Feds sold lab equipment that exposed US to ‘severe bioterrorism threat,’ report says
Mary Van Beusekom, MS17 minutes ago.
Biosecurity Issues
Bioterrorism
Federal agencies sold unneeded lab equipment to apparent resellers, exposing it to potential redeployment by people with malicious purposes, creating a national biosecurity risk, per a new US Government Accountability Office (GAO) report.
“Federal agencies like the Department of Health and Human Services [HHS] and the U.S. Department of Agriculture [USDA] can donate or sell lab equipment that they no longer need,” the report said. “But some lab equipment could pose public health or national security threats if it falls into the wrong hands. For example, bad actors could use it to develop bioweapons.”
Both HHS and the USDA operate research labs that dispose of equipment. While the sale or donation of such equipment can increase access to resources needed to conduct scientific research, the authors said neither HHS nor the USDA has evaluated the biosecurity risks associated with selling this equipment or taken steps to keep it from people with nefarious intent.
Nondisclosure of 9 items subject to export controls
From 2022 through 2025, HHS and USDA sold 1,316 pieces of lab equipment, including nine freeze dryers and mass spectrometers on the Commerce Control List, or subject to export controls. The equipment was sold to people and firms—some apparent resellers—in the United States and Canada.The agencies didn’t disclose to the General Services Administration (GSA) that the equipment was on the Commerce Control List, a violation of federal regulations. GSA manages equipment disposal, including transfer to other federal agencies or auction to the public.
The absence of notification can be attributed to a lack of policy or standardized approach. “HHS’s policy is silent on this requirement and GSA’s property management system does not have a standard approach, such as a specific field, for agencies to report this information,” the GAO said.
The agencies’ lack of biosecurity risk assessment is likely at least partially due to their prioritization of equipment decontamination over risk mitigation—something that became apparent during a GAO sting operation.
“To illustrate risks, GAO used fictitious identities, including that of a nonprofit organization, to successfully acquire four pieces of HHS and USDA laboratory equipment that experts said could pose a biosecurity risk,” the report said. The GAO also visited a federal lab being decommissioned to review the equipment disposal.
Bad actors, foreign adversaries
The GAO made four recommendations to the GSA, HHS, and USDA:- The GSA should develop a standard approach for agencies to flag lab equipment that is undergoing disposal and on the Commerce Control List, such as adding a dedicated field to its property-management system.
- HHS should revise its policy to require identification of lab equipment undergoing disposal on the Commerce Control List.
- HHS should regularly assess resale-related biosecurity risks such as the risk of ill-intended people acquiring the equipment to create a biological weapon or obtain sensitive information. It should also work with the GSA to mitigate identified risks based on the assessment results.
- The USDA should take the same risk-assessment and mitigation steps as those advised for HHS.
In a House Committee on Energy and Commerce press release characterizing the equipment sales as posing “a severe bioterrorism threat,” Rep. Brett Guthrie (R-Ky), committee chair, noted that most of the experts interviewed identified 16 additional pieces of equipment that could have presented risk but weren’t on the Commerce Control List.
“With advances in AI [artificial intelligence] and synthetic biology, bad actors and foreign adversaries of the U.S. already possess enhanced access to scientific research information,” he said. Guthrie and other Republican leaders had asked the GAO for the investigation in February 2024.