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Liquidity Problems

kent nickell

Well-known member
The role of quantitative easing to flood the economy with liquidity has people worried about resultant fiscal deficits, higher interest rates and inflation. This article suggests that it also may be funding the wrong things such as 'technical' advances in China and US stock markets without real economic structural change. It's a temporary morphine drip or sugar high that distracts us from solving the real problems....

http://english.caijing.com.cn/2009-06-10/110181808.html
Liquidity's Role in Delusions of Recovery

06-10 08:51 Caijing


Chinese market rallies, commodity prices and U.S. improvements are fueling hopes of an economic turnaround. Don't be fooled.


By Hu Shuli, editor of Caijing

(Caijing Magazine) Mercury on the Chinese capital market's thermometer is rising in tandem with the summer heat. We're seeing a lot of excitement. The Shanghai Stock Index has been hitting highs not seen since last summer. Capital inflow has been explosive. And Hong Kong shares have rallied in ways reminiscent of the 2006 bull market.

The mainland property market is rising again. In the first four months of this year, residential housing sales rose 30 to 40 percent. Land has been selling at a premium. And sales in Beijing more than doubled compared to the same period last year.

Global commodities have rallied. The Reuters/Jefferies CRB Index in May recorded the highest single-month gain in 35 years, and on June 1 scored the largest ever single-day advance in the last two months. The market expects the index to rise another 19 percent by August. Crude oil prices shot up nearly 30 percent in the past month to almost US$ 70 a barrel.
Admittedly, the warming trend is linked to economic recovery. In the United States, the ISM manufacturing index, new factory orders and housing starts have started to look better. A consumer confidence index jumped to a level of 54.9 in April -- the fourth largest monthly rise in 32 years. All these factors indicate a moderating of the economic slide.



In China, the Purchasing Management Index performed better than expected. Export orders in May rose above 50 (on a scale of 0-100) for the first time since November, reflecting a pickup in the export sector that could sustain an economic rebound.

However, these warm spots are no reason for runaway optimism. The crisis may be abating, but the real economy provides limited evidence of a turnaround.

Excess liquidity is the primary reason for the sharp rise in asset prices. We believe the market is likely pumped up on steroids and basking in a liquidity-induced euphoria.

Through the ongoing crisis, central banks of major countries have adopted low or zero-interest rate policies. Governments and central banks injected huge amounts of capital. The Chinese government's 4 trillion yuan stimulus package got a lot of attention, and the U.S. Federal Reserve's "quantitative easing" policy touched the extremes of loose monetary policy.

Each of these short-term stabilization measures point to a key phenomenon -- excess liquidity. This U.S. dollar-led global liquidity binge is pushing up inflation expectations, as well as weakening the dollar's role as a risk haven. As a result, global capital has been rushing into tangible assets and commodities to hedge against inflation.

Rising asset and commodity prices reflect not only the normal bounce after prices bottom out, but also a swelling bubble of speculation. Because the economic recovery is not yet on solid ground, undue market speculation will destabilize the economy. Indulging in liquidity-induced euphoria is worrisome.

In the short run, rallies in China's stock and property markets can only be regarded as a technical bounce -- not a fundamental turnaround.
The property market, either in terms of trading volume or investment inflow, is propped by policies: The government cuts the ratio of required capital for developers, relaxes conditions for developers to get land, and lowers land prices, while banks offer easier credit for property projects. In contrast, market factors such as real demand and earnings are unstable. Rising stock indexes may reflect reasonable bounce, but they do not mean macroeconomic conditions and corporate earnings have turned for the better.

This latest rally has all the marks of being fueled by easy credit. Statistics are difficult to come by, but the consensus is that a substantial part of the unusually high level of bank lending since the beginning of the year went into the stock market.



One possible reason for rising commodity prices is the strong demand for crude oil, copper and iron ore to feed an economic recovery in China. However, a close analysis reveals that only a small portion of recent Chinese imports went toward meeting production demand. A lot of these imported materials were used to build up strategic reserves or restock some Chinese enterprises that wanted to take advantage of low prices. In terms of demand this year, the current increase is not sustainable.
Moreover, the global commodity bounce and inflation expectations are self-fulfilling, raising a risk of global stagflation.

From medium- and long-term perspectives, the current financial crisis stems from global economic imbalance. World recovery must start with a new balancing. A precondition is that major countries must readjust economic structures. This takes time and involves many twists and turns.

The 4 trillion yuan stimulus package notwithstanding, China continues to face soft domestic demand and is pinning hopes on rising external demand to absorb new capacity. The United States, searching for a rebalancing of its own, must abandon a model that relies on over-consumption.

But a recovery of U.S. demand is likely to fall short of China's expectations.
Recent figures show U.S. personal savings in April rose 5.7 percent -- to the highest level in 14 years. Due to tax cuts, personal disposable income in April rose 1.1 percent. But instead of spending their additional income, Americans put it in savings.

Recent trends indicate overseas demand for Chinese goods is unlikely to recover in the short term. Nor will it return to previous levels of prosperity in the medium term. This puts more pressure on China to expand domestic demand through structural adjustment, while at the same time pursuing important reforms such as income re-distribution and expanding the service industry. It is indeed a tough battle.

Without a doubt, data that shows warming trends can increase the kind of market confidence badly needed in this economic crisis. But solid confidence must be built on fundamental economic improvements and rational expectations. Over-optimism about economic recovery or exaggerated inflation expectations are to be avoided. For now, we must be prudent and optimistic, without being swept away by liquidity-induced euphoria.
 
Re: Liquidity Problems

The role of quantitative easing to flood the economy with liquidity has people worried about resultant fiscal deficits, higher interest rates and inflation.

Pretty much the big take on Mainstreet is that Walltreet doesn't have a clue about what the reality on the ground is.

Let me give a summary of some facts.
* Foreclosures are still exploding
* It is scaring the pants of the financial institutions, and they are mandating all appraisals include the foreclosure sales. This is DESTROYING price values much faster than people think.
* Consequently - the banks are NOT lending money.

Here's a perfectly good example: a local fellow has a $400K home. Great shape. Great location, and aggrssively priced. Marketing finally attracted a buyer with stellar credit. Banks saw s foreclosure in the area and mandated a 20% downpayment - which is unheard of. BUT - just before closing, the bank saw yet another foreclosure, and went back tot he buyer, and said that while they would still do the deal - they now wanted 30% down. Killed the deal. Nobody comes up with $120K downpayment in a primary residence.

Summary - the banks are creating this mess. Stimulus package flowed $Billions into their pockets - and they are sitting on it. Price market for real estate in the U.S. is getting ready to drop off the cliff AGAIN!

We're heading into something worse than 1929 - and any Pandemic is just going to exacerbate the situation, but even without a pandemic - it's going to be worse than anyone imagines.
 
Re: Liquidity Problems

Thanks MV, I also don't see real estate, commercial or residential getting better anytime soon. I'm not sure how solvent the banks are. They still seem to have many legacy/toxic assets (old mortgage packages that are going bad) that they haven't realistically priced for their balance sheets and that are getting worse. (And this is after shuffling off billions of these assets onto to Feds balance sheets) They are trying to raise capital in the fragile stock market...

I don't know where the endgame is. Housing seems to need to be more in line with peoples income. Maybe 3 times after tax income.. This deflationary spiral is definitely going to cause more problems for banks and the general economy. I would like to see more power given to regional banks who can deal more realistically with local conditions... And where are the jobs that are going to support mortgage payments... This definitely has a way to go...
 
Re: Liquidity Problems

I've talked to a lot of local / regional banks "off the record" as I've tried to discuss joint ventures regarding their foreclosures. Considering the fact that these guys know "where the bodies are buried" so to speak - and given the circumstances of conversations - I'd say the land/housing/commercial markets are getting ready to get unbelievably bad - heck, they are almost non-existent now, and the next result will be absolute price freefall.

Banks are also starting to worry about the credit card market. That's not getting much coverage yet - but it's the next shoe to fall.

You add these 2 facts together - and I think the only thing bigger than exponential explosions in Flu numbers - is going to be bank failure numbers.

AND HERE IS A VERY INTERESTING FACT I PICKED UP IN A CONVERSATION THIS MORNING......

I didn't put much stock in this last rumour go round, but I am hearing that the "Amero" a new central Mexico/American/Canadian currency is SERIOUSLY in the works behind closed doors. It's basically the Western version of the Euro.

I haven't seen this myself yet, simply because I haven't had time to look, but my reliable source tells me there is a "Bank Holiday" scheduled for sometime in August, and that they are going to close the banks for several days and that this will probably coincide with the rollout of the new currency.

Kent, you or anyne else have any feedback on this new central currency development??? Bank holiday details?
 
Re: Liquidity Problems

I haven't heard anything about those 2 issues but I think the currency markets and exchange rates are going to be volatile...

It's interesting that in the Fitch analysis below they rate the US as the the best in terms of low sovereign risk (ie maintaining a AAA rating implying a low chance for default) with Germany second (let's you know how bad of shape everyone else is ;)) This is largely due to the overall depth and strength of these economies as a whole. The US has a huge advantage in the amount of world trade that is conducted in dollars and its prominent use by many countries as a reserve currency. It seems to be in everyones best interest to continue that at least for the short to intermediate term.

It's also interesting in that the US is running large deficits as a primary importer and Germany is running large surpluses as a primary exporter. Both countries though are under severe stress and will have to make fundamental changes. The US banking system may be barely stabilized by dramatic measures but will still have to adapt to real estate prices that probably won't bottom out for a few years. Fitch will eventually have to deal with these losses on the Feds balance sheet. As with China it's going to be very difficult for Germany do deal with declining exports in the deflationary world economy.

Also interesting is the interaction of these two strongest currencies... the USD and the euro. The Financial Times article below talks about possible violent swings as these import/export adjustmens play out....




Fitch Ratings (free registration required) by David Riley, Jun 09, 2009
The Financial Crisis, Policy Response and Sovereign Credit Risk
Link: http://www.rgemonitor.com/redir.php?sid=2&tgid=166&cid=354879





----------


Some interesting ramifications when you play these things out....

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5901f960-538b-11de-be08-00144feabdc0.html?nclick_check=1

Down and out for the long term in Germany

By Wolfgang M?nchau

Published: June 7 2009

Let me attempt, perhaps foolhardily, to map out a scenario of how the global economic crisis could evolve in continental Europe.

Even if we assume a recovery elsewhere, Europe?s economy may be stuck at low growth for some time. To understand why, it is perhaps best to look at sectoral balances for households, companies and the public sector.

The current account can be expressed as the difference between national savings and investments. Of the world?s 10 largest economies, the US, the UK and Spain used to run the largest current account deficits before the crisis. The US household sector has been shifting from a negative savings rate before the crisis to a positive rate of 4 per cent of disposable income now.
The US corporate sector used to have a large negative savings rate, but this has almost disappeared. So far, the increase in net savings in the US private sector has been balanced by increased borrowing from the US government.

I am making three assumptions: the first is that the return to a positive US household savings rate is permanent ? even under a scenario of a strong economic recovery. US households will take time to repair their balance sheets after the housing and credit disaster. Second, I also expect US companies not to return to the high level of borrowings that prevailed before the crisis. Third, I expect the US government to reduce its deficit after 2010. The recent rise in long-term bond yields should serve as a reminder that deficits cannot go on rising forever.

Taking all three factors together, the US will shift from a strongly negative current account balance towards neutrality
, perhaps even a small surplus for a short period. I expect similar shifts in the UK and Spain at different magnitudes.

Among countries with large current account surpluses, the three biggest are China, Japan and Germany. I am focusing on Germany here. The German household sector will maintain its high savings rate. The German government increased its deficit during the crisis, but is now looking for a quick fiscal exit strategy. The Bundestag has recently voted through a constitutional balanced-budget clause, which requires cuts in the deficit almost right away. Japan will probably maintain its larger fiscal deficit for longer, but if we take Germany, China and Japan together, we will not see a sufficient and sustained fiscal expansion to compensate for the sectoral shifts elsewhere.

Global current account surpluses and deficits add up to zero. So if everybody is saving more, who will be dissaving? It will have to be the corporate sector in the countries with large net exports
. So if the US, the UK and Spain are heading for a more balanced current account in the future, so will the surplus countries.

The current account balance can also be expressed as the sum of the trade balance, net earnings on foreign assets, and unilateral financial transfers. In several countries, including the US and Germany, the gap between exports and imports serves as a good proxy for the current account. A fall in the trade deficit in the US, UK and Spain implies a fall in the combined trade surplus elsewhere. And as some of the shifts in the US and the UK are likely to be structural, this will have long-term effects on others. In particular, it means the export model on which Germany, China and Japan rely, could suffer a cardiac arrest.

What about the argument that a large part of German exports goes to the rest of the eurozone? This is true, but there are imbalances within the eurozone too. Spain has been running a current account deficit of close to 10 per cent of gross domestic product. As that comes down, so will Germany?s equally unsustainable intra-eurozone surplus.

Through what mechanism will this export-sector meltdown come about? My guess is that in Europe it will happen through a violent increase in the euro?s exchange rate against the US dollar, and possibly the pound and other free-floating currencies.

Exchange rate devaluation would greatly help the US and others to reduce their current account deficits, but it will impair the economic recovery in countries with large trade surpluses and free-floating exchange rates.
Last week?s remarks by Angela Merkel, who criticised the Federal Reserve and other central banks for running inflationary policies, sharpened investor perceptions of transatlantic policy divergence and decoupling. Many investors are now starting to bet on a strong appreciation of the euro ? the last thing Ms Merkel wants.

Neither Germany nor Japan is politically equipped to deal with an exchange rate shock. China may continue to manage its exchange rate, but the Europeans are much less likely to intervene in foreign exchange markets. For the time being, the governments of the classic export nations cling on to their export-based economic model, the model they know best. Their only strategy, if you call it that, is to hope for a miraculous bail-out from the US consumer ? which is not going to happen this time.

If my predictions prove correct, Germany will be down and out for a long time with a huge and still unresolved banking crisis, an overshooting exchange rate and lower net exports, presided over by politicians who panic about domestic inflation. This will not end well.

munchau@eurointelligence.com
 
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