Re: Man Made H5N1 - Super Version
Vincent Racaniello wrote on his blog:
>Ferreting out influenza H5N1
>6 December 2011
>A laboratory
>in the Netherlands has identified a lethal influenza H5N1 virus
>strain that is transmitted among ferrets. These findings are under
>review by the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity
>(NSABB) to ensure that they do not constitute a threat to human
>health. Meanwhile both the popular and scientific press has been
>calling this a "virus that could change world history". Even
and half of mankind could die. But how likely ? "Noone knows ..."
>the usually restrained Helen Branswell writes that "... the dangerous
>virus can mutate to become easily transmissible among ferrets
>" - and perhaps humans..." Should we be frightened?
yes, but how much ?
>Details
>of Ron Fouchier's experiments are not known because the results
>have not yet been published. Reports at CIDRAP and Science indicate
>that Fouchier was attempting to make the H5N1 virus more transmissible
>in ferrets. This strain of influenza is lethal in birds and humans
>- there have been over 500 human cases with over 50% mortality.
> However, the virus is not readily transmitted among humans. The
>virus is lethal in ferrets but does not transmit among the animals.
> Fouchier selected a transmissible H5N1 variant by ferret-to-ferret
>passage. This experiment involves infecting a ferret, harvesting
>virus from the animal, and infecting another ferret. After ten
>such passages, the H5N1 variant could spread from one ferret to
>another by airborne transmission. The two amino acid changes that
>permit airborne spread among ferrets were identified.
just 2 aa in the whole genome ? Frightening. I remember, in 2005(?) we had the
much cited study that suggested 10 mutations were needed to distinguish
the 1918 virus from avian ones and that H5N1 already is getting some of those
>Scientists
>appear to be responsible for the hype surrounding this experiment.
too much "hype" or too few, who knows. Compare with 2005f
> Fouchier called it "one of the most dangerous viruses you can
>make". Paul Keim, chair of NSABB, "can't think of another
>pathogenic organism that is as scary as this one", and Richard
>Ebright, a molecular biologist at Rutgers University says the
>experiment should not have been done. Martin Enserink writing
>in ScienceInsider says that the virus could change world history,
> and similar proclamations of doom can be found in the popular
>press.
the problem is the typical use of words "can","could","may",...
here, instead of giving probability estimates.
Now, you say "does not mean","not guaranteed" ...which is even
less informative. Then you say "highly unlikely" , but even 1%
would be highly frightening ...
>I cannot fault the press for not having the background
>to interpret these studies,
and I think this is because of the lack of clear words from scientist,
i.e. subjective probability estimates.
And the hesitation and non-insistence of the press to ask for those.
> but scientists should know better
>than to declare that this is a dangerous virus.
you mean, it is not ??? You should know better ...
> First and foremost,
> ferrets are not humans. Every influenza researcher will say that
>ferrets are a good model for influenza - they display similar
>flu-like symptoms, immune responses, and pathological alterations
>such as elevated temperature, weight loss, and histological changes.
> But it would be foolish to conclude that ferret influenza is
>the same as human influenza in all aspects. For example, not all
>influenza virus strains have the same virulence in humans and
>ferrets. A good example is the 2009 pandemic H1N1 virus which
>caused severe infections in some ferret studies, but was relatively
>mild in humans.
>In other words, just because the Fouchier H5N1
>virus is transmissible among ferrets does not mean that it will
>be equally transmissible among humans.
right. And below you write:
" No one can guarantee that Fouchier's
virus would not be lethal and transmissible in humans. "
So it's undecided either way. But it's a clear indication that the
chances are not bad (IMO > 20%) that the same few or other mutations
would make it equally or better transmissable in humans.
And yes, that would not yet give a pandemic ... but maybe 10%
that it would ? Give your estimate !
> The experiment to answer
>this question cannot be done.
It can and it was. E.g. in USA 1918:
Roseman,M.J.,Keegan,W.J.,Goldberger,J,and Lake,G.C.:
Experiments upon volunteers ...
Maybe it is being done in China. And you needn't necessarily
risk human health, some questions can be ansered in simulations
or cell cultures. Animal experiments can answer further questions.
And I think it's worth to be figured out. How much should be
published - that's another question
>Passage of viruses in a different
>host is one strategy for reducing the virulence in humans. This
>concept is explained in this passage from Principles of Virology:
>Less virulent (attenuated) viruses can be selected by growth
>in cells other than those of the normal host, or by propagation
>at nonphysiological temperatures. Mutants able to propagate better
>under these selective conditions arise during viral replication.
> When such mutants are isolated, purified, and subsequently tested
>for pathogenicity in appropriate models, some may be less pathogenic
>than their parent.
>The possibility that passage of the H5N1 virus
>in ferrets will attenuate its virulence in humans has been ignored.
it did not happen in the ferrets. It did not happen in chicken and
mice experiments with H5N1. It did not happen in humans (well,
the current H5N1 in Egypt is less deadly, but not Indonesia,China,..)
It's possible but not very likely IMO (<50%)
>In my view, it is highly unlikely that laboratory-modified viruses
>will be able to cause extensive disease in humans.
now, this is strage. Who else thinks this ?
There are lots of examples. Maybe we should run all viruses through a lab
to make them less dangerous ...
>When humans tinker with viruses, they generally do not know what the virus
>needs to replicate efficiently, cause disease, and transmit in
>humans. Consequently, they are likely to introduce changes that
>attenuate pathogenesis in humans.
OK, maybe you meant that most changes are bad for the virus
statistically. But those are being filtered out.
The changes that survive can as well make it more dangerous,
spread to other organs than the original.
>Nature is far better at producing
>viruses that can kill -
nature has no interest to kill. The virus wants to replicate,
but killing is usually a disadvantage here.
In fact influenza mainly evolves in mallards and there it is most often
not much pathogenic. When it jumps to other species, that is "accidental"
and may cause severe disease, but the virus doesn't benefit and after
years,decades,centuries of evolution in those species it usually
becomes less virulent.
>to think that we can duplicate the enormous
>diversity and selection pressures that occur in the wild is a
>severe case of scientific hubris.
they were quite successful. Apparently nature didn't yet find
those 2 or 5 mutations.
>Another aspect of this story
>that deserves comment is the review by the NSABB. That body is
>charged with reviewing experiments that would render a vaccine
>ineffective; confer resistance to antimicrobial agents; enhance
>the virulence of a pathogen or make a non-pathogen virulent; increase
>transmissibility of a pathogen; enable evasion of detection; and
>enable weaponization of a biological agent or toxin. It is not
>clear to me how this committee could make some of these conclusions
>without data from human experiments. Nevertheless, why would the
>NSABB recommend against publication of Fouchier's data? Could
>the sequence of the ferret adapted H5N1 be used for bioterrorism?
>It seems unlikely: it is not known if the virus would be pathogenic
>and transmissible in humans.
"unlikely" could just only be <50% ...
Not yet satisfying.
>Bioterrorists do not want to carry
>out an experiment; they want to instill terror.
all terrorism is experiment. They never know whether it works
as planned.
>Why use a laboratory
>modified H5N1 strain when the sequence of the 1918 influenza virus,
> known to be a lethal and transmissible human virus, is readily
>available?
is it ? Is it still dangerous to humans ?
H5N1 is another HA, so pandemic potential, while for H1 we have some immunity.
H5N1 is also much more deadly.
>Ebright calls the 1918 virus "the most effective
>bioweapons agent now known".
>No one can guarantee that Fouchier's
>virus would not be lethal and transmissible in humans. But the
>same could be said about any number of laboratory modified viruses,
the same = "No one can guarantee".
> none of which have attracted the attention of the NSABB or the
>press. When dealing with viruses, both caution and restraint are
>necessary qualities.
But only influenza does these pandemics.
And H5 is a candidate
>This article is based on the conversation
>with Rich Condit and Alan Dove on TWiV 159 and 160.
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