The federal government?s 37-page objection to BP?s legal claims blast the oil giant?s ?culture of corporate recklessness? that led to the Deepwater Horizon disaster and argue that BP wants the court to overlook deceased dolphins in Louisiana?s Barataria Bay and dying deep-sea corrals that are sickening fish in Gulf of Mexico.
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In addition to its assertions on the long-term environmental impacts, the rebuttal from the government?s lawyers comes down hardest on BP?s campaign to minimize the recklessness displayed in its operation of the Deepwater Horizon rig and in key decisions made before, during, and after the catastrophe.
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The Alabama filing (by the Alabama attorney general?s office) notes:
We also intend to prove that BP represented to the federal government and the public that the flow rate was 5,000 bpf (barrels per day), while having knowledge that the flow rate was significantly higher. At the same time, BP proceeded with the ?top kill? method, even though BP knew that a) a top kill risked well integrity and thus further delay or permanent damage b) a top kill would be unsuccessful at 15,000 bpd or greater and c) the flow rate was far greater than 15,000 bpd. We intend to prove that BP?s ordering of the risky top kill, which BP knew was predestined to fail, amounted to willful misconduct which delayed the capping of the well by several weeks ? weeks in which an additional 1+million barrels of oil unnecessarily entered the Gulf.
Full blog post: http://www.stuarthsmith.com/bombshe...tion-from-2010-spill-continues-to-ravage-gulf
...
In addition to its assertions on the long-term environmental impacts, the rebuttal from the government?s lawyers comes down hardest on BP?s campaign to minimize the recklessness displayed in its operation of the Deepwater Horizon rig and in key decisions made before, during, and after the catastrophe.
...
The Alabama filing (by the Alabama attorney general?s office) notes:
We also intend to prove that BP represented to the federal government and the public that the flow rate was 5,000 bpf (barrels per day), while having knowledge that the flow rate was significantly higher. At the same time, BP proceeded with the ?top kill? method, even though BP knew that a) a top kill risked well integrity and thus further delay or permanent damage b) a top kill would be unsuccessful at 15,000 bpd or greater and c) the flow rate was far greater than 15,000 bpd. We intend to prove that BP?s ordering of the risky top kill, which BP knew was predestined to fail, amounted to willful misconduct which delayed the capping of the well by several weeks ? weeks in which an additional 1+million barrels of oil unnecessarily entered the Gulf.
Full blog post: http://www.stuarthsmith.com/bombshe...tion-from-2010-spill-continues-to-ravage-gulf
