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Emerg Infect Dis . Determining Existing Human Population Immunity as Part of Assessing Influenza Pandemic Risk

tetano

Editor, Senior Moderator
Emerg Infect Dis


. 2022 May;28(5):977-985.
doi: 10.3201/eid2805.211965.
Determining Existing Human Population Immunity as Part of Assessing Influenza Pandemic Risk

Jonathan Tin Lai Cheung, Tim K Tsang, Hui-Ling Yen, Ranawaka A P M Perera, Chris Ka Pun Mok, Yong Ping Lin, Benjamin J Cowling, Malik Peiris

Abstract

Zoonotic influenza infections continue to threaten human health. Ongoing surveillance and risk assessment of animal viruses are needed for pandemic preparedness, and population immunity is an important component of risk assessment. We determined age-stratified hemagglutinin inhibition seroprevalence against 5 swine influenza viruses circulating in Hong Kong and Guangzhou in China. Using hemagglutinin inhibition seroprevalence and titers, we modeled the effect of population immunity on the basic reproduction number (R[SUB]0[/SUB]) if each virus were to become transmissible among humans. Among 353 individual serum samples, we reported low seroprevalence for triple-reassortant H1N2 and Eurasian avian-like H1N1 influenza viruses, which would reduce R[SUB]0[/SUB] by only 18%-20%. The smallest R[SUB]0[/SUB] needed to cause a pandemic was 1.22-1.24, meaning existing population immunity would be insufficient to block the spread of these H1N1 or H1N2 variants. For human-origin H3N2, existing population immunity could suppress R[SUB]0[/SUB] by 47%, thus reducing pandemic risk.

Keywords: China; Hong Kong; hemagglutination inhibiting antibody; hemagglutinin; influenza; neuraminidase; pandemics; population immunity; reproduction numbers; risk assessment; seroprevalence; swine; swine flu; viruses; zoonoses.
 
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