus
such a mechanism was not currently available for communicating information in the H5N1
manuscripts under consideration at the March 29-30 NSABB meeting

## then she added your point mentioned above:

There was also discussion of the
international fiamework for virus sharing recently negotiated by the WHO
and concerns that the
framework could be endangered if the manuscripts were redacted

 

[Pathfinder]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Limits on Laboratories
The Deadliest Virus

by David Levin
March-April 2013

...?Part of what makes H5N1 so deadly is that most people lack an immunity to it,? explains Marc Lipsitch, a professor of epidemiology at Harvard School of Public Health (HSPH) who studies the spread of infectious diseases. ?If you make a strain that?s highly transmissible between humans, as the Dutch team did, it could be disastrous if it ever escaped the lab.?
...
If a transmissible strain of H5N1 escapes the lab, says Lipsitch, it could spark a global health catastrophe. ?It could infect millions of people in the United States, and very likely more than a billion people globally, like most successful flu strains do,? he says. ?This might be one of the worst viruses?perhaps the worst virus?in existence right now because it has both transmissibility and high virulence.?

Ironically, this is why Ron Fouchier, the Dutch virologist whose lab created the new H5N1 strain, argues that studying it in more depth is crucial. If the virus can be made transmissible in the lab, he reasons, it can also occur in nature?and researchers should have an opportunity to understand as much as possible about the strain before that happens.
Lipsitch, who directs the Center for Communicable Disease Dynamics at HSPH, thinks the risks far outweigh the rewards. Even in labs with the most stringent safety requirements, such as enclosed rubber ?space suits? to isolate researchers, accidents do happen. A single unprotected breath could infect a researcher, who might unknowingly spread the virus beyond the confines of the lab.

Full text:
http://harvardmagazine.com/2013/03/h5n1-the-deadliest-virus
...

 

[sharon sanders]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Limits on Laboratories
The Deadliest Virus

by David Levin
March-April 2013

...?Part of what makes H5N1 so deadly is that most people lack an immunity to it,? explains Marc Lipsitch, a professor of epidemiology at Harvard School of Public Health (HSPH) who studies the spread of infectious diseases. ?If you make a strain that?s highly transmissible between humans, as the Dutch team did, it could be disastrous if it ever escaped the lab.?
...
If a transmissible strain of H5N1 escapes the lab, says Lipsitch, it could spark a global health catastrophe. ?It could infect millions of people in the United States, and very likely more than a billion people globally, like most successful flu strains do,? he says. ?This might be one of the worst viruses?perhaps the worst virus?in existence right now because it has both transmissibility and high virulence.?

Ironically, this is why Ron Fouchier, the Dutch virologist whose lab created the new H5N1 strain, argues that studying it in more depth is crucial. If the virus can be made transmissible in the lab, he reasons, it can also occur in nature?and researchers should have an opportunity to understand as much as possible about the strain before that happens.
Lipsitch, who directs the Center for Communicable Disease Dynamics at HSPH, thinks the risks far outweigh the rewards. Even in labs with the most stringent safety requirements, such as enclosed rubber ?space suits? to isolate researchers, accidents do happen. A single unprotected breath could infect a researcher, who might unknowingly spread the virus beyond the confines of the lab.

Full text:
http://harvardmagazine.com/2013/03/h5n1-the-deadliest-virus
...

A response:

hat tip Vincent Racanciello

Harvard University: Great virology, bad science writing

<abbr class="published" title="2013-02-18">18 February 2013</abbr>

Harvard University is home to some of the world?s finest virologists. But apparently they do not communicate with the writers at Harvard Magazine, where a botched story on the avian H5N1 influenza virus has just been published.
The problems begin with the first paragraph:

But when Dutch researchers recently created an even more deadly strain of the virus in a laboratory for research purposes, they stirred grave concerns about what would happen if it escaped into the outside world.
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Readers of virology blog will know by now that the Dutch researchers did not make an ?even more deadly strain of the virus? ? they made one that could be transmitted by aerosol, but which had lost its lethality.
The title of the article, ?The Deadliest Virus?, presumably refers to the H5N1 virus that transmits by aerosol among ferrets. This title is simply wrong, because the virus is not deadly to ferrets.
The first paragraph also contains an equally egregious statement by epidemiologist Marc Lipsitch:

If you make a strain that?s highly transmissible between humans, as the Dutch team did, it could be disastrous if it ever escaped the lab.
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Dr. Lipsitch seems to be saying that the Dutch group created an H5N1 virus that transmits among humans. As far as I know, ferrets are not humans.
The article is accompanied by a photograph of two scientists working in BSL4 suits. The legend reads:

The modified H5N1 virus could infect a billion people if it escaped a biocontainment lab like the Canadian facility shown above.
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And later Lipsitch is quoted as saying:

It could infect millions of people in the United States, and very likely more than a billion people globally, like most successful flu strains do. This might be one of the worst viruses?perhaps the worst virus?in existence right now because it has both transmissibility and high virulence.
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For Lipsitch to say that the virus is both transmissible and of high virulence in humans is a misrepresentation of the Dutch group?s findings. He seems to be making up numbers and scenarios.
Perhaps Dr. Lipsitch does not know that ferret studies are not predictive of how viruses will behave in humans. With so many virologists at Harvard, the writer could have checked Dr. Lipsitch?s statements. But he did not, and the result looks as foolish as the New York Times.

 

[Pathfinder]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Amid massive security, bird flu virus research awaits approval

By Karen Herzog of the Journal Sentinel
Feb. 19, 2013
...
Kawaoka is ready to tackle new questions about how avian influenza virus evolves in nature.

He never expected to be thrust into the international spotlight in November 2011, when his research was lumped together with a scientist's research in the Netherlands that - unlike Kawaoka's work - created a deadly H5N1virus strain .

Kawaoka does research only with influenza viruses that are sensitive to antiviral drugs, Moritz says.

Making a virus that's resistant to countermeasures would be a major violation of U.S. government guidelines, she says.

To determine whether H5N1 viruses could be spread among humans, Kawaoka's team generated viruses that combine a gene of avian influenza with genes from a human pandemic 2009 H1N1 influenza virus.

The team used ferrets because the mammals sneeze and cough like humans when infected with a virus. That's how flu viruses are spread among people.

The freezer holding the viruses in the Madison lab is accessible to only a handful of approved personnel. It's kept at -80 degrees Celsius (-112 Fahrenheit), and the virus inventory is checked monthly.
...
As scientists around the world debate the wisdom of creating viruses in labs that could pose serious health threats if accidentally released, or intentionally misused, UW-Madison scientists continue to defend the safety and security surrounding their work.

How would UW researchers know if the virus escaped into the lab?

"That's why we have multiple layers of protection," Moritz says.

Full text:
http://www.jsonline.com/features/he...search-awaits-approval-b78q2ei-191913361.html

 

[gsgs]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

I don't understand that Racaniello fellow.
It's new for us flubies to deal with people saying
it won't be so bad rather than that it won't happen.

it's hard to prove the "coulds" and "mights" from Lipsich incorrect

but even if, what's the point ? Don't worry about a H5N1 pandemic
because it would likely be not so bad ??

(and thus silently considering that it may well happen ....)

H5N1 is awful. Even if it would be only as bad as 1918, which could
well happen, that doesn't let me sleep well ...

Taking the Fouchier-virus and assuming it behaves similar in humans
and assuming it goes pandemic, how many deaths can we estimate ?
(my estimate 100M, I challenge Racaniello to give his estimate)