Re: Indonesia agrees to give bird flu information to new online database
in
http://209.85.135.104/search?q=cach...nals.edu.sg/PDF/37VolNo6Jun2008/V37N6p482.pdf
(hattip ironorehopper )
Sedyaningsih,Isfandari,Soendoro,Supari wrote:
> ...
> Mandatory Virus Sharing Practice
> The application of the International Health Regulations( IHR)
> 2005 is based on 2 ways of interpretation.15 The first interpretation
> was that IHR 2005 requires a country to share relevant biological
> samples as part of the duty to provide WHO with accurate and
> detailed public health information about all events that might
> constitute a public health emergency of international concern
> (PHEIC).16 Although IHR 2005 does not literally or specifically
> express the requirement for sharing of biological samples, this
> school of thought believes that surveillance for aetiological
> agents that may cause a PHEIC can only be conducted if countries
> share samples in a timely and consistent manner, without
> preconditions. This interpretation was supported by World
> Health Assembly (WHA) resolution adopted in May 2006 and May
> 2007.17,18 It is in accordance with this interpretation that
> influenza A (H5N1) specimens have been shared through the WHO
> Global Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN).19
> Contrary to the first opinion, the second interpretation accepts
> that IHR 2005 does not require countries to share biological specimens
> with WHO and biological substances are 2 independent concepts
> and were actually negotiated separately; public health information
> strictly means knowledge and facts.15 This school of thought
> argues that even the WHA resolutions of 2006 and 2007 distinguished
> these 2 terminologies, i.e.,information and relevant biological
> materials.17,18 Moreover,this interpretation strongly believes
> that countries have sovereign control over biological resources
> found within their territories, as stated in the Convention on
> Biological Diversity (CBD).20 Hence, countries have the right
> and authority to decide whether to share their specimens with
> the WHO system or not, depending on their own judgment.
There are probably 3rd, 4th etc. interpretions and schools of thought too.
It's not sufficient to establish an interpretation, it should also
be reasonable.
The intent of the WHO-regulation is to early detect and contain
infectious disease. If sharing of specimens is important to achieve
this goal, then it should be included.
What are the possible countermeasures ? Quarantaine,surveillance,
treatment,prophylaxis. WHO has a history to recommend panflu-vaccination,
Indonesia herself has propagated it and apparantly doesn't question
its possible merits, see below.
So it would make sense from the purpose and intent of the regulations
to include sharing of specimens.
The lawyers of the two schools may examine the wordings of the regulations
and whether they include sharing of specimens.
But it's clear that the authors of the paper resort to such "juristical
tricks" and counter the purpose of the regulations which they signed.
> ...
> Since April 2006, incidents that led to Indonesia's
> discontentment towards the WHO system for global influenza surveillance
> came one after another.
>
> First, results of laboratory analyses
> that involved H5N1 viruses from Indonesia were presented in
> various international meetings without prior permission nor
> notification to the Indonesian government nor its scientists,
> or with notification just a couple of hours prior to the presentation,
> at best.
that's not an Indonesia-specific problem. It could involve
any results from any country.
Does Indonesia think it has right to control the presentation
of results involving Indonesia samples in meetings etc. ?
If yes, did they ever require this publicly ? Are there any
regulations to cover this ? Had it been done in the past ?
Had Indonesia being trested worse than other countries here ?
> Then Indonesian scientists and/or government officers
> were offered to be included as co-authors in papers written
> by international scientists who had access to Indonesian specimens
> sent to the WHO system, at a very late stage of the manuscript
> writing.
again, was it worse than average or does the whole system suck ?
Then this was known since long, could have been anticipated by
Indonesia and should have been addressed before
> These unethical practices had actually violated the
the frequent use of such pre-judgement adjectives do suggest some bias
> WHO guidance for the timely sharing of influenza viruses/specimens
> with potential to cause human influenza pandemics released in
> March 2005,21 which stated that The designated WHO Reference
> Laboratories will seek permission from the originating country/
> laboratory to co-author and/or publish results obtained from
> the analyses of relevant viruses/samples
which apparantly they did. Just maybe rathe (too ?) late
> and There will
> be no further distribution of viruses/specimens outside the
> network of WHO Reference Laboratories without permission from
> the originating country/laboratory.
now it's being debated, what WHO-reference laboratories are :
> It is important to be
> noted that at that time there was no document explaining what
> exactly the network of WHO Reference Laboratories were.
> What was generally known were only the 4 WHO Collaborating
> Centers and another 4 WHO H5 Reference Laboratories.22 Later
> on, the list was expanded to include other laboratories claimed
> to be essential for H5N1 vaccine development, without a clear,
> formal explanation of the roles and functions of each of them.
> All of these laboratories are in industrialised countries,and
> the terminology for them was changed several times,from global
> research laboratories to essential, non-commercial research
> laboratories and to essential regulatory laboratories. 23
how many labs did Indo vs.WHO consider as qualifying here ?
Which specific lab is debated ?
...
> Toward the end of 2006, a call by a journalist to the
> Indonesia MOH confirming news that an Australian vaccine company's
> plan to develop vaccine against H5N1 virus using a virus strain
> that Indonesia had provided to the WHO system triggered Indonesia's
> drastic action. The fact that pharmaceutical companies had access
> to Indonesian (vaccine seed) viruses that were shared with the
> WHO affiliated laboratories was not only in violation (again)
> of the WHO guidance for virus sharing (March 2005), but also
> as strongly argued by Indonesia revealed the unfairness
> and inequities of the global system.
...
looks as if it had happened before. Since decades. So why was it a
surprise to Indonesia ?
Why didn't they critisize these 'unethical,guidance-violating'
practices before ? What is special about the Indonesia case now ?
Does Indonesia really want a system now, where virus-originators
get royalties from vaccine producers ?
Wouldn't that generally make vaccines of all sorts less affordable
for any country ?
Wouldn't it encourage countries to culture or even develope certain
viruses or bacteria in order to get more royalties ?
the lack of logic and clear guidelines by government officials is cause
for concern. That's how wars start. (not that I see this danger here,
just in principal)
