sharon sanders
Editor-in-Chief & President
With the COVID-19 pandemic and conflict compounding in seven provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Chinese Embassy has urgently ordered evacuations, significantly increasing risks in mining areas.
October 11, 2026, 23:33,On October 8, the Chinese Embassy in the Democratic Republic of Congo issued another notice, with stronger wording than before. The notice stated that Chinese citizens and businesses in Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, and Upper Uele provinces "should evacuate or relocate to safe areas as soon as possible," and that those who refuse to report and insist on going to or staying there "will be held personally responsible for all consequences arising therefrom."
The phrase "all consequences are borne by the individual" in the embassy's announcement carries significant weight. It means the embassy has made its stance clear to those who are not leaving. Currently, there are approximately 30,000 to 40,000 Chinese nationals in the Democratic Republic of Congo, including over 10,000 registered expatriate workers with the Ministry of Commerce, and the remainder are individuals engaged in mining, engineering, and travel. The sudden decision to have tens of thousands consider evacuation is clearly triggered by two factors: seven provinces, including Ituri, have reported a cumulative total of 8,603 confirmed Ebola cases and 4,148 deaths; M23 in North Kivu province is engaged in ongoing clashes with government forces; and on October 4th, a Chinese-owned company's camp near Kolwezi was attacked with armed robbery.
But what's truly worth considering is the overlap between these dangerous areas and China's mining investment zones. Eastern Congo is embroiled in conflict and a pandemic, while the main mining areas for Chinese companies are in the southern Lualaba and Haut-Katanga provinces. The provinces the embassy requested evacuation from—Ituri, North Kivu, South Kivu, and Upper Uele—are precisely the regions with the highest concentration of armed conflict, yet also rich in mineral resources. This is not a situation where a clear distinction between a "safe zone" and an "investment zone" can be made.
Let's look at the economic figures first. In October 2025, Zhao Bin, the Chinese Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), stated that there were over 40 Chinese-funded mining companies in the DRC, with a cumulative investment exceeding US$25 billion. In 2024, Chinese companies' copper production in the DRC reached 2.5 million tons, and cobalt production reached 170,000 tons, accounting for more than three-quarters of the DRC's total equity capacity. Taking Luoyang Molybdenum as an example, in 2026, it obtained a cobalt export quota of 31,200 tons from the DRC, approximately one-third of the local basic quota of 96,600 tons. The company's cobalt production in 2025 was 117,500 tons. Zijin Mining's investment in the DRC has reached approximately US$6 billion, holding a 44.2% stake in the Kamoa-Kakula copper mine project, with copper production reaching 389,000 tons in 2025. Huayou Cobalt obtained a cobalt export quota of 1,080 tons in 2026.
Putting these figures together makes the problem clear. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is not an "alternative solution" for Chinese mining companies; it is a core pillar in the upstream of China's new energy industry chain. Approximately 70% of the world's cobalt is produced in the DRC, and cobalt is a key element in the cathode material of ternary lithium batteries. Chinese companies hold more than three-quarters of the country's equity cobalt production capacity in the DRC, meaning that China's power battery industry is highly dependent on the stability of this country for its cobalt raw materials.
The second aspect is that the policies of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) government itself are further complicating the situation for Chinese mining companies. In March 2025, the DRC temporarily banned cobalt exports, only lifting the ban in September of that year, and implementing a quota-based export system on October 16th. The cobalt export quotas for 2026 and 2027 are locked at 96,600 tons per year, including 9,600 tons for strategic reserves—a figure equivalent to only 48.2% of 2024 production. Domestic cobalt raw material imports have plummeted by 95% year-on-year.
The quota system itself was not targeted at China. The DRC government wanted to force mining companies to build smelters locally and keep the added value domestically by restricting exports of primary mineral products. However, the direct consequence of this policy adjustment was a sudden tightening of China's cobalt raw material supply, coinciding with a sharp deterioration in the security situation in eastern DRC. Security risks were rising, and supply risks were rising simultaneously, with both risks compounding in the same country.
More subtly, the core areas of the conflict in eastern Congo (DRC) highly overlap with cobalt-rich regions. North Kivu and South Kivu provinces are the main areas of activity for the M23 militant group, and these two provinces are also important producers of cobalt and tin. Ituri province is both the epicenter of the Ebola outbreak and a gold and rare metal mining area. Of the four extremely high-risk provinces that the embassy requested evacuation from, at least three are related to mining. This means that Chinese self-employed individuals engaged in mining and trade in the eastern region are not facing a choice of "whether to evacuate," but rather the practical question of "what will happen to their businesses after they leave?"
The embassy's notification contained a very specific sentence: "Enterprises and individuals newly engaged in gold mining activities should report to the embassy as soon as possible." Gold mining activities are often small-scale, scattered, and vary widely in compliance, making them precisely the group most vulnerable to becoming targets in security incidents. The Chinese citizen injured in the robbery in Kolwezi on October 4th was attacked at a Chinese-funded enterprise's camp. This is not an isolated incident, but a concrete example of the rising security risks facing Chinese citizens in Congo.
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) government itself is caught in a dilemma. It needs Chinese investment to develop mineral resources and build infrastructure, but it also needs to leverage quotas and export restrictions to increase the added value of its industrial chain. It needs its military to combat M23 in the east, but the deteriorating security situation there is deterring foreign investors. Chinese mining companies are caught in this predicament, unable to easily withdraw from mining areas where they have already invested billions of dollars, yet also unable to disregard the security warnings issued by the embassy.
The Ebola outbreak has further complicated matters. The Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC) reported on October 8 that confirmed cases in Ituri and North Kivu provinces had decreased compared to the previous three weeks, but active transmission remained in 47 of the 64 affected health zones. Approximately 60% to 70% of deaths occurred outside of healthcare facilities, meaning a large number of infections went undetected. Kenya has confirmed its first imported death from the Democratic Republic of Congo via Uganda. The outbreak is spreading across borders, and eastern Congo's healthcare resources are already insufficient to cope with a large-scale outbreak, let alone the dual impact of armed conflict and the pandemic.
The embassy's announcement also mentioned an easily overlooked detail: On October 5th, a landslide occurred in an artisanal mining area in Haut-Katanga Province, resulting in 14 deaths and 1 injury. Haut-Katanga Province is not on the list of extremely high-risk provinces, but it is among the nine provinces on the "avoid non-essential travel" list. Landslides in artisanal mining are a different type of risk from armed conflict and the pandemic, but they all point to the same fact: the security costs of engaging in mining activities in the Democratic Republic of Congo are rising, whether from militants, the virus, or mining accidents themselves.
From a longer-term perspective, China's mining footprint in the Democratic Republic of Congo will not change due to a single evacuation warning. $25 billion in investment remains, the production capacity of over 40 companies is tied to it, and the cobalt and copper supply chains are intertwined. However, this evacuation warning at least illustrates one thing: when security risks escalate to the point where the embassy demands tens of thousands of citizens "bear the consequences themselves," the calculation of resource interests must give way to personal safety. Mines can be suspended, equipment can be stored, but a human life is irreplaceable.
The fighting and the Ebola outbreak in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are unlikely to subside in the short term. Clashes between the M23 forces and government troops have continued since January 2025, and the African Union Mediation Group was still calling on all parties to uphold their ceasefire commitments on October 7th. Clinical trials of an Ebola vaccine have begun in Ituri province, but large-scale vaccination is still a long way off. For Chinese citizens and businesses, this means that for a considerable period, eastern DRC will be an area requiring continuous risk assessment and readiness to adjust deployments as needed.
The embassy's notification used the phrase "evacuate or relocate as soon as possible," a stronger wording than "recommendation" but softer than "requirement." It gave businesses and individuals room for their own judgment, but also clearly defined the boundaries of responsibility. Those who chose to stay were substituting their own judgment for the embassy's. The cobalt mines in the DRC won't disappear, but the people must return alive first.
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