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Avian Influenza Prevalence in Pigs,Donkeys Egypt

Twall

Well-known member
this would most likely be why they killed of the swine herds within egypt.

http://www.cdc.gov/eid/content/16/4/726.htm
Volume 16, Number 4–April 2010
Letter
Avian Influenza Prevalence in Pigs, Egypt
Amr El-Sayed, Walid Awad, Adel Fayed, Hans-Peter Hamann, and Michael Zschöck
Author affiliations: Cairo University, Giza, Egypt (A. El-Sayed, W. Awad, A. Fayed); and Hessian State Laboratory, Giessen, Germany (H.P. Hamann, M. Zschöck)

Suggested citation for this article

To the Editor: Since 1996, avian influenza virus (H5N1) has spread to >65 countries (1). The disease represents a serious threat for the poultry industry and public health. Egypt has the highest human infection and fatality rates outside Asia (2). Some isolates of influenza virus (H5N1) in Egypt are resistant to oseltamivir (3), and in others, virulent mutations have developed, leading to case-fatality rates of 100% (4).

Pigs have the largest epidemiologic role in the evolution of new influenza viruses (5). Recombination between the newly emerged influenza virus subtypes H1N1 and H5N1 in pigs would have catastrophic results. We therefore investigated the seroprevalence of influenza virus (H5N1) in pigs in Egypt.

In May 2008, we collected 1 serum sample and 1 nasal swab from each of 240 pigs (11 herds) in Cairo slums. May was selected because it directly follows the season of bird migration and the seasonal storms usually accompanied by airborne diseases. Cairo slums were selected because 1) pigs there feed on organic remains, including dead birds, and thus have a higher chance of becoming infected; 2) Cairo is at the base of the Nile Delta, where most subtype H5N1 foci occurred; and 3) Cairo is near Fayum, the main stopover site for migrating birds.

To detect anti–avian influenza antibodies in the serum, we used hemagglutination inhibition (HI) assays with 2 inactivated antigens: subtype H5N2 from the Veterinary Laboratories Agency, UK; and a local subtype H5N1 prepared according to the protocol used in the central national laboratories. To detect viral RNA in the nasal swabs, we used real-time PCR, as was recommended for detection of influenza (H5N1) infection during outbreaks in Southeast Asia (6).

Although all nasal samples reacted negatively to influenza A/H5 by real-time PCR, only 4 serum samples showed positive results by HI when using subtype H5N2 antigen; titers were 32 for 3 samples and 64 for 1. Seven additional positive serum samples were detected when antigen prepared from local subtype H5N1 virus was used; titers ranged from 16 (6 samples) to 512 (1 sample). Also during this 2-week sampling period, titers of 32 for 3 samples and 128 for 1 were obtained. Seroprevalence rate of avian influenza for the 240 pigs was 1.67% and 4.6% when the nonlocal or local viral antigens, respectively, were used. Of the 11 positive pigs, 8 were from 1 herd and 3 were from 3 other herds.

Failure to detect viral RNA in the upper respiratory tract indicates the absence of acute infections in the investigated pigs. Inability of the virus to persist in the pigs was reported (7). Contrary to the HI results, results of routine examination of the 240 pigs found no abnormalities. Absence of clinical signs in infected pigs was reported (8) and was attributed to their low susceptibility to influenza (H5N1) (7). The results indicate that infection rate for pigs in Egypt is clearly higher than that for pigs in China and Vietnam (8,9). This increase may be attributed to different spatial and temporal factors leading to increased infection risk among sampled pigs, higher antigenicity of native isolates, or most probably to the disease situation in Egypt. The detection of 8 positive reactors from 1 herd indicates a subtype H5N1 focus there as was reported in Indonesia (8). The difference in the number of reactors when using different antigens indicates the difference in antigenicity. These data are supported by field observations regarding low protection level (≈35% in some reports) of imported vaccines (A. El-Sayed, unpub. data). The relatively low seroprevalence of avian influenza in pigs may be misleading because of the poor immunogenicity of some avian influenza lines and lack of sensitivity for detecting low titers of induced antibodies (10). It may be also explained by the use of a virus antigen other than that existing in the population, as was done in the present study.

Human risk for influenza (H5N1) infection in Egypt seems to be associated mainly with infected birds. It has not yet been associated with infected pigs.

Acknowledgments
We thank Elham Elebiary and Lamia Omar for their excellent help.

This study was financed by Cairo University.

References
Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy. Avian influenza (bird flu): implications for human disease [cited 2010 Jan 29]. http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/influenza/avianflu/biofacts/avflu_human.html
World Health Organization. Confirmed human cases of avian influenza A/(H5N1); 2009 [cited 2009 Apr 4]. http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/country/en
Kage B. Bird flu virus mutates into Tamiflu-resistant strain in Egypt; WHO does not expect pandemic [cited 2007 Jan 24]. http://www.flunews.org/1058_bird_flu_Tamiflu.html
L. Third H5N1 fatality in Gharbiya cluster in Nile Delta. Recombinomics commentary, December 27, 2006 [cited 2010 Feb 11]. http://www.recombinomics.com/News/12270601/H5N1_Gharbiya_Fatal_3.html
Ma W, Kahn RE, Richt JA. The pig as a mixing vessel for influenza viruses: human and veterinary implications. J Mol Genet Med. 2008;3:158–66.
Tran TH, Nguyen L, Nguyen D, Luong S, Pham M, Nguyen C, et al. Avian influenza A (H5N1) in 10 patients in Vietnam. N Engl J Med. 2004;350:1179–88. PubMed DOI
Lipatov AS, Kwon YK, Sarmento LV, Lager KM, Spackman E, Suarez DL, et al. Domestic pigs have low susceptibility to H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses. PLoS Pathog. 2008;4:e1000102. PubMed DOI
Cyranoski D. Bird flu spreads among Java's pigs. Nature. 2005;435:390–1. PubMed DOI
Choi YK, Nguyen TD, Ozaki H, Webby RJ, Puthavathana P, Buranathal C, et al. Studies of H5N1 influenza virus infection of pigs by using viruses isolated in Vietnam and Thailand in 2004. J Virol. 2005;79:10821–5. PubMed DOI
de Jong MD, Hien TT. Avian influenza A (H5N1). J Clin Virol. 2006;35:2–13. PubMed DOI
Suggested Citation for this Article
El-Sayed A, Awad W, Fayed A, Hamann HP, Zschöck M. Avian influenza prevalence in pigs, Egypt [letter]. Emerg Infect Dis [serial on the Internet]. 2010 Apr [date cited]. http://www.cdc.gov/EID/content/16/4/726.htm

DOI: 10.3201/eid1604.091316
 
Re: Avian Influenza Prevalence in Pigs, Egypt

Re: Avian Influenza Prevalence in Pigs, Egypt

The relatively low seroprevalence of avian influenza in pigs may be misleading because of the poor immunogenicity of some avian influenza lines and lack of sensitivity for detecting low titers of induced antibodies (10).

This lead me to here, which I found very discouraging, because it goes back to 2006. Shouldn't we have more accurate/current tests that detect low titers by 2008 when this study took place?:
J Clin Virol. 2006 Jan;35(1):2-13. Epub 2005 Oct 6.
Avian influenza A (H5N1).

de Jong MD, Hien TT.
Oxford University Clinical Research Unit, Hospital for Tropical Diseases, 190 Ben Ham Tu, District 5, Ho Chi Minh City, Viet Nam. mddejong@hcm.vnn.vn
Since their reemergence in 2003, highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) viruses have reached endemic levels among poultry in several southeast Asian countries and have caused a still increasing number of more than 100 reported human infections with high mortality. These developments have ignited global fears of an imminent influenza pandemic. The current knowledge of the virology, clinical spectrum, diagnosis and treatment of human influenza H5N1 virus infections is reviewed herein.

PMID: 16213784 [PubMed - indexed for MEDLINE]
 
Re: Avian Influenza Prevalence in Pigs,Donkeys Egypt

Thanks Treyfish :tiphat:

Mild infections with no mortality in donkeys and lasting for 72 hours, this is a interesting report. which was done starting in early march 2009. a snip from the report is below. a link to the entire report is available on this link

The highly pathogenic H5N1 is a major avian pathogen that crosses species barriers and seriously affects humans as well as some mammals. It mutates in an intensified manner and is considered a potential candidate for the possible next pandemic with all the catastrophic consequences.

Methods: Nasal swabs were collected from donkeys suffered from respiratory distress.

The virus was isolated from the pooled nasal swabs in specific pathogen free embryonated chicken eggs (SPF-ECE). Reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) and sequencing of both haemagglutingin and neuraminidase were performed.H5 seroconversion was screened using haemagglutination inhibition (HI) assay on 105 donkey serum samples.
Results: We demonstrated that H5N1 jumped from poultry to another mammalian host; donkeys. Phylogenetic analysis showed that the virus clustered within the lineage of H5N1 from Egypt, closely related to 2009 isolates.
It harboured few genetic changes compared to the closely related viruses from avian and humans. The neuraminidase lacks oseltamivir resistant mutations.Interestingly, HI screening for antibodies to H5 haemagglutinins in donkeys revealed high exposure rate.

Conclusions: These findings extend the host range of the H5N1 influenza virus, possess implications for influenza virus epidemiology and highlight the need for the systematic surveillance of H5N1 in animals in the vicinity of backyard poultry units especially in endemic areas.


I have added the map to the areas which the donkeys infections were located in.It looks like the infections were spread over and area of 1,322 Kilometers square with and estimated population base of 2,290,527.Its worth mentioning only five of the seven areas had samples taken and testing performed.
 

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Re: Avian Influenza Prevalence in Pigs,Donkeys Egypt

added the map of beni suef which shows the area the infected donkeys were spread over.
 
Re: Avian Influenza Prevalence in Pigs,Donkeys Egypt

Issue No. 21
FAO report No. 21 | March 2010



Egypt reported the first H5N1 HPAI outbreak in February
2006. Despite a vigorous initial response to the disease,
including the culling of over 40 million birds, Egypt is
considered as an endemic country where outbreaks are
regularly reported from different governorates.

In March 2010, 77 H5 HPAI outbreaks were observed in poultry
(chickens, ducks and turkeys) from Alexandria (1), Beni-Suef
(6), Dakahlia (4), Fayoum (3), Gharbia (5), Giza (1), Helwan
(2), Kafr-el-sheikh (8), Menia (4), Menofia (23), Qalubia (6),
Sharkia (4), Sixth of October (9), and Suez (1)
governorates. Of these, 59 outbreaks (76%) were reported
from the household poultry sector. Sixty-two of the 77

outbreaks occurred in non-vaccinated birds while the
remaining 15 outbreaks occurred in vaccinated birds. During
March 2010, Community Animal Health Outreach (CAHO)
teams visited 48 villages in ten governorates and detected
10 (13%) of the above-reported confirmed outbreaks. CAHO
teams operate in high-risk governorates and collect samples
only from suspected cases.

Poultry farms are required to test their birds and receive
certification (HPAI infection negative status) prior to any
planned transportation. During March 2010, 2 779 samples
were collected for this purpose, nine of them confirmed
positive for HPAI, from five governorates. In Egypt,
compliance with certification for poultry transportation is
generally sub-optimal, as only registered farms (<20 % of
the farms) seek such services.

During March 2010, 103 farms in eleven governorates were
subjected to active surveillance and six of them were
confirmed positive for HPAI infections. On the other hand,
three of seven HPAI notifications (passive surveillance)
received from commercial poultry farms were found to be
positive for H5 HPAI.

By way of active surveillance, 35 out of 200 household
poultry units sampled in 16 governorates were confirmed as
H5 HPAI. Conversely, 14 of the 45 suspected outbreak
notifications (passive surveillance) from nine governorates
were confirmed positive to H5 HPAI. Besides this, 33 samples
collected at road check points were found to be negative for
HPAI.

The current government policy is to allow commercial poultry
farms to vaccinate their flocks with registered vaccines of
their choice. Although there are no official data, it is assumed
that vaccines are widely used in the commercial poultry
sector. All AI vaccines used in Egypt (at least 21) are
inactivated (mostly H5N2) and imported. For three years, the
government provided vaccination to household/village poultry
free of charge until July 2009, when vaccination was
suspended until further notice, because of a limited or no
impact on H5N1 HPAI incidence. A recent assessment study
conducted by FAO and the General Organisation for
Veterinary Services (GOVS), in the framework of the
Strengthening Avian Influenza Detection and Response
(SAIDR) project, revealed that vaccination coverage was
under 20% and flock immunity under 10% in the household
sector. The study also highlighted substantial weaknesses in
the current immunization programme, mainly due to the
difficulties of blanket vaccinations in the semi-commercial and
household poultry sectors, lack of sufficient funding and
communication support, absence of an efficient monitoring
system, and inadequate training of field technicians. More
information can be found in Peyre et al. (2009) at
http://www.libpubmedia.co.uk/MedJ-Issues/Issue-
5/Peyre.pdf.

Live bird markets (LBMs) are key links between commercial
and household poultry sectors. Egypt has recently
implemented bans on selling live birds at open markets (Law
70/2009, MOALR MD 941/09), but the ban has had little
effect and LBMs continue to operate. Some governorates are
enforcing decrees related to the closure of unregistered
poultry farms and control of bird movements. Enforcement
varies from one governorate to another, but is generally
weak.

In March 2010, five human avian influenza A H5N1 cases
were reported, in an 18-year old female from Fayoum
Governorate (fatal), a 30-year old female from Damietta
Governorate, a four-year old male from Beni-Suef
Governorate (fatal), a 20-year old pregnant female from
Qaliobia Governorate (fatal), and an 18-month old male from
Kafr-el-sheikh Governorate.

Of the 109 human laboratory-confirmed cases of influenza A
H5N1 reported in Egypt since the beginning of the epidemic,
34 (30%) have been fatal. Compared with 2009, when most
cases were in children under four years of age, 14 out of the
19 human infections so far reported in 2010 have been in
patients over that age. The observed CFR is also higher so far
in 2010 (37%) compared with 10% in 2009, when it
dramatically decreased from 50% in 2008. The relative
increase in H5N1 HPAI outbreaks in poultry (239 in 2010
compared with 55 in the same period in 2009) may be a
result of the improved surveillance and reporting rate, mainly
because of the effectiveness of CAHO.

In May 2008, serum and nasal swabs were collected from
240 pigs (11 herds) in Cairo slums, where pigs feed on
organic remains, including dead birds,
and thus have a higher
chance of becoming H5N1-infected. Although all nasal
samples were negative to by real-time PCR, seroprevalence
for avian influenza was 1.67% and 4.6% (for non-local H5N2
and local H5N1 viral antigens, respectively). Of the 11
positive pigs, eight were from one herd and three from three
other herds. More details are available in El-Sayed et al.
(2010) at http://www.cdc.gov/EID/content/16/4/726.htm.

In a recent study by Abdel-Moneim et al. (2010) available at
http://www.jbiomedsci.com/content/17/1/25, nasal swabs
were collected from three donkeys suffering from respiratory
distress in March 2009, one week after a H5N1 HPAI poultry
outbreak in Aborady Village, El-Wasta Locality, Beni-Suef
Governorate, where many donkeys suffered from the same
clinical manifestations in an epidemic manner. Sequences
were deposited in GenBank. Phylogenetic analysis showed
that the virus clustered within the lineage of H5N1 from
Egypt, closely related to 2009 isolates. One hundred and five
serum samples were collected from apparently healthy
donkeys from different localities in the Beni-Suef
Governorate, four to six months after the virus isolation. H5
specific antibodies were detected in 27 out of 105 (25.71%)
of the examined animals, with the highest percentage found
in the area where the virus was isolated, suggesting donkeyto-
donkey transmission.
 
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