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CIDRAP: Pandemic reveals strengths of new flu database

Shiloh

Editor, Senior Moderator
Source: http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/swineflu/news/jun2509gisaid-br.html


Pandemic reveals strengths of new flu database

Lisa Schnirring * Staff Writer

Jun 25, 2009 (CIDRAP News) ? Against the backdrop of a global struggle to solve a dispute related to H5N1 avian influenza virus sharing and an anxious watch over the novel H1N1 virus sweeping the globe, a new public database for sharing influenza genetic sequences is easing the flow of data and winning the support of a growing community of researchers and health officials, even some from countries that have sparred in the past over intellectual property rights.

The database, which contains both human and animal influenza sequences as well as epidemiologic and clinical data, is part of the Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data (GISAID), a nonprofit foundation based in Washington, DC, that was formed in 2006 with the support of international researchers who sought a more open way to share genetic data from H5N1 and other influenza viruses. Seventy-seven of the world's leading flu researchers, including six Nobel laureates, signed a letter in Nature announcing the group's formation.

Though databases such as GenBank still play a vital role in sharing and archiving influenza viruses, GISAID's EpiFlu database provides a more complete picture of the flu data. It includes some flu sequences that have not been made available to the public and permits scientists to submit extra information, such as clinical features, when they upload sequences. Once sequences are submitted, they are immediately accessible to other researchers.

Database exposes new virus structure and spread
In late April, the first news of the novel H1N1 virus threatened to overwhelm the database, GISAID officials said. However, partners from four time zones kept registration verifications going around the clock, ensured everyone's access to the data, and shared early detection findings with health authorities.

By April 25, the CDC had uploaded the first full genome sequence of the new virus from the initial US cases onto the GISAID database, instantly giving the world's research community its first detailed look at novel H1N1.

A spokeswoman for GISAID said its database administrators were among the first to see where the new virus was circulating, as spikes in registrations from a country typically preceded official confirmation of the first case.

"It was an incredible way to see where the next cluster was about to be confirmed," she said. "These were indeed some very dramatic days for all of us, days I believe some will never forget, since no one really knew what was about to happen next."

Virus-sharing dispute sparked project
Peter Bogner, a broadcast-executive-turned-international-crisis-manager who is GISAID's principal facilitator, devised a strategy for this initiative after first hearing about the virus-sharing debate at the World Economic Forum in Switzerland in January 2006, where he attended a meeting with former U.S. Homeland Secretary Michael Chertoff on America's preparedness for an influenza pandemic. He used his contacts in governments around the globe to forge a consensus between scientists and policy makers on how a responsible sharing mechanism for influenza data should work, then pushed forward with its development.

He enlisted support for the new database concept from Nancy Cox, MD, director of the influenza division and the WHO collaborating center at the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta, and from veterinary virologist Ilaria Capua, of Italy's Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale delle Venezie (IZSV) in Padua.

Capua had previously said in scientific forums that sequence data for H5N1 avian influenza virus strains should be shared immediately in publicly accessible databases so that researchers around the world can more quickly track the virus's movement and evolution. Her proposals represented a departure from the policies that have kept some H5N1 viruses in more protected databases because of governmental secrecy, research publishing constraints, and intellectual property considerations.

Cox?s team and those of the other three World Health Organization (WHO) collaborating centers that were caught in the middle of the data-sharing debate decided to support the GISAID concept by providing the scientific expertise and some initial financial backing from the CDC to get GISAID?s EpiFlu database off the ground. However, designing the structure of the new database also required the involvement of researchers from other national influenza centers and the leading H5 influenza veterinary laboratories, GISAID officials said.

"Together they are effectively the architects of our database, given that no bioinformatics group by itself could even begin to design such a system without the experience of these influenza experts," the GISAID spokeswoman said.

Following the request by governments of countries hit by avian influenza, GISAID also developed on its platform a system for tracking actual samples of H5N1 and other flu strains with pandemic potential. The tracking system is designed to mitigate transparency concerns that have spurred intellectual property rights controversy and moved some developing countries to demand greater access to pandemic vaccines in return for the viral isolates they share.

GISAID?s platform was created and is maintained by the Max-Planck-Institute for Informatics in Saarbruecken, Germany. The Swiss Institute of Bioinformatics developed programming for the influenza database.

System yields practical benefits
GISAID?s EpiFlu went live on May 15, 2008, with Indonesia supporting the project and promising to share its H5N1 sequences, and quickly achieved important milestones. Alexander Klimov, PhD, ScD, chief of the CDC's influenza surveillance and diagnosis branch, said several of the WHO collaborating centers used the database in September 2008 to make their recommendation for the southern hemisphere's 2009 seasonal flu vaccine, and all of the centers used it in February to make the recommendation for the northern hemisphere's 2009-10 vaccine.

He said GISAID?s EpiFlu database is more comprehensive than others the group has used and has search tools and filters that allow for more precise data analysis.

Catherine Smith, sequence activity officer in the CDC's flu division, told CIDRAP News that GISAID's database combines several features that scientists have long hoped for. She said researchers have sought more flexibility, such as ways to include information about antiviral resistance with the sequence information.

Although the EpiFlu database is open to the public and free of charge, its quest for transparency requires users to identify themselves and to cite the original source of the specimen and submitting laboratory of the data in their manuscripts. Users are also encouraged to collaborate with representatives of the originating laboratories and, most important, to refrain from imposing any restrictions that might preclude others from freely accessing and using all the data. By comparison, other public databases do not offer the same measures to ensure openness and crediting of sources.

Submitting sequences is quick and easy
Loading sequences is quick and easy, and several can be submitted at once. "It was mind-boggling before, but now it's nothing to dread," says Smith. When a user adds a sequence, the database program performs a curation step by verifying that the sequence is a functional protein and comparing it to subtypes in GenBank. The program generates a unique accession number for each sequence submitted, which is critical when submitting a manuscript for publication. If necessary, with a single click, users can automatically upload their sequences to GenBank at the same time they submit them to EpiFlu, which avoids duplicating the entry.

Isabella Monne, a researcher from IZSV in Padua who has used the EpiFlu database, said other useful features include the ability to add new information, such as clinical and epidemiologic data, about sequences that have already been submitted. She said another major benefit is that other users have already agreed on the principles of trust and respect for intellectual property.

Collecting sequences in one place from humans, animals, and the environment "will allow us to 'join the dots' from en epidemiological point of view," Monne said. "In addition, we will have a real-time grasp on the occurrence of mutations which are of relevance to public health, such as virulence markers and antiviral resistance, and this will allow scientists to study these mutations and policymakers to decide accordingly on pandemic preparedness."

Monne said the 2006 rallying call for greater virus sharing has dramatically boosted the number of sequences in all public avian influenza databases. "I believe that now there is a new awareness about the importance of sharing for improved global public health," she added. "Certainly, the major challenge we have is to continue to promote sharing and find incentives for scientists that share."

Also, the database has searchable fields. For example, when working on the flu vaccine recommendation, scientists were able to search the viral sequences by country over a certain time frame. "There's no other database that lets you do that," she said. The volume of sequences that researchers can compare has provided powerful benefits to researchers, she added. "A conclusion [previously] based on 5 samples can now be a conclusion based on 70 samples."

Tracking virus samples' travels
The virus tracking application, which has been offered to the WHO free of charge, is ready to use, and scientists are currently exploring its features, GISAID confirmed to CIDRAP News.

The tracking system was developed by the German based Kisters AG with the support of members of the GISAID community after an appeal from WHO member states in 2007. Countries supplying H5N1 isolates wanted a secure and transparent mechanism for continuously monitoring a specimen's chain of custody after it is submitted to a WHO collaborating center or H5 reference laboratory for confirmation and risk analysis.

After countries affected by H5N1 viruses send specimens from a living or deceased patient or animal to the laboratories, the WHO collaborating centers ship samples to research institutes and vaccine manufacturers request that request them.

The tracking system creates a record of where the sample goes by sending automatic e-mail notifications. "Many countries want to have some ownership and a way to give credit," Smith said. Another benefit for researchers is that the tracking system contains ample contact information in case questions arise about the sample. "There's a lot of potential for transparency. For example, there's a mapping tool to see where the sample or copies have traveled contained within the application," she said.

Though progress has been slow in solving virus-sharing issues, members of the WHO's intergovernmental virus-sharing group in a report following their May 15 and 16 meeting acknowledged the importance of transparency and the need for mechanisms such as those on GISAID's platform. A week earlier at an Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) meeting in Bangkok, the group recognized GISAID for encouraging the sharing of influenza genetic data, as well as the CDC for its contributions during the novel H1N1 outbreak.

See also:

GISAID Platform
http://platform.gisaid.org

Aug 31, 2006, GISAID letter in Nature

Aug 25, 2006, CIDRAP News story Scientists launch effort to share avian flu data""

May 19, 2008, CIDRAP News story "Experts welcome Indonesia's vow to share H5N1 data"
 
Re: CIDRAP: Pandemic reveals strengths of new flu database

so sad.
CIDRAP advocates GISAID-secrecy.
Dig out some old Osterholm comments about keeping sequences secret...

Capua on the forefront of publishing hoarded H5N1-sequences
in 2006 is now advocating
GISAID who's primary goal is to keep sequences secret !


> It includes some flu sequences that have not been made available
> to the public

why not ?

> and permits scientists to submit extra information,
> such as clinical features

and by which law is it forbidden to do this outside GISAID ?
Since when do scientists need a permission to submit information ?
 
Re: CIDRAP: Pandemic reveals strengths of new flu database

http://209.85.129.132/search?q=cach...lm+h5n1+sequences&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&ie=UTF-8

October 2005:

Part 4: Scientists of conscience act
Ilaria Capua of Italy was offered access to the secret WHO H5N1 database in exchange for locking up her data there. She refused. Instead, she made her sequences available to the world by depositing them in GenBank. Reference
Scientists who support public release of all H5N1 sequence data include:
Steven Salzberg, Director of the Center for Bioinformatics and Computational Biology at the University of Maryland
Michael Osterholm, Director of the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy at the University of Minnesota
Frank Plummer, Scientific Director of Canada?s National Microbiology Laboratory
Editorials condemning WHO secret database
Nature
New York Times
Effect Measure
WHO response
WHO: Bird Flu Database Should Be Public


tempora mutantur
 
Re: CIDRAP: Pandemic reveals strengths of new flu database

Exactly what are the downsides to this sharing program? It sounds like a fine idea to disperse sequences quickly, efficiently, gives credit to the sequencer and, ensures the data is from a source that is reliable. So, what am I missing?
 
Re: CIDRAP: Pandemic reveals strengths of new flu database

Shannon,
To the best of our understanding, what information is in GISAID may only be shared with others who are registered at GISAID, even though it claims to be a "public" database. If it's truly public, I don't understand why a person should have to register to begin with.

Therefore, sequences that are in GISAID may not be posted to places like FT, where there are non-members. Or even shared between a member and a non-member.

If this understanding is wrong, someone please clarify. If information sharing outside of the GISAID registry is allowed, then we should know it.

I read the user agreement several times and still don't understand exactly what a person agrees to.
 
Re: CIDRAP: Pandemic reveals strengths of new flu database

Shannon,
To the best of our understanding, what information is in GISAID may only be shared with others who are registered at GISAID, even though it claims to be a "public" database. If it's truly public, I don't understand why a person should have to register to begin with.

Therefore, sequences that are in GISAID may not be posted to places like FT, where there are non-members. Or even shared between a member and a non-member.

If this understanding is wrong, someone please clarify. If information sharing outside of the GISAID registry is allowed, then we should know it.

I read the user agreement several times and still don't understand exactly what a person agrees to.

And the other option is that sequences are not made available at all. If you want the sequences you only have to register. The conditions are there to encourage people conducting surveillance to share data and ensure their opportunities to publish are not lost.

Why do you want the sequences? Do you intend to publish results from the analysis of these sequences? You can share your analysis of the sequences. A number of groups are already doing this, including researchers from Oxford, University of Edinburgh and others. Chances are your analysis will be duplicated by many other researchers and labs. The information is being shared with the WHO, Gov't's and other research groups. Numerous groups are doing analyses, the results of which are being used to inform public health decisions. So the question remains, why do you want the information, what do you hope to do with it?
 
Re: CIDRAP: Pandemic reveals strengths of new flu database

> And the other option is that sequences are not made available at all.

maybe some, but not the majority. Why not restrict to those ?
Instead we see others who usually transmitted to genbank joining now,
a general movement towards more secrecy.

> If you want the sequences you only have to register.

only. Have you read the long conditions ? We had a thread about it, they intervened
and did forbid us to quote from their registering conditions. Even the conditions are
somehow non-public !
Registering means supporting and accepting their system. Registering means
agreement of not publishing "their" sequences.
Registering means no more free discussion and copying of their sequences on public boards like this.

> The conditions are there to encourage people conducting surveillance to share data and
> ensure their opportunities to publish are not lost.

then why not say it this way ? I hereby ensure their opportunities to publish are not lost.

> Why do you want the sequences?

e.g. help to mitigate pandemic effects ? Help to predict new possible mutations. Predict the spread
of newflu and the possible replacement of oldflu. Better estimate the probability of a H5N1-pandemic.
Etc.

> Do you intend to publish results from the analysis of these sequences?

yes. E.g. here and on other forums.

> You can share your analysis of the sequences.

I don't think so. E.g. from my tables the sequences can be reconstructed. That's just what they
want to prevent. (although they don't clearly say it)

>A number of groups are already doing this, including researchers from Oxford,
>University of Edinburgh and others. Chances are your analysis will be duplicated
>by many other researchers and labs.

but when ? This virus is already spreading and the next one might come before
the analysis is duplicated.

>The information is being shared with the WHO, Gov't's and other research groups.

only when they agree to also keep is secret, I assume.

>Numerous groups are doing analyses, the results of which are being used to inform
>public health decisions.

and numerous other groups are excluded

> So the question remains, why do you want the information, what do you hope to do with it?

see my forum.
http://www.setbb.com/fluwiki2/viewforum.php?f=7&mforum=fluwiki2
See my posts here.
http://h5n1experts.org/forum/showthread.php?t=738
http://www.flutrackers.com/forum/showthread.php?t=101112
That sort of things. I'm still hoping to find other programmers
here to share the tasks. I do spend more work on improving the format, correcting errors,
non-uniform spellings, aligning etc. than I spend for analysis. This creation of an improved
database only needs to be done once, but it isn't available AFAIK (why ?). Except here:
http://easyurl.net/aff92
I won't be able to do it with GISAID-sequences, and others won't be able to download the
files in improved,computer-readable format for analysis, like recombination - lists,
preservation lists, ... all sorts of tasks and statistics. First you need a robust computer-
readable database, which isn't available. And cannot include GISAID-sequences.
 
Re: CIDRAP: Pandemic reveals strengths of new flu database

... So the question remains, why do you want the information, what do you hope to do with it?

Why does anyone want information?

Considering it's a "public" database, it's odd that you should even ask me why I want it. Why are you even be concerned with that?
 
Re: CIDRAP: Pandemic reveals strengths of new flu database

Exactly what are the downsides to this sharing program? It sounds like a fine idea to disperse sequences quickly, efficiently, gives credit to the sequencer and, ensures the data is from a source that is reliable. So, what am I missing?

And the other option is that sequences are not made available at all. If you want the sequences you only have to register. The conditions are there to encourage people conducting surveillance to share data and ensure their opportunities to publish are not lost.

Why do you want the sequences? Do you intend to publish results from the analysis of these sequences? You can share your analysis of the sequences. A number of groups are already doing this, including researchers from Oxford, University of Edinburgh and others. Chances are your analysis will be duplicated by many other researchers and labs. The information is being shared with the WHO, Gov't's and other research groups. Numerous groups are doing analyses, the results of which are being used to inform public health decisions. So the question remains, why do you want the information, what do you hope to do with it?

Combining the 2 above thoughts... my only possible guess as to Shannon's question would be in regards to bioterrorist concern. Sort of like putting the plans for a nuclear bomb on a public website - you'd be putting the plans for a "biological bomb" on public display.

So in exchange - you limit the data to only a few governments and connected entities that can be trusted, and in turn, they share the parts of the data with whoever they decide can be trusted. And as a carrot to entice a larger library of secret data - they offer the carrot of a "show me yours and I'll show you mine" program.

And since the information is controlled and tightly locked down by people that can be trusted - not that sort of ilk that runs secret bioweapons labs and such, we're all safer from homegrown bioterrorists.
 
Re: CIDRAP: Pandemic reveals strengths of new flu database

#8: public

Seems that the some folks who controled the gen databases, when they said "(all) public" or "(all) published", thinks maybe to an more researcher exclusive only publicization - so the wider folks received only partial infos, or must be submited to additional identifications, etc.

Or maybe it is more liked to make inner researchs, and make "inner" publishing, much more than wide journals publishings.

If that is part of the microbial gen worldwide anti-proliferation policy,
patenting fights, or only scientific members exclusivity, or all this, who knows.
 
Re: CIDRAP: Pandemic reveals strengths of new flu database

Why do you want the sequences? Do you intend to publish results from the analysis of these sequences? You can share your analysis of the sequences. A number of groups are already doing this, including researchers from Oxford, University of Edinburgh and others. Chances are your analysis will be duplicated by many other researchers and labs. The information is being shared with the WHO, Gov't's and other research groups. Numerous groups are doing analyses, the results of which are being used to inform public health decisions. So the question remains, why do you want the information, what do you hope to do with it?

Information, from whatever source, is only as good as it is timely and accurate. I would be more than happy to cease analysis of sequences if those agencies established to protect the public would provide objective, honest, non-political, thorough and timely analysis of the data that they have in their position.
 
Re: CIDRAP: Pandemic reveals strengths of new flu database

if there is concern about copyright or vaccine, then they could publish at least the 3rd positions.
This still allows us somehow to track the evolution and spread,
but not to construct vaccine, which Indonesia can't afford.
Nor would it allow us to reconstruct the other mutations.
It could always be easily proved who is the "owner" of the sequence by showing the complete sequences.
So others can't so well use it in publications without giving credit
to the owner. (if that's the concern)
I suggested this several times in several forums and emails, but no
interest, no response.
 
Re: CIDRAP: Pandemic reveals strengths of new flu database

Why does anyone want information?

Considering it's a "public" database, it's odd that you should even ask me why I want it. Why are you even be concerned with that?

Let me rephrase the question.

You're free to look at the data, you're free to analyze the data, you're free to share the results of the analysis. What do you want to do with the data that would go against the terms of usage agreement?
 
Re: CIDRAP: Pandemic reveals strengths of new flu database

Information, from whatever source, is only as good as it is timely and accurate. I would be more than happy to cease analysis of sequences if those agencies established to protect the public would provide objective, honest, non-political, thorough and timely analysis of the data that they have in their position.

Agreed. But unfortunately some peoples personal agenda is presented instead. Much like USDA officials claiming that the virus is not swine origin or originated in China. Certainly there is no data to support such statements. But they're still presented.

Currently the data is available to all the agencies and those that are advising public health policy. How it is used/interpreted/presented to the public is independent of the public now having access to the data.

The wider community can now independently analyze and confirm any result or even making an unusual phenomenon widely known to the community in general - exactly what happens here on Flutrackers and now if you want to analyze the newly generated data then you only need to agree to their terms. I think what happens here is good and worthwhile. I'd rather it continues with the data being available.

gsgs -

Maybe you need to change the presentation of your results instead of a table.
 
Re: CIDRAP: Pandemic reveals strengths of new flu database

Let me rephrase the question.

You're free to look at the data, you're free to analyze the data, you're free to share the results of the analysis. What do you want to do with the data that would go against the terms of usage agreement?

Thanks for rephrasing.

To be honest, I still don't understand the terms and no one has answered my questions.

Let's try this: as a registered member, I might want to ask (unregistered) gs a question about a mutation I saw and didn't understand. Would I be able to show him that sequence so he would know what I'm talking about or would that be against the UA?

How could gs present his results without being about to present data to back it up?
 
Re: CIDRAP: Pandemic reveals strengths of new flu database

Let me rephrase the question.

You're free to look at the data, you're free to analyze the data, you're free to share the results of the analysis. What do you want to do with the data that would go against the terms of usage agreement?


publishing the data
 
Re: CIDRAP: Pandemic reveals strengths of new flu database

> Agreed. But unfortunately some peoples personal agenda is presented
> instead. Much like USDA officials claiming that the virus is not swine
> origin or originated in China. Certainly there is no data to support
> such statements. But they're still presented.

reveal the personal agendas.
USDA=United States Department of Agriculture (doesn't sound "personal")

> Currently the data is available to all the agencies and those
> that are advising public health policy.

...provided they don't publish it, right ?

> How it is used/interpreted/presented to the public is independent of
> the public now having access to the data.

? no public access to GISAID-data

> The wider community can now independently analyze and confirm
> any result or even making an unusual phenomenon widely known
> to the community in general - exactly what happens here on Flutrackers

no. You can read Flutrackers without registering. You can copy Flutracker
content to other boards or blogs.

> and now if you want to analyze the newly generated data then you
> only need to agree to their terms.

"only" means to support their secrecy. Do advocate and practise
keeping sequences secret. Exactly that thing, what since years
people here were fighting against (see the archive)

> I think what happens here is good and worthwhile. I'd rather it
> continues with the data being available.

6 months delay, as I understand

> gsgs -
> Maybe you need to change the presentation of your results instead
> of a table.

after working many hours on it ?
this is decided by usefullness-considerations alone.
Seems like asking journalists to change the presentation of their results
e.g. no pictures or such ---> censorship
You can't change science by political orders how to do it.
The truth will come out and all available presentations will be used.
Earlier or later.
 
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