• FluTrackers.com Inc. does not provide medical advice. Information on this web site is collected from various internet resources, and the FluTrackers board of directors makes no warranty to the safety, efficacy, correctness or completeness of the information posted on this site by any author or poster. The information collated here is for instructional and/or discussion purposes only and is NOT intended to diagnose or treat any disease, illness, or other medical condition. Every individual reader or poster should seek advice from their personal physician/healthcare practitioner before considering or using any interventions that are discussed on this website. By continuing to access this website you agree to consult your personal physican before using any interventions posted on this website, and you agree to hold harmless FluTrackers.com Inc., the board of directors, the members, and all authors and posters for any effects from use of any medication, supplement, vitamin or other substance, device, intervention, etc. mentioned in posts on this website, or other internet venues referenced in posts on this website.
  • We are not asking for any donations. Do not donate to any entity who says they are raising funds for us.

_|Virologist [G. Laver] Endorses Plan to Help Business Stockpile Tamiflu, But Not as Prophylactic|_

Shiloh

Editor, Senior Moderator
Source: http://hstoday.us/content/view/3741/150/

Prophylactic Use of Tamiflu Bad Idea, Leading Virologist Says
by Anthony L. Kimery
Tuesday, 10 June 2008

?Early treatment is the only way to go?

The US government?s new proposal to use drugs like Tamiflu and Relenza as a prophylaxis to prevent infection by a pandemic strain of influenza is wrongheaded, says Dr. Graeme Laver, a former professor of biochemistry and molecular biology at the John Curtin School of Medical Research at the Australian National University in Canberra.

Laver, who played a key role in the development of both drugs, has been studying influenza viruses for nearly 40 years. He and Dr. Robert Webster (another world-renowned virologist at St. Jude Children?s Research Hospital) are credited with having first found the link between human flu and bird flu.
In the 1960's, both received world acclaim when they developed a new and innovative generation of vaccines for flu viruses.

Laver told HSToday.us that ?prophylaxis with Tamiflu in a pandemic is wrong. Early treatment is the only way to go.?

But the US government proposes to use Tamiflu and Relenza prophylactically to prevent infection, including giving guidelines to businesses that may want to buy the drugs in advance to treat or protect employees.

The Department of Health and Human Services?s (HSS) pandemic plan calls for ?targeted antiviral prophylaxis ? of disease clusters, administration of antiviral treatment to persons with confirmed or suspected cases of pandemic influenza, and provision of drug prophylaxis to all persons in [an] affected community.?

Similarly, should clusters of humans be found infected with a virulent strain of influenza like H5N1, the World Health Organization's plan of attack is to flood the regions with Tamiflu in the hope that it will quell further spread of the virus.


Dr. Ben Schwartz, a pandemic planner at HHS who wrote most of the new guidelines, told Reuters that "for prophylaxis of health care and emergency services workers, the responsibility for purchasing and stockpiling the drugs would primarily be on the health care organizations ... or on the emergency organizations that would be protecting their workforce.?

Meanwhile, HSToday.us has learned that there also are discussions within HHS about making Tamiflu and Relenza ?push packets? available to people to have on hand in the event of a pandemic.

Laver also has problems with that notion.

?Personal stockpiles of Tamiflu or Relenza are not a good idea,? Laver told HSToday.us, explaining, ?personal stockpiles are wrong for two reasons. First, nothing might happen and the stockpiles will be wasted and, second, if the stockpiles are used, it will be on the basis of self-diagnosis, and that is not a great idea.?

?Widespread prophylaxis to control a pandemic before any vaccine is available, is totally wrong,? Laver continued. ?It would be a wicked waste of a valuable resource! Australia had a policy (long since abandoned) to provide essential workers with Tamiflu prophylaxis for six weeks at the start of the pandemic.?

But ?what happens then?? Laver mussed. ?Apart from the difficulty in identifying the essential workers, and keeping the Tamiflu stockpile safe from desperate people who would do anything to get the drug, at the end of six weeks all those people who had been taking Tamiflu for prophylaxis would be left without protection. And the stockpile would have vanished.?


Laver explained to HSToday.us that it is ?much better to use Tamiflu only for early treatment. If people with flu symptoms take Tamiflu immediately, say within six or so hours after symptom onset, the infection should be rapidly terminated, the person should recover, and then, and this is important, should then be immune to reinfection for the rest of the pandemic. Much better than any vaccine. This has been called ?Aborted-infection Immunization,? and to use Tamiflu in this way would allow many health care workers and so on to go about their business without fear of reinfection.?

?People will, of course, say, ?but Aborted-infection Immunization has never been shown to work,? ? Laver said. ?Of course not, but then neither has long-term prophylaxis or the use of pre-pandemic vaccines. But my bet is that it will!?


To work, Tamiflu must be taken in proper doses within 6 to 12 hours after onset of symptoms.

"Forty-eight hours is about the limit the drug is effective," Laver said.

Laver does believe that ?prophylaxis with Tamiflu should be used in some circumstances. For example, Tamiflu should be taken by poultry workers culling H5 or H7 infected chickens,? he said.


Prior to HHS's release of its new proposals Laver expressed his concerns in a letter to Dr. Bruce Gellin, director of the department?s National Vaccine Program Office and chairman of HHS Secretary Michael Leavitt's Task Force on Influenza Preparedness.

?I believe this is completely wrong,? Laver wrote Gellin, explaining that ?as soon as prophylaxis is stopped, the person taking Tamiflu is just as susceptible to infection as before. Early treatment would be so much better.?Laver told Gellin ?Tamiflu should be available over-the-counter [OTC] in pharmacies now, where flu victims can get it without the time-wasting need to first get a prescription from a doctor. There is no need for a prescription and the time taken to get one can render Tamiflu pretty well useless.

?To have people familiar with the correct use of Tamiflu (and Relenza) for seasonal influenza infections would mean the community would be ?trained? in the correct use of these drugs in the event of a pandemic. I imagine that, in this case, there would be much less panic than would occur otherwise.?


Laver told HSToday.us that it would be ?much better to hold stocks of the drugs in every pharmacy in the country where it can be got quickly after diagnosis by a trained pharmacist or other health care worker.?

Laver also said ?using a rapid flu test to assist this would be a good idea, so that people who think they have the flu can be properly diagnosed quickly and take the drugs very soon after symptom onset. This rapid procedure of ?test and treat? would mean that the infection should be immediately terminated and the flu victim experience a quick recovery. Seems quite simple, really!?


In late 2006, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention awarded $11.4 million in contracts to four companies working to develop new diagnostic tests that doctors and field pidemiologists could eventually use to quickly and accurately test patients for avian influenza H5N1 and other emerging influenza viruses, as well as more common influenza viruses.

Brit Oiulfstad, pandemic influenza coordinator for the County of Los Angeles, had earlier expressed concern to HSToday.us about the prophylactic use of Tamiflu.

Oiulfstad said she and other authorities ?are concerned about ? the current push for community-wide antiviral prophylaxis when the effectiveness for such long-term use (several times the duration of the recommended treatment period) has not been evaluated.?

Continuing, Oiulfstad told HSToday.us that ?planning for antivirals is very complex as we are not certain that the current antivirals will be effective in whatever viral strain will be circulating. However, planning for any pharmaceutical dispersal is good for other future events. In Los Angeles County, planning for antiviral use and distribution is going well as our overall goal is to use antivirals in medical settings to reduce serious illness and death among cases, not general prophylaxis.?


Oiulfstad added: ?We do not know the effects of long-term antiviral use in a prophylactic setting. Therefore, we always consider that we must do no harm, and until we have some more answers, we proceed on those recommendations for prophylaxis with great caution. Until the science is in that shows that these drugs prevent illness, this seems to be the only reasonable way to approach the problem.?

The Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA) said in an October 2005 statement that "personal stockpiling would likely lead to inappropriate use and wastage,? adding, ?institutions should not stockpile drug for prophylaxis of health care workers, as this strategy requires much greater drug supplies than early treatment, and could deplete the reserve necessary for treatment on a national level.?

[IDSA and the Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America (SHEA) said local health care institutions ought to have sufficient stockpiles to treat sick people and maintain the health care system in the event of a pandemic./B]

The group advised health care facilities to have enough supply of the drugs to reduce hospitalizations and mortality and maintain social order and function in the event of a severe pandemic.

"Hospitals will need to be able to treat those who are sick and keep their own doors open," said Dr. Kathleen Neuzil, chair of IDSA?s Pandemic Influenza Task Force.

IDSA and SHEA do not recommend institutions stockpile enough drugs to prevent illness among health care workers because this strategy requires much greater drug supplies than early treatment and could deplete the reserve necessary for treatment on a national level.

"This recommendation could change if drug supplies increase in the future," Dr. Neuzil said. "When one considers the cost and loss of workers caused by illness among nurses and doctors, it may make sense for hospitals to have adequate supplies to use the drug to prevent illness among health care workers who are seeing patients with flu.?


HHS? goal is to have 81 million doses (10 capsules per dose) of Tamiflu, Relenza and Rimantidine available for the US population. Of this 81 million, 50 million are to be stored in the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Of this, approximately 44 million courses are to be held for emergency pandemic usage by states and 6 million reserved for domestic containment efforts at the onset of localized outbreaks.

Of the 50 million doses the government plans to put into the SNS, though, HHS says only 37.4 million have been procured and 29.8 million treatment courses put into the SNS, and the remaining 7.6 million treatment courses are due by the end of calendar year 2007. The balance, HHS says, is expected this year.

The Department of Defense has stockpiled many millions less, and less than half the states have stockpiled only 13 million of the 31 million doses HHS is supposed to help states buy, largely because the remaining states have had difficulty coming up with their share of the money for purchases. HHS is authorized to subsidize 25 percent of the procurement costs states incur, apportioned based on population.


Oklahoma is among the states that haven?t yet stockpiled Tamiflu because of the cost. Even with manufacturer F. Hoffmann-La Roche giving states an 80-percent discount on the medication, states still must fork up $14.43 per dose. Oklahoma would have to spend $10 million to stockpile enough of the drug to treat a massive outbreak.

States without stockpiles shouldn?t count on having supplies earmarked for them in the SNS. According to the HHS pandemic plan, ?should the military stockpile be exhausted and additional antiviral medication required to ensure national defense or continued support to civil authorities, use of antiviral drugs from the national stockpile may also be required.?

There?s another problem with Tamiflu. It has a shelf life of approximately five years, which means stockpiles must be replenished. Existing mass stockpiles will have to be replaced in order to ensure there are adequate stores beyond 2010, but according to F. Hoffmann-La Roche, new orders for future batches have dwindled, and there?s a lag time in making the drug. The company has, though, entered into agreements with other countries to allow them to manufacture Tamiflu themselves.

The Food and Drug Administration manages a Shelf Life Extension Program, but only products in the federal SNS are eligible to receive an extended expiration date if a drug meets specific conditions. When states? stockpiles expire, they will have to buy new supplies - without additional federal assistance.

This problem, combined with those states that have yet to procure their own stockpiles, means there could be a widespread national shortage of antivirals. Thus, as Laver pointed out, using Tamiflu to treat, rather than trying to prevent, infections, is necessary to prevent the valuable stockpiles of these drugs from being wasted.
 
Re: Prophylactic Use of Tamiflu Bad Idea, Leading Virologist Says

Re: Prophylactic Use of Tamiflu Bad Idea, Leading Virologist Says

It seems another Laver words' explosion...

It is not advisable that a large amount of antivirals will go into home stockpiles without an informative campaign against the indiscriminate use, leading to adverse reactions or emersion of resistant viruses.

However, a targeted stockpile - well identified cases - where a prophylaxis would be useful, eg in essential services' workers sectors, may be wise in order to warrant the services' continuity.

Clearly, it is a tentative operation, without definitive outcome; a resistant variant of influenza could deplete rapidly stockpiles. But I think some heath care workers could avoid workplace without any form of chemoprophylaxis.
 
Re: Prophylactic Use of Tamiflu Bad Idea, Leading Virologist Says

Re: Prophylactic Use of Tamiflu Bad Idea, Leading Virologist Says

Laver doesn't make sense to me.
just saying "bad idea" is not helpful. There are many modeling papers which suggest
the benefits of prophylaxis, are the papers wrong ? Where ? He must have read them,
so he should be able to point out their flaws. How else did he get his opinion but by
reading the papers on the subject ?

> personal stockpiles are wrong for two reasons.

he gives more than two

> First, nothing might happen and the stockpiles
> will be wasted and, second, if the stockpiles are used, it will be on the basis of self-diagnosis,
> and that is not a great idea.?

we have discussed this extensively in 2005/2006.
Yes, the stockpiles may be wasted, so you need to renew it after some years.
That just makes it more expensive, but we expect the threat to go down in some
years, if nothing happens. We won't keep the stockpiles for decades.
Of course, the solution would be to allow personal stockpiles to be
rotated and to give Tamiflu close to expiration to people sick with seasonal flu.
But the laws forbid it.

Self diagnosis will only be used in a pandemic, when doctors won't be available anyway.
And you could get advice by telefone or internet, which would be preferrable
anyway when there is an infectious epidemic. Doctor visits increase the danger of
infection. And Tamiflu must be used early and people with flu often get very
sick within 15 minutes, so there may not be time for a doctor-visit.

> If people with flu symptoms take Tamiflu immediately, say within six or so hours after
> symptom onset, the infection should be rapidly terminated, the person should recover,

this is uncertain IMO. Are there studies to support this ? Tamiflu can lessen the
infection but not always and usually not terminate it rapidly, AFAIK

> and should then be immune to reinfection for the rest of the pandemic.

shouldn't an asymptomatic infection controlled by prophylactic Tamiflu also achieve this ?
The immunity only starts after 3 weeks, and the wave lasts ~10 weeks.

> Much better than any vaccine. This has been called ?Aborted-infection Immunization,?

then, we could better start a counterpandemic with a similar virus, but less virulent.

>Forty-eight hours is about the limit the drug is effective,

we had just seen a study here suggesting it would still be somehow effective after that.
H5N1-human infection seems to be slower here than seasonal flu.

> Tamiflu should be available over-the-counter [OTC] in pharmacies now, where flu victims can
> get it without the time-wasting need to first get a prescription from a doctor.
> There is no need for a prescription and the time taken to get one can render
> Tamiflu pretty well useless.

hmm, surprise, agreed, my argument above. Didn't he warn for "self diagnosis" above ?



can't they test prophylactic Tamiflu in some small environment for seasonal flu now ?

> There?s another problem with Tamiflu. It has a shelf life of approximately five years,
> which means stockpiles must be replenished

the big boxes used by institutions containing some "pre-product" (I don't know exactly)
have a longer duration AFAIK. 10 years ?
The usual capsules should be effective with good probability some years after expiring,
I read.
 
Re: Prophylactic Use of Tamiflu Bad Idea, Leading Virologist Says

Re: Prophylactic Use of Tamiflu Bad Idea, Leading Virologist Says

"personal stockpiling would likely lead to inappropriate use and wastage,” adding, “institutions should not stockpile drug for prophylaxis of health care workers, as this strategy requires much greater drug supplies than early treatment, and could deplete the reserve necessary for treatment on a national level.”

Estabs,
don't buy enaugh antivirals (for all),
don't produced enaugh pre-pand. vaccines (for all)
don't produced enaugh pand. vaccines,
don't wan't that antivirals be buyed individualy,
don't build up much more the health systems,
don't want to buy enaugh strategic food/meds for all citizens,
don't adapted bio-shielded working places,
but they wants that the workforce works during the pandemic.

Without PPE, and SIP, the above would result in an "work and die".
 
Re: Prophylactic Use of Tamiflu Bad Idea, Leading Virologist Says

Re: Prophylactic Use of Tamiflu Bad Idea, Leading Virologist Says

Graeme Laver is no idiot. He understands that genetic variant expression within an active pathogen population is dynamic. Certain low prevalence phenotypes are carried along, perhaps because they answer to more than one selective pressure, and arise in later generations when conditions support their widespread expression.

Case in point: several mutations were reported in the literature long ago that confer antiviral resistance; these were identified within environmental isolates (isolates pre-90s) BEFORE antivirals were in broad use, suggesting that their antiviral evasion evolved sans drug selection.

These nonsynonymous substitutions, as Henry has patiently pointed out, are not random events; they are predictable and traceable.

Heavy prophylactic antiviral (aka Tamiflu treatment of poultry) use in SE Asia was a bad idea. Equally well-intentioned, but inappropriate and heavy-handed blankets of vaccines is also a dangerous game.

In warfare, you do not trot out your most effective weapons in your arsenal before your first big battle, unless you want the enemy to come prepared with weapon-specific defense strategy.
 
Re: Prophylactic Use of Tamiflu Bad Idea, Leading Virologist Says

Re: Prophylactic Use of Tamiflu Bad Idea, Leading Virologist Says

Graeme Laver is no idiot. He understands that genetic variant expression within an active pathogen population is dynamic. Certain low prevalence phenotypes are carried along, perhaps because they answer to more than one selective pressure, and arise in later generations when conditions support their widespread expression.

Case in point: several mutations were reported in the literature long ago that confer antiviral resistance; these were identified within environmental isolates (isolates pre-90s) BEFORE antivirals were in broad use, suggesting that their antiviral evasion evolved sans drug selection.

These nonsynonymous substitutions, as Henry has patiently pointed out, are not random events; they are predictable and traceable.

Heavy prophylactic antiviral (aka Tamiflu treatment of poultry) use in SE Asia was a bad idea. Equally well-intentioned, but inappropriate and heavy-handed blankets of vaccines is also a dangerous game.

In warfare, you do not trot out your most effective weapons in your arsenal before your first big battle, unless you want the enemy to come prepared with weapon-specific defense strategy.
Yes Oracle,
Graeme Laver is no idiot indeed, even he is far from that.

But at the same time, I think I'm not err to said that many of the others out there aren't also.

It's wide known that antivirals could possibly in short time induce antiviral resistance, vanishing the prophylactic intentions, and worsening the situation.

But if it seems possible to control, and bring to infected workplaces people in a way of poultry in their concentration slums prior butchering, that would be an big mass-bihaviour error.
Without any valuable prophylactic, or vaccine, only the military forces (not the civilians) can try to contain the would coming subsequent pandemic chaos (a year ago there was some posts about, at an FT thread).

The personal, or company, buyed antivirals are not intended to be used before the "very big battle" (aka when the novel deadly pathogen already start to spread in the interested region).
The WHO 05. guidelines settled up the schedule of an needed possibility of preventive assumption of prophylactic Tamiflu.
 
Re: Prophylactic Use of Tamiflu Bad Idea, Leading Virologist Says

Re: Prophylactic Use of Tamiflu Bad Idea, Leading Virologist Says

There are pros and cons about the wide use of the anti-virals prophylactically.

Nevertheless, to date - they have bought us time to prepare and develop coping strategies.
 
Re: Prophylactic Use of Tamiflu Bad Idea, Leading Virologist Says

Re: Prophylactic Use of Tamiflu Bad Idea, Leading Virologist Says

From ProMED:
[The following comment has been received from Professor Tang in response to
the ProMED-mail post entitled "Avian influenza, human (52): treatment or
prophylaxis 20080611.1846". ProMED-mail welcomes this contribution, but as
debate is likely to divert attention from our principal function of
outbreak reporting, further discussion of this topic will be discouraged. -
Mod.CP]

Although the aborted-infection immunization approach may work, and is
preferable to mass prophylaxis, the main problem may be the implementation
of influenza rapid testing at pharmacists or other general practitioner
clinics, both of whom are untrained to perform such rapid tests. In addition,
they are usually already very busy and will be only more so during any pandemic
influenza event, so substantial resources will have to
be put into place to enable them to perform such rapid diagnostic testing
prior to the distribution of anti-influenza drugs, like oseltamivir.

In addition, most rapid tests for influenza require a minimum level of
training to perform well and may have quite a high rate of false negatives,
especially when the actual pandemic influenza strain will not have been
tested on existing kits (see CDC website for an up-to-date summary:
<http://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/diagnosis/>).

There needs to be some sort of mechanism for these samples to be forwarded
on to the local diagnostic or reference virology laboratory for viral
culture and further strain characterization, since none of these rapid
tests can distinguish influenza subtypes (i.e. H3N2, H5N1 and H1N1), but
just between influenza types A and B.

Secondly, if such a policy becomes widely accepted and publicized, a large
number of people with influenza-like illness will be swamping such premises
that probably do not have sufficient waiting area capacity to accommodate
all these patients whilst they are (presumably) registering their personal
details, awaiting their turn to have their nasal swab, etc. taken, then
waiting for the rapid test to be performed, then waiting for their results
(up to 30 minutes), then waiting for their oseltamivir.

Thirdly, there are also serious infection control issues to consider. While
all of these people are waiting with their influenza-like illness, they
will be coughing, sneezing, talking, mouth-breathing amongst themselves,
and may well be cross-infecting each other as well as any other patients or
staff members nearby; some of them may have TB (or perhaps even MDR-TB)
rather than a respiratory viral infection. Ideally, they should be made to
wear masks while they are in the waiting areas, but compliance with this
may be difficult to monitor and enforce. Importantly, there needs to be
some mechanism for referring the seriously ill directly to the local
Accident and Emergency room.

Fourthly, will these individuals have to pay for these tests and any
oseltamivir prescription? If so, what are the pharmacists and general
practitioners going to say to those people with an influenza negative test?
"Sorry, you may have another respiratory viral infection, but it is not
influenza, so please pay for your negative test result, then maybe you can
take some paracetamol and go home?"

Clinical microbiologists/virologists are usually wary of introducing such
rapid/bedside/near-patient/point-of-care diagnostic tests in healthcare
settings (usually to be performed by infectious disease or pediatric teams)
because of the need to then confirm such results (either positive or
negative) by the standard laboratory tests (again, see:
<http://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/diagnosis/>), since these results
will have a significant impact on subsequent clinical management (Madeley
2007). So the use of such rapid tests in community settings where the staff
are generally untrained with relatively non-specialized facilities needs to
be approached with caution.

The expenditure to put such community rapid testing facilities in place may
well outweigh the cost of the mass stockpiling and distribution of
antiviral drugs in preparation for any influenza pandemic. Of course, this
consideration should be secondary to the potentially worse alternative
scenario arising from the use of widespread prophylaxis that may result in
the widespread development of antiviral resistance, making such antivirals
useless.
http://www.promedmail.org/pls/otn/f..._BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1010,72840
 
Re: Prophylactic Use of Tamiflu Bad Idea, Leading Virologist Says

Re: Prophylactic Use of Tamiflu Bad Idea, Leading Virologist Says

prophylaxis leads to resistance more than treatment ?
Privates can stockpile flu-tests too.
 
Re: Prophylactic Use of Tamiflu Bad Idea, Leading Virologist Says

Re: Prophylactic Use of Tamiflu Bad Idea, Leading Virologist Says

I have no idea how a rapid test is performed; but this may give many people problems:
In addition, most rapid tests for influenza require a minimum level of
training to perform well
and may have quite a high rate of false negatives,
especially when the actual pandemic influenza strain will not have been
tested on existing kits (see CDC website for an up-to-date summary:

Considering how little our govt has informed the general public, it would be interesting to see how they would tell people they now need to add influenza test kits to their non-existing stockpiles of food, water, medicine and ppe.
 
Re: Prophylactic Use of Tamiflu Bad Idea, Leading Virologist Says

Re: Prophylactic Use of Tamiflu Bad Idea, Leading Virologist Says

I'm not sure it is even going to matter, if Osterholm was correct when he said this:
For example, he said it now takes up to 3 years or even longer for the delivery and installation of equipment to bottle and fill vaccines
http://www.flutrackers.com/forum/showthread.php?t=71119&highlight=years

Do we have any idea of the capacity of our current equipment?
 
Re: Prophylactic Use of Tamiflu Bad Idea, Leading Virologist Says

Re: Prophylactic Use of Tamiflu Bad Idea, Leading Virologist Says

I don't trust Osterholm. there were probably some "ifs" to follow

they did it in 1976. They deliver the seasonal vax
 
Re: Prophylactic Use of Tamiflu Bad Idea, Leading Virologist Says

Re: Prophylactic Use of Tamiflu Bad Idea, Leading Virologist Says

He might have been talking about world-wide supplies, also. Underdeveloped countries likely have limited capacity.

I don't even know how much seasonal vax we produce each year...
 
Re: Prophylactic Use of Tamiflu Bad Idea, Leading Virologist Says

Re: Prophylactic Use of Tamiflu Bad Idea, Leading Virologist Says

I have no idea how a rapid test is performed; but this may give many people problems:


Considering how little our govt has informed the general public, it would be interesting to see how they would tell people they now need to add influenza test kits to their non-existing stockpiles of food, water, medicine and ppe.
Precisely well said mixin,
this are the reality:
"to their non-existing stockpiles" for the masses.

"how they would tell people"
That would be easy resolved:
they would tell nothing.:D

We saw that even some high spec. tends to not suggests to their govs such need. Al this 21 century gadgets, and we don't have even a chance to shield us ...
 
_|Virologist [G. Laver] Endorses Plan to Help Business Stockpile Tamiflu, But Not as Prophylactic|_

Virologist Endorses Plan to Help Business Stockpile Tamiflu, But Not as Prophylactic
by Anthony L. Kimery
Monday, 30 June 2008

But companies need to have 'a designated person on the staff skilled in flu diagnosis'

F. Hoffmann-La Roche, the manufacturer of the antiviral Tamiflu, announced it has launched a program under which US companies can stockpile supplies of the drug in preparation for distribution to employees in the event of a pandemic.

The move comes on the heels of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) having told HSToday.us is wrongheaded.

Laver played a key role in the development of both drugs as well as in having found the link between human flu and bird flu.

Laver told HSToday.us that Roche?s program is a good idea, but ?only [if companies who stockpile Tamiflu] hand out [the antiviral] to people who test positive for influenza.?

?Stockpiles by large companies seem to be a very good thing to do.,? Laver said, adding, ?these should be used both in seasonal flu and in a pandemic when one comes along. Such a procedure should be put in place now to deal with next year's flu in the US.?

But Laver said companies should not make the drug available prophylactically. ?It should only be dispensed if employees test positive for influenza ? that is why large companies should have a person or persons specially trained in flu diagnostics.?

Laver earlier told HSToday.us that HHS?s proposed plan to use Tamilfu prophylactically is wrongheaded.

?Prophylaxis with Tamiflu in a pandemic is wrong. Early treatment is the only way to go,? Laver said, as have numerous other authorities, as HSToday.us previously reported.

Laver explained that it is ?much better to use Tamiflu only for early treatment. If people with flu symptoms take Tamiflu immediately, say within six or so hours after symptom onset, the infection should be rapidly terminated, the person should recover, and then, and this is important, should then be immune to reinfection for the rest of the pandemic.?

But ?as soon as prophylaxis is stopped,? Laver said, ?the person taking Tamiflu is just as susceptible to infection as before. Early treatment would be so much better.?

Laver advocates the dispensing of Tamiflu through company programs like Roche is supporting, as well as making Tamiflu ?available over-the-counter [OTC] in pharmacies ? where flu victims can get it without the time-wasting need to first get a prescription from a doctor. There is no need for a prescription and the time taken to get one can render Tamiflu pretty well useless.?

Of course, Laver stated, the pharmaceutical ?community would [need to] be ?trained? in the correct use of these drugs in the event of a pandemic.

It would be ?much better to hold stocks of the drugs in every pharmacy in the country where it can be got quickly after diagnosis by a trained pharmacist or other health care worker.?

Laver said using a rapid flu test to assist such a diagnosis ?so that people who think they have the flu can be properly diagnosed quickly and take the drugs very soon after symptom onset. This rapid procedure of ?test and treat? would mean that the infection should be immediately terminated and the flu victim experience a quick recovery.?

?If companies and other institutions too, like schools, universities, and so on had their own stockpiles of Tamiflu and had a designated person on the staff skilled in flu diagnosis, maybe using a fast flu test, members of staff or students or whatever could be rapidly diagnosed and given or denied Tamiflu depending on the diagnosis. Just imagine how much illness this would prevent??

Laver said ?this procedure should be adopted now, so that the community would become familiar with this ?test and treat? way of dealing with influenza and if a pandemic should suddenly erupt, everyone would [or should] know what to do.?

Addressing the issue of false negatives from a business?s diagnosing its employees, Laver said, ?imagine, if ten people with flu turn up to be tested, seven test positive and get Tamiflu and three test negative, even though they have flu, and are denied Tamiflu. The result is that seven people benefit greatly and the unfortunate three with false negatives will be no worse off than they were previously when there were no fast tests, no Tamiflu and nothing they could do except take chicken soup and go to bed. Meanwhile, seven people would benefit from the treatment. Doesn't that make sense? And these fast flu tests are getting better all the time, so it really does seem to be the way to go.?

While some authorities have raised concerns about the efficacy of Tamiflu, Laver told HSToday.us that ?there is lots of published evidence that Tamiflu and Relenza are effective in both flu treatment and flu prophylaxis if used correctly. Some of the people who deny this make bizarre statements such as ?Tamiflu has no effect on flu-like illness!? Of course not, it is only good for true influenza.?

?Also,? Laver said, ?it is often stated that the duration of illness is only reduced by one to two days. This is nonsense, if the drug is taken very soon after infection, then the reduction in illness may be five or six days or better.

To work, Tamiflu must be taken in proper doses within six to 12 hours after onset of symptoms.

"Forty-eight hours is about the limit the drug is effective," Laver said.
Laver said ?there are also statements that Tamiflu reduces flu symptoms,? but ?cold and flu tablets do that; Tamiflu targets and disables (kills) the virus directly.

Tamiflu works by blocking the action of the neuraminidase (NA) enzyme on the surface of the virus. When neuraminidase is inhibited, the spread of the virus to other cells in the body is inhibited.

?I believe that in most of the human H5N1 bird flu cases that died despite having been given Tamiflu, the drug was given far too late after infection to be effective,? Laver continued. ?It needs to be taken early to stop the virus replicating. It seems that people who die from flu do not die from the virus directly, but as a result of the damage the virus does to the body. This damage results in a ?cytokine storm? released by the body's immune system, and so the earlier the virus is killed the better.?

H5N1 upsets the chemical messengers that regulate immune function in a healthy, vigorous immune system. These chemical messengers activate an inordinate number of immune cells - a ?cytokine storm? - which causes pervasive inflammation and eventual death if not promptly treated with antiviral drugs.

According to a team led by Menno de Jong of the Oxford University Clinical Research Unit in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, ?the focus of clinical management should be on preventing this intense cytokine response by early diagnosis and effective antiviral treatment.?

-
http://hstoday.us/content/view/4053/149/
------
 
Re: _|Virologist [G. Laver] Endorses Plan to Help Business Stockpile Tamiflu, But Not as Prophylactic|_

For me this is the key part of this article.
“Also,” Laver said, “it is often stated that the duration of illness is only reduced by one to two days. This is nonsense, if the drug is taken very soon after infection, then the reduction in illness may be five or six days or better.

To work, Tamiflu must be taken in proper doses within six to 12 hours after onset of symptoms.

"Forty-eight hours is about the limit the drug is effective," Laver said.

Neuraminidase inhibitors (Tamiflu, Relenza, Peramivir) do not prevent the flu virus entering the cell but do aim to block the release of newly created virons, so infecting more of the hosts cells and potentially new hosts. The key to effective use is to keep viron numbers down and buy the hosts immune system time to mount its own defenses. The earlier you can detect infection and get the drug into the system the more effective it will be. This model makes it an effective prophylactic and progressively less effective as an aid to the immune response the longer the you wait to get it into your system. The 48hrs on the packet is a measure of when it becomes ineffective due to being swamped by the rate of viral replication but as the drug does not block infection but slows its spread every hour counts.
Most countries with the wealth to stockpile these drugs have not – IMO – taken this MO sufficiently into account. Too much time will be wasted between symptom onset and taking the first tablet in all the plans I have seen. Many of these plans compound the problem by asking the sick, or their relatives, to collect from a pharmacy or similar. If an individual enters a house hold and infects one member there is a good chance they also infected others which means the designated collector, for the first to show symptoms, is likely to be in influenzas pre-symptomatic infectious phase endangering everyone they encounter while out Tamiflu shopping.
At present – in a pre-pandemic phase – we have a problem that real human H5N1 cases are so rare that the symptoms are likely to be misdiagnosed as another more common illness with similar symptoms. If a pandemic starts – particularly if clinically more severe than season flu – it is unlikely anyone is going to have a big problem with self diagnosis, every TV and radio station is going to have wall-to-wall pandemic coverage.
Having identified the problem what I suggest as a solution is that we now get Roche to produce a Tamiflu ‘sample pack’ with only two or three Tamiflu tablets in it. These should be mailed to every address in the country with storage instruction and a ‘not to be opened until instructed message’. Once the pandemic is announced the media would explain the symptoms of the early cases and instruct house holders to call the number on the pack if they think they may have an ill household member. If the call center agreed the symptoms were likely to be pan-flu then one tablet would be taken immediately and additional full courses would be posted out with detailed home care instructions.
Tamiflu in the system from hour one, no contacts, small household stocks so little danger of attempts at self prophylaxis, opportunity to adjust plans once the pandemic is underway and virulence and symptoms are better understood.

Under current plans the effectiveness of the Tamiflu stock pile will be diminished and the later start of the course will greatly accelerate the spread of polymorphisms that confer resistance as there will be so many more virons in the host's system before the drug begins to act.

Agreed
<!-- / message --><!-- sig -->
 
Re: _|Virologist [G. Laver] Endorses Plan to Help Business Stockpile Tamiflu, But Not as Prophylactic|_

the 1-2 days is what you get from the papers !

I'm not sure that prophylactic Tamiflu won't induce immunity against
the early defeated virus. Non-symptomatic illness also induces
immunity.

When time is so important (H5N1 is slower than normal flu), then
post-exposure prophylaxis should be the method of choice.
The virus needs 6-10 hours for one replication cycle,
so I assume 5 hours after supposed exposure would be the
optimal time to start NI-treatment.
Then maybe there are "waves" every 8 hours, for the replication cycles,
I'm not sure.
 
Re: _|Virologist [G. Laver] Endorses Plan to Help Business Stockpile Tamiflu, But Not as Prophylactic|_

I'm not sure that prophylactic Tamiflu won't induce immunity against
the early defeated virus. Non-symptomatic illness also induces
immunity.
In the case of prophylactic use I suppose if it is not wholly effective at stopping virons leaving the cell then the immune system may start producing antigen specific B cell and anti-bodies. Even if these are in small quantaties they should help prime the immune response should the host be re-exposed.
When time is so important (H5N1 is slower than normal flu), then
post-exposure prophylaxis should be the method of choice.
I am not sure what you mean by "H5N1 is slower than normal flu" but at present this is an AI virus so not optimised for infection of mammalian cell. I would expect it to improve this ability very quickly once reproducing successfully in mammals. Re post-exposure use I wonder if you felt you could not avoid exposure if a small deliberate viral load followed by timed Tamiflu hit might be a good way of priming the system. Any volunteers?
 
Last edited:
Back
Top