ECDC: Risk assessment: Outbreak of acute respiratory syndrome associated with a novel coronavirus, China: first local transmission in the EU/EEA − thi

[tetano]

[h=2]Executive summary[/h] On 31 December 2019, a cluster of pneumonia cases of unknown aetiology was reported in Wuhan, Hubei Province, China. On 9 January 2020, China CDC reported a novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) as the causative agent of this outbreak, which is phylogenetically in the SARS-CoV clade.
As of 30 January 2020 09:00, more than 7 000 laboratory-confirmed 2019-nCoV cases have been reported worldwide, mainly in China, but also with more than 70 imported cases from other countries around the world. Details on the epidemiological update for 2019-nCoV can be found on ECDC’s website.
So far, one hundred and seventy deaths associated with this virus have been reported. On 20 January, Chinese health authorities confirmed human-to-human transmission outside of Hubei province. Sixteen healthcare workers are reported to have been infected.
On 24 January 2020, the first three cases of 2019-nCoV imported into the EU/EEA were identified in France and one additional case was reported on 29 January 2020. On 28 January, a cluster of four locally-acquired cases, with indirect links to Wuhan, was reported from Germany. On 29 January, Finland reported an imported case from Wuhan.
China CDC assesses the transmissibility of this virus to be sufficient for sustained community transmission without unprecedented control measures. Further cases and deaths in China are expected in the coming days and weeks. Further cases or clusters are also expected among travellers from China, mainly Hubei province. Therefore, health authorities in the EU/EEA Member States should remain vigilant and strengthen their capacity to respond to such an event.
There are considerable uncertainties in assessing the risk of this event, due to lack of detailed epidemiological analyses.
On the basis of the information currently available, ECDC considers that:

• the potential impact of 2019-nCoV outbreaks is high;
• the likelihood of infection for EU/EEA citizens residing in or visiting Hubei province is estimated to be high;
• the likelihood of infection for EU/EEA citizens in other Chinese provinces is moderate and will increase;
• there is a moderate-to-high likelihood of additional imported cases in the EU/EEA;
• the likelihood of observing further limited human-to-human transmission within the EU/EEA is estimated as very low to low if cases are detected early and appropriate infection prevention and control (IPC) practices are implemented, particularly in healthcare settings in EU/EEA countries;
• assuming that cases in the EU/EEA are detected in a timely manner and that rigorous IPC measures are applied, the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission within the EU/EEA is currently very low to low;
• the late detection of an imported case in an EU/EEA country without the application of appropriate infection prevention and control measures would result in the high likelihood of human-to-human transmission, therefore in such a scenario the risk of secondary transmission in the community setting is estimated to be high.

https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publi...acute-respiratory-syndrome-associated-novel-1

 

[JJackson]

Hmm - cognitive dissonance anyone.
How do you reconcile
the late detection of an imported case in an EU/EEA country without the application of appropriate infection prevention and control measures would result in the high likelihood of human-to-human transmission, therefore in such a scenario the risk of secondary transmission in the community setting is estimated to be high.

the likelihood of observing further limited human-to-human transmission within the EU/EEA is estimated as very low to low if cases are detected early and appropriate infection prevention and control (IPC) practices are implemented, particularly in healthcare settings in EU/EEA countries;

and

assuming that cases in the EU/EEA are detected in a timely manner and that rigorous IPC measures are applied, the likelihood of sustained human-to-human transmission within the EU/EEA is currently very low to low;

If there is any transmission prior to symptom onset, clusters outside China, pre-symptomatic carriers or H2H outside Wuhan - and we seem to have all of them - then it is difficult to imagine there will not be late detection of an imported case in an EU/EEA country without the application of appropriate infection prevention and control measures if true then only in such a scenario the risk of secondary transmission in the community setting is estimated to be high makes any sense. It also seems arrogant to think we will make a better job of containment given our political system mitigates against the kind of draconian measures China has been able to apply - even if they are inadequate to contain spread.

 

[gsgs]

I read it that such clusters will likely die out earlier or later and that they currently consider the risk of a starting uncontrolled h2h as low.
I'm thinking at New York in 2009 after the arrival of the infected Cancun visitors - they couldn't control it.
Such things are currently unlikely with nCoV in Europe , they think (I think they think)

 

[peace]

Yeah here what your saying gsgs gsgs just a few miles away from the first two cases in uk how long have they been on holiday in Yorkshire is anyone's guess hope they fair well though with blighty hospitality

 

[etudiant]

We are currently testing this hypothesis in Germany, where an asymptomatic carrier infecting about a half dozen others.directly or by H2H transmission.
It remains to be seen how effective the contact tracing and monitoring turns out to be and whether the optimistic projection of low sustained H2H transmission is valid.