• FluTrackers.com Inc. does not provide medical advice. Information on this web site is collected from various internet resources, and the FluTrackers board of directors makes no warranty to the safety, efficacy, correctness or completeness of the information posted on this site by any author or poster. The information collated here is for instructional and/or discussion purposes only and is NOT intended to diagnose or treat any disease, illness, or other medical condition. Every individual reader or poster should seek advice from their personal physician/healthcare practitioner before considering or using any interventions that are discussed on this website. By continuing to access this website you agree to consult your personal physican before using any interventions posted on this website, and you agree to hold harmless FluTrackers.com Inc., the board of directors, the members, and all authors and posters for any effects from use of any medication, supplement, vitamin or other substance, device, intervention, etc. mentioned in posts on this website, or other internet venues referenced in posts on this website.
  • We are not asking for any donations. Do not donate to any entity who says they are raising funds for us.

Canadian Govt: Large Saskatchewan Chicken Farm - Highly pathogenic H7N3

Avian flu closes farm (H7N3)

Avian flu closes farm (H7N3)

Avian flu closes farm

Poultry operation north of Regina under quarantine


JOE FRIESEN
From Friday's Globe and Mail
September 28, 2007 at 6:04 AM EDT

<!-- dateline -->WINNIPEG<!-- /dateline --> ? A strain of avian influenza that led officials to order the killing of 17 million birds in British Columbia three years ago is tearing through a poultry farm in Saskatchewan.
The Canadian Food Inspection Agency said the chickens are infected with a highly pathogenic H7N3 form of the virus, which is deadly for poultry but unlikely to cause serious illness in humans.
The problem was first reported on Sunday, when an unusual number of chickens fell ill and died, but not publicly disclosed until yesterday when a laboratory was able to confirm the pathogen.
A three-kilometre perimeter has been established around the affected farm, located about 80 kilometres north of Regina, and any poultry operation within 10 kilometres will be closely monitored. All 50,000 chickens on the farm will be killed by carbon dioxide gas, the CFIA said, and the farm will remain under quarantine.
Sandra Stephens, a veterinarian with the CFIA, said at this point it's impossible to pinpoint the source of the outbreak, but said the virus may have been carried into the barn on clothes or equipment, or even by a wild bird.
The concern is that the virus may spread to other farms, as it did in B.C. in 2004, which would make a mass cull necessary. But the CFIA says that in Saskatchewan, unlike B.C., farms are quite distant from one another, making it harder for the virus to travel quickly.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture reacted yesterday by closing the border to poultry exports from Saskatchewan, not all of Canada, a move applauded by the Chicken Farmers of Canada.
The United States hasn't imported any poultry from Saskatchewan since 2005, and Chicken Farmers spokeswoman Lisa Bishop-Spencer said a regional ban is all that's warranted at this point. In any case, the Canadian poultry industry is geared primarily for domestic consumption, and exports make up only 7.5 per cent of sales, Ms. Bishop-Spencer said.
The affected farm is a broiler-breeder operation, which produces eggs that hatch broiler chicks, but Dr. Stephens said there's no chance of the virus entering the food chain because it kills any embryo it infects.
In British Columbia's Fraser Valley in 2004, two people developed conjunctivitis after coming in contact with infected birds, but their symptoms were not serious.
Todd Hatchette, director of virology at Queen Elizabeth II Health Sciences Centre in Halifax, said the H7 version of avian flu can infect humans but is much milder than the H5 version.
"This virus is really a problem for agriculture," Dr. Hatchette said.
The farm is expected to stay under a quarantine for at least 21 days after it has been cleaned and disinfected. Infected materials are then disposed of either through composting or by being buried.

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20070928.wquarantine28/BNStory/National/home
 
Re: Canadian Govt: Large Saskatchewan Chicken Farm - Highly pathogenic H7N3

Although official reports tend to make distinction between various H7 outbreaks (H7N3 in Canada H7N3 in 2004 and 2007, H7N3 and H7N2 UK in 2006 and 2007, H7N7 in the Netherlands in 2003), all resulted in human cases and all are H7,
 
Re: Canadian Govt: Large Saskatchewan Chicken Farm - Highly pathogenic H7N3

OIE report, outbreak started september 23:

http://www.oie.int/wahid-prod/public.php?page=single_report&pop=1&reportid=6260


Chicken broiler breeder flock. The operation consists of ten barns. There are 1100 roosters housed within two barns. In close proximity are three barns which house a total of 16,000, 10 week-old broiler breeder pullets.

Approximately 400 metres away are four laying barns which house a total of 16,000, 52 week-old broiler breeders and 16,000, 29 week-old broiler breeders. Approximately 540 roosters have died in one barn containing approximately 600 birds (approximately 90% mortality). There are currently less than sixty birds remaining in this barn.

The 100 rooster had been moved from the affected barn into the 52 week-old breeder flock two weeks previously. Additionally, 160 rooster were moved to the 29 week-old breeder flock on September 17. No signs of illness have been noticed in any of the breeder barns; however, the 29 week-old breeder flock has not performed well; they did not peck as expected and production is not as good as anticipated.
On September 25, ancillary genetic results indicated the presence of an H7N3 virus in swab and tissue samples taken from the rooster barn. As of September 26, further test results indicate that birds in that barn were exposed to the virus several days prior to the findings as serology titers are demonstrated towards the virus.

H7N3 active infection was further demonstrated with the presence of live virus in tissues from dead birds and swabs. Initial virus molecular pathotyping indicate that the virus has a high pathogenic molecular pattern. All samples tested to date from birds located in the other barns on the same premise do not indicate the presence of avian influenza viruses.

Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) officials continue to proceed with the investigation according to the Notifiable Avian Influenza - Hazard Specific Plan (NAI-HSP).

CFIA will apply restrictions on the movement of poultry and poultry products
within three kilometres of the infected premises. As an additional safeguard, any poultry operations within ten kilometres of the infected premises will be closely and regularly monitored for signs of illness.
 
Re: Avian flu closes farm (H7N3)

Re: Avian flu closes farm (H7N3)

Information received on 28/09/2007 from Dr Brian Evans, Chief Veterinary Officer, 59 Camelot Drive, Room 146 W, Canadian Food Inspection Agency, OTTAWA, Canada
Summary
<TABLE class=rep_table cellPadding=0 width="100%" border=0 cellmargin="0"><TBODY><TR><TD class=rep_item width=200>Report type</TD><TD class=rep_data width=*>Immediate notification</TD></TR><TR><TD class=rep_item width=200>Start date</TD><TD class=rep_data width=*>23/09/2007</TD></TR><TR><TD class=rep_item width=200>Date of confirmation of event</TD><TD class=rep_data width=*>27/09/2007</TD></TR><TR><TD class=rep_item width=200>Report date</TD><TD class=rep_data width=*>28/09/2007</TD></TR><TR><TD class=rep_item width=200>Date submitted to OIE</TD><TD class=rep_data width=*>28/09/2007</TD></TR><TR><TD class=rep_item width=200>Reason for notification</TD><TD class=rep_data width=*>Reoccurrence of a listed disease</TD></TR><TR><TD class=rep_item width=200>Date of previous occurrence</TD><TD class=rep_data width=*>2004</TD></TR><TR><TD class=rep_item width=200>Manifestation of disease</TD><TD class=rep_data width=*>Clinical disease</TD></TR><TR><TD class=rep_item width=200>Causal agent</TD><TD class=rep_data width=*>Avian influenza virus</TD></TR><TR><TD class=rep_item width=200>Serotype</TD><TD class=rep_data width=*>H7N3</TD></TR><TR><TD class=rep_item width=200>Nature of diagnosis</TD><TD class=rep_data width=*>Clinical, Laboratory (basic), Laboratory (advanced)</TD></TR><TR><TD class=rep_item width=200>Report pertains to</TD><TD class=rep_data width=*>Entire country</TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE>

New outbreaks <TABLE class=rep_table width="100%" border=0><TBODY><TR><TD class=rep_item_ob width=200>Outbreak 1 (CAN-AI-2007-01)</TD><TD class=rep_data_ob width=*>Regina Beach, Regina, SASKATCHEWAN</TD></TR><TR><TD class=rep_item width=200>Date of start of outbreak</TD><TD class=rep_data width=*>23/09/2007</TD></TR><TR><TD class=rep_item width=200>Outbreak status</TD><TD class=rep_data width=*>Continuing (or date resolved not submitted)</TD></TR><TR><TD class=rep_item width=200>Epidemiological unit</TD><TD class=rep_data width=*>Farm</TD></TR><TR><TD class=rep_item width=200>Affected animals</TD><TD><TABLE class=rep_sub_table width="100%" border=0><TBODY><TR><TD class=rep_sub_item width="20%">Species</TD><TD class=rep_sub_item width="16%">Susceptible</TD><TD class=rep_sub_item width="16%">Cases</TD><TD class=rep_sub_item width="16%">Deaths</TD><TD class=rep_sub_item width="16%">Destroyed</TD><TD class=rep_sub_item width="16%">Slaughtered</TD></TR><TR vAlign=top><TD class=rep_sub_data>Birds</TD><TD class=rep_sub_data>49100</TD><TD class=rep_sub_data>560</TD><TD class=rep_sub_data>560</TD><TD class=rep_sub_data>0</TD><TD class=rep_sub_data>0</TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE></TD></TR><TR><TD class=rep_item width=200>Affected population</TD><TD class=rep_data width=*>Chicken broiler breeder flock. The operation consists of ten barns. There are 1100 roosters housed within two barns. In close proximity are three barns which house a total of 16,000, 10 week-old broiler breeder pullets. Approximately 400 metres away are four laying barns which house a total of 16,000, 52 week-old broiler breeders and 16,000, 29 week-old broiler breeders. Approximately 540 roosters have died in one barn containing approximately 600 birds (approximately 90% mortality). There are currently less than sixty birds remaining in this barn.</TD></TR><TR><TD class=rep_item_ob width=200>Summary of outbreaks</TD><TD class=rep_data_ob width=*>Total outbreaks: 1</TD></TR><TR><TD class=rep_item width=200>Outbreak statistics</TD><TD class=rep_data><TABLE class=rep_sub_table width="100%" border=0><TBODY><TR><TD class=rep_sub_item width="20%">Species</TD><TD class=rep_sub_item width="20%">Apparent morbidity rate</TD><TD class=rep_sub_item width="20%">Apparent mortality rate</TD><TD class=rep_sub_item width="20%">Apparent case fatality rate</TD><TD class=rep_sub_item width="20%">Proportion susceptible removed* </TD></TR><TR vAlign=top><TD class=rep_sub_data>Birds</TD><TD class=rep_sub_data>1.14%</TD><TD class=rep_sub_data>1.14%</TD><TD class=rep_sub_data>100.00%</TD><TD class=rep_sub_data>1.14%</TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE>* Removed from the susceptible population either through death, destruction or slaughter</TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE>
Epidemiology <TABLE class=rep_table width="100%" border=0><TBODY><TR><TD class=rep_item width=200>Source of infection</TD><TD class=rep_data width=*>
  • <LI class=rep_list>Unknown or inconclusive
  • Contact with wild species suspected but not confirmed
</TD></TR><TR><TD class=rep_item width=200>Epidemiological comments</TD><TD class=rep_data width=*>The 100 rooster had been moved from the affected barn into the 52 week-old breeder flock two weeks previously. Additionally, 160 rooster were moved to the 29 week-old breeder flock on September 17. No signs of illness have been noticed in any of the breeder barns; however, the 29 week-old breeder flock has not performed well; they did not peck as expected and production is not as good as anticipated.
On September 25, ancillary genetic results indicated the presence of an H7N3 virus in swab and tissue samples taken from the rooster barn. As of September 26, further test results indicate that birds in that barn were exposed to the virus several days prior to the findings as serology titers are demonstrated towards the virus. H7N3 active infection was further demonstrated with the presence of live virus in tissues from dead birds and swabs. Initial virus molecular pathotyping indicate that the virus has a high pathogenic molecular pattern. All samples tested to date from birds located in the other barns on the same premise do not indicate the presence of avian influenza viruses.
Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) officials continue to proceed with the investigation according to the Notifiable Avian Influenza - Hazard Specific Plan (NAI-HSP).
CFIA will apply restrictions on the movement of poultry and poultry products within three kilometres of the infected premises. As an additional safeguard, any poultry operations within ten kilometres of the infected premises will be closely and regularly monitored for signs of illness.</TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE>
Control measures <TABLE class=rep_table width="100%" border=0><TBODY><TR><TD class=rep_item width=200>Measures already applied</TD><TD class=rep_data width=*>
  • <LI class=rep_list>Movement control inside the country <LI class=rep_list>Screening <LI class=rep_list>Quarantine <LI class=rep_list>Vaccination prohibited
  • No treatment of affected animals
</TD></TR><TR><TD class=rep_item width=200>Measures to be applied</TD><TD class=rep_data width=*>
  • <LI class=rep_list>Disinfection of infected premises/establishment(s)
  • Stamping out
</TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE>
Diagnostic test results <TABLE class=rep_table width="100%" border=0><TBODY><TR><TD class=rep_item width=200>Laboratory name and type</TD><TD class=rep_data width=*>CFIA National Center Foreign Animal Disease, Winnipeg (National laboratory)</TD></TR><TR><TD class=rep_item width=200>Tests and results</TD><TD><TABLE class=rep_sub_table width="100%" border=0><TBODY><TR><TD class=rep_sub_item width="35%">Species</TD><TD class=rep_sub_item width="40%">Test</TD><TD class=rep_sub_item width="15%">Test date</TD><TD class=rep_sub_item width="10%">Result</TD></TR><TR vAlign=top><TD class=rep_sub_data>Birds</TD><TD class=rep_sub_data>competitive ELISA (c-ELISA)</TD><TD class=rep_sub_data>24/09/2007</TD><TD class=rep_sub_data>Positive</TD></TR><TR vAlign=top><TD class=rep_sub_data>Birds</TD><TD class=rep_sub_data>neuraminidase inhibition assay </TD><TD class=rep_sub_data>25/09/2007</TD><TD class=rep_sub_data>Positive</TD></TR><TR vAlign=top><TD class=rep_sub_data>Birds</TD><TD class=rep_sub_data>polymerase chain reaction (PCR)</TD><TD class=rep_sub_data>25/09/2007</TD><TD class=rep_sub_data>Positive</TD></TR><TR vAlign=top><TD class=rep_sub_data>Birds</TD><TD class=rep_sub_data>polymerase chain reaction (PCR)</TD><TD class=rep_sub_data>26/09/2007</TD><TD class=rep_sub_data>Positive</TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE></TD></TR><TR><TD class=rep_item width=200>Laboratory name and type</TD><TD class=rep_data width=*>CFIA NAtional Center Foreign Animal Disease, Winnipeg (National laboratory)</TD></TR><TR><TD class=rep_item width=200>Tests and results</TD><TD><TABLE class=rep_sub_table width="100%" border=0><TBODY><TR><TD class=rep_sub_item width="35%">Species</TD><TD class=rep_sub_item width="40%">Test</TD><TD class=rep_sub_item width="15%">Test date</TD><TD class=rep_sub_item width="10%">Result</TD></TR><TR vAlign=top><TD class=rep_sub_data>Birds</TD><TD class=rep_sub_data>haemagglutination inhibition test (HIT)</TD><TD class=rep_sub_data>26/09/2007</TD><TD class=rep_sub_data>Positive</TD></TR><TR vAlign=top><TD class=rep_sub_data>Birds</TD><TD class=rep_sub_data>virus isolation</TD><TD class=rep_sub_data>26/09/2007</TD><TD class=rep_sub_data>Positive</TD></TR><TR vAlign=top><TD class=rep_sub_data>Birds</TD><TD class=rep_sub_data>virus sequencing</TD><TD class=rep_sub_data>27/09/2007</TD><TD class=rep_sub_data>Positive</TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE></TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE>Map of outbreak locations

http://www.oie.int/wahid-prod/public.php?page=single_report&pop=1&reportid=6260
 
Re: Avian flu closes farm (H7N3)

Re: Avian flu closes farm (H7N3)

Post from ProMed today which indicates that eggs from the infected flock will be hatched out at another facility (see bolded section below). I am surprised, as I thought that the whole issue of vertical transmission had not been resolved. Most of the information I find states that virus HAS been isolated from eggs of infected birds, but that the virus is expected to 'most likely' kill the chicks before they hatch:


Date: Fri, 28 Sep 2007 10:07:30 -0400 (EDT)
From: ProMED-mail
Subject: PRO/AH/EDR> Avian influenza (163): Canada (SK), H7N3

AVIAN INFLUENZA (163): CANADA (SASKATCHEWAN), H7N3
**************************************************
A ProMED-mail post

ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases


Date: Thu 27 Sep 2007
Source: CBC News [edited]



Avian influenza has been confirmed at a large chicken farm near
Regina, officials with the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA)
said Thursday 27 Sep 2007].

The H7N3 strain of the virus found at Pedigree Poultry at Regina
Beach is fatal to birds, but is not dangerous to humans, the agency
said. All 50 000 birds at the farm will be destroyed with carbon
dioxide gas over the next few days.

"We could consider the entire premise to be infected," CFIA
veterinary specialist Sandra Stephens said. Speaking to reporters in
Regina, Stephens said the farm-produced eggs will be hatched at
another facility, but added that the virus couldn't be carried by
chicks born from those eggs.


Stephens said the H7H3 [this was from the original article and likely
a typo; it should be H7N3 - Mod.TG] subtype is not normally
associated with serious human illness. When asked whether any of the
people around the farm have been tested or were sick, Stephens said
that was a question for health officials.

Earlier in the day [27 Sep 2007], the road to the farm was blocked
off about a kilometer (0.6 mi) away, and an official in a car was
making sure nobody tried to get through. The official told a CBC
reporter anyone coming out would be disinfected.

Officials with the local rural municipality were issuing a warning to
the public. "I would advise people to just stay away from the area
because if there is a disease issue, we don't need to have any of
this spread about either in our area, or any other area," said Jim
Hipkins, reeve for the rural municipality of Lumsden.

Vehicles leaving the farm Wednesday [26 Sep 2007] were seen having
their tires washed. People walking in the area were also seen having
their footwear sprayed down.

Stephens said equipment and tools at the facility will be cleaned and
disinfected in the days ahead. A 3-km (2 mi) control zone has been
established around the farm, but the facility is the only one in the
zone with poultry, she said.

However, there is a Hutterite colony with a 65 000-bird chicken
operation about 8 kilometres (5 mi) away from the Pedigree Poultry
site. [Hutterites are a communal branch of Anabaptist Christians who
trace their roots to the Radical Reformation of the 16th century and
are now living in parts of Canada and the northwest United States. - CopyEd.MJ]

Nobody knows how the infection spread to the Regina Beach-area farm,
but the virus is commonly carried by migrating waterfowl, Stephens
said. Regina Beach is about 55 kilometres (34 mi) northwest of Regina.

Health authorities are concerned about avian flu because of the way
the virus can jump to other species, including humans. Some believe
avian flu could someday cause a worldwide pandemic.

Around the world, 200 people have died of avian flu since 2003,
according to the World Health Organization.

An outbreak of one strain of avian flu on a poultry operation in
British Columbia in 2004 saw 2 people infected, but they suffered
only mild flu-like symptoms.

However, the poultry industry took a major blow when the disease
forced the destruction of more than 17 million birds.

- --
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail Rapporteur Mary Marshall

[The outbreak of avian influenza in British Columbia in 2004 was
highly pathogenic strain H7N3. This article does not state if this is
a low or high pathogenic strain. Hopefully some testing is being done
on the strain even as they are depopulating the premises. - Mod.TG

Other articles have identified it as a highly pathogenic strain.- Mod.DK

The province of Saskatchewan can be located on the map at
.
- - CopyEd.MJ]

[see also:
2006
- ----
Avian Influenza (141) Canada (PE): not highly pathogenic 20060620.1706
Avian influenza (138) - Canada (PE) 20060616.1677
2005
- ----
Avian influenza - Canada (06) 20051211.3572
Avian influenza - Canada (05): comment 20051124.3409
Avian influenza - Canada (04): BC, MB 20051121.3379
Avian influenza, H5, poultry - Canada (BC) 20051120.3370
Avian influenza - Canada (02): survey wild ducks 20051102.3204
Avian influenza - Canada: survey wild ducks 20051031.3182
Avian influenza, imported pigeons - Australia (NSW) ex Canada 20051020.3062
Avian influenza, turkeys, H3 - Canada (BC) 20050601.1524
2004
- ----
Avian influenza - Canada (ON): susp 20040721.1992
Avian influenza, poultry - Canada (BC): H5 not 20040514.1311
Avian influenza, poultry - Canada (BC): H5 susp. 20040512.1281
Avian influenza - Canada (23): OIE 20040507.1248
Avian influenza, H7, poultry - Canada (BC) (22) 20040505.1233
Avian influenza, H7, poultry - Canada (BC) (21) 20040425.1144
Avian influenza, H7, poultry - Canada (BC) (20) 20040422.1116
Avian influenza, H7, poultry - Canada (BC) (19) 20040416.1052
Avian influenza, H7, poultry - Canada (BC) (18) 20040415.1029
Avian influenza, H7, poultry - Canada (BC) (17) 20040414.1014
Avian influenza, H7, poultry - Canada (BC) (16) 20040412.0994
Avian influenza, H7, poultry - Canada (BC) (15): OIE 20040410.0974
Avian influenza A (H7), human - Canada (BC) (04) 20040407.0948
Avian influenza, H7, poultry - Canada (BC) (14) 20040407.0946
Avian influenza A (H7) virus, human - Canada (BC) (03) 20040406.0935
Avian influenza, H7, poultry - Canada (BC) (13) 20040404.0925
Avian influenza A (H7N3) virus, human - Canada (BC) (02) 20040402.0908
Avian influenza, H7, poultry - Canada (BC) (12) 20040401.0893
Avian influenza, H7, poultry - Canada (BC) (11) 20040330.0870
Avian influenza, H7, poultry - Canada (BC) (10) 20040327.0843
Avian influenza A (H7N3) virus, human - Canada (BC) 20040327.0842
Avian influenza, H7, poultry - Canada (BC) (09) 20040324.0821
Avian influenza, H7, poultry - Canada (BC) (08) 20040323.0814
Avian influenza, H7, poultry - Canada (BC) (07): correction 20040315.0721
Avian influenza, H7, poultry - Canada (BC) (06) 20040313.0704
Avian influenza, H7, poultry - Canada (BC) (05): OIE 20040310.0675
Avian influenza, H7, poultry - Canada (BC) (04): RFI 20040310.0672
Avian influenza, H7, poultry - Canada (BC) (03): OIE 20040222.0562
Avian influenza, H7 serotype, poultry - Canada (BC) (02) 20040221.0557
Avian influenza, H7 serotype, poultry - Canada (BC) 20040220.0548]
...................................tg/mj/dk



Then I found this from the USDA's 'gray book' of foreign animal diseases (see paste below). Which makes me wonder why they would take the chance?

Any one else have anything more definitive information on vertical transmission of HPAI in poultry?

It is interesting that Lancet has just published an article documenting vertical transmission in an H5N1 infected human (http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140673607615153/abstract).


AVIAN INFLUENZA (Fowl Plague)
C.W. Beard, D.V.M., USDA, ARS. Southeast Poultry Research Laboratory, Athens, GA.
http://www.vet.uga.edu/vpp/gray_book/FAD/avi.htm


Avian influenza has produced losses of variable severity, primarily in turkeys in the United States, since the mid-1960's. The disease outbreaks in turkeys in the United States have been caused by AI viruses with many of the HA designations. It was in the fall of 1983 that a highly virulent H5 virus produced severe clinical disease and high mortality in chickens, turkeys, and guinea fowl in Pennsylvania. This severe disease, clinically indistinguishable from classical fowl plague, occurred after a serologically identical but apparently mild virus had been circulating in poultry in the area for 6 months.


Outbreaks of less virulent AI have frequently been described in domestic ducks in many areas of the world. The AI viruses are often recovered from apparently healthy migratory waterfowl, shore birds, and sea birds worldwide. The epidemiologic significance of these isolations relative to outbreaks in domestic poultry has led to the generally accepted belief that waterfowl serve as the reservoir of influenza viruses.


Transmissions

There is a considerable body of circumstantial evidence to support the hypothesis that migratory waterfowl, sea birds, or shore birds are generally responsible for introducing the virus into poultry. Once introduced into a flock, the virus is spread from flock to flock by the usual methods involving the movement of infected birds, contaminated equipment, egg flats, feed trucks, and service crews, to mention a few. Preliminary trapping evidence indicates that garbage flies in the Pennsylvania outbreak were sources of virus on the premises of the diseased flocks. Virus may readily be isolated in large quantities from the feces and respiratory secretions of infected birds. It is logical to assume, therefore, that because virus is present in body secretions, transmission of the disease can take place through shared and contaminated drinking water. Airborne transmission may occur if birds are in close proximity and with appropriate air movement. Birds are readily infected via instillation of virus into the conjunctival sac, nares, or the trachea. Preliminary field and laboratory evidence indicates that virus can be recovered from the yolk and albumen of eggs laid by hens at the height of the disease. The possibility of vertical transmission is unresolved; however, it is unlikely infected embryos could survive and hatch. Attempts to hatch eggs in disease isolation cabinets from a broiler breeder flock at the height of disease failed to result in any AI-infected chickens. This does not mean that broken contaminated eggs could not be the source of virus to infect chicks after they hatch in the same incubator. The hatching of eggs from a diseased flock would likely be associated with considerable risk.
 
Re: Avian flu closes farm (H7N3)

Re: Avian flu closes farm (H7N3)

It would seem that vertical transmission of HPAI would be likely. The Lancet results were not surprising. HPAI AI has a polybasic cleavage site, which allows for virus replication in multiple tissue types because the polybasic cleavage site increases the number of proteases that can cleave HA. Consequently, the virus can spread to many tissue types outside of the respiratory tract.

Since the H7N3 in Canada is said to be high path based on sequence analysis, it would seem to have a polybasic cleavage site and therefore could spread vertically.
 
Re: Avian flu closes farm (H7N3)

Re: Avian flu closes farm (H7N3)

@ Farmer:

Today I stumbled on a retrospective story about the bird flu outbreak in Bali. First confirmation of bird flu in Bali was in 2004, by a team of the University under supervision of Mahardika.

They did (in 2004) a test on 10 days old embryo in eggs; after injection of fluids of dead birds supposed to have H5N1, the embryo?s died in 20 hours:



In 2004 that then confirmation about the existence of the AI case in Bali happened.

The team of the researcher has from the Universitas Udayana School Of Veterinary Medicine isolated the virus of Avian Influenza (AI) to the nonpedigreed chicken in Bali.

The case that was found by the team of the expert this FKH Unud happened to the property nonpedigreed chicken of a breeder in the Kerobokan Village, Kota Madya Denpasar that on June 16 2004 that showed the sign did not want to eat and drink, the dull hair, weak, pale, inkoordinasi and the head bent xNP.

As for the team from FKH Unud was GNK Mahardika, M. Sibang, M. Suamba, KA Adnyana, NMS Dewi, KA Meidiyanti, and YES Paulus.

In the case that was reported the Veteriner FKH Universitas Udayana Journal, the carcass operation was found by the point bleeding or spread under skin, trakhea and the lungs, proventrikulus and wiped the tonsils.

Further, the material suspension of the lungs, wiped-tonsils, and silly the example diinjeksikan to space alantois the chicken egg sprouted the age 10 days.

Around 20 hours paska the injection all embryo died and experienced the bleeding of all the body as well as his membrane.

http://www.flutrackers.com/forum/showpost.php?p=102724&postcount=56
 
Re: Avian flu closes farm (H7N3)

Re: Avian flu closes farm (H7N3)

Thanks Dutchy. It makes sense that injecting live virus into developing eggs would kill them. My understanding is that this was one of the limiting factors to large scale H5N1 vaccine production, that the virus, even a modified live version, was so lethal to embryos.

It is unclear to me why the Canadian vet would OK a scheme to hatch out eggs from the farm. However, maybe I am reading too much into her comment. She actually is quoted as just saying that surviving chicks will not be carriers....
 
Re: Canadian Govt: Large Saskatchewan Chicken Farm - Highly pathogenic H7N3

2nd Saskatchewan farm under quarantine over avian flu worries

Last Updated: Saturday, September 29, 2007 |

The Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) has put another Saskatchewan chicken farm under quarantine, but says the move is only a precautionary measure.

The small farm affected by the decision on Friday is less than three kilometres away from Pedigree Poultry, a much larger operation just north of Regina, where officials confirmed on Thursday they had found a strain of avian influenza.

The CFIA said the quarantine measures are standard given the close proximity of the two farms. It said the 20 chickens tested on what the agency calls a "small backyard operation" have shown no signs of disease.

More than 50,000 chickens at the Pedigree Poultry operation near Regina Beach were to be killed and all equipment thoroughly sanitized.

The H7N3 strain of influenza is fatal to birds, but isn't a danger to human health, and it's not expected to have much of an economic impact, according to Lisa Bishop Spencer of the Chicken Farmers of Canada.

She says much has changed since Canada had its last case of avian flu three years ago in British Columbia, where the virus swept through a number of farms, and that industry and government have developed a system to respond quickly to any future outbreaks.

http://www.cbc.ca/canada/saskatchewan/story/2007/09/29/avian-flu.html
 
Re: Canadian Govt: Large Saskatchewan Chicken Farm - Highly pathogenic H7N3

September 29, 2007
  • The <ACRONYM title="Canadian Food Inspection Agency">CFIA</ACRONYM> began humane depopulation of birds on the affected farm on September 28.
  • Medical staff and regional animal welfare representatives will be on site throughout the disease control operations.
  • All birds will be disposed of in accordance with provincial environmental regulations and internationally accepted disease control and biocontainment guidelines.
  • As a precaution, one backyard flock located in the three-kilometre region around the index farm has also been placed under quarantine measures. This is not a commercial operation. There have no signs of illness in the flock and test results from samples taken from this flock will determine next steps.
  • Surveillance of premises within the three-kilometre and 10-kilometre regions around the index farm is underway.
  • Although there has been limited movement on or off the index farm, the <ACRONYM title="Canadian Food Inspection Agency">CFIA</ACRONYM> is conducting a comprehensive trace-out investigation associated with all recent movement of birds, bird products, vehicles or equipment.
  • Avian influenza viruses do not pose risks to food safety when poultry and poultry products are properly handled and cooked.
  • The <ACRONYM title="Canadian Food Inspection Agency">CFIA</ACRONYM>'s actions are consistent with internationally recognized animal health guidelines and the CFIA?s established avian influenza response protocols.
  • The <ACRONYM title="Canadian Food Inspection Agency">CFIA</ACRONYM> is collaborating with the Province of Saskatchewan, industry, local authorities, health officials and the producer in this response effort.
http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/anima/heasan/disemala/avflu/situatione.shtml
 
Re: Canadian Govt: Large Saskatchewan Chicken Farm - Highly pathogenic H7N3

AVIAN INFLUENZA, H7N3, POULTRY - CANADA (SASKATCHEWAN) (02)
****************************************************
A ProMED-mail post
<http://www.isid.org>
ProMED-mail is a program of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases
<http://www.isid.org>

[1]
Date: 27 Sep 2007
Source: Canadian Food Inspection Agency [edited]
<http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/corpaffr/newcom/2007/20070927e.shtml>


Avian influenza detected in Saskatchewan
---------------------------------------------
Highly pathogenic H7N3 avian influenza has been detected in a
commercial poultry operation in Saskatchewan, the Canadian Food
Inspection Agency (CFIA) announced today [27 Sep 2007]. This virus is
not the same as the strain circulating in Asia, Africa and Europe,
which has been associated with human illness. H7N3 is not normally
associated with serious human illness.

Avian influenza viruses do not pose risks to food safety when poultry
and poultry products are properly handled and cooked. In this case,
the affected birds were not destined for immediate slaughter and were
not producing eggs for human consumption.

All birds on the infected premises will be humanely euthanized and
disposed of in accordance with provincial regulations and
internationally accepted disease control guidelines. Normally, birds
on any commercial operations within one kilometre [0.62 miles] of an
infected premises would also be destroyed, but early information
indicates that no such operations are present in the immediate area.

Once all birds have been removed, the CFIA will oversee the cleaning
and disinfection of the barns, vehicles, equipment and tools to
eliminate any infectious material that may remain.

To limit any potential virus spread, the CFIA will apply restrictions
on the movement of poultry and poultry products within three
kilometres [1.86 miles] of the infected premises. As an additional
safeguard, any poultry operations within ten kilometres [6.2 miles]
of the infected premises will be closely and regularly monitored for
signs of illness.

The CFIA is investigating the recent movement of birds, bird products
and equipment onto and off of the property. Through this activity,
additional cases of infection may be detected.

The CFIA's actions are consistent with internationally recognized
animal health guidelines and the CFIA's established avian influenza
response protocols.

It may be difficult to identify the source of the virus, but the
possibility of exposure to wild waterfowl -- which are the natural
hosts for the virus -- cannot be discounted. Poultry owners are urged
to take an active role in protecting their flocks by keeping them
away from wild birds and areas frequented by wild birds.

Under the Health of Animals Act, the CFIA has authority to compensate
producers for animals ordered destroyed during disease responses. The
producer might also be eligible for assistance under other Government
of Canada or provincial programs.

The Province of Saskatchewan and industry are actively collaborating
in this response effort. The CFIA wishes to acknowledge the
responsible actions of the owner, who reported signs of illness at
the earliest possible moment. This commitment to animal health
protection has maximized the Agency's ability to contain and
eliminate this situation as quickly as possible.

New information emerging from the CFIA's activities will be
provided to the public as it becomes available.

--
Communicated by:
ProMED-mail
<promed@promedmail.org>

[2]
Date: 29 Sep 2007
From: Dr. Emily Jenkins and Dr. Catherine Soos
<emily.jenkins@ec.gc.ca> and
<catherine.soos@ec.gc.ca>


[The following post is in reference to ProMED-mail
post 20070928.3210 - Mod.TG]

The current outbreak in Saskatchewan poultry has been linked to a
highly pathogenic strain of H7N3 avian influenza
(<http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/corpaffr/newcom/2007/20070927e.shtml>).

Management of this outbreak is well underway by the Canadian Food
Inspection Agency.

The H7N3 strain of avian influenza is a potential zoonosis with low
risk of transmission, causing mild conjunctivitis in 2 heavily
exposed people in the 2004 outbreak of highly pathogenic H7N3 in the
Fraser Valley, British Columbia, Canada. The concern, of course, is
that people co-infected with avian and human influenza viruses could
serve as mixing vessels for viral recombination and subsequent
development of human adapted, virulent strains of influenza.

Wild birds are frequently implicated in outbreaks of avian influenza
in poultry, often with little or no supporting evidence (Please
reference ProMED-mail post 20051124.3409).

Highly pathogenic strains are not commonly carried in migratory
waterfowl; indeed the recent highly pathogenic H5N1 outbreak in
Eurasia is an anomaly in that wild birds may be acting as carriers
and victims of a highly pathogenic strain of avian influenza. Wild
birds are the natural hosts of low pathogenicity strains, which can
mutate into high pathogenicity strains in intensively managed
poultry. As such, enhanced biosecurity to prevent bidirectional
spillover between wild and domestic birds is well warranted, but
speculation about the source of the virus in this outbreak is
premature pending epidemiological and molecular characterization.

Investigation into the source of the virus will be facilitated by
recent surveillance for avian influenza in 1000 wild ducks in
southern Saskatchewan in August 2007, which occurred as a part of
Canada's Interagency Wild Bird Influenza Survey, in collaboration
with the United States Department of Agriculture to enhance
surveillance in the Central Flyway. Results from 2007 are pending.

In 2006, no H5 or H7 strains were detected in samples from 56 ducks
(primarily northern pintails) in southern Saskatchewan, although
there were 6 positives for non H5/H7, low pathogenicity influenza A
viruses (based on PCR). Canada-wide, no H7 subtypes or highly
pathogenic strains were detected in 4268 samples from wild ducks in
2005, nor in over 12,000 samples from wild birds in Canada in 2006:
(<http://wildlife1.usask.ca/en/aiv/index.php>).

At the moment, there appears to be no scientific justification for
increased concern over the avian influenza status of hunter-killed
wild birds in Saskatchewan, including export to the USA. Resident and
non-resident hunting of wild waterfowl is a major activity in
Saskatchewan at this time of year. As usual, hunters should observe
common sense food safety and handling precautions:
(http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/influenza/fs-hwb-fr-mos_e.html).

--
Dr. Emily Jenkins and Dr. Catherine Soos
Wildlife Disease Specialists/Research Scientists
Environment Canada
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, S7N 0X4
Canada
<emily.jenkins@ec.gc.ca> and
<catherine.soos@ec.gc.ca>

[These comments from Drs. Jenkins and Soos illustrate the concern and
heightened sensitivity around all types of avian influenza. - Mod.TG]

[see also:
Avian influenza, H7N3, poultry - Canada (SK) 20070928.3210
2006
----
Avian Influenza (141) Canada (PE): not highly pathogenic 20060620.1706
Avian influenza (138) - Canada (PE) 20060616.1677
2005
----
Avian influenza - Canada (06) 20051211.3572
Avian influenza - Canada (05): comment 20051124.3409
Avian influenza - Canada (04): BC, MB 20051121.3379
Avian influenza, H5, poultry - Canada (BC) 20051120.3370
Avian influenza - Canada (02): survey wild ducks 20051102.3204
Avian influenza - Canada: survey wild ducks 20051031.3182
Avian influenza, imported pigeons - Australia (NSW) ex Canada 20051020.3062
Avian influenza, turkeys, H3 - Canada (BC) 20050601.1524
2004
----
Avian influenza - Canada (ON): susp 20040721.1992
Avian influenza, poultry - Canada (BC): H5 not 20040514.1311
Avian influenza, poultry - Canada (BC): H5 susp. 20040512.1281
Avian influenza - Canada (23): OIE 20040507.1248
Avian influenza, H7, poultry - Canada (BC) (22) 20040505.1233
Avian influenza, H7, poultry - Canada (BC) (21) 20040425.1144
Avian influenza, H7, poultry - Canada (BC) (20) 20040422.1116
Avian influenza, H7, poultry - Canada (BC) (19) 20040416.1052
Avian influenza, H7, poultry - Canada (BC) (18) 20040415.1029
Avian influenza, H7, poultry - Canada (BC) (17) 20040414.1014
Avian influenza, H7, poultry - Canada (BC) (16) 20040412.0994
Avian influenza, H7, poultry - Canada (BC) (15): OIE 20040410.0974
Avian influenza A (H7), human - Canada (BC) (04) 20040407.0948
Avian influenza, H7, poultry - Canada (BC) (14) 20040407.0946
Avian influenza A (H7) virus, human - Canada (BC) (03) 20040406.0935
Avian influenza, H7, poultry - Canada (BC) (13) 20040404.0925
Avian influenza A (H7N3) virus, human - Canada (BC) (02) 20040402.0908
Avian influenza, H7, poultry - Canada (BC) (12) 20040401.0893
Avian influenza, H7, poultry - Canada (BC) (11) 20040330.0870
Avian influenza, H7, poultry - Canada (BC) (10) 20040327.0843
Avian influenza A (H7N3) virus, human - Canada (BC) 20040327.0842
Avian influenza, H7, poultry - Canada (BC) (09) 20040324.0821
Avian influenza, H7, poultry - Canada (BC) (08) 20040323.0814
Avian influenza, H7, poultry - Canada (BC) (07): correction 20040315.0721
Avian influenza, H7, poultry - Canada (BC) (06) 20040313.0704
Avian influenza, H7, poultry - Canada (BC) (05): OIE 20040310.0675
Avian influenza, H7, poultry - Canada (BC) (04): RFI 20040310.0672
Avian influenza, H7, poultry - Canada (BC) (03): OIE 20040222.0562
Avian influenza, H7 serotype, poultry - Canada (BC) (02) 20040221.0557
Avian influenza, H7 serotype, poultry - Canada (BC) 20040220.0548]
....................tg/ejp/dk
 
Re: Canadian Govt: Large Saskatchewan Chicken Farm - Highly pathogenic H7N3

AVIAN INFLUENZA, H7N3, POULTRY - CANADA (SASKATCHEWAN) (02)
****************************************************
--
Dr. Emily Jenkins and Dr. Catherine Soos
Wildlife Disease Specialists/Research Scientists
Environment Canada
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, S7N 0X4
Canada
<emily.jenkins@ec.gc.ca> and
<catherine.soos@ec.gc.ca>

[These comments from Drs. Jenkins and Soos illustrate the concern and
heightened sensitivity around all types of avian influenza. - Mod.TG]
Promed propaganda campaign remains in high gear.
 
Re: Canadian Govt: Large Saskatchewan Chicken Farm - Highly pathogenic H7N3

Commentary

H7N3 in Saskatchewan Canada

Recombinomics Commentary
September 27, 2007

Highly pathogenic H7N3 avian influenza has been detected in a commercial poultry operation in Saskatchewan, the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) announced today.

H7N3 is not normally associated with serious human illness.

The above comments from the press release from the Canadian Food Inspection Agency confirm HPAI H7N3 in Canada. The comment on human illness has two qualifiers, which have been dropped from media reports. H7N3 is easily transmitted from birds to humans as well as human-to-human. However, most infections are mild and assays for H7 genetic information in healthy host (birds or people) is abysmal, Antibody testing of convalescent sera is more sensitivity and reliable. The serological tests provide conclusive evidence for efficient transmission.

The last major outbreak of H7 in birds in Canada was the 2004 outbreak in British Columbia. The H7N3 initially tested as low path, but HPAI was detected within days, and the outbreak led to culling of millions of birds. Two workers were confirmed H7N3 infected, but many more had symptoms, which include conjunctivitis.

The most recent H7 infection was in England in late May. The low path H7N2 was linked to multiple confirmed cases, and many more suspect cases.
Although an update on human testing of suspect cases was promeised at the Options VI presentation in Toronto, the update has not been made public.

H7 infections are cause concern because the virus is efficiently transmitted to mammals. The only reported bird flu fatality that was not H5N1 was a death linked to the 2003 H7N7 outbreak in the Netherlands. Serological testing of cullers and contacts indicated well over 1000 people had H7 antibodies.

Although the current outbreak is almost certainly linked to wild birds, the influenza surveillance program in Canada failed to detect high or low path H7 in wild birds this year or last year.

Sequence information on the poultry outbreak would be useful.


.
 
Re: Canadian Govt: Large Saskatchewan Chicken Farm - Highly pathogenic H7N3

Although the Canadian press release accurately states that H7N3 does not pose a serious human health threat as compared to H5N1, it probably does pose a greater pandemic threat.

The H7 avian influenza virus has far more human characteristics associated with its genome than does H5, and is much more easily transmitted from poultry to humans. Just because it doesn't have a case fatality history does not mean that folks will not get sick and have to miss work. If H7 goes pandemic, we could possibly experience very high clinical infection rates that could be disruptive to our economies, even though relatively few lives are lost.

Just something to ponder as officials downplay this latest detection.

Have any of the H7s ever had more than 4 amino acids at the cleavage site, or is Asian H5N1 the only one? Would an H7 with only 4 amino acids be likely to infect few organs than the H5N1 with 8?

Are there any AIs circulating in the Americas that have been found with the NS1/pos 92 mutation?

My point is that should H7N3 go pandemic, can we assume it would be less virulant than a pandemic H5N1?

.
 
Re: Canadian Govt: Large Saskatchewan Chicken Farm - Highly pathogenic H7N3

from Protective measures and human antibody response during an avian influenza H7N3 outbreak in poultry in British Columbia, Canada

.....Given that the only human infections in British<SUP> </SUP>Columbia followed direct contact with unprotected conjunctiva,<SUP> </SUP>these concerns should be addressed. Other investigators have<SUP> </SUP>also underscored the importance of eye protection and the particular<SUP> </SUP>ocular tropism of H7 subtypes.<SUP>12?14</SUP><SUP>,</SUP><SUP>39</SUP><SUP>,</SUP><SUP>40</SUP> Human influenza<SUP> </SUP>viruses are thought to bond preferentially to
agr.gif
2,6 cellular receptors,<SUP> </SUP>which predominate in the upper respiratory tract.<SUP>39</SUP><SUP>,</SUP><SUP>40</SUP> Conversely,<SUP> </SUP>avian influenza viruses preferentially bond to
agr.gif
2,3 receptors,<SUP> </SUP>which are expressed with preponderance in the human eye and<SUP> </SUP>deep in the lung
.<SUP>39</SUP><SUP>,</SUP><SUP>40</SUP> Avian influenza viruses that successfully<SUP> </SUP>replicate in the conjunctiva may gain access to the respiratory<SUP> </SUP>tract through the nasolacrimal duct. Given enough opportunities,<SUP> </SUP>adaptation to
agr.gif
2,6 receptors in the upper airway may occur, setting<SUP> </SUP>the stage for efficient human-to-human transmission
.<SUP>40......</SUP>
<SUP></SUP>
<SUP>.</SUP>
 
Re: Canadian Govt: Large Saskatchewan Chicken Farm - Highly pathogenic H7N3

Have any of the H7s ever had more than 4 amino acids at the cleavage site, or is Asian H5N1 the only one? Would an H7 with only 4 amino acids be likely to infect few organs than the H5N1 with 8?

Are there any AIs circulating in the Americas that have been found with the NS1/pos 92 mutation?

My point is that should H7N3 go pandemic, can we assume it would be less virulant than a pandemic H5N1?

.
Both H5 and H7 isolates with poly-basic HA cleavage sites have been reported.
 
Re: Canadian Govt: Large Saskatchewan Chicken Farm - Highly pathogenic H7N3

Have any of the H7s ever had more than 4 amino acids at the cleavage site, or is Asian H5N1 the only one? Would an H7 with only 4 amino acids be likely to infect few organs than the H5N1 with 8?
.

D, the H5N2 outbreak in Gonzales, Texas in 2004 had more than the normal basic amino acids at the HA cleavage site, but that virus turned out to not be highly pathogenic when tested against eight week old chicks. That is, less than 75% of them died.

Also, the H7N2 outbreak in Pennsylvania back in 2002 started out as low path, but within months had acquired poly basic amino acids at the cleavage site and began devasting the domestic poultry flocks.

The H5 and H7 viruses have a history of becoming highly pathogenic when introduced into poultry. Diligence is necessary and continuous monitoring is essential. The problem for North America will likely arise from a small flock that has less than adequate biosecurity.
 
Re: Canadian Govt: Large Saskatchewan Chicken Farm - Highly pathogenic H7N3

China bans Canadian poultry imports on bird flu fears


BEIJING - China says it has banned Canadian poultry because of an outbreak of bird flu in Saskatchewan.

The notice from the Agriculture Ministry says Canadian poultry imports were banned September 30 and any shipments arriving in China will be destroyed or returned.

The move follows similar bans by the United States and Japan.

The Canadian Food Inspection Agency said last month a strain of bird flu that is not harmful to humans had been confirmed at a large chicken farm in Saskatchewan.

The Saskatchewan avian influenza is not the H-5-N-1 virus that has caused worldwide alarm but officials say the H-7-N-3 virus is a considerable threat to commercial poultry farms.

.
 
Re: Canadian Govt: Large Saskatchewan Chicken Farm - Highly pathogenic H7N3

Poultry allowed on disinfected Sask. farm


A Saskatchewan poultry farm quarantined for H7N3 avian flu since last September has been given the all-clear to bring new birds to the property.

The Canadian Food Inspection Agency said Monday that all cleaning and disinfection have been completed on the affected farm and all quarantine measures have been removed.

CFIA regulations allow quarantines to be lifted 21 days after all barns, vehicles, equipment and tools on an affected farm are cleaned and disinfected.

Assuming no further cases arise, Canada will be considered free of highly pathogenic avian flu, according to international guidelines, 90 days after cleaning and disinfection were complete. In this case, that date will be April 17, CFIA said in a statement on its web site.

Most other CFIA restrictions on the movement of other farms' birds and bird products within and through Saskatchewan related to this case were lifted by the end of October.

The cleanup of the farm, in the Regina Beach/Lumsden area northwest of Regina, was funded in part by Saskatchewan's poultry industry groups, who raised $100,000 as an ad-hoc measure to help with the "prohibitive" costs. The bills for cleanup and disinfection in such cases usually fall to the farmer.

Government programs compensate livestock producers for the market value of animals lost to "depopulation" -- in this case, about 50,000 birds -- as well as costs related to the culling and burial, but do not cover the cleanup needed to prevent further outbreaks.

"Shared responsibility"

"Ensuring that the infected premise is appropriately cleaned and disinfected is critical to ensuring confidence in both government and industry biosecurity systems, and should be a shared responsibility," said Joy Smith, general manager of Saskatchewan Egg Producers, in a statement in December, calling on governments to support cleanup operations.

The highly pathogenic H7N3 virus, which sickened and killed some birds on the Regina Beach farm last September and led to the complete cull, affects birds but not people, and is not to be confused with H5N1, another "high-path" strain. H5N1 is blamed for the deaths of at least 225 people overseas since late 2003, largely through direct contact with infected birds.

The most recent confirmed human fatality from H5N1 was a 29-year-old Indonesian woman, who died Saturday, according to a Reuters report on Monday.

Health officials worldwide are tracking H5N1, citing fears it may mutate into a form that people can catch from other people, and thus spur a pandemic.

http://www.canadiancattlemen.ca/issues/ISArticle.asp?id=79712&issue=02042008&story_id=&PC=FBC
 
Re: Canadian Govt: Large Saskatchewan Chicken Farm - Highly pathogenic H7N3

For those FT readers in Winnipeg, a one day conference will be held regarding the outbreak in Saskatchewan and its implications for public health.

J.


______________

Avian Influenza ?The Saskatchewan Experience? A Special Event hosted by Manitoba Health and Healthy Living

Much can be learned from Saskatchewan?s 2007 avian influenza outbreak. Presentations will focus on the public health and occupational health response.

We invite colleagues who may be involved in an avian influenza public health or occupational health response to participate.

Friday, March 14, 2008 8:30 am - 4:30 pm University of Manitoba Aboriginal Centre Classroom C 11 The Promenade Winnipeg, MB (Main Floor of the apartment building behind Portage Place)

As space is limited, RSVP to Andrea.Fontaine-Barry@gov.mb.ca by Friday, February 29th
 
Back
Top