kent nickell
Well-known member
A few interesting things here. First is that mortgages are non-recourse loans meaning that homeowners can and will and are walking away from their mortgages with no recourse for lenders to recoup this money. This definitely makes it in their best interest to try and restructure these loans into performing loans primarily by reducing principal more in line to realistic market value and keeping interest rates at reasonalbe levels.
Second is using a 'hold to maturity' price instead of current market value to value these mortgages. This is artificial propping up of these values. Is the hope that they will return to the crazy credit and ninja loans we were seeing? Try pricing them at more of a historical realistic value for the buyer which is 28% of pretax income to include PITI and utilities...
Third is banks holding these illiquid assests 'off balance sheet'. How are investors supposed to analyse what they are investing in when these entities are allowed to keep their most toxic assets off balance sheet??
I also just heard an economic pundit saying we should bulldoze houses to increase the price of the remaining houses... How desperate an attempt to artificially prop up home prices is that??
Deflation in home prices is going to happen one way or other. The most responsible way seems to be to back off the extreme excesses of the past by restructuring loans to adequately reflect real market value and affordable interest rates....
http://www.rgemonitor.com/
TARP In Flux: Second $350bn Tied To Foreclosure Prevention (REM)
Dec 19 Bloomberg: Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson urges Congress to release the second half of the $700 billion financial rescue fund after exhausting the first $350 billion including a $13.4 billion loan to GM and Chrysler. Barney Frank links release of remaining funds to rescue package to help stem foreclosures, incl. cutting interest payments and forgiving a portion of a mortgage's principal. Paulson resisted calls to support foreclosure relief.
Nov 12 Secretary Paulson: "Purchasing mortgage-backed securities is not the most effective way to use TARP funds." Prioirities going forward are: 1) more capital for banks; 2) support securitization of credit card receivables, auto loans and student loans; 3) reduce the risk of foreclosure.--> RMBS derivatives fall to new lows upon lack of support with the latest Markit AAA subprime RMBS index trading at 41 cents on the dollar.
Home Front: 3 Reasons for change of course: 1) capital injection is more immediate; 2) the remaining $350bn available for TARP (upon Congress approval) are not enough to make a difference; 3) Paulson is leaving soon.
Sep 30 Bloomberg: Industry groups want to temporarily suspend mark-to-market accounting in order not to take a writedown on assets sold --> The SEC and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) probably will resist calls to suspend the fair-value accounting rules that some members of Congress blame for exacerbating the global financial crisis; says companies should use their own judgment such as expected cash flow in valuing illiquid assets.
Bernanke has proposed 'hold-to-maturity' purchase price instead of current market value described as 'fire-sale' price. Daniel Gros shows that non-recourse feature of U.S. mortgages translates into put option for borrowers that gains value as house prices fall--> real value of RMBS might indeed be close to zero.
Tett: valuation and pricing issues prevented the first Super-SIV from working, the same might happen again. If bad asset purchase price is too low, writedowns might be too large to bear; if price is too high, taxpayer overpays and has limited upside eventually
Geithner (via MarketWatch): The 'shadow banking system' that needs to be re-intermediated is a $10 trillion market without adequate capital provisions (=$2.2tr commercial paper conduits incl ABCP + $2.5tr repo/reverse repo market + $4tr combined brokerage assets + $1.8tr hedge funds = $10.5tr in 2007) that boomed outside traditional banking. In comparison: the traditional banking system is also $10trillion.
In July, FASB has decided to "eliminate the concept of the Qualified Special Purpose Entity (QSPE)" in the revised financial-accounting standard, FAS 140, starting November 2009. This requires banks to consolidate off-balance sheet vehicles used to package assets into securities --> Up to $5 trillion of dollars worth of illiquid assets/derivatives are buried in banks' Variable Interest Entities (VIEs)
BIS Joint Forum: CDO of ABS (i.e. structured finance CDOs), CDO^2 are not likely to survive the turmoil ($765bn CDOs of ABS issued from 2005-2008q1, see SIFMA)
SIFMA: Global issuance of CDOs from 2004 - 3Q2008 totaled $1.53trillion. CDO issuance by underlying collateral in 2007:
-$254.8bn structured finance CDOs (collateral pool consisting of RMBS, CMBS, CMOs, ABS, CDOs, CDS, and other securitized/structured products)
-$148.3bn high-yield loansCDOs (rated below BBB-/Baaa3)
-$78bn investment-grade bonds CDOs
Dec 22, 2008
Second is using a 'hold to maturity' price instead of current market value to value these mortgages. This is artificial propping up of these values. Is the hope that they will return to the crazy credit and ninja loans we were seeing? Try pricing them at more of a historical realistic value for the buyer which is 28% of pretax income to include PITI and utilities...
Third is banks holding these illiquid assests 'off balance sheet'. How are investors supposed to analyse what they are investing in when these entities are allowed to keep their most toxic assets off balance sheet??
I also just heard an economic pundit saying we should bulldoze houses to increase the price of the remaining houses... How desperate an attempt to artificially prop up home prices is that??
Deflation in home prices is going to happen one way or other. The most responsible way seems to be to back off the extreme excesses of the past by restructuring loans to adequately reflect real market value and affordable interest rates....
http://www.rgemonitor.com/
TARP In Flux: Second $350bn Tied To Foreclosure Prevention (REM)
Dec 19 Bloomberg: Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson urges Congress to release the second half of the $700 billion financial rescue fund after exhausting the first $350 billion including a $13.4 billion loan to GM and Chrysler. Barney Frank links release of remaining funds to rescue package to help stem foreclosures, incl. cutting interest payments and forgiving a portion of a mortgage's principal. Paulson resisted calls to support foreclosure relief.
Nov 12 Secretary Paulson: "Purchasing mortgage-backed securities is not the most effective way to use TARP funds." Prioirities going forward are: 1) more capital for banks; 2) support securitization of credit card receivables, auto loans and student loans; 3) reduce the risk of foreclosure.--> RMBS derivatives fall to new lows upon lack of support with the latest Markit AAA subprime RMBS index trading at 41 cents on the dollar.
Home Front: 3 Reasons for change of course: 1) capital injection is more immediate; 2) the remaining $350bn available for TARP (upon Congress approval) are not enough to make a difference; 3) Paulson is leaving soon.
Sep 30 Bloomberg: Industry groups want to temporarily suspend mark-to-market accounting in order not to take a writedown on assets sold --> The SEC and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) probably will resist calls to suspend the fair-value accounting rules that some members of Congress blame for exacerbating the global financial crisis; says companies should use their own judgment such as expected cash flow in valuing illiquid assets.
Bernanke has proposed 'hold-to-maturity' purchase price instead of current market value described as 'fire-sale' price. Daniel Gros shows that non-recourse feature of U.S. mortgages translates into put option for borrowers that gains value as house prices fall--> real value of RMBS might indeed be close to zero.
Tett: valuation and pricing issues prevented the first Super-SIV from working, the same might happen again. If bad asset purchase price is too low, writedowns might be too large to bear; if price is too high, taxpayer overpays and has limited upside eventually
Geithner (via MarketWatch): The 'shadow banking system' that needs to be re-intermediated is a $10 trillion market without adequate capital provisions (=$2.2tr commercial paper conduits incl ABCP + $2.5tr repo/reverse repo market + $4tr combined brokerage assets + $1.8tr hedge funds = $10.5tr in 2007) that boomed outside traditional banking. In comparison: the traditional banking system is also $10trillion.
In July, FASB has decided to "eliminate the concept of the Qualified Special Purpose Entity (QSPE)" in the revised financial-accounting standard, FAS 140, starting November 2009. This requires banks to consolidate off-balance sheet vehicles used to package assets into securities --> Up to $5 trillion of dollars worth of illiquid assets/derivatives are buried in banks' Variable Interest Entities (VIEs)
BIS Joint Forum: CDO of ABS (i.e. structured finance CDOs), CDO^2 are not likely to survive the turmoil ($765bn CDOs of ABS issued from 2005-2008q1, see SIFMA)
SIFMA: Global issuance of CDOs from 2004 - 3Q2008 totaled $1.53trillion. CDO issuance by underlying collateral in 2007:
-$254.8bn structured finance CDOs (collateral pool consisting of RMBS, CMBS, CMOs, ABS, CDOs, CDS, and other securitized/structured products)
-$148.3bn high-yield loansCDOs (rated below BBB-/Baaa3)
-$78bn investment-grade bonds CDOs
Dec 22, 2008