tetano
Editor, Senior Moderator
doi: 10.1128/mBio.00379-12 9 October 2012 mBio vol. 3 no. 5 e00379-12
The H5N1 Moratorium Controversy and Debate
Arturo Casadevall and
Thomas Shenk
Address correspondence to Arturo Casadevall, casadeva@aecom.yu.edu.
The views expressed in this Editorial do not necessarily reflect the views of the journal or of ASM.
Editorial
The pause in gain-of-function experiments involving highly pathogenic avian influenza virus to dissect mechanisms of mammalian transmission and virulence is a historic moment for science. The scientific community and the greater society that it serves are currently engaged in a vigorous debate on whether and how to carry out experiments that could provide essential information for preparedness against a pandemic of avian influenza. To foster discussion and to provide a venue to record the arguments for or against this moratorium, mBio has commissioned a series of views from experts in the field. In addition to these views, we note a need for a clear scientific rationale for gain-of-function studies and suggest that many of the current concerns involving such experiments can be circumvented by efforts to generate safer systems that could provide comparable information with much-reduced risk.
In the winter of 2012, a group of influenza virus investigators announced in a joint letter a ?voluntary pause of 60 days on any research involving highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 viruses leading to the generation of viruses that are more transmissible in mammals? (1). The pause came at a time of great controversy in science, which was caused by the recommendation of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) to redact details from two manuscripts that provided molecular information on mutations which allowed H5N1 to become transmissible in mammals (2). Although the self-imposed moratorium was originally meant for 60 days, experimental work has presumably not resumed. In the summer of 2012, the U.S. Government proposed an indefinite continuation of the moratorium on gain-of-function studies with H5N1 viruses that could affect mammalian virulence and transmissibility until a consensus emerges on what type ?
http://mbio.asm.org/content/3/5/e00379-12
The H5N1 Moratorium Controversy and Debate
Arturo Casadevall and
Thomas Shenk
Address correspondence to Arturo Casadevall, casadeva@aecom.yu.edu.
The views expressed in this Editorial do not necessarily reflect the views of the journal or of ASM.
Editorial
The pause in gain-of-function experiments involving highly pathogenic avian influenza virus to dissect mechanisms of mammalian transmission and virulence is a historic moment for science. The scientific community and the greater society that it serves are currently engaged in a vigorous debate on whether and how to carry out experiments that could provide essential information for preparedness against a pandemic of avian influenza. To foster discussion and to provide a venue to record the arguments for or against this moratorium, mBio has commissioned a series of views from experts in the field. In addition to these views, we note a need for a clear scientific rationale for gain-of-function studies and suggest that many of the current concerns involving such experiments can be circumvented by efforts to generate safer systems that could provide comparable information with much-reduced risk.
In the winter of 2012, a group of influenza virus investigators announced in a joint letter a ?voluntary pause of 60 days on any research involving highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 viruses leading to the generation of viruses that are more transmissible in mammals? (1). The pause came at a time of great controversy in science, which was caused by the recommendation of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) to redact details from two manuscripts that provided molecular information on mutations which allowed H5N1 to become transmissible in mammals (2). Although the self-imposed moratorium was originally meant for 60 days, experimental work has presumably not resumed. In the summer of 2012, the U.S. Government proposed an indefinite continuation of the moratorium on gain-of-function studies with H5N1 viruses that could affect mammalian virulence and transmissibility until a consensus emerges on what type ?
http://mbio.asm.org/content/3/5/e00379-12