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Can Commun Dis Rep . One Health response to SARS-CoV-2-associated risk from mink farming in British Columbia, Canada, October 2020 to October 2021

tetano

Editor, Senior Moderator
Can Commun Dis Rep


. 2022 Jun 9;48(6):261-273.
doi: 10.14745/ccdr.v48i06a04. One Health response to SARS-CoV-2-associated risk from mink farming in British Columbia, Canada, October 2020 to October 2021

Veronic Clair[SUP] 1 2 3 [/SUP], Elaine Chan[SUP] 1 4 [/SUP], Adrianna Paiero[SUP] 5 [/SUP], Erin Fraser[SUP] 1 2 [/SUP], Rayna Gunvaldsen[SUP] 6 [/SUP], Emily Newhouse[SUP] 2 5 [/SUP]



Affiliations
Abstract

Background: Mink farms are susceptible to severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) outbreaks and carry an associated risk of novel SARS-CoV-2 variant emergence and non-human reservoir creation. In Denmark, control measures were insufficient to prevent onward transmission of a mink-associated variant, contributing to the nation-wide culling of farmed mink. To date, British Columbia (BC) is the only Canadian province to report mink farm SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks. The objective of this study is to describe BC's One Health response to SARS-CoV-2-associated risk from mink farming, its outcomes, and insights from implementation.
Methods: The detection of two mink farm outbreaks in December 2020 catalyzed BC's risk mitigation response for both infected and uninfected farms, including the following: farm inspections and quarantines; Public Health Orders mandating mink mortality surveillance, enhanced personal protective equipment, biosafety measures and worker coronavirus disease 2019 vaccination, at-a-minimum weekly worker viral testing, and wildlife surveillance.
Results: A One Health approach enabled a timely, evidence-informed and coordinated response as the situation evolved, including the use of various legislative powers, consistent messaging and combined human and mink phylogenetic analysis. Ongoing mink and worker surveillance detected asymptomatic/subclinical infections and facilitated rapid isolation/quarantine to minimize onward transmission. Voluntary testing and mandatory vaccination for workers were acceptable to industry; enhanced personal protective equipment requirements were challenging. Regular farm inspections helped to assess and improve compliance.
Conclusion: British Columbia's One Health response reduced the risk of additional outbreaks, viral evolution and reservoir development; however, a third outbreak was detected in May 2021 despite implemented measures, and long-term sustainability of interventions proved challenging for both industry and governmental agencies involved.

Keywords: COVID-19; One Health; SARS-CoV-2; mink farm; reservoir; spillover.

 
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