CIDRAP - Influenza Roundup Boreal Winter 2007

[JohnW]

Has anyone else looked at this? Note the last sentence.

Why is the world so poorly prepared for a pandemic of hypervirulent
avian influenza?
Authors: Olav Albert Christophersen; Anna Haug a
Affiliation: a Norwegian University of Life Sciences. ?s. Norway
DOI: 10.1080/08910600600866544
Published in: journal Microbial Ecology in Health and Disease, Volume
18, Issue 3 & 4 December 2006 , pages 113 - 132

The world is now extremely poorly prepared to counter a possible
pandemic of hypervirulent H5N1 influenza. Most countries are planning
for nothing worse than the Spanish flu pandemic. It may be possible
that this can in large measure be explained as a consequence of an
epidemic of wishful thinking, which may already have infected the
health authorities (and parts of the scientific community as well) in
most countries in the world. However, it may also be possible that it
can have happened as a consequence of too little contact between
medical scientists and more general biologists (natural scientists)
from disciplines such as ornithology, ecology and evolutionary
biology. This may have led to a lack of proper understanding among
medical scientists (and health bureaucrats) of the nature of
evolutionary processes affecting influenza viruses, as regards the
evolution of host species adaptation, infectivity and virulence
properties, and also a lack of appreciation of the ways in which such
forms of evolutionary adaptation depend on ecological boundary
conditions that have radically changed, comparing the world in 2006 to
the world in 1918. While the Spanish flu virus possibly might be
compared to a one-headed monster, it may be possible that highly
virulent varieties of H5N1 virus might better be compared to a
three-headed one - because there is evidence of at least three
independent virulence factors connected with three different genes. It
is highly unlikely that all of the high-virulence alleles will
simultaneously mutate and disappear if and when the haemagglutinin
gene changes so as to make the haemagglutinin molecule better adapted
for the human-type (alpha-2,6-linked) receptor (which is a necessary
prerequisite in order that a pandemic with H5N1 virus may start). It
is more probable that evolutionary adaptation of the haemagglutinin of
H5N1 viruses to the human-type receptor will happen without any
simultaneous change in those other genetic properties that now are
important for explaining the exceptionally high virulence of certain
strains of avian-adapted H5N1 influenza virus. The change of the
haemagglutinin molecule from avian adaptation to human adaptation must
be expected to act as an additional virulence factor because it will
enhance the total number of cells that can be infected (per host
organism), increase the total rate of virus replication and potentiate
the effects of the other virulence factors already present. The
monster will then have four heads, not three, and case fatality rates
must be expected to become even higher than they have been until now, perhaps reaching as high as 98-99% (at least in poor countries with
less than optimal nutrition).

 

[Sally Furniss]

Re: CIDRAP - Influenza Roundup Boreal Winter 2007

Yes
http://www.flutrackers.com/forum/showthread.php?t=14798

 

[JohnW]

Re: CIDRAP - Influenza Roundup Boreal Winter 2007

It seems most of the folks at FluTrackers have had the opportunity to fully wrestle with the implications of the Sept. 2006 WHO conference and the subsequent uptick in the estimates for deaths from the virus. I left for vacation in October comfortable with the assumption that 1918 was the worst case scenario. I "got back" into close monitoring of H5N1 in mid-January, to find estimates of death rates of 15% of the human race and higher. Seeing an article like this one...which I saw for the first time yesterday...lead to a bad night's sleep.

I've ratcheted up my family preparation plan to now plan for disruption of the supply chain for an indeterminate period...meaning learning to be self-sufficient without electricity, gasoline, heat or food. In interesting exercise in planning.

It is interesting that you don't see these new estimates being talked about by the government...or do you? My daughter C___ works in a level two biosecurity lab at Ft. Dietrick (where all the bioweapons reasearch is done.) She cares for the animals in the lab, is not a scientist herself. Last week, they had a series of back to back meetings...one half hour each...that were open to any interested employee. C____ went in knowing very little about pandemic flus. The presenter at each session was a representative from the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta. After the meeting, she was so shaken that she wouldn't talk about it with her sister for a week. I talked to her Saturday. She seems to have picked up the points made fairly accurately. I asked her what he said the probability of a pandemic was. "Inevitable", she said. When can we expect this to occur? "Know one knows. It could be now, it could be two years, but it could be very sudden, without warning". What is the anticipated death rate? "Everybody is going to die." I told C____ I thought she had heard that last part incorrectly...but that she had picked up the very real sense of concern at the CDC right now.

 

[sharon sanders]

Re: CIDRAP - Influenza Roundup Boreal Winter 2007

I have spoken with a few officials over the last few months on the phone and at conferences.

They are very concerned. They feel the chances of another pandemic occuring is 100%, BUT, no one knows the virus strain or the CFR.

We need to prepare and watch. FluTrackers has been recommending a 90 day supply of essentials for each person.

Do not panic. There are disasters frequently. We need to be better prepared for them.

 

[JohnW]

Re: CIDRAP - Influenza Roundup Boreal Winter 2007

They are very concerned. They feel the chances of another pandemic occuring is 100%, BUT, no one knows the virus strain or the CFR.

Understood. I guess the question I am asking is how well accepted these new estimates are by the scientific community. I know that Mike Osterholm, in interviews since the beginning of the year, has talked in these terms. However, is this still a minority position within the scientific community? Osterholm and the article referenced above talk about hurdles the virus has to overcome to become less virulent. How do other scientists feel about this issue? (Dr. Niman care to comment?)

FluTrackers has been recommending a 90 day supply of essentials for each person.

Yes. That is where I have been for the last year. However, these new estimates imply the need for self-reliance. That is a completely different type of preparation than stocking up.

I've been through this before. (Like last year when I first heard about the risk.) I'll process it in the next week or two. I found last year that I felt considerable peace once I had done what I felt was needed for preparation. I expect I will just change my preparation targets and march on. Each of us has to reach our own comfort level on preparation, and do our best.

No way to opt out of this event, I suppose? (Just kidding, or course. As my brother says, "We have to live in the times we have been given.")