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French Scientists Trying To Combine H1N1 & Influenza H5N1

tetano

Editor, Senior Moderator
In the P4, a maximum security laboratory, an experiment in progress attempts to determine the conditions for hybridization of the two viruses. The first is spreading fast but few kills, the second is not contagious but often fatal
For three weeks, the P4 Lyon stopped all other manipulations. This maximum security laboratory - there is only in France and twenty in the world - is currently focusing on experience in high-risk attempts to cross between the new virus and the H1N1 avian influenza, the H5N1. The first spread far and few kills, the second low spreads and kills many. Hybridization of the two would be disastrous.

"We try to understand, by infecting a cell with these two viruses, which are the genetic determinants that allow them to exchange genes (especially in pigs Ed)" summarizes the virologist Bruno Lina, who heads the work on influenza A for this laboratory Inserm. Three biologists of his team have been seconded to perform these tests determined and endorsed at ministerial level.Provided with special passports, they are assisted by a half-dozen technicians attached to the site."All operations are diving and are subject to very restrictive regulations" provides Lina.

If experience is linked to the National Reference Center for influenza virus, that it manages, its purpose would, in his opinion, not lead to a vaccine, but just "cognitive": "Why make a vaccine against a virus that does not exist? Or not. The first results will fall within two months and decide the action to the operation budget (provisional) 200 000. For now, "we made some tests, but obtained only very preliminary results," continues the virologist. If it is too early to deduce anything about the likelihood of the emergence of such a viral monster, "today, the risk seems low," says he.He concluded: "This is good news."

Olivier Season



H1N1: Meanwhile in the second wave

If the media seem to currently be done with influenza A, this is probably not true of our bodies. "It is a certainty, There will be a new epidemic wave," said Bruno Lina, head of the National Reference Center for influenza virus. "Whether the H1N1 virus becomes a seasonal virus and the epidemic will have a moderate impact, or it triggers a second wave next winter," he continues. Second wave that could have a greater impact, as was the case during the winter influenza epidemics of 1957 (H2N2) and 1968 (H3N2): "It was during the second wave, in winter 58 and winter 69 that there were more deaths, "said virologist. Even "if nothing is logical with the flu, we must still keep this in mind."Without being alarmist, the researcher also keeps an eye on the avian H5N1 virus (287 deaths from 486 cases in the world), says he, "seems a little back hair of the beast." As evidenced by the five new cases reported in Egypt.

OS - The filoviruses Ebola and Marburg - The type of arenavirus 4: Lassa virus of African origin and arenaviruses from South America. - The virus haemorrhagic fever Crimean Congo - The smallpox virus - The Henipavirus Nipah and Hendra viruses - Influenza A viruses of H5N1 origin

http://beforeitsnews.com/news/28880/French_Scientists_Trying_To_Combine_H1N1_Influenza_H5N1.html
 
Re: French Scientists Trying To Combine H1N1 & Influenza H5N1

#1: "its purpose would, in his opinion, not lead to a vaccine, but just "cognitive": "Why make a vaccine against a virus that does not exist? Or not."


if it does not exist, than made it ...
:nuke:

___

"cogito ergo sum"

maybe to sum only, it will be less proliferations

and by doing less "cogito" and "just cognitive", it will be many times much safer and healthier to humanity
___

http://www.flutrackers.com/forum/showthread.php?t=135445
 
Re: French Scientists Trying To Combine H1N1 & Influenza H5N1

Declan Buttler made a paper about Bruno Lina and P4 in Lyon in " Nature".
 
Re: French Scientists Trying To Combine H1N1 & Influenza H5N1

Thank you Anne,

#3 info:


http://www.nature.com/news/2009/091111/full/462154a.html

Published online <abbr title="2009-11-11T18:00:00Z" class="published">11 November 2009</abbr> | Nature 462, 154-157 (2009)

Swine flu: One killer virus, three key questions

Nature reports from three laboratories scrutinizing the pandemic flu virus.
Brendan Maher & Declan Butler


Excerpt:

"
The experiments that Lina's team is carrying out in the BSL-4 lab aren't technically novel or difficult in themselves. But the encumbrance of the safety procedures for getting in and out of the high-security lab make even the most straightforward procedures complicated, says Lina. Looking through the bulletproof window, one can see why. As the researchers move around the lab, they connect and disconnect their blindingly white spacesuits from some 60 yellow air hoses dangling from the ceiling. The hands of the researchers snipping away at tissue samples are wrapped in multiple layers of gloves to avoid accidental pricks. "It's like trying to do surgery wearing boxing gloves," says Hervé Raoul, director of the facility.

Before researchers can even begin to work in the lab, they must pass a three-week training course. It's only after a further 200 hours of practice that they are given any real autonomy in the lab, and they are never allowed inside alone. Users are limited to working a maximum of one four-hour shift a day, so that they are less likely to make mistakes. They are also encouraged to share any concerns about the behaviour of colleagues, or whether they themselves are going through a difficult patch, which might cause distraction and accidents.

Before Lina's experiments get approved, the facility's external scientific board will need to be convinced of the public-health justification, that the science is top-notch and that the experiments can be done safely, says Raoul. It will also need to be approved by government regulatory agencies. If all goes well, he could have his authorization in weeks, Lina says."
 
Re: French Scientists Trying To Combine H1N1 & Influenza H5N1

http://www.temple.edu/law/tjstel/2006/fall/v25no2-Emerson.pdf

Biosafety Regulations:
Who?s Watching the Lab?
Safety in High Risk Infectious Diseases Research


Rebecca Emerson
*

INTRODUCTION

Scientists debate whether the recent recreation of the 1918 flu virus, one of the deadliest diseases known (1), will help prevent another pandemic or will trigger one. (2)


Excerpt:

"Government regulations from a number of different agencies
address certain aspects of infectious disease research7 and voluntary federal guidelines provide recommended laboratory safety standards,8 but the current targeted regulations and voluntary guidelines are not enough. Laboratories and institutions are, for the most part, left to decide for themselves what safety protocols are needed for a particular experiment.9

Currently, there are no government regulations on biosafety that mandate the proper procedures to follow when handling infectious viruses such as the 1918 flu.10

This allows a dangerous situation to continue unchecked, where laboratories may not be taking enough precautions to properly contain potentially deadly microorganisms.11"
 
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