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Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Comment: Fouchier is in a position to know, and in light of the information below, I am clarifying my position as follows:- a) an essential need for all indivduals carrying out research on H5N1 to be made fully aware of the full information contained in the Fouchier research and b) that active work on the Fouchier team developed virus should be confined to BL4 labs... but if we have naturally occurring virus that is this close to transmissibility it argues for increased levels of research to find new interventions as a matter of extreme urgency for the world.

Perhaps the natural proximity of some viruses to full transmissibility is what has triggered the concerns by Biosecurity organisations over this whole issue; Fouchier and his team make very good points.

Excerpts from Fouchier Reuters interview

In an opinion piece published in Science on Thursday, Fouchier argued for the release the research to help public health officials better prepare for a scenario where the virus could mutate and become more deadly, spreading from person to person via coughs and sneezes. He emphasized that other researchers are close to the same findings, some of them inadvertently, and should be warned in advance how the virus could become airborne.

"We have identified, from the published literature, laboratories working with H5N1 viruses that may only require one to three mutations before the viruses used may become transmissible" via airborne particles, the Erasmus team wrote.

They did not identify the other laboratories, though other experts say they include facilities in both government and academia. "We want them to be careful," Fouchier said in an interview. "They did not know that they were one or two or three mutations away" from having an easily transmissible mutant virus.
Click to expand...

Continued: http://news.yahoo.com/more-lab...
 
Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

I am happy to second Vibrant62's recommendation to read Fochier et al in full.

One thing they have addressed is the impact this may all have on the PIP Framework. The legality of the attempted censorship, under PIP, has been bothering me.

I can not see the point of trying to limit the publication to 'those who need to know' who ever some well meaning group might think that includes if that group will need to include almost everyone capable of reproducing the experiment. The only people who will have to wait to see data are people like us who are not virologists but are sufficiently interested to read papers like this and look at, and try and understand, sequence data. The situation is already bad enough with sequences often not openly available until they are so old they throw little light on the currently circulating strains.

For those not familiar with the PIP Framework a little background and some links.

Since 1952 the WHO have had an influenza surveillance system which now includes about 150 labs in over 100 countries.

Countries were freely supplying samples and data to the system until a few years ago, but some thought the system was not working to their advantage and started to withhold data and samples. The main bone of contention was that commercial vaccine and antiviral manufactures were getting access to the system but their products were unaffordable to the bulk of the populations in the poorer members of the system.

The problem became more acute with the possibility of a high virulence pandemic based on AIHP H5N1 as all the vaccine plants and most of the antiviral production was based in the richer industrialised nation and there was little chance any of it would flow outside the hosting countries in a severe pandemic.

The negotiations to resolve this problem have been very difficult but in May 2011 the PIP Framework was adopted by the 64th World Health Assembly. The new system renames the Global Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN) to Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS) into which samples are sent, logged and subsequently tracked. All the labs in this system have to sign an agreement to get access and agree to share any data derived form these samples. Labs, Pharmaceutical companies and anyone else interested in getting access to the samples have to negotiate with WHO and will be required to input something back into the system. For-instance the manufactures have agreed to fund 50% of the GISRS's running cost as part of their agreements. The agreement also covers technology transfer, pandemic vaccine and seasonal vaccine transfers to poor countries. How these will work in practice remains to be seen as the wording is very weak "Member States should urge vaccine manufacturers to set aside a portion of each production cycle ...".
The PIP Framework can be downloaded as a .pdf here.
and there is a PIP Q&A here.
Click to expand...
As can be seen form the above the GISRS labs alone are 150 in number and situated in 100 countries so how limited can the 'need to know' list be without breaching the terms of the PIP Framework?
 
Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Any lab carrying out H5N1 research needs to know. That means all 150 labs if H5N1 research is going on in all of them - see Fouchier's point about the risks of blind research on local strains that may be uncomfortably close to full transmissibility. This is IMHO a far greater risk than any bioterrorism threat.

Also necessary to keep PIP agreements valid and in place, which is even more important.
 
Re: Researchers suspend study of H5N1 mutations

Re: Researchers suspend study of H5N1 mutations

So, while there have been 10 documented human H5N1 cases in the last 6 weeks, all research has been stopped for 60 days.

Yesterday it was announced that a girl in Egypt had a "light" case of H5N1 in Egypt in October 2011 and was treated as an out-patient. Only surveillance testing found this case.

And today there is news that the Indonesian health minister suspects oseltamivir resistance in human cases.

Maybe this is not the best timing for a moratorium?
 
Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Why do all topresearchers in the world suspend their H5N1 research ?

Read what they say in this great article.

In Dramatic Move, Flu Researchers Announce Moratorium on Some H5N1 Flu Research, Call for Global Summit

by David Malakoff and Martin Enserink, with reporting by Gretchen Vogel and Jon Cohen

on 20 January 2012,

Stung by a growing global controversy over the potential dangers of experiments involving the H5N1 avian flu virus -- and worried about heavy-handed government regulation?the world's leading H5N1 researchers have agreed to a 60-day moratorium on a controversial category of studies "to allow time for international discussion."

"We recognize that we and the rest of the scientific community need to clearly explain the benefits of this important research and the measures taken to minimize its possible risks," a group of 39 researchers write in a statement published today by Science and Nature. "To provide time for these discussions, we have agreed on a voluntary pause of 60 days on any research involving highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 viruses leading to the generation of viruses that are more transmissible in mammals."

"It's a pity that it has to come to this," says Ron Fouchier, of Erasmus Medical Center in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, one of the scientists who took the initiative for the announcement. (Fouchier's H5N1 paper, under review by Science, was one of two that triggered the international debate.) "I would have preferred if this hadn't caused so much controversy, but it has happened and we can't change that. So I think it's the right step to make."
Click to expand...

read more : ScienceMag
 
Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

It looks to me that the researchers were forced into accepting this moratorium:

"..Anthony Fauci, head of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases in Bethesda, Maryland, which funded the studies, strongly supports the moratorium and discussed it at length.."
 
Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

VB

Moratorium on influenza H5N1 transmission research

In letters to Science and Nature, the authors of the controversial avian H5N1 influenza virus transmission experiments in ferrets, together with other influenza virologists, have agreed to a 60 day moratorium on transmission research:

?we have agreed on a voluntary pause of 60 days on any research involving highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 viruses leading to the generation of viruses that are more transmissible in mammals. In addition, no experiments with live H5N1 or H5 HA reassortant viruses already shown to be transmissible in ferrets will be conducted during this time.

They write that research will continue on assessing the ?transmissibility of H5N1 influenza viruses that emerge in nature and pose a continuing threat to human health?.

This research is being halted because of the concerns that ferret-transmissible H5N1 viruses may escape from laboratories. They argue that the finding in two laboratories that viruses with a hemagglutinin (HA) protein from highly pathogenic avian H5N1 influenza viruses can become transmissible in ferrets advances our understanding of influenza transmission. Nevertheless,

We recognize that we and the rest of the scientific community need to clearly explain the benefits of this important research and the measures taken to minimize its possible risks. We propose to do so in an international forum in which the scientific community comes together to discuss and debate these issues.

I agree in principle with this decision, because the argument over this research has become increasingly polarized in recent weeks, with a distressing demarcation between those who believe the work should proceed, and those who feel it should not be done. A dialogue to identify the crucial issues and develop plans to address them, while continuing this important line of research, is certainly welcome.

I am curious to see who will participate in the proposed dialogue. I do hope it will be a balanced forum: a fair mix of microbiologists, especially those working on influenza virus, and those interested in biosecurity. As I have said before, scientists will listen to the policy analysts, but the latter must also understand the science.

Update: Alan Dove has written an honest analysis of the moratorium announcement.

Related:

Palese: Don?t censor live-saving science
N.Y. Times: H5N1 ferret research should not have been done
Should we fear avian H5N1 influenza?
A bad day for science
Ferreting out influenza H5N1

http://www.virology.ws/2012/01/20/moratorium-on-influenza-h5n1-transmission-research/
 
Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

This means that research into therapies, interventions and vaccines should continue - only experiments that seek to assess transmission from ferret to ferret will be suspended pending an agreement.
 
Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Provincial Academy of Agricultural Sciences permitted to engage in highly pathogenic avian influenza
At 8:12 on January 21, 2012

(Reporter correspondent Huang Xianguang Hang Wei Fang) 17, reporter learned from the Provincial Academy of Agricultural Sciences, Department of Agriculture recently agreed by the Provincial Academy of Agricultural Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Biosafety three laboratories engaged in animal highly pathogenic avian influenza experiments.

Allegedly, this is the first of China's provincial Academy of Agricultural Sciences, the fourth permitted to engage in domestic bird flu research lab.

China attaches great importance to research and highly pathogenic avian influenza prevention and control, required to perform highly pathogenic avian influenza research laboratory must have the animal biosafety level three protection of hard and soft conditions and research management. In August 2002, the province started construction of three animal biosafety lab, multi-million capital investment to build the highest level of animal bio-security laboratory.

Provincial Academy of Agricultural Sciences, said the demand for frontier science and technology and industry, to strengthen the field of bird flu research original innovation, break through the public key technology, and promote sustained and healthy development of China's poultry industry.:tiphat: http://roll.sohu.com/20120121/n332822430.shtml
 
Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Source: http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/avianflu/news/jan2012letter.html

US virologists ask NSABB to reconsider H5N1 decision
Lisa Schnirring * Staff Writer

Jan 20, 2012 (CIDRAP News) ? Eighteen virologists have sent a letter to the US government's dual-use research advisory board, asking members to reconsider their recommendation that two research groups redact key details about their studies on mutated H5N1 viruses.

The letter, sent to the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) on Jan 18, was signed by virologists from US universities, according to a report today from ScienceInsider, the online news service of Science. The NSABB made its ruling last month based on concerns about an intentional or accidental release of the viruses.

On Dec 20, the US government asked two journals, Science and Nature, to omit key details of two studies on the transmissibility of mutant H5N1 strains, based on the recommendation of the NSABB, a panel of independent experts that advises the National Institutes of Health (NIH) on dual-use research issues. Both studies were conducted under NIH contracts.

The journals responded cautiously to the recommendation and are waiting for the government to come up with a mechanism to share key details with researchers who have a legitimate need for them. The NSABB's recommendation has been criticized as a threat to scientific freedom, though other experts have supported the board's stance.

The letter was signed by some virologists who have previously criticized the NSABB's recommendation, including some among an international list of scientists who today signed on to a voluntary 60-day H5N1 research moratorium, such as Dr Peter Palese and Dr Adolfo Garcia-Sastre, with Mount Sinai School of Medicine in New York (see related CIDRAP News story).

The letter to the NSABB from the virologists argues that fears about the mutant virus falling into the wrong hands or escaping during a lab accident are overblown, ScienceInsider reported.

The letter writers say there is no evidence that the mutated strains would sicken humans, except if large doses were inhaled, the report said. The virologists also took issue with estimates of how lethal the H5N1 virus is and said the number of human infections is not known and could be higher than previously thought.

They maintained that current safety oversight is adequate, and that the studies should proceed. Writers urged the NSABB to consider broad discussion in the science community before taking final action.

See also:

Jan 20 ScienceInsider story

Jan 20 CIDRAP News story "Researchers announce pause in controversial H5N1 studies"

Dec 20, 2011, CIDRAP News story "US government urges journals to omit details of two H5N1 studies"
 
Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

I copied the last 2 posts onto this thread.

It looks like many researchers have been strongly encouraged to stop working on H5N1 studies while China's scientists continue working?

Does this sound right?

Also, at the World Health Organization conference/discussion on H5N1 research, are "normal" people represented? Who is representing the 6,999,990,000 people on earth who are not virology or biosecurity experts?
 
Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

they say "moratorium" but it looks like strike to me.
They want to publish because they get money for it ?

Just now we need to know more.

Shall others do the research ? China,Russia,3rd world ?
= less regulated,takes longer, full of secrecy

compare this with 2006 when scientists were calling for
more research, more funds, dramatising the pandemic
threat.
Now they are playing down the threat but I can't follow
the arguments.
And formerly as now they won't discuss here, they won't give
their probability estimes.

They have already created a system (GISAID) for withholding
information while sharing the info among them.
Now they want to publish critical info and threaten to stop
research to enforce it.
And behind that even the unspoken threat to give the
research into wrong hands. They don't say that and
even if they won't do that, they seem to enjoy our fear
that they could and might.
And this is all being done with our money, with public funds.

First we have to ban pandemic weapons in a global approach
_including_ El Kaida and such. Who speculates with such
weapons should lose even local support or support within
certain groups. Because it's just clear terrorism.
Using weapons that would damage the whole world,
even the uninvolved and aggressors.
We need a global consensus and cooperation on this.

Then we have to intensify our preparations and research.
And not go on 60-day strike.

just my momentary thoughts after reading this.
This may change after reading the details and spending
more thought on it
 
Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

how dangerous is it to work on this ?
Fouchier pointed out that some used viruses are
close to airborne and shouldn't be handled.

But now scientific curiosity will just be trying to figure out those...

We need to know whether that hypothetical virus is indeed capable
of going pandemic. And if yes, we need to increase our prepandemic
efforts a lot.
Quickly.
 
Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

There are, and should be, checks at two points. Firstly all research on, or which might produce, a dangerous pathogen needs to be pre-approved by an institutional research ethics committee. At this point all reasonably predictable consequences should be considered. As the research comes to be published the editors should exercise a duty of care to make sure nothing unforeseen and potentially dangerous gets disseminated. Those in the peer review process are best equipped to spot anything of that nature. The interference of a national third party body, only some of whom are scientist in relevant fields, is not helpful. Further to which their recommendations are wholly impracticable. There are just too many people who have a legal right to the information added to which the information is not actually a secret.

Without knowing the exact details I would be willing to bet they passaged a candidate H5N1 in a medium that favoured alpha 2,6 binding a few times and then kept infecting ferrets until they got a strain that could cause infection in cages just far enough apart to pick out any mutations that were well adapted to droplet transmission. Iterate from there.

Now I have given away the secret to all the Bio WMD terrorists reading this thread. So the cat is out of the bag so lets get back to trying to find a way to mitigate the effects of the resultant strain once nature also cracks this particular problem.
 
Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

I find myself getting increasingly angry at this debate. We are wasting time.

While all the interested parties debate the issues of censoring scientific data, the real point is ignored.

We have no quick and effective method to treat some of the emerging pathogens.

We need to increase our efforts on developing a new class of antibiotics to counter drug resistant tuberculosis and other resistant diseases.

We need to find a non-vaccine therapy for flu. Vaccines are great for the tiny percentage of the world's population that can get them in a timely manner. What about everyone who can not?

We are dancing while Rome burns.
 
Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Scientists to Pause Research on Deadly Strain of Bird Flu</NYT_HEADLINE><NYT_BYLINE>
By DENISE GRADY

Published: January 20, 2012

Excerpt:

Richard H. Ebright, a molecular biologist at Rutgers, is among those who oppose the research because of its risks, and doubts that it could be used to predict pandemics. He said that a moratorium was a good idea, but that this one did not go far enough. He said that the letter did not acknowledge the need for improved ?biosafety, biosecurity and oversight,? and that in any case, 60 days would not be enough time to put the needed safeguards in place. The letter noted a ?perceived fear? among the public, Dr. Ebright said, and seemed to suggest that the debate would cool down if people would just let the researchers explain that they had done the experiments safely.

Dr. Ebright said experiments with this virus should be done only in laboratories with the highest biosafety rating, BSL4, not in the ?enhanced BSL3? in which the work was actually done.

Dr. Fouchier disagreed. He also said that his center did not have BSL4 labs.

Dr. Fauci said various expert groups, including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, had determined that enhanced BSL3 was good enough for bird flu research.

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/s...deadly-strain-of-bird-flu.html?_r=1&src=rechp
 
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