Laidback Al
Well-known member
Discussion: Where in the World will S-OI A (H1N1) meet up with Influenza
A(H5N1)?
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As of today, the case counts of S-OIV infections still seem to be climbing. Accurate mortality and morbidity data are not yet available, but this novel virus, although capable of human to human transmission, does not appear to be exceptionally virulent. Influenza A (H1N1) has been found in 24 countries and has infected at least 2371 individuals, but to date only 44 deaths have attributed to this novel virus.
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In contrast, Influenza A (H5N1) is exceptionally lethal, killing 6 of every 10 infected individuals (based on WHO case counts). Since WHO began tracking Influenza A (H5N1) cases in 2003, there have been 423 cases identified in 15 countries. Of those, fully 61% or 258 have died, the most recent death occurred in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1
lace w:st="on">Viet Nam</st1
lace></st1:country-region> on April 22. So far, Influenza A (H5N1) has been lacking the capabilities to easily transmit between humans.
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Confirmed Influenza A (H1N1) cases are now starting to be reported in countries that have had previously confirmed human cases of Influenza A (H5N1). The possibility exists that some where in the world there could be a human coinfection of Influenza A (H1N1) with Influenza A (H5N1) and that the highly virulent Influenza A (H5N1) could pick the transmissibility characteristics of Influenza A (H1N1) or alternatively that Influenza A (H1N1) could pick up the virulence of Influenza A (H5N1).
<o
> </o
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So, it is time to speculate on where that coinfection might be most likely to occur. But first we need to consider the demographics of the Influenza A (H1N1) outbreak as we understand them today.
<o
> </o
>
Over the past few days the CDC has been revising the median age infection downward, it is now at 15 years for Influenza A (H1N1) with a dozen cases of children under 1 year old. A newly published article on 11 human cases of swine flu infections between 2005 and early 2009 indicates that the median age of the infected individuals was 10 years old. This indicates to me that the Influenza A (H1N1), and possibly earlier recent swine flu infections, represent a children?s disease, rather than a disease that attacks young healthy adults as is expected with a pandemic virus.
<o
> </o
>
But is this even a pandemic virus? Twenty-first century technology and world wide surveillance and monitoring have identified this novel virus and numerous infections. But would a novel virus of this nature have even been detected 90 years ago by public health officials who had to rely on epidemiological data? At that time, influenza viruses were only recognized by their effects on the population through epidemiological analysis, more people getting sick, more healthy adults getting sick and dying, etc. While we don?t have all of the numbers yet for this outbreak of Influenza A (H1N1), it may only represent a late season bump on the world wide influenza patterns for the 2008-2009 season.
<o
> </o
>
One question that is often posed about the 1918 pandemic is how could the virus spread so quickly around the world. There are conflicting reports that it started in various locations around the world just about the same time, yet this was the era of horse and buggy transportation. Perhaps this current outbreak of Influenza A (H1N1) suggests a potential answer. It may be that the world-wide seeding mechanism for a pandemic virus is spread of a novel, but minimally lethal, virus through children and young adult populations first, and only later infecting healthy adults and older individuals perhaps in later waves with higher virulence.
<o
> </o
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Given this argument about world seeding of a novel virus, one might ask where in the world would this novel swine-based strain reassort or recombine with an existing strain of Influenza A (H5N1) to produce an easily transmissible, potentially highly virulent pandemic strain of either Influenza A (H1N1) or Influenza A (H5N1).
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I assume for a particular location to be the geographical candidate for the mixing vessel, it would have to take place in country where there have been many cases of human Influenza A(H5N1) infection over the years. For no particular reason, I set the initial cut off at 25 or more cases. If a country has 24 or less confirmed human cases I removed it from consideration. Of the 15 countries with human Influenza A (H5N1), There are only five that have had 25 or more cases, <st1:country-region w:st="on">China</st1:country-region>, <st1:country-region w:st="on">Egypt</st1:country-region>, <st1:country-region w:st="on">Indonesia</st1:country-region>, <st1:country-region w:st="on">Thailand</st1:country-region>, and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1
lace w:st="on">Viet Nam</st1
lace></st1:country-region>.
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Considering that <st1:country-region w:st="on">Thailand</st1:country-region> has only had 25 human cases and the last one was in 2006, I don?t consider <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1
lace w:st="on">Thailand</st1
lace></st1:country-region> as a likely location for a genetic interaction between Influenza A (H1N1) and Influenza A (H5N1). Likewise, I don?t think <st1
lace w:st="on"><st1:country-region w:st="on">Viet Nam</st1:country-region></st1
lace> is a likely candidate. Although <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1
lace w:st="on">Viet Nam</st1
lace></st1:country-region> initially had many cases in 2003 and 2004, the number of cases has fallen over the last two years (although they may be increasing in 2009).
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That leaves three high potential countries, <st1:country-region w:st="on">China</st1:country-region>, <st1:country-region w:st="on">Indonesia</st1:country-region>, and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1
lace w:st="on">Egypt</st1
lace></st1:country-region>. I believe that <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1
lace w:st="on">China</st1
lace></st1:country-region> learned some lessons from the SARS episode several years ago. I think that <st1:country-region w:st="on">China</st1:country-region> has specific contingency plans to restrict and control any outbreak of either Influenza A (H1N1) and Influenza A (H5N1) as demonstrated by the recent quarantine measures in <st1
lace w:st="on">Hong Kong</st1
lace>. A strong central government with tight political and economic control, such as <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1
lace w:st="on">China</st1
lace></st1:country-region>, may be able to contain an outbreak of a virulent pandemic virus, regardless of its origin. I don?t think that a lethal pandemic virus will escape immediately from <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1
lace w:st="on">China</st1
lace></st1:country-region>.
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<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1
lace w:st="on">Indonesia</st1
lace></st1:country-region> is the next potential candidate country. Influenza A (H5N1) is known to be endemic in the poultry throughout the country. Indonesia has the highest number of confirmed human Influenza A (H5N1) cases in the world, many of those human cases have been concentrated in the greater Metropolitan Jakarta area where the population density is very high. <st1
lace w:st="on"><st1:country-region w:st="on">Indonesia</st1:country-region></st1
lace> has the highest case fatality rate (CFR) of the five countries with more than 25 human Influenza A (H5N1) cases. Based on current WHO data, the Indonesia CFR is about 82%; more than 8 out of every 10 confirmed cases in <st1
lace w:st="on"><st1:country-region w:st="on">Indonesia</st1:country-region></st1
lace> dies directly or indirectly from Influenza A (H5N1) infection.
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Recently, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1
lace w:st="on">Indonesia</st1
lace></st1:country-region> has officially declined to report human Influenza A (H5N1) cases in a timely manner. Besides the 141 officially reported cases by WHO, locals news reports have identified perhaps another half dozen individuals who were locally confirmed with Influenza A (H5N1), but who have not yet been reported to WHO. The artificially high CFR from Indonesia probably results from the fact that local news media can and do follow up on deaths attributed to bird flu, in some cases forcing the Health Ministry to report these deaths from Influenza A (H5N1) infection.
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However, in the short run, I don?t think that <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1
lace w:st="on">Indonesia</st1
lace></st1:country-region> will be where Influenza A (H1N1) and Influenza A (H5N1) comingle and escape. It is clear that <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1
lace w:st="on">Indonesia</st1
lace></st1:country-region> is assaulting any potential cluster of Influenza A (H5N1) with a Tamiflu ?blanket?. Any potentially infected individual is immediately treated with Tamiflu. Family members, friends, neighbors, or anyone else who had contact with the individual including health care workers are routinely given Tamiflu as a prophylaxis to minimize infectious spread. Given this breadth of experience of coping with the largest number of human Influenza A (H5N1) infections in the world coupled with indiscriminate distribution of Tamiflu, I think Indonesia will be able to contain a reassortment of Influenza A (H1N1) for a while, but only until either Influenza A (H1N1) or Influenza A (H5N1) loses its sensitivity to Tamiflu.
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Finally we are left with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1
lace w:st="on">Egypt</st1
lace></st1:country-region>. In my estimation, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1
lace w:st="on">Egypt</st1
lace></st1:country-region> is the most likely country for the origin of a novel pandemic virus with high virulence coupled with ease of transmission through reassortment or recombination of the Influenza A (H1N1) and Influenza A (H5N1).
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Like <st1:country-region w:st="on">Indonesia</st1:country-region>, Influenza A (H5N1) is known to be endemic in the poultry throughout the country and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1
lace w:st="on">Egypt</st1
lace></st1:country-region> has not been able to eradicate it. Unlike <st1:country-region w:st="on">Indonesia</st1:country-region>, <st1:country-region w:st="on">Egypt</st1:country-region> does not have much experience suppressing clusters with Tamiflu because the strain(s) circulating in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1
lace w:st="on">Egypt</st1
lace></st1:country-region> have not yet produced long H2H2H chains. Also, the strain(s) in <st1:country-region w:st="on">Egypt</st1:country-region> seem to be less virulent than those circulating in <st1:country-region w:st="on">China</st1:country-region> and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1
lace w:st="on">Indonesia</st1
lace></st1:country-region>. Less virulence means a greater likelihood of H2H transmission before it is detected and contained.
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Containment of a reassorted virus in <st1
lace w:st="on"><st1:country-region w:st="on">Egypt</st1:country-region></st1
lace> will be difficult. Population densities in lower Egypt in the Nile Delta region are among the highest in the world. This is the area of <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1
lace w:st="on">Egypt</st1
lace></st1:country-region> where most of the Influenza A (H5N1) cases have occurred. Once a virulent and highly transmissible virus originates in this area, the reproductive number could be very high.
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Finally, the demographics of Influenza A (H5N1) infections in <st1:country-region w:st="on">Egypt</st1:country-region> suggest that <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1
lace w:st="on">Egypt</st1
lace></st1:country-region> is a suitable breeding ground for a new, lethal pandemic reassortment of Influenza A (H5N1) and Influenza A (H1N1). Ten of the last 13 human cases of Influenza A (H5N1) infections in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1
lace w:st="on">Egypt</st1
lace></st1:country-region> were toddlers under 3 years of age. While most of them have recovered, almost all required hospitalization. Half of all of the confirmed cases of Influenza A (H1N1) in <st1:country-region w:st="on">USA</st1:country-region> and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1
lace w:st="on">Mexico</st1
lace></st1:country-region> are under 19 years of age. This suggest to me, that toddlers, young children, and teenagers in Egypt provide the perfect mixing vessel for a dual infection of Influenza A (H1N1) and Influenza A (H5N1) and the development of a novel strain of influenza with much increased virulence. It seems that me that the most likely location for a reassortment of Influenza A (H1N1) and Influenza A (H5N1) will take place in toddlers or young children in the Nile Delta region of Egypt and could result in a second and more lethal wave of Influenza A (H1N1) in the next several months when the next influenza season start in the northern hemisphere in August or September.
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A(H5N1)?
<o
As of today, the case counts of S-OIV infections still seem to be climbing. Accurate mortality and morbidity data are not yet available, but this novel virus, although capable of human to human transmission, does not appear to be exceptionally virulent. Influenza A (H1N1) has been found in 24 countries and has infected at least 2371 individuals, but to date only 44 deaths have attributed to this novel virus.
<o
In contrast, Influenza A (H5N1) is exceptionally lethal, killing 6 of every 10 infected individuals (based on WHO case counts). Since WHO began tracking Influenza A (H5N1) cases in 2003, there have been 423 cases identified in 15 countries. Of those, fully 61% or 258 have died, the most recent death occurred in <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1
<o
Confirmed Influenza A (H1N1) cases are now starting to be reported in countries that have had previously confirmed human cases of Influenza A (H5N1). The possibility exists that some where in the world there could be a human coinfection of Influenza A (H1N1) with Influenza A (H5N1) and that the highly virulent Influenza A (H5N1) could pick the transmissibility characteristics of Influenza A (H1N1) or alternatively that Influenza A (H1N1) could pick up the virulence of Influenza A (H5N1).
<o
So, it is time to speculate on where that coinfection might be most likely to occur. But first we need to consider the demographics of the Influenza A (H1N1) outbreak as we understand them today.
<o
Over the past few days the CDC has been revising the median age infection downward, it is now at 15 years for Influenza A (H1N1) with a dozen cases of children under 1 year old. A newly published article on 11 human cases of swine flu infections between 2005 and early 2009 indicates that the median age of the infected individuals was 10 years old. This indicates to me that the Influenza A (H1N1), and possibly earlier recent swine flu infections, represent a children?s disease, rather than a disease that attacks young healthy adults as is expected with a pandemic virus.
<o
But is this even a pandemic virus? Twenty-first century technology and world wide surveillance and monitoring have identified this novel virus and numerous infections. But would a novel virus of this nature have even been detected 90 years ago by public health officials who had to rely on epidemiological data? At that time, influenza viruses were only recognized by their effects on the population through epidemiological analysis, more people getting sick, more healthy adults getting sick and dying, etc. While we don?t have all of the numbers yet for this outbreak of Influenza A (H1N1), it may only represent a late season bump on the world wide influenza patterns for the 2008-2009 season.
<o
One question that is often posed about the 1918 pandemic is how could the virus spread so quickly around the world. There are conflicting reports that it started in various locations around the world just about the same time, yet this was the era of horse and buggy transportation. Perhaps this current outbreak of Influenza A (H1N1) suggests a potential answer. It may be that the world-wide seeding mechanism for a pandemic virus is spread of a novel, but minimally lethal, virus through children and young adult populations first, and only later infecting healthy adults and older individuals perhaps in later waves with higher virulence.
<o
Given this argument about world seeding of a novel virus, one might ask where in the world would this novel swine-based strain reassort or recombine with an existing strain of Influenza A (H5N1) to produce an easily transmissible, potentially highly virulent pandemic strain of either Influenza A (H1N1) or Influenza A (H5N1).
<o
I assume for a particular location to be the geographical candidate for the mixing vessel, it would have to take place in country where there have been many cases of human Influenza A(H5N1) infection over the years. For no particular reason, I set the initial cut off at 25 or more cases. If a country has 24 or less confirmed human cases I removed it from consideration. Of the 15 countries with human Influenza A (H5N1), There are only five that have had 25 or more cases, <st1:country-region w:st="on">China</st1:country-region>, <st1:country-region w:st="on">Egypt</st1:country-region>, <st1:country-region w:st="on">Indonesia</st1:country-region>, <st1:country-region w:st="on">Thailand</st1:country-region>, and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1
<o
Considering that <st1:country-region w:st="on">Thailand</st1:country-region> has only had 25 human cases and the last one was in 2006, I don?t consider <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1
<o
That leaves three high potential countries, <st1:country-region w:st="on">China</st1:country-region>, <st1:country-region w:st="on">Indonesia</st1:country-region>, and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1
<o
<st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1
<o
Recently, <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1
<o
However, in the short run, I don?t think that <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1
<o
Finally we are left with <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1
<o
Like <st1:country-region w:st="on">Indonesia</st1:country-region>, Influenza A (H5N1) is known to be endemic in the poultry throughout the country and <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1
<o
Containment of a reassorted virus in <st1
<o
Finally, the demographics of Influenza A (H5N1) infections in <st1:country-region w:st="on">Egypt</st1:country-region> suggest that <st1:country-region w:st="on"><st1
<o