Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

[Vibrant62]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Re: attenuation. If we look at the result of infections in birds i.e multiple die offs interspersed by periods of attenuation, followed by mass die offs which are caused by regular viral mutation and evolution amongst wild bird hosts, there is no reason to suppose that the experience in humans will be any different. It will be bad indeed if H5N1 successfully makes the leap to humans to become a humanised virus. This is why continued research to find an effective universal vaccine or therapies that can attenuate infection without emergence of resistance are so important, and why research MUST continue in this area and continue to receive adequate funding, and in every country no matter how bad the global economic situation is. An H5N1 pandemic would not be over in a single season; it would pose an ongoing problem for many years. Just look at what happens to ducks/ wild bird populations in asia periodically... never mind the chickens..

H5 viruses are unique amongst the influenza family because they contain polybasic cleavage sites (well not quite - so do H7 and H9 viruses, but the number of cleavage sites possible is lower) - i.e they dont just have one key to enter a cell and infect it, they have a whole bunch of them. When one key fails because the lock gets barred, it still has a number of other keys - and potentially other target cells - for initiating infection. This is why it is so deadly, and why it is such a threat.

 

[gsgs]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

can't they just reduce the cleavage site ?
It doesn't seem to happen in nature, while increasing it does happen.
Test it in ferrets !

that would also give them better publicity ;-)

 

[Gert van der Hoek]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

"the new H5N1 variants must be restricted to BSL-4 labs" ?

Fears grow over lab-bred flu

Scientists call for stricter biosafety measures for dangerous avian-influenza variants.

Declan Butler

20 December 2011

- snip -

Both experiments were conducted in labs rated at ‘biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) enhanced’ (see ‘ Safety by degrees’). Such labs require scientists to shower and change clothes when leaving the lab, and include other safety features such as negative air pressure and passing exhaust air through high-efficiency particulate air filters. This should be quite sufficient to provide protection against an accidental release of the virus, some virologists say.

“Current biosafety rules are adequate for safely doing such transmission experiments with H5N1 viruses or any other influenza virus,” says Peter Palese, a virologist at Mount Sinai School of Medicine in New York.

Requiring the more stringent protocols of BSL-4 facilities would hamper the research needed to develop countermeasures against an H5N1 pandemic, says Masato Tashiro, a virologist at the National Institute of Infectious Diseases in Tokyo, because it would limit the number of researchers able to work with the virus. As such, he believes that the work should be done in BSL-3 enhanced facilities.

High security
But others say that to protect not only the researchers working on the viruses, but also society at large, the new H5N1 variants must be restricted to BSL-4 labs. These labs have far tougher safety and security measures, such as requiring workers to wear positive air pressure suits and undergo more rigorous decontamination; some also have additional security measures, such as video surveillance and bomb-proofing. Corralling this research in BSL-4 facilities would also immediately limit the proliferation of the viruses in labs, because only a few dozen such facilities exist worldwide, says Ebright. Indeed, one regulatory official, who requested anonymity, says that he is most concerned about the H5N1 mutants being handled in BSL-3 labs in countries with weak biosafety cultures or competences.

Deborah Middleton, an H5N1 researcher at the high-containment facilities at the Australian Animal Health Laboratory in Geelong, says that the characteristics of the new variants “fulfil the criteria of a BSL-4 pathogen”, adding that she believes they would probably be handled as such in her institution. Indeed, the original experiments to create the viruses should also have been conducted in a BSL-4 facility, argues Hervé Raoul, director of the Jean Meriéux-INSERM BSL-4 lab in Lyons, France.

Past experience suggests that the risk of the new variant H5N1 escaping from a lab is far from negligible. Over the past decade, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) has accidentally infected staff at four high-containment labs in mainland China, Taiwan and Singapore, variously rated as BSL-3 and BSL-4. A US National Research Council report released in September detailed 395 biosafety breaches during work with select agents in the United States between 2003 and 2009 — including seven laboratory-acquired infections — that risked accidental release of dangerous pathogens from high-containment labs.

Read more - Nature

thanks to Helen Branswell

 

[Pathfinder]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Outbreak: super-flu research to be published?

<!--a href="http://rt.com/news/super-flu-terrorist-threat-251/" class="permalink">permalink</a--><IFRAME style="POSITION: absolute; FILTER: alpha(opacity=0); VERTICAL-ALIGN: top; TOP: 0px; LEFT: 0px" id=shorturl_iframe height=20 src="http://on.rt.com/s/iframe1.html" frameBorder=no width=100 scrolling=no></IFRAME>Published: 20 December, 2011, 20:02

A man-made virus that could wipe out half humanity has been deemed a terrorist threat. And while the scientists behind the Frankenstein-flu hoped their research would help find a cure, critics fear they have developed the ultimate bio-weapon.
<!--RTEditor:genereated--><!--RTEditor textarea-->­
When virologist Ron Fouchier and his team of scientists first "mutated the hell out of? the H5N1 bird flu virus and presented their findings this past September, fear spread like contagion across the Internet.

But it is not just panic-prone bloggers who are up in arms about the latest virus.

Microbiologist and US National Science Advisory Board (NSABB) chair Paul Keim did not mince his words when describing the potentially deadly bug.

"I can't think of another pathogenic organism that is as scary as this one," Keim, who has worked on anthrax for many years, told the science insider journal. "I don't think anthrax is scary at all compared to this."

Despite the widespread panic, the Dutch team who engineered the deadly strain at the Erasmus Medical Center in Rotterdam still hope to publish their findings in the American Journal of Science.

However, sensing the imminent threat of making the results of their investigation public, the NSABB is now reviewing the paper to determine whether it should ever see the light of day, the Daily Mail reports.
One senior scientific advisor to the US Government also expressed his grave concerns.


?The fear is that if you create something this deadly and it goes into a global pandemic, the mortality and cost to the world could be massive. The worst-case scenario here is worse than anything you can imagine,? the paper cites.

More...
http://rt.com/news/super-flu-terrorist-threat-251/

 

[Gert van der Hoek]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Tuesday, December 20, 2011

Press Statement on the NSABB Review of H5N1 Research

The U.S. government remains concerned about the threat of influenza, for the risks it poses seasonally, as well as its potential to cause a pandemic. Our domestic and global influenza surveillance efforts have become increasingly capable, along with expanded vaccine manufacturing capacity and assistance to other countries in their efforts to detect and respond to a pandemic. To enhance the detection of and response to influenza outbreaks, the U.S. government supports a broad range of domestic and global preparedness and response efforts that include research on better diagnostics, vaccines, and therapeutics.

Currently, H5N1 avian influenza virus — the strain commonly referred to as "bird flu" — rarely infects humans and does not spread easily from person to person. However, many scientists and public health officials are concerned that the virus could evolve in nature into a form that is transmissible among humans — an event that could potentially make this deadly virus an extremely serious global public health threat. Thus research on factors that can affect the transmissibility of the H5N1 virus is critically important to international efforts to prepare and prevent threats to public health.

While the public health benefits of such research can be important, certain information obtained through such studies has the potential to be misused for harmful purposes. The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) — an independent expert committee that advises the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and other Federal departments and agencies on matters of biosecurity — completed a review of two unpublished manuscripts describing NIH-funded research on the transmissibility of H5N1. These manuscripts — which describe laboratory experiments that resulted in viruses with enhanced transmissibility in mammals – concluded that the H5N1 virus has greater potential than previously believed to gain a dangerous capacity to be transmitted among mammals, including perhaps humans, and describe some of the genetic changes that appear to correlate with this potential.

Following its review, the NSABB decided to recommend that HHS ask the authors of the reports and the editors of the journals that were considering publishing the reports to make changes in the manuscripts. Due to the importance of the findings to the public health and research communities, the NSABB recommended that the general conclusions highlighting the novel outcome be published, but that the manuscripts not include the methodological and other details that could enable replication of the experiments by those who would seek to do harm.

The NSABB also recommended that language be added to the manuscripts to explain better the goals and potential public health benefits of the research, and to detail the extensive safety and security measures taken to protect laboratory workers and the public.

HHS agreed with this assessment and provided these non-binding recommendations to the authors and journal editors.

Recognizing the significant potential benefit of the information about the experimental details to the global influenza surveillance and research communities, the U.S. government is working to establish a mechanism to allow secure access to the information to those with a legitimate need in order to achieve important public health goals. The U.S. government is also developing a proposed oversight policy that would augment existing approaches to evaluating research that has the potential to be misused for harmful purposes.

The NSABB supports the overall goals of the National Institutes of Health, in conducting safe, ethical and informative research to enhance health, lengthen life, and reduce the burdens of illness and disability. To learn more about the NSABB, visit www.biosecurityboard.gov.

About the National Institutes of Health (NIH): NIH, the nation's medical research agency, includes 27 Institutes and Centers and is a component of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. NIH is the primary federal agency conducting and supporting basic, clinical, and translational medical research, and is investigating the causes, treatments, and cures for both common and rare diseases. For more information about NIH and its programs, visit www.nih.gov.

NIH

 

[tetano]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science
The Risk of Engineering a Highly Transmissible H5N1 Virus
To cite this article:
Thomas V. Inglesby, Anita Cicero, and D. A. Henderson. Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science. -Not available-, ahead of print. doi:10.1089/bsp.2011.1214.
Online Ahead of Print: December 16, 2011

Thomas V. Inglesby,
Anita Cicero, and
D. A. Henderson
Thomas V. Inglesby, MD, is the Chief Executive Officer and Director; Anita Cicero, JD, is Chief Operating Officer and Deputy Director; and D. A. Henderson, MD, MPH, is a Distinguished Scholar, all at the Center for Biosecurity of UPMC, Baltimore, Maryland. Drs. Inglesby and Henderson are Coeditors-in-Chief of Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science.


Over the past 8 years, H5N1 avian influenza has sickened 571 people, killing 59% of them. To give some perspective, the fatality rate of the virus that caused the 1918 Great Pandemic was 2%, and that pandemic killed on the order of 50 million people. Like all influenza strains, H5N1 is constantly evolving in nature. But thankfully, this deadly virus does not now spread readily through the air from person to person. If it evolves to become as transmissible as normal flu and results in a pandemic, it could cause billions of illnesses and deaths around the world?the proportion of the global population affected by past pandemics.

Scientists recently have announced that they genetically modified H5N1 in the laboratory and that this mutated strain spread through the air between ferrets that were physically separated from each other. This is ominous news. Since ferret influenza virus infection closely mirrors human infection and is similarly transmissible, these scientists appear to have created a bird flu strain with characteristics that indicate it would be readily transmissible by air between humans. In fact, the lead scientist on one of the experiments explicitly stated this.

The question is this: Should we purposefully engineer avian flu strains to become highly transmissible in humans? In our view, no. We believe the benefits of this work do not outweigh the risks. Here's why.

full text

http://www.liebertonline.com/doi/full/10.1089/bsp.2011.1214

 

[Gert van der Hoek]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Pressrelease NIH/NSABB

Helen Branswell : article with comments of stakeholders


U.S. asks journals not to publish details of controversial bird flu studies

Helen Branswell, Tuesday, December 20, 2011

The U.S. government is asking scientific journals and two top-flight research teams not to publish details of controversial studies on the bird flu virus, expressing concerns the information could be put to nefarious use.

The government asked the journals, Science and Nature, to publish only brief reports of the end result of the work, withholding the methods by which the research teams managed to adapt the dangerous H5N1 virus to become easily transmissible.



Read it on Global News: Global Calgary | U.S. asks journals not to publish details of controversial bird flu studies

thanks to Crof

 

[Gert van der Hoek]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Snip from a blog

Should the new flu stay secret? Or does secrecy kill?


Vincent Racaniello, a virologist at Columbia University, thinks taking this path is a bad idea. Here?s how he put it to me when I sent him the statements:

It doesn?t make any sense to publish Fouchier?s paper without complete data and experimental details. The point of a science paper is to enable others to duplicate the findings. Are we going to set a new precedent, where security matters override the reason for publication? This is setting a very dangerous precedent for virology and biological sciences in general.

I disagree with the NSABB recommendations, because they have no scientific basis?one cannot conclude that the mutations selected by Fouchier [the head of the Dutch research team] will have effects on transmission of the virus among humans.

I understand that if you publish the plans for a nuclear weapon, that may enable a terrorist to make one, but the Foucher finding doesn?t enable anything except more experiments. And that is why the paper should be published ? to allow virologists to extend his findings and determine what controls transmission of H5N1 viruses.

Often the best experiments are done by scientific unknowns who take an interest in a problem and apply a fresh view. If you restrict dissemination of this information, you are limiting our eventual understanding of the problem.

http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/l...the-new-flu-stay-secret-or-does-secrecy-kill/

 

[Gert van der Hoek]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

december 20, 2011

Science: Editor-in-Chief Bruce Alberts on Publication of H5N1 Avian Influenza Research

Science confirmed today that it has received a recommendation by the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) to publish only an abbreviated version of a research report related to a strain of H5N1 avian influenza virus. Editors at the journal are considering the request seriously and Editor-in-Chief Bruce Alberts has released a public statement today summarizing the journal?s position.

On 30 November, the NSABB verbally asked Science to delete details regarding both scientific methodology and specific viral mutations before publishing a research article by Dr. Ron Fouchier of the Erasmus Medical Center and colleagues. The written recommendation, provided to the journal on 1 December, expressed concern that publication of the full paper could pose security issues.

...................

Science has concerns about withholding potentially important public-health information from responsible influenza researchers. Many scientists within the influenza community have a bona fide need to know the details of this research in order to protect the public, especially if they currently are working with related strains of the virus.?

Science editors are now evaluating how best to proceed.

?Our response will be heavily dependent upon the further steps taken by the U.S. government to set forth a written, transparent plan to ensure that any information that is omitted from the publication will be provided to all those responsible scientists who request it, as part of their legitimate efforts to improve public health and safety,? Alberts said.

read more: http://www.aaas.org/news/releases/2011/1220herfst.shtml

 

[Pathfinder]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Thank you Gert van der Hoek for the link:

http://www.nature.com/news/fears-grow-over-lab-bred-flu-1.9692
</SECTION>

Excerpt:

On 20 December, the US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) released a statement outlining its recommendations to the authors of the two flu studies under review, and to the editors of the journals that are considering publishing them. The statement says:

"Due to the importance of the findings to the public health and research communities, the NSABB recommended that the general conclusions highlighting the novel outcome be published, but that the manuscripts not include the methodological and other details that could enable replication of the experiments by those who would seek to do harm. The NSABB also recommended that language be added to the manuscripts to explain better the goals and potential public health benefits of the research, and to detail the extensive safety and security measures taken to protect laboratory workers and the public."

...
In response, Nature's Editor-in-Chief Philip Campbell said:

"We have noted the unprecedented NSABB recommendations that would restrict public access to data and methods and recognise the motivation behind them. It is essential for public health that the full details of any scientific analysis of flu viruses be available to researchers. We are discussing with interested parties how, within the scenario recommended by NSABB, appropriate access to the scientific methods and data could be enabled."


</SECTION>

 

[sharon sanders]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

I think it is wrong to censure this material. The people who have the ability to make a laboratory H5N1 strain are researchers who will be able to see the entire paper anyway.

So what have we achieved here?

A huge interest generated by "The Forbidden Fruit".

A public relations nightmare that has only served to illuminate the existence of this paper.

This almost guarantees that the very people who the security establishment does not want to have access to this data - will now seek it out - while access to a general body of researchers, who may help find the key to disable H5N1 should it become pandemic, are limited.

 

[gsgs]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

do you think that USA,China,.. didn't know it before ?

It's an important experiment and not too difficult
and expensive.
Maybe Webster&Co did it in 2006 and that's why he said
half of mankind could die ?!?

Are there some "secrets" which make it harder for
others to repeat it ?
How hard ? Enough to prevent them from doing it ? Hardly.

The same question will arise later in other labs and other countries.

Time to intensify our counter-measures

 

[Vibrant62]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

To me there are some interesting and worrying statements in these reports.

The suggestion by some leading researchers that most recent or 'new' h5n1 variant research should be restricted to BL4 labs suggest that currently circulating H5N1 variations are significantly closer to a pandemic status than previously circulating variations; of all people, these researchers are in a position to know. Whilst it limits the volumes of research that can be done, if current forms of H5N1 are intrinsically closer to full adaptation, restricting research of certain types i.e research involving genetic alteration or manipulation of these viruses should be restricted to BL4 Labs.

That said, there is plenty of other (very necessary) H5N1 research which should be OK for BL3 labs and be permitted to continue eg. devt of immunoassay tests, immune responsiveness, potential drug candidate assays etc.

I worry that in this debate, decisions will be made that do not distinguish between different types of research and the inherent risks associated with that research vs. potential gains.

It must not be forgotten that at this time Tamiflu is the only (imperfect) drug intervention we have, and it is prone to development of resistance. In the absence of globally and instantly available vaccines, research must continue to find defensive measures against a pandemic outbreak of this nature.... lest we all get left to our 'natural' fate with a virus with a devastatingly high CFR. I dont think anyone wants that.

 

[Laidback Al]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Grudgingly, Virologists Agree to Redact Details in Sensitive Flu Papers

by Martin Enserink on 20 December 2011, 2:38 PM

Two groups of scientists who carried out highly controversial studies with the avian influenza virus H5N1 have reluctantly agreed to strike certain details from manuscripts describing their work after having been asked to do so by a U.S. biosecurity council. The as-yet unpublished papers, which are under review at Nature and Science, will be changed to minimize the risks that they could be misused by would-be bioterrorists.
But the stricken details may still be made available to influenza scientists who have a legitimate interest in knowing them under a new system the journals and U.S. government officials have been actively debating for some time.
The two papers have both been reviewed at length by the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSSAB), and both have been the subject of intense global media attention the past 2 months. They have also triggered debates among scientists, security experts, and officials within various branches of the U.S. government.
. . .
read more at: http://news.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2011/12/grudgingly-virologists-agree-to.html
:tiphat: to pogge

 

[Giuseppe]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Apart the controversial move by US bioterror advisors, I think that our main concern is related to the natural history of H5N1 and its consequence for global health.

We are seeing the seasonal spike in human H5N1 cases in Egypt and sooner than later other regions endemic for this virus will experience human infections too.

Currently, H5N1 is a widespread zoonosis in Egypt, Bangladesh, Indonesia, China, some India's Regions where overcrowded human communities often are struggling with floods, poverty, malnutrition, other infectious diseases and very poor hygiene.

Have we really the need of another Prometheus eagerly awaiting to see to us how his invention may change the world?

And have we made an account of the increase in popularity of this novel Prometheus and the Journal that wants to publish his paper?

Perhaps, our efforts may be much more needed in control the animal diseases and in developing improved treatment rather than creating chimeric organism with high destructive potential.

Science is our best hope for the future but scientists aren't a group outside the world, the ethic and the humanity.

Science is not aseptic, it is not a angel's driven heaven of Truth and Salvage. As other field of mankind culture needs to be honest, independent and sober.

One small success today may cause a disaster tomorrow.

People that are relying on backyard poultry for survival almost surely will have not a single cent from the shareholders of the Prometheus Journal... (IOH)

 

[gsgs]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

strange that you say that just in this context.
Who do you think might save us from that
H5N1 pandemic , if not science ?

 

[Laidback Al]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

A Moral Imperative

Too often researchers hide behind the cloak of science and claim neutrality when critical bioethical issues arise. Now that the Fouchier team from Erasmus University Medical Center and the Kawaoka team from the University of Wisconsin have succeed in their quest to turn H5N1 into a virulent, human-transmissible virus, they cannot remain neutral. They now have a new categorical imperative. The only ethical path forward for these two groups of researchers is to turn their scientific prowess to the task of emasculating the H5N1 monster that they have just created in their laboratories.

 

[Laidback Al]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

New York Times interview with Ron A. M. Fouchier, the lead researcher at the Erasmus Center.

Security in Flu Study Was Paramount, Scientist Says By DOREEN CARVAJAL

Published: December 21, 2011

The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, concerned about bioterrorism and a worldwide pandemic, has for the first time ever urged scientific journals to keep details out of reports that they intend to publish on a highly transmissible form of the bird flu called A(H5N1), which has a high death rate in people. Working with ferrets, researchers on the virus at two medical centers ? Erasmus Medical Center in Rotterdam, in the Netherlands, and the University of Wisconsin-Madison ? are investigating genetic changes that may make the virus more easily transmittable to people. Doreen Carvajal spoke with Ron A. M. Fouchier, the lead researcher at the Erasmus Center. . . . .

full interview at: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/22/h...d-flu-study-was-paramount-scientist-says.html

 

[gsgs]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

my summary:
1.) proof that it can go airborne
2.) surveillance of mutations so to concentrate on strains with those mutations to wipe out
3.) test and adapt the vaccines and antivirals to that artificial airborne virus

started planning 10 years ago, biosafety was a problem
Fouchier et.al. are continuing the work for 3.)
not easy to repeat, sophisticated team and facilities
[gsgs: but what, if they use lower biosafety ???]
nature is the biggest bioterrorist
they think it should be published in detail

public health specialists are pro publishing
biosecurity experts against

 

[tetano]

Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version

Too late to contain killer flu science, say experts

Attempts to suppress details of the controversial experiments that have created a highly infectious form of bird flu virus are likely to fail, according to scientists familiar with the research.

The US government has asked two scientific journals to refrain from publishing key parts of research on the H5N1 strain of bird flu to prevent the information falling into the hands of terrorists intent on recreating the same flu strain for use as a bioweapon.

..


http://www.independent.co.uk/news/s...n-killer-flu-science-say-experts-6280399.html