Discussion: Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) in Wuhan has been working with bats and coronavirus for many years - DNA manipulations, cloning.... - Ja

[sharon sanders]

No. This paper alone is not enough. You have made some valid points. I have made some valid points before on this thread. Why not have the discussion? I resent the censorship. Let people debate it. Apparently there is a strong "cancel culture". No room for debate apparently. Some paternalistic figures are telling everyone what to believe. This will backfire.

 

[sharon sanders]

NAMRU2 & 3 suffered all kinds of conspiracy theories in both Indonesia & Egypt - dastardly US military spreading bird flu or just a front for spies. In these threads I had written something about testing in the early days of the H1N1(2009) pandemic about looking for a signal for a novel type A flu in the point of care tests results under 'Type A unsub-typed' as these might show a spike. One of our members corrected an error in my understanding of the sensitivity and then turned out to work in a US military lab in California which had been the first to sequence the new virus. Big discovery so they went to the boss and requested to announce but he said no. Reason - If it comes for us we will be knee deep in claims we lab created it, let the CDC or civilian lab announce.

Your story is not supported by the facts. Below is an interview on April 25, 2009 done by Jon Cohen of Science in the same month that the untyped flu A virus sample was first examined at the US military lab in California. Obviously there was an announcement. What other inaccuracies are there in your story?


Behind the Scenes: Navy Researchers Helped Spot Swine Flu in the United States


By Jon Cohen

Apr. 25, 2009 , 2:10 PM

SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA—Late on the afternoon of 16 April, 5 days before the public first learned about the current outbreak of swine flu, Michele Ginsberg received word from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) that a 10-year-old boy in San Diego County had tested positive for the rare infection. “I thought this could be the big one, honestly,” says Ginsberg, chief of community epidemiology for the San Diego County Health & Human Services Agency. By “big one,” Ginsberg meant the long-anticipated arrival of a new strain of influenza that humans had not seen before and could completely overwhelm the immune system, vaccinated or not.

Ginsberg says the first two cases that surfaced easily could have been missed, but novel research projects under way in the San Diego area, both connected to the Naval Health Research Center (NHRC) here, determined that something unusual was afoot. NHRC has developed sophisticated tests for influenza that can sort out whether the virus is strain A or B and then the specific subtype based on two proteins, hemagglutinin and neuraminidase, on the viral surface. “In the usual setting, they would have done a rapid test and found that they were both positive for influenza A, and that’s as far as it would have gone,” says Ginsberg. But the new tests couldn't identify the specific subtype, so the Navy forwarded the samples to CDC.

NHRC has received little attention for its critical role in uncovering the U.S. outbreak with what’s known as an H1N1 influenza A virus, so ScienceInsider asked for a detailed explanation of its influenza program and how these two cases came its way.

Answers after the jump.

Q: When did the NHRC increase its surveillance capabilities for influenza?

Our expansion was largely a result of an initiative by the Department of Defense’s (DOD's) Global Emerging Infectious System to intensify pandemic surveillance as a result of the avian influenza (H5N1) crisis. NHRC augmented existing febrile respiratory illness surveillance programs in military recruit trainees and ship-board populations and expanded into dependent populations in San Diego. Also, in a collaborative effort with the CDC, we developed surveillance on the Southern California-Mexico border, which was enhanced this year to deepen surveillance and augment diagnostic training of our Mexican collaborators via funding from the Department of State’s Biosecurity Engagement Program.

Q. How did these swine flu cases end up at NHRC?

The first case, a 10-year-old DOD dependent, was identified in a trial to evaluate a novel influenza diagnostic. On 1 April, a swab sample from the patient was tested on the diagnostic platform. The result suggested an influenza A but subtype negative virus. Our screening questionnaire deemed the patient at low-risk for an avian influenza infection. Per the study protocol, a second specimen was sent to a third-party lab in Wisconsin. This laboratory, along with the state laboratory, confirmed the influenza A/un-typed finding. The specimen and an isolated virus were then sent to the CDC for confirmation. The CDC determined the virus was an influenza A/swine/H1N1.

The second case, a 9-year-old female from Brawley, California, was sampled in the collaborative study with the CDC’s Border Infectious Disease Surveillance Project. What was thought to be a routine specimen was sent to our laboratory the first week in April. Our initial testing demonstrated an influenza A/untyped virus. Further testing on the Ibis T5000 platform, which infers H and N types from multiple genomic signatures, suggested an influenza A/swine/H1 virus. [Although most tests rely on known DNA sequence or antibodies to identify influenza isolates, the Ibis T5000 has a mass spectrometer and can identify unknown subtypes.] This was right about the time we received word from CDC about the first case. At that point we knew we were onto something significant. The CDC subsequently confirmed an influenza A/swine/H1N1 virus.

Q: What was the reaction of the researchers at NHRC?

The evasive nature of influenza viruses keeps us on our toes. Because of the obvious public health concern, we found it prudent to send the sample to CDC for confirmation.

Q: How many influenza specimens does NHRC process during flu season and has it increased since the discovery of this swine flu case?

NHRC regularly processes around 5500 specimens a year, about two-thirds of which come in during the influenza season from October to February. Normally, towards the end of the flu season, the number of specimens we process each week falls. In the 2008-2009 season, cases began to decrease in late January. This decline continued until last week when the number of cases and the sampling effort among our civilian populations was increased.

Q: Had you ever had specimens before that you could not type and sent to CDC?

This was the first.

Q: Does NHRC do surveillance only for San Diego County or for a larger area?

Our surveillance is quite expansive. NHRC is the Navy hub for the conduct of population-based surveillance at recruit centers involving the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Coast Guard. We also conduct surveillance onboard 20 large-deck U.S. Navy ships in three fleets, within the Pacific Rim, among deployed populations and of course along the U.S./Mexico border. We participate in surveillance during military exercises such as Cobra Gold, in Thailand, and also collaborate in febrile respiratory infection surveillance with the Singaporean military.

Q: Do you now have the capability to identify this strain of swine flu or must samples still be sent to the CDC?

We hope to have the reagents for the swine variant soon. We are in the process of developing our own reagents. At this time we can use advanced diagnostics such as the Ibis T5000 to detect swine viruses. That stated, it is important to share novel specimens with the CDC for the purpose of public health. Both institutes gain from this collaboration.


https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2009...-united-states

 

[sharon sanders]

Here is the direct link. https://zenodo.org/record/4028830

 

[sharon sanders]

Apparently Dr. Yan's twitter account was suspended.

She was interviewed on tv tonight and she says she worked in the W.H.O. reference lab in Hong Kong. The plot thickens. No wonder everyone is so upset about her.

She also said she is going to release an additional paper.

Again, I have no idea if she is correct or not, but it is interesting.

Here is the direct link, again, to her paper: https://zenodo.org/record/4028830

Also...

FluTrackers is Independent Media.

 

[gsgs]

while the furin cleavage site is common in H5 and H7 flu, it's still unusual in betacoronavirus.
And so is the amino-acid-preservation in S2 and the RBD. It does happen in nature,
but somehow unusual, rare. It may point to evolution in unusual hosts - or a different mode
of transmission.

here a thread by @K_G_Andersen about the Yan-report :
https://twitter.com/K_G_Andersen/status/1306037072914866178

 

[Mary Wilson]

Covid-19 "genetically engineered to target humans"

Ana Beatriz Mic? AS English
Update: 15/09/2020 22:26

Li-Meng Yan, the Chinese virologist who has been in hiding in the US after claiming that the Chinese authorities not only knew about the novel coronavirus long before the first cases were officially reportedin Wuhan last December but who has also suggested Covid-19 was created in a Chinese military laboratory has published with her team of researchers a 26-page document laying out her theory that the pandemic sweeping the world is not of natural origin.

... The report also claims that the novel coronavirus has been adapted by already-identified naturally occurring coronaviruses in bats by the Chinese military.

The research follows “three lines of evidence” that Yan and her team say demonstrate Covid-19 is a lab-based virus.

https://en.as.com/en/2020/09/15/latest_news/1600196698_232755.html

 

[Emily]

Yes, I remember that. It did open them up to accusations from political enemies, but so what? It's better than censoring and hurling cheap shots out from under a rock.

 

[JJackson]

Sharon - I hate censorship and like debate but this thread needs self-censorship. Two opposing arguments should not be taken as equal if the logic and evidence are 99% on one side but the other side has a few loud voices. For me anthropomorphic climate change, natural selection/creationism, the holocaust and 'SARS-2 is a lab creation' fall into this category. Although I am sad this thread has had as many hits and posts as it has as I am one of the main posters in this debate, not because I think it has any merit, but as it is dangerous and needs someone to refute it. I do not expect it to change the minds of anyone whose minds are locked but hope to show those looking for information that their time would be better spent on something else. I also fear that the excellent reputation Flutrackers has built up since you opened it is being damaged amongst the science community, journalist and those in power with the ability to effect change. We were viewed as haven of science based discussion, absent of the rubbish pushed on twitter and some less reputable sites. In this pandemic I think we are in danger of setting that back a decade as some of the China bashing from the political domain is creeping into what should be a discussion of the data, where there is any.

 

[Emily]

Mary’s article says:

The report states that “ZC45 and ZXC21 were discovered between July 2015 and February 2017 and isolated and characterized by the aforementioned military research laboratories.”

This is the paper Sharon posted about that research:
Genomic characterization and infectivity of a novel SARS-like coronavirus in Chinese bats
"To test the pathogenicity of the ZC45 agent, infection experiments were performed in suckling rats. 3-day-old suckling BALB/c rats (SLAC, China) were intracerebrally inoculated with 20 μl of volume grinding supernatant of ZC45 intestinal tissue."

That’s horrific Island of Dr. Moreau ‘science’ – like Gajdusek's experiments and what is described here:

NPR 9.1: China's Role in the Chemical and Biological ... www.nonproliferation.org › wp-content › uploads › npr
It should be noted, however, that the Institute of Military Medicine
is not listed in the PRC confidence-building declarations
under the BWC. The facilities supporting this unit, as described
in the article, are potentially dual-use (i.e., have
both civilian and potential military applications):

The research institute looks like a sanatorium
or a villa. Inside is a mysterious animal kingdom.
Its laboratories are sealed by layers of
glass. Its workers are servicemen whose entire
bodies are covered in white protective clothing
with only their eyes uncovered. Affixed on some
glass doors is the warning “Deadly Bacteria
Laboratory.” It is reported that the harm done
by a leak of any drop of bacteria from there
would be no less than that caused by a nuclear
leak. The section for flies and mosquitoes is a
room with the highest classification in the whole
building. In this air-conditioned room, tens of
thousands of deadly insects live on quality milk
bran and fresh animal blood.116

Mary’s article continues:

“It also says that when a non-military lab, the Shanghai Public Health Clinical Centre, published a Nature article reporting “a conflicting close phylogenetic relationship between SARS-CoV-2 and ZC45/ZXC2 rather than with RaTG13, was quickly shut down for ‘rectification.’””

We have a thread about the closure:
Chinese laboratory that first shared coronavirus genome with world ordered to close for ‘rectification’


The article below describes this virus pretty well. It is mostly mild or undetectable in younger healthier people. But age and chronic health issues or genetic disablilties signal a nasty turn.



BIOTECHNOLOGY: GENETICALLY ENGINEERED PATHOGENS

Lt Col Joel Almosara, BSC, USAF
June 2010

The Counterproliferation Papers Series was established by the USAF Counterproliferation Center to provide information and analysis to assist the understanding of the U.S. national security policy-makers and USAF officers to help them better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction.
….
The properties and characteristics of these genetically engineered pathogens could make them appear quite benign, but when triggered by a signal, they could become extremely lethal. Thus, the nature of these bioweapons could make a covert attack appear to be a natural disease outbreak; and by the time of discovery, the damage would already have been done. As noted, Japan, after more than half a century, only then formally acknowledged that they used biological weapons in mainland China.
Biotechnology and its dual-use nature will continue to revolutionize the biological weapons program. When a weapon system can have a small footprint, become easy to manipulate, and be used at a specific time and place of the attacker’s choosing, then it will almost invariably become a highly sought after weapon for mass destruction. Biological warfare may be is inevitable by the year 2035. It can never be too early to be prepared with the knowledge and power to deter or prevent such an attack. The United States cannot afford to lose this battle.

 

[JJackson]

I am not sure this refutes what I said. Admittedly I was recounting an anecdote told to me but I believed it at the time and this story is very close to what I was told. The only difference is I was told they already knew what they had when they sent it off for confirmation but did not announce their results but waited for a civilian agency to do so. This is a spokesman recounting the events after the fact I do not know if he knew what had actually happened in the lab. My information came from a bench scientist who actually did the analysis. If we are picking holes in stories this one is factually incorrect.

"NHRC has developed sophisticated tests for influenza that can sort out whether the virus is strain A or B and then the specific subtype based on two proteins, hemagglutinin and neuraminidase, on the viral surface. “In the usual setting, they would have done a rapid test and found that they were both positive for influenza A, and that’s as far as it would have gone,” says Ginsberg. But the new tests couldn't identify the specific subtype, so the Navy forwarded the samples to CDC."

This is not correct. As I pointed out I came to discuss this as a result of my posting about the testing regime. There are three levels of testing which were going on. The rapid test (lateral flow used in GP surgeries) which just tell you if you have flu, they are not very reliable. Then there are the state labs, and similar, used for conformation, these use reagents supplied by the CDC which can sort Type A from B and then the type A sub types into H1 & H3, and if it fails to detect either 'Type A un-subtyped'. The new H1N1(2009) Type A H1 was sufficiently different to the seasonal H1 so that the reagent could not recognise it so classifies it as 'Type A un-subtyped'. This is where I got corrected, what I did not know at the time was the A or B test is a hundred times more sensitive than the H1 or H3 part of the test. The third test is full genome sequencing by PCR and would be done the CDC or any other research lab with the right kit. Any State or regional lab would do the middle test so “In the usual setting, they would have done a rapid test and found that they were both positive for influenza A, and that’s as far as it would have gone,” is true for a GP surgery but not for a bigger lab like this NHRC which would have the middle test or its equivalent. According to the events as related to me this sample was also internally PCR sequenced, but the credit not claimed for the reason given, but forwarded for confirmation which came back with the result they already knew.
So I bat back the question "What other inaccuracies are there in your story?".

 

[sharon sanders]

I don't have a story. I am not connected to the NHRC lab. I don't know the Science writer. I am just looking at the dates. It appears that H1N1 was discovered at the beginning of April 2009 and a couple of weeks later someone at the lab gave an interview about it.

 

[sharon sanders]

NAMRU2 & 3 suffered all kinds of conspiracy theories in both Indonesia & Egypt - dastardly US military spreading bird flu or just a front for spies.

Also - for the record. I remember those accusations from 2006/2007. Who knows? I do not work for the US government. This site is not affiliated with any US gov entity. Accusing a US lab/military facility of anything does not irritate me in the least. It is not personal for me.

If you want to deflect the China lab discussion to some possible US lab escape topics - go for it - on another thread please. You can title it "Possible US government lab escapes all over the world since 2006".

Everyone knows there are lab escapes. All countries deny it - but it happens. This is what makes the China argument so ridiculous in this case. It is 100% possible that SARS-Cov-2 is an accidental lab escape. I am not convinced it was purposeful as Dr. Yan says - but accidental lab escapes happen.

 

[JJackson]

Emily - Is this evidence of something?
Yes NIH grant money was used to collect bat samples (thank you NIH, pity about the pulling of funding under political pressure) for sequencing and they were sequenced at a Chinese Lab - cooperative science working as it should do, at least until the US Executive decided to stop it.

I had a quick look at the ZC45 paper - which I have no problem with. Why they went for cerebral inoculation I do not know and did not see mentioned. ZV45 and ZC2 both have the more common RBD type which is not well adapted to human or rat ACE2 receptors but is a better fit for bats. If they were having difficulty infecting rats with these strains they may have used a high tighter in the CNS to avoid the host immune response and get the opportunity to observe disease progression in their animal model - but that is a guess.

The NPR post adds nothing useful. Any BSL3/4 lab - US or Chinese, military or civilian - can be put to dual use, as can the computer I am typing on, if I choose to use it for hacking. How the labs facade became evidence of evil intent is beyond me. The rest of it just describes any BSL3/4 lab, people in PPE, securely contained experiments & warning signs. Shock horror - flies like bran and milk and mosquitoes drink blood.

Your link was incomplete so I do not know what the other thread was claiming but RaTG13 is an outlier in the bat sequence database but does have an RBD that is a much better fit to human ACE2 so was largely ignored until SARS-2 due to its close homology in the spike gene.

"The article below describes this virus pretty well. It is mostly mild or undetectable in younger healthier people. But age and chronic health issues or genetic disablilties signal a nasty turn."
I do not think it describes SARS-2 specifically. If you have genes or an immune system that is not working well any pathogen will take advantage of the fact.
What I read was a branch of the us military worrying about the the advances in genetics giving the ability to custom make gene sequences. This is already here, what is not is the understanding of what effect given changes will have, we are still nibbling around the edges of this problem. We will probably get there one day and we need to think about how we manage that now.
"When a weapon system can have a small footprint, become easy to manipulate, and be used at a specific time and place of the attacker’s choosing, then it will almost invariably become a highly sought after weapon for mass destruction." This bit is true but it does not apply to any foreseeable bio-weapon the problem being you can not contain a contagious pathogen and it will spread to your troops as well as the enemy but the real victims will be the civilian population who are the ones that do not have NBC suites.

There is probably someone on a Chinese thread worrying about the last sentence "The United States cannot afford to lose this battle." and claiming it is an obvious reference to the US's intention to develop a bio-weapon first.

 

[bertrand789]

Comme de plus en plus sont d'accord sur les erreurs de management, il est propos? quoi pour que cela ne se reproduise pas ?

 

[JJackson]

I can not say it was not a lab escape or that HIV was not a bio weapon designed to attack gay people because I can not prove a negative. All I can say is that these two statements are basically equally well supported by the available evidence i.e. there isn't anything worthy of calling evidence that I have seen.
There are many things that need debating testing, vaccines and their distribution, etc.
I am not sure what this thread is even claiming apart from that China has been a bad actor in this outbreak. I would rate it as good, at least in comparison to most countries which does not set the bar very high.

 

[JJackson]

Pathfinder - Ebright can think what he likes but but 'the tens of millions' would be a drop in the bucket if added to the vaccine and pharmaceutical budget. Also where does he think the genetic sequences and samples of beta CoVs that the vaccine labs and pharmaceutical companies are using to develop their products came from? If we had more data on what pathogens are lurking in the wildlife around us we would have a better idea about where to invest our billions on pharmaceuticals, for very little cost, or we could stick with burying our heads in the sand and spending a fortune without knowing what is likely to cause the next pandemic. Had we heeded the warnings, after SARS-1, that there were plenty of similar viruses circulating in the bat population and SARS 2/3/4 should be expected we should have looked at the range of potential zoonotic viruses in this population and could have had a broadly acting anti-viral targeting a conserved region of the CoV gene pool that had the highest likelihood of jumping species to us.

 

[bertrand789]

si beaucoup disent que le concept One Health, d?ploy? pas , comme cette O.N.G , est une partie de la solution, il me semble temps, de regarder dans tous les d?tails comment celui-ci a et est utilis? ici et l? .

En Chine, sans que l'on dispose de vrais d?tails , il semble que les ?levages de rat bambous ne soient plus recommand?s , ni autoris?s. Mais ou sont les faits scientifiques produits et le motif invoqu? , pour le cas de cette esp?ce.

En Hollande et au Dannemark , comme il a ?t? prouv? le passage homme animal, puis en se d?ployant chez un animal sensible d'?levage , l'?mergence de nouveaux variants , avec retour chez l'homme, les ?levages atteins sont supprim?s . Le motif, n'est en rien , comme certains le pr?tendent la protection animale, mais de mon point de vue , la protection des populations humaines, vu le fait que l'on ne peut qualifier le risque de ces nouveaux variants .

Sauf que cette position ne semble pas partager , notamment par les am?ricains, par exemple qui pour ce type d'?levage , font quoi dans les faits ?


Maintenant , en regardant la situation dans le monde, on peut noter , que l'attitude vis ? vis des animaux de compagnie qui peuvent produire le m?me danger est disons, non formalis?e et ou pire .

Il y a certes , les visons, les furets , mais il y a aussi les cochons d'Inde , qui sont ? la fois un animal de compagnie en x lieu et un aliment dans certains pays .

Ne serait-il pas temps , de faire un fil sp?cifique sur ce sujet , et de lister les attitudes des uns et des autres sur des bases formalis?es.

Donc quid de la position des chinois , des am?ricains pour commencer?

juste pour sourire, ils ont dit et disent quoi les membres de cette O.N.G , qui a ?t? cit? comme les experts de ce sujet ?



Quand aux g?n?ticiens, dans les cas av?r?s dannois et hollandais, des variants sont apparus, mais peut-on ? posteriori qualifier un nouveau variant par le biais d'un passage homme animal?

si oui, combien des variants qualifi?s au monde sont issu de passage homme animaux ?

dire que l'on ne peut ou sait faire serait un plus ...



Au moment ou certains ?crivent ceci:
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/...ary-no-wonder-public-health-officials-hate-it
donc que ?conomiquement et m?dicalement , la gestion de crise propos?e, par une entreprise identifi?e a ?t? une belle connerie,

Si l'on va tendre de fa?on volontaire et ou forc?e vers une forme d'immunit? collective, regarder avec soin l'ensemble des aspects de la diffusion de ce type de virus dans nos soci?t?s me semble une vraie n?cessit? d'une part et d'autre part que les membres de ce forum , vu ses qualit?s fassent leur part aussi ...

Faire des remarques et parfois des critiques, pour de grandes instances, comme, par exemple, l'office internationale des ?pizooties, ce n'est pas ?tre un complotiste, mais plus, de mon point de vue, une marque de respect , pour le travail fait , mais aussi le travail ? faire ...

 

[Emily]

"Emily - Is this evidence of something?"

JJackson - Is this a court of law? Am I being paid to be lawyer, or even to furnish you with 'useful' data? My bank account has zero evidence of that. I think there is evidence here of you being rude and nasty though.
Whatever cooks your books and thanks for letting me know about the link.

 

[Emily]

I think this could help limit at least the dangerous experiments that involve animal suffering:
https://flutrackers.com/forum/forum...can-democratisation-help-resolve-difficulties
Also, a vision for developing the role of the Biological Weapons Convention as part of a larger interconnected global security architecture seems very much needed.

 

[bertrand789]

Merci,
je suis d'accord pour cet aspect exp?rimentation animale, mais dans le dossier qui nous occupe, c'est une infime partie du sujet, car le travail sur les lign?es cellulaires en amont des exp?rimentations , c'est sans danger .

En tout cas, vu les animaux de compagnie sensible, non vraiment suivi et sans vrai conseil donn? , ce me semble une gigantesque exp?rimentation ? ciel ouvert .

Les prori?taires d'animaux de compagnie ou de consommation ( cas des cochon d'Inde: Cavia porcellus) ont ?t? pr?venus des dangers ?

Quand on se souvient des propos des uns et des autres vis ? vis des habitudes alimentaires des chinois , c'est risible . Mais les chinois ne me semblent pas avoir publi? ce qui se doit , notamment, sur les rats des bambous, etc ...


La science , ce n'est pas la formalisation du su ?