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International Biodefense Handbook 2007
Source: Center for Security Studies (CSS)
The handbook compares different political, strategic and structural approaches to biosecurity in seven countries and five international and supra-national organizations. It provides an overview of national and multilateral biodefense efforts by examining important policies in this field and through an inventory of the institutions and actors involved.
+ Full Document (PDF; 2.5 MB)
Some excerpts from this document....
From the Preface "The nature of risks and vulnerabilities in modern societies is becoming more and more transnational today. An open, non-heirarchical dialog on newly recognized vulnerabilities is needed at the physical, virtual, and psychological levels to create new knowledge and a better understanding of new risks and of their causes, interactions, probablilties, and costs.
The menace of diseases caused by naturally or deliberately released viruses, bacteria, or toxins poses a serious challenge to society and politics. It confronts states with a multitude of complex tasks, many of which have an interdisciplinary character affecting various distinct government entities. In an analysis of various national frameworks, the "International Biodefense Handbook" compares different political, strategic, and structural apporaches to biosecurity in seven countries and five international and supra-national organizations. It provides an overview of national and multilateral biodefense efforts by examining important policies in this field and through an inventory of the institutions and actors involved. It is an important step towards a comprehensive overview of existing efforts in biodefense.
From the Foreward by Dr. Marc Cadisch, Director, SPIEZ LABORATORY, www.labor-spiez.ch
In recent years, biological threats and hazards have been discussed and investigated intensely all over the world. Scientists, public health agencies, policymakers in the security field, military leaders, intelligence services, journalists, industrial experts, international organizations, and many other professionals are concerned with this issue.
This handbook offers a great overview with comprehensive information and will further foster international cooperation. It should serve as a useful reference book for all of the concerned parties mentioned above.
From the Introduction by Andreas Wenger and Sergio Bonin (Center for Security Studies)..
The menace of diseases caused by naturally or deliberately released microorganisms poses serious challenges to society. Besides the fact that biodefense measures must cope with a threefold menace that may originate form states, non-state actors, or natural developments, the complexities of a comprehensive biological defense stem from its cross-sectoral nature that affects many diverse government entities in areas ranging from the public health and civil protection sectors to law enforcement and intelligence agencies as well as the military, but also including research institutions, veterinary offices, and export control organizations.
The great level of uncertainty, especially as regards the terrorist dimension of the biological threat, largely accounts for the differing and ambiguous threat perceptions and assessments among policy-makers and experts. The threefold nature of the threat, which affects previously unrelated communities - namely the public health sector and the national security apparatus - may cause competition for the allocation of scarce resources among uneven stakeholders and lead to a potentially problematic integration of health issues into national security considerations.
In order to cope with all of these obstacles successfully, structures for accurate risk communication need to be established. On the one hand, this is important for the public dissemination of potentially live-saving information as well as for the prevention of a mass panic. On the other hand, a multidisciplinary response to a biological incident as described here requires considerable coordination efforts and command structures.
The interfaces between early-warning and crisis management structures in the security and health sectors are subject to particularly serious challenges in terms of coordination and communication. Transparency and rapid information exchange, form the local to the regional and even national levels, are preconditions for efficient crisis management, and require that roles and responsibilities be clearly delegated.
The overall purpose of the International Biodefense Handbook is to provide an overview of biodefense practices on the national level in a range of countries (Part I). For the first edition of the Handbook, we have chosen France , Germany, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and US. Additional countries will be added in future versions of the Handbook Furthermore, the initiatives and structures of selected international and supra-national organizations (WHO, EU, NATO, ICRC, and G8) are examined (Part II) and the activities of two civil-society initiatives (BioWeapons Prevention Project and Sunshine Project) are presented (Part III).
The Handbook is aimed at security policy analysts, researchers, and practitioners. It can be used either as a reference work for a quick overview of biodefense policies, or as a starting point for further, in-depth research. The Handbook does not claim to offer a comprehensive, scientific analysis of the topic; rather, it is an effort to collect existing policies and structures, and to provide an inventory of disposable assets on the national nad international level.
From Concluding Remark: "Healthification" Instead of "Securitization"
At present, the biodefense agenda seems to be largely dominated by the concerns of foreign and security policy, and not of global public health. The "securitization" of the health sector - that is, the trend towards dealing with health issues using the vocabulary and the means of national security, and thereby justifying extraordinary state interventions - is a problematic development. Preparedness for an uncertain bioterror risk may jeopardize a country's capacity to respond to other well-known, immediate, and measurable rusks.
The main difference is one of focus. While bioterrorism preparedness is based on an anticipatory strategy that focuses on the specific threat of a terror attack involving already identified biological weapons agents, the general model of infectious disease preparedness, in contrast, is designed to focus not on a specified threat, but on the capability to respond to a variety of (unanticipated) infectious diseases threats - that is, a resilience strategy.
Such a "healthification" of the bioterrorism preparedness and response (re-)assigns the primary responsibility for an infectious disease emergency to public health authorities, with the security sector only becoming involved in cases where an outbreak is believed to have a terrorist background. Given the fact that natural outbreaks are inevitable, while intentional attempts to release biological agents are not, such an approach is far more cost-effective and politically sustainable than preparing a separate approach for each individual threat source.
International Biodefense Handbook 2007
Source: Center for Security Studies (CSS)
The handbook compares different political, strategic and structural approaches to biosecurity in seven countries and five international and supra-national organizations. It provides an overview of national and multilateral biodefense efforts by examining important policies in this field and through an inventory of the institutions and actors involved.
+ Full Document (PDF; 2.5 MB)
Some excerpts from this document....
From the Preface "The nature of risks and vulnerabilities in modern societies is becoming more and more transnational today. An open, non-heirarchical dialog on newly recognized vulnerabilities is needed at the physical, virtual, and psychological levels to create new knowledge and a better understanding of new risks and of their causes, interactions, probablilties, and costs.
The menace of diseases caused by naturally or deliberately released viruses, bacteria, or toxins poses a serious challenge to society and politics. It confronts states with a multitude of complex tasks, many of which have an interdisciplinary character affecting various distinct government entities. In an analysis of various national frameworks, the "International Biodefense Handbook" compares different political, strategic, and structural apporaches to biosecurity in seven countries and five international and supra-national organizations. It provides an overview of national and multilateral biodefense efforts by examining important policies in this field and through an inventory of the institutions and actors involved. It is an important step towards a comprehensive overview of existing efforts in biodefense.
From the Foreward by Dr. Marc Cadisch, Director, SPIEZ LABORATORY, www.labor-spiez.ch
In recent years, biological threats and hazards have been discussed and investigated intensely all over the world. Scientists, public health agencies, policymakers in the security field, military leaders, intelligence services, journalists, industrial experts, international organizations, and many other professionals are concerned with this issue.
This handbook offers a great overview with comprehensive information and will further foster international cooperation. It should serve as a useful reference book for all of the concerned parties mentioned above.
From the Introduction by Andreas Wenger and Sergio Bonin (Center for Security Studies)..
The menace of diseases caused by naturally or deliberately released microorganisms poses serious challenges to society. Besides the fact that biodefense measures must cope with a threefold menace that may originate form states, non-state actors, or natural developments, the complexities of a comprehensive biological defense stem from its cross-sectoral nature that affects many diverse government entities in areas ranging from the public health and civil protection sectors to law enforcement and intelligence agencies as well as the military, but also including research institutions, veterinary offices, and export control organizations.
The great level of uncertainty, especially as regards the terrorist dimension of the biological threat, largely accounts for the differing and ambiguous threat perceptions and assessments among policy-makers and experts. The threefold nature of the threat, which affects previously unrelated communities - namely the public health sector and the national security apparatus - may cause competition for the allocation of scarce resources among uneven stakeholders and lead to a potentially problematic integration of health issues into national security considerations.
In order to cope with all of these obstacles successfully, structures for accurate risk communication need to be established. On the one hand, this is important for the public dissemination of potentially live-saving information as well as for the prevention of a mass panic. On the other hand, a multidisciplinary response to a biological incident as described here requires considerable coordination efforts and command structures.
The interfaces between early-warning and crisis management structures in the security and health sectors are subject to particularly serious challenges in terms of coordination and communication. Transparency and rapid information exchange, form the local to the regional and even national levels, are preconditions for efficient crisis management, and require that roles and responsibilities be clearly delegated.
The overall purpose of the International Biodefense Handbook is to provide an overview of biodefense practices on the national level in a range of countries (Part I). For the first edition of the Handbook, we have chosen France , Germany, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and US. Additional countries will be added in future versions of the Handbook Furthermore, the initiatives and structures of selected international and supra-national organizations (WHO, EU, NATO, ICRC, and G8) are examined (Part II) and the activities of two civil-society initiatives (BioWeapons Prevention Project and Sunshine Project) are presented (Part III).
The Handbook is aimed at security policy analysts, researchers, and practitioners. It can be used either as a reference work for a quick overview of biodefense policies, or as a starting point for further, in-depth research. The Handbook does not claim to offer a comprehensive, scientific analysis of the topic; rather, it is an effort to collect existing policies and structures, and to provide an inventory of disposable assets on the national nad international level.
From Concluding Remark: "Healthification" Instead of "Securitization"
At present, the biodefense agenda seems to be largely dominated by the concerns of foreign and security policy, and not of global public health. The "securitization" of the health sector - that is, the trend towards dealing with health issues using the vocabulary and the means of national security, and thereby justifying extraordinary state interventions - is a problematic development. Preparedness for an uncertain bioterror risk may jeopardize a country's capacity to respond to other well-known, immediate, and measurable rusks.
The main difference is one of focus. While bioterrorism preparedness is based on an anticipatory strategy that focuses on the specific threat of a terror attack involving already identified biological weapons agents, the general model of infectious disease preparedness, in contrast, is designed to focus not on a specified threat, but on the capability to respond to a variety of (unanticipated) infectious diseases threats - that is, a resilience strategy.
Such a "healthification" of the bioterrorism preparedness and response (re-)assigns the primary responsibility for an infectious disease emergency to public health authorities, with the security sector only becoming involved in cases where an outbreak is believed to have a terrorist background. Given the fact that natural outbreaks are inevitable, while intentional attempts to release biological agents are not, such an approach is far more cost-effective and politically sustainable than preparing a separate approach for each individual threat source.
