Mary Wilson
Well-known member
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
February 2024
... Executive Summary
Throughout history, viral diseases have been among humankind’s greatest scourges. Many millions of people died worldwide during the 1918 influenza pandemic. Prior to initiation of the World Health Organization’s smallpox eradication program and the development and widespread use of measles vaccines, it is estimated that each of these diseases caused more than two million deaths annually.
Basic scientific knowledge obtained from studying viruses has been an essential step in creating lifesaving countermeasures. Today, therapeutics and vaccines have reduced the disease burdens of COVID-19, hepatitis C, influenza, poliomyelitis, and a variety of other viral diseases. The development of these countermeasures, enabled in part by research in virology and immunology, has greatly benefited public health and will continue to do so in the future.
Most viral disease outbreaks stretching back over millennia have been caused by viruses transmitted to humans through direct or indirect contact with domesticated and wild animals. Yet modern virology research also creates new avenues for outbreaks to arise, as researchers can also become infected while collecting field specimens or performing research with viruses in the laboratory. Depending on the virus under study, an infection may spread to other workers, family members, and the wider community. These risks have existed since the early days of virology research. For example, the last cases of smallpox occurred in a small outbreak triggered by an accidental infection originating from a laboratory studying the virus in Birmingham, United Kingdom, in 1978. While biosafety has improved since the 1970s, advances in virology research also open new risks.
Recognizing the need for a focused conversation on the risks and benefits of a subset of research that could plausibly source a large outbreak, or even a pandemic, the Bulletin convened an independent and international panel of experts in biosafety, biosecurity, epidemiology, ethics, genetic engineering, virology, and other areas: the Task Force on Research with Pandemic Risks.
The scope of the research examined by the Task Force included (1) research on pathogens known to be capable of causing a pandemic that under current conditions (e.g., low population immunity) could result in extensive spread beyond the current infection burden; (2) manipulation of pathogens that are not currently thought capable of pandemic spread in ways that can be anticipated to increase their capacity to cause a pandemic (e.g., by increasing virulence or transmissibility); and (3) research on pathogens with unknown characteristics.
The Task Force’s report discusses the potential benefits of virology research and outlines how advances in science and technology may increase certain benefits. It then focuses on some of the potential risks of virology research, including biosafety and biosecurity, and outlines how advances in science and technology may increase some of these risks. The Task Force also examined ethical obligations to make research with pandemic risks more safe, secure, and responsible, suggesting actionable and sustainable strategies to effectively maximize the potential benefits and mitigate the foreseeable potential harms of research with known or potential pandemic pathogens, while attending to issues of equity and proportionality. The report argues for empirical studies on biosafety and biosecurity to make research with pandemic risks more safe, secure, and responsible. It also reviews the contemporary governance space for research with known or potential pandemic pathogens and argues that effective legislation, regulations, policies, and guidelines specifically regulating such research will strengthen the scientific enterprise and should be put in place and implemented without delay. It discusses challenges in building and sustaining trust in science in general and research with pandemic risks more specifically. Finally, the Task Force has issued several recommendations. ...
https://thebulletin.org/pathogens-project/report-2024/
February 2024
... Executive Summary
Throughout history, viral diseases have been among humankind’s greatest scourges. Many millions of people died worldwide during the 1918 influenza pandemic. Prior to initiation of the World Health Organization’s smallpox eradication program and the development and widespread use of measles vaccines, it is estimated that each of these diseases caused more than two million deaths annually.
Basic scientific knowledge obtained from studying viruses has been an essential step in creating lifesaving countermeasures. Today, therapeutics and vaccines have reduced the disease burdens of COVID-19, hepatitis C, influenza, poliomyelitis, and a variety of other viral diseases. The development of these countermeasures, enabled in part by research in virology and immunology, has greatly benefited public health and will continue to do so in the future.
Most viral disease outbreaks stretching back over millennia have been caused by viruses transmitted to humans through direct or indirect contact with domesticated and wild animals. Yet modern virology research also creates new avenues for outbreaks to arise, as researchers can also become infected while collecting field specimens or performing research with viruses in the laboratory. Depending on the virus under study, an infection may spread to other workers, family members, and the wider community. These risks have existed since the early days of virology research. For example, the last cases of smallpox occurred in a small outbreak triggered by an accidental infection originating from a laboratory studying the virus in Birmingham, United Kingdom, in 1978. While biosafety has improved since the 1970s, advances in virology research also open new risks.
Recognizing the need for a focused conversation on the risks and benefits of a subset of research that could plausibly source a large outbreak, or even a pandemic, the Bulletin convened an independent and international panel of experts in biosafety, biosecurity, epidemiology, ethics, genetic engineering, virology, and other areas: the Task Force on Research with Pandemic Risks.
The scope of the research examined by the Task Force included (1) research on pathogens known to be capable of causing a pandemic that under current conditions (e.g., low population immunity) could result in extensive spread beyond the current infection burden; (2) manipulation of pathogens that are not currently thought capable of pandemic spread in ways that can be anticipated to increase their capacity to cause a pandemic (e.g., by increasing virulence or transmissibility); and (3) research on pathogens with unknown characteristics.
The Task Force’s report discusses the potential benefits of virology research and outlines how advances in science and technology may increase certain benefits. It then focuses on some of the potential risks of virology research, including biosafety and biosecurity, and outlines how advances in science and technology may increase some of these risks. The Task Force also examined ethical obligations to make research with pandemic risks more safe, secure, and responsible, suggesting actionable and sustainable strategies to effectively maximize the potential benefits and mitigate the foreseeable potential harms of research with known or potential pandemic pathogens, while attending to issues of equity and proportionality. The report argues for empirical studies on biosafety and biosecurity to make research with pandemic risks more safe, secure, and responsible. It also reviews the contemporary governance space for research with known or potential pandemic pathogens and argues that effective legislation, regulations, policies, and guidelines specifically regulating such research will strengthen the scientific enterprise and should be put in place and implemented without delay. It discusses challenges in building and sustaining trust in science in general and research with pandemic risks more specifically. Finally, the Task Force has issued several recommendations. ...
https://thebulletin.org/pathogens-project/report-2024/