AFD - New Zealand

[sharon sanders]

Low Pathogenic H5N1 Detected In New Zealand



# 2306



Taking great pains to explain that `low path' H5N1 is different from highly pathogenic H5N1 (and it is), this article on Voxy.co.nz gently informs the reader that a surveillance program in New Zealand had detected two wild bird samples with the low path virus.


First the article (hat tip to Sally on Flutrackers), then some discussion of `low path' vs. `high path'.

Low Pathogenic Virus No Cause For Concern





17 September 2008 - A surveillance programme researching the presence of avian influenza in New Zealand has found low pathogenic (LPAI) H5N1 virus in two samples taken from mallard ducks. Tests indicate that the virus is closely related to viruses found in the past and has been here for some time.


LPAI H5N1 is different to 'bird flu', which is the high pathogenic (HPAI) form of the virus. The samples were taken from healthy birds and there have been no reported bird deaths or disease in the area since the samples were collected, says Team Manager, Animal Response, Dr Andre van Halderen.


"This confirms what we already know - that strains of non disease causing avian influenza viruses are present in our wild bird populations and when we increase surveillance we will find evidence of virus elsewhere. The finding of low pathogenic H5N1 is not unexpected."


Sampling of healthy wild birds took place at seven locations across New Zealand in February this year, as part of MAFBNZ's ongoing avian influenza surveillance programme. A total of 1241 samples were collected from mostly mallard ducks and some migratory bird species in Paparoa, the mouth of Kaituna River, Lake Aniwhenua, Reparoa, Napier, Temuka and Invercargill.


"The risk of HPAI 'bird flu' reaching New Zealand is unchanged and remains low. This finding does not affect New Zealand's avian influenza disease free status, and poultry consumers have no cause for concern, Dr van Halderen said."


Avian influenza viruses are naturally present in many species of wild birds, especially water fowl (ducks and geese) and shorebirds. Strains of avian influenza are categorised as highly pathogenic (HPAI) or low pathogenic (LPAI) on the basis of their ability to produce disease in poultry. HPAI causes severe disease that spreads quickly, causing sudden death in birds. LPAI viruses, depending on the strain, may cause mild or no clinical disease in birds. Most avian influenza viruses are harmless to humans.

​

Pathogenicity refers to the ability of a virus to cause illness. Low path viruses do not, as a general rule, cause detectable symptoms in its host.

It is not unusual when doing surveillance of healthy appearing birds to find a variety of low path avian flu viruses. Birds, after all, are the primary host of flu viruses.

Low Path Avian Influenza (LPAI), including LPAI H5N1, has been detected numerous times around the world in otherwise healthy appearing birds.
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Low path H5N1 is not, however, quite as benign as the article above makes it sound.


In wild birds, and in low concentration (which with just 2 positive samples, this appears to be) these viruses appear to be pretty stable.


Low path tends to remain low path. At least that's the assumption. Our knowledge base is somewhat limited.


But when introduced into domestic livestock, such as ducks, chickens, or turkeys, low pathogenic H5N1 has a potential of mutating into highly pathogenic form of the H5N1 virus.


Even remaining LPAI, the economic impact of an outbreak can be enormous.

• Last year a turkey farm in Virginia detected low path H5N1 in their flock, and tens of thousands of turkeys were culled. Details of this outbreak are available from CIDRAP News.

• In 2002, LPAI H7N2 affected 197 farms in the Shenandoah Valley, and 4.7 million birds were destroyed at a cost of $130 million dollars.

The OIE takes LPAI seriously, and it is now a reportable disease. This from AVIAN INFLUENZA Low Pathogenic H5N1 vs. Highly Pathogenic H5N1 (UPDATE July 23, 2007) (reparagraphed for readability).

LPAI H5N1 ("North American" H5N1)
LPAI, or "low path" AI, commonly occurs in wild birds. In most cases, it causes minor sickness or no noticeable signs of disease. It is rarely fatal in birds.

LPAI strains are not a human health concern. This includes LPAI H5N1.

Evidence of LPAI H5N1 has been found in wild birds in the United States in recent years and is not closely related to the more severe HPAI H5N1 circulating overseas.

<snip list of outbreaks>

In the past, there was no requirement for reporting or tracking LPAI H5 or H7 detections in wild birds so states and universities tested wild bird samples independently of USDA. Because of this, the above list of previous detections might not be all inclusive of past LPAI H5N1 detections.

However, the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) recently changed its requirement of reporting detections of avian influenza.


Effective in 2006, all confirmed LPAI H5 and H7 AI subtypes must be reported to the OIE because of their potential to mutate into highly pathogenic strains.


Therefore, USDA now tracks these detections in wild birds, backyard flocks, commercial flocks and live bird markets.
​

Bottom line?


LPAI, even LPAI H5N1, can be found in wild birds almost anywhere in the world. It is probably more prevalent that we know.



The news that New Zealand has detected two wild birds with this virus isn't startling, nor should it unduly worry the public.


On rare occasions LPAI viruses can be introduced into commercial flocks. And when that happens, there is at least the possibility of it mutating into a highly pathogenic form.


And that, of course, would constitute a serious turn of events.


Hence the monitoring, and reporting of the disease.

 

[sharon sanders]

Re: AFD - New Zealand

New Zealand: Worries Over Low Pathogenic Bird Flu Discovery



# 2312


On Wednesday we learned that New Zealand researchers had discovered through routine surveillance that two wild bird samples (out of more than 1200 taken) in their country tested positive for LPAI (Low Pathogenic Avian Influenza) H5N1.


The reporting on this discovery carried with it immediate assurances that there was absolutely no danger to the public.


Headlines stated Low Pathogenic Virus No Cause For Concern.


The public was told, repeatedly, that this discovery was expected, that it was similar to viruses detected in the past, and that it was of no real consequence.


All very reassuring.


While I pointed out that I agreed; the danger was slight and the public shouldn't be unduly alarmed - I also said the discovery wasn't quite as benign as it was being portrayed in the press.

• LPAI (low pathogenic avian influenza) viruses are not uncommon in wild birds. Most are believed to be relatively benign.

• The H5 and H7 LPAIs are of greater concern, and are reportable to the OIE because they have the potential to mutate into HPAI (highly pathogenic avian influenza).

• On rare occasions LPAI viruses can be introduced into commercial flocks from contact with infected wild birds. And when that happens, there is at least the possibility of it mutating into a highly pathogenic form.

Apparently at least one Australian researcher is making some of the same points.

This from 3news.co.nz.

Researcher: NZ bird flu could mutate, become more serious



Fri, 19 Sep 2008 8:17p.m.


An Australian researcher says it is theoretically possible that the low-grade bird flu virus detected in wild mallard ducks in New Zealand could mutate into a more serious form of the virus.

Professor Gregor Tannock told the Australian Broadcasting Corporation that the virus could pose a threat to New Zealand poultry "if it mutates from low pathogenic to high pathogenic".

Prof Tannock, who is studying bird flu at the MacFarlane Burnet Institute for Medical Research and Public Health in Melbourne, told the Australian Broadcasting Corporation the virus was probably present in many more estuaries than those where it was found.

Both the infected ducks were found near Invercargill, one at an estuary 2km west of the city and one at Roslyn Bush, following a surveillance programme in February that tested six other sites throughout the country. Invercargill was the only site with infected ducks when the findings were confirmed this week. Now Australian poultry owners are being warned to step up their own biosecurity checks in the wake of the discovery.

Australian poultry owners should ensure wild waterbirds cannot access poultry feed or water and should limit contact between wild waterbirds and poultry, Biosecurity Queensland's chief veterinary officer Ron Glanville told AAP.

"This is just a commonsense, precautionary measure," Dr Glanville said.

Biosecurity New Zealand team manager Andre van Halderen said the Southland ducks were the first time that low-pathogenicity avian influenza H5N1 strain had been recorded in New Zealand.

He stressed it should not be mistaken for the highly pathenogenic (HPAI) H5N1 virus that spread throughout parts of Asia, Europe and Africa, killing more than 200 people and forcing the destruction of millions of birds.

Dr van Halderen said the nature of the virus meant it was impossible it could cross-species jump into humans and mutation was "highly unlikely".

"There's a negligible risk of it firstly getting into birds and because it's `low-path': it causes very mild or no clinical disease in domestic poultry.

"It's only through mutation into highly pathogenic strains that you will get strains arising which cause problems.

"The low pathenogenic avian influenza viruses are adapted to waterfowl and shorebirds, which are their natural hosts."
NZPA
​

 

[sharon sanders]

Re: AFD - New Zealand

Of Square Pegs, Round Holes, And Pandemics



# 3470


Like it or not, the world is entering into a pandemic period, and we should expect it to last for a year or longer. In order to cope as a society, some of the `rules? we?ve grown accustomed to may have to change ? at least, temporarily.

Unfortunately, a great many people remain in denial, refusing to believe that this is really a pandemic, or that it will affect them personally.

They point to the low fatality rate and somehow fail to take into account the other serious effects of a pandemic, such as an overwhelmed health care system, employee absenteeism, and widespread economic impacts.

These people, quite naturally, will be the last to to prepare or to adapt.
​

While no one can say how bad this pandemic will become, we are already seeing serious economic and social repercussions in South America, Australia, and New Zealand.

Many businesses are closed with employees on forced holiday, economic losses are already substantial, and their flu season hasn?t even peaked.

New Zealand is reporting record numbers of people with influenza-like illness, and in parts of Australia absenteeism is running over 10% and is rising.

Even in the northern hemisphere, at a time when influenza is practically unheard of, we are seeing spreading illness and regrettably - a small but growing number of deaths ? particularly among younger adults and children.

For the week ending July 4th, 2009 the national P&I mortality rate was at the seasonally adjusted epidemic threshold. Pediatric deaths from influenza-related illness continue to be reported throughout June at a rate normally not seen in the summer months.

While the numbers are still relatively low, the fact that we are seeing this level of activity this time of year is worrisome, and the CDC fully expects this virus to ramp up in the fall with an even greater impact.

Many pundits are dismissive of this pandemic because it has, thus far, produced a fairly low fatality rate. While welcome news ? that isn?t the only measure of a pandemic.
​

Experts predict that a third to a half of the population could fall ill over the coming months, and that absenteeism could rise to over 30% in some workplaces.

That has real ramifications for our society, and our economy. We may see disruptions in the supply chain, shortages of essential goods, and increased levels of business closings and unemployment.

And it even raises serious public safety issues.

Imagine fire, EMS, police, or hospital staffs operating during a pandemic at 70% or less. At a time when demand for these services is likely to escalate, their ability to provide them will be reduced.

How we choose to meet the challenge of this pandemic may very well determine how much damage we sustain economically, and as a society.
​

If we cling rigidly to the `old rules? simply because we are used to them, instead of adapting to a changing environment, we will probably just make matters worse.

Yes, you can sometimes drive a square peg into a round hole, but the peg and the hole are usually the worse for the wear of it.

​

In New Zealand employers usually require a medical certificate when an employee is out sick for more than 3 days. While reasonable in normal times, during a pandemic, these sorts of `rules? no longer make sense.

The last thing overwhelmed GP?s want is for hordes of infected people to show up at their waiting room just to get a note for work.

Luckily, they are working on a solution (hat tip DazzaMc on Flutrackers).

GPs want to issue medical certificates over phone

General practitioners want to issue medical certificates on the basis of a telephone conversation, in an effort to halt the spread of swine flu.

The College of GPs has asked the Ministry of Health to endorse the practice and hopes to have an answer by the end of the week.

College president Jonathan Fox says the Medical Council has guidelines for the issuing of medical certificates, that normally involves the examination of a patient.

But he says these rules can be relaxed during a pandemic.
​

A small example, perhaps, but it shows that sometimes we have to discard the old ways of doing things in order to deal with a crisis.

Here in the United States ? where sick leave benefits for some jobs are marginal or simply don?t exist ? many workers who live paycheck-to-paycheck are going to be tempted to come into work when ill out of sheer financial necessity.

I know how difficult it would be for many companies ? some of whom are already operating at or near a loss in these economic times ? to offer sick leave. It becomes even more difficult, I?m sure, in the face of further economic losses that may come during a pandemic.

But the alternative is: you have sick and infectious employees coming to work, infecting more of your staff (and maybe even customers), which in short order could impair your company?s ability to function at all.
​

The smart employer will find ways to help support their employees who may be out sick during a pandemic. This could involve full (or perhaps limited) sick leave benefits, organizing volunteer `flu buddies? to check on those out sick, delivering food baskets, or other innovative support mechanisms.

A pandemic is an extraordinary event, and will require an extraordinary response. And sometimes that requires looking beyond the bottom line or the quarterly report.

Those who fail to adapt, are just simply likely to fail.
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In order to survive, businesses are going to have to find new ways to operate in this pandemic environment. And that means breaking away from old ways of thinking.

We no longer have the luxury of maintaining the comfortable status quo. We can?t afford to stay stuck on stupid.

The stakes are too high.

Companies with limited `depth? may find that with key employees out with the flu, their entire operation grinds to a halt. How many companies rely on one or two people in the payroll/AR/AP department?

If one or both are out sick, can the company operate? And if so, for how long?
​

Cross training so that more than one person (preferably at least 3) can do each job is imperative. While most people recover from this influenza in a week or two, some may need several weeks, or even months, to recuperate.

This is just one example. But it is a big one.

Every business, every organization, and every family needs a serious, sensible, and workable pandemic plan.

And they need to be drilling and testing it today. Looking for flaws and weaknesses, and finding solutions now.

We?ve no longer the luxury of pretending that a pandemic is a rare, far-off event, and that we can think about it `tomorrow?.

The pandemic is a reality, and in 90 days or less ? whether we are ready for it or not - we in the northern hemisphere are likely to be hip deep in it.
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We either accept that it?s coming, and find novel ways to adapt to this crisis, or we risk learning the lessons of Darwinism the hard way.

It?s our choice.